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 THE WRITING ON THE SCREEN: IMAGES OF TEXT IN THE GERMAN CINEMA 
FROM 1920 TO 1949 
Daniel H. Wild, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
By establishing a crucial figural relation between image and text in the cinema, this dissertation 
offers a detailed analysis of the uses of writing through select canonical works of a significant 
period in the history of the German cinema. Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s theory of allegory 
and Gilles Deleuze’s conceptions of the cinematic image, as well as a Derridean definition of 
writing, I argue that instances of written text in images of the German cinema are social 
hieroglyphs rendered as allegorical gestures, which inscribe questions of authority in the form of 
grammatological constellations within the movement of images. These hieroglyphic 
configurations, spelled out as writing on the screen, stand in reference to specific modalities 
which affirm the presence of a larger organizational regime of truth. Instances of writing thus 
constitute the inscriptions through which such structures of power acquire legibility and, 
conversely, become visible. Ultimately, this figural regime delineates questions of the political 
constitution of the state because the struggle for authority and its legitimacy as an organizational 
system become embodied in allegorical forms of writing that inscribe the body politic into filmic 
texts as subject positions. This approach is predicated on a subjunctive dimension that redefines 
the intrinsic relation of the text to its “outside.” Chapters discuss the figure of authority in The 
Cabinet of Dr. Caligari and Kameradschaft, circularity in Fritz Lang’s M and his Mabuse films, 
titles and writing in early Weimar film censorship decisions, the star figure of Emil Jannings in 
the Nazi film Ohm Krüger, and the postwar films Die Mörder Sind Unter Uns and Rotation. An 
epilogue investigates the reconfigurations of writing on the screen in R.W. Fassbinder’s Die 
Dritte Generation (1979) and the 1998 hacker film 23. In all of these case studies, I contend that 
writing in film remains significant when the image as such must be augmented by gestures 
toward a figural language. 
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PREFACE 
 
… im Erdensturz dem Umbruch einer Zeile 
noch zugewandt, bis an den jüngsten Tag 
erfüllend jene heilige Satzung, wo  
es auf das Komma ankommt, mag ich stammelnd 
dereinst nicht wissen, was das Thema war.   
–– Karl Kraus, “Nach Zwanzig Jahren” (1919) 
 
(… At earth’s decline still facing the page- 
proof of a line, until Doomsday 
complying with that sacred statute where 
a comma matters, I, stammering, may one day 
no longer know what the subject was.  
–– “Twenty Years Later”)     
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 vii 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: WRITING, TEXT, AND FIGURATION IN THE 
CINEMA 
The following is borne out of the desire to reconcile the conflict between two critical aspects that 
stand in seemingly diametrical distance to each other, the self-evident conceptual significance of 
the history of German cinema on the one hand and the marginal relevance of the single filmic 
element of writing among so many categories on the other, and thereby to delineate an area of 
critical interest in which these two aspects do not invalidate or oppose each other but instead 
continue to oscillate in a state of productive tension. More than any other medium, save perhaps 
for printed matter itself, the German cinema has justifiably been taken to task and summoned for 
historical evidence given its central prominence for the conjunction of film and politics, where 
the imaginary on the screen finds its actual corollary on the streets, so to speak, and this vise-like 
yoking in which “the German nation is haunted by its cinema screen, and the films are haunted 
by German history,”1 as Thomas Elsaesser puts it, has structured the critical horizon of a 
scholarship haunted by these dual specters.  
The awareness of this haunting presence is a familiar assertion by now, so that it has 
become customary for critical endeavors to announce from the outset a necessary paradigmatic 
departure from the umbrage cast by these specters. In turn, this horizon is defined by two figures 
                                                 
1 Thomas Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After: Germany’s Historical Imaginary (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 3-
4. 
  1
that determine the ideological fiction which, in a variation of Elsaesser’s terms, constitutes the 
“two halves of a whole that to this day spells Germany’s national cinema.”2 These figures are 
Siegfried Kracauer with his From Caligari to Hitler from 1947 and Lotte Eisner with her 1952 
work The Haunted Screen, works that so profoundly influenced the understanding of German 
cinema that they seem to define it to this day.3 In this respect, as a gesture of contraposing their 
works from these two figures, Tim Bergfelder notes a shift from the “methodological 
stranglehold… that has begun to unhook German film historiography from its anchorage in a 
political master narrative of nation,”4 Sabine Hake vows to “move beyond symptomatic readings 
of a few canonical films and famous directors,”5 and Thomas Elsaesser diagnoses a “historical 
imaginary” that is defined by a “quasi-existential bond between a group of films and the 
subsequent fate of the society that produced and consumed them,”6 only to pose the rhetorical 
question, “how far do we need this imaginary today?”7
Accompanying these departures are the declarations in which different areas of inquiry 
are outlined and proposed, such as Elsaesser’s statement that at this point, for the “idea” of 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p. 21. 
3 Cf. Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film (1947; reprint, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), and Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen: Expressionism in the 
German Cinema and the Influence of Max Reinhardt, trans. Roger Greaves (1952; reprint, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), originally published in French as L’écran démoniaque. 
4 Tim Bergfelder, introduction to The German Cinema Book, ed. Tim Bergfelder, Erica Carter, and Deniz Göktürk 
(London: BFI Publishing, 2002), p. 8. 
5 Sabine Hake, German National Cinema (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 1. 
6 Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After, p. 36. 
7 Ibid. 
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German cinema, his decision is that “we can afford to pay a little less attention to the best-known 
periods: the 1920s and the 1970s.”8 This sentiment is echoed by Bergfelder’s declaration that 
“selected moments in German film history, most notably Weimar, Nazi, and the New German 
Cinema of the 1970s, have received an enormous amount of scholarly attention”9 to the 
detriment of other fields of inquiry, which has regrettably amplified a “commonly held 
perception that German cinema can be defined and understood almost exclusively through an 
isolated engagement with these three historical periods.”10 While it may certainly be true that 
these periods represent a well-trodden academic terrain, it does not necessarily follow that it has 
been exhausted nor that it warrants abandonment. In other words, to focus now on canonical 
films from the periods of Weimar, Nazi, or the New German Cinema as a theoretical cluster, 
then, indicates either a belated return in which it becomes possible to survey the material 
unimpeded by a sense of urgency and immediacy after scholarship has “moved on,” to invoke a 
current phrase, or it indicates the possibility to reconfigure in different terms the questions and 
concerns that drew scholars to the area in the first place. 
To begin with Kracauer, therefore, once again, means to conjure up the melancholy 
figure of the film historian who, in Elsaesser’s characterization, “has to turn detective, alert to 
every index or clue,”11 and then despairs “at having discovered so many hitherto unsuspected 
skeletons in Weimar cinema’s cupboard.”12 If Kracauer’s project was to survey the “visible 
                                                 
8 Thomas Elsaesser, “The German Cinema as Image and Idea,” in The BFI Companion to German Cinema, ed. 
Thomas Elsaesser and Michael Wedel (London: BFI Publishing, 1999), p. 112. 
9 Bergfelder, The German Cinema Book, p. 1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After, p. 31. 
12 Ibid. 
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hieroglyphs”13 recorded by the cinema in order to collect the “clues to hidden mental 
processes,”14 then a replication of this work will, at best, add to the already-known in the 
imaginary of the history of German cinema and thus merely provide “mutually confirming 
metaphors between the film-text and the context”15 that have “long settled into historical 
clichés.”16 Inasmuch as Kracauer has been the frequent point of departure, his formulation of the 
“hidden mental processes” that provide the insight into “the inner life of the nation from which 
the films emerge”17 has been the main focus for charges and the basis of critique, even when, as 
in Anton Kaes’ From Hitler to Heimat, his work provides the impetus for a variation on its 
title.18 But what is rarely noted is that in his methodological introduction Kracauer pays specific 
                                                 
13 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 7. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After, p. 76. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 7. 
18 Anton Kaes, From Hitler To Heimat: The Return of History as Film, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1989). Kaes notes that Kracauer’s “trajectory… is a bold and problematic construct.” Cf. p. xi. In anticipation of 
both his title and the argument Kaes outlines for his discussion of Hans Jürgen Syberberg’s Hitler, A Film From 
Germany, Gilles Deleuze acknowledges the importance of Kracauer’s suggestion of the concept of automata and 
states that “what is interesting in Krackauer’s [sic] book From Caligari to Hitler is that it shows how expressionist 
cinema reflected the rise of the Hitlerian automaton.” Thus, Deleuze continues, it is “as if Syberberg felt the need to 
add a second volume to Krackauer’s [sic] book, but this second volume would be a film: … from Hitler to a Film 
from Germany.” Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 264. The English translation replicates the unfortunate 
typographical error in the French original. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Cinéma 2: L’Image-Temps (Paris: Les Éditions de 
Minuit, 1985), p. 344.     
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attention to what he terms a film’s “innate mission to ferret out minutiae.”19 Borrowing the term 
“visible hieroglyphs” from the German-born Jewish-American philosopher Horace Meyer 
Kallen, Kracauer quotes from Kallen’s 1942 work Art and Freedom in which Kallen notes the 
“unseen dynamics of human relations”20 as they are revealed in the “slight actions, such as the 
incidental play of the fingers, the opening or clenching of a hand, dropping a handkerchief, 
playing with some apparently irrelevant object, stumbling, falling, seeking and not finding and 
the like.”21
What Kracauer emphasizes here through a recourse to Kallen is a description of gesture, 
which, as Giorgio Agamben demonstrates, serves as the categorical quality of the cinema, since 
the cinema is the place where “a society that has lost its gestures tries at once to reclaim what it 
has lost and to record its loss.”22 For Kracauer, writing in 1946 about Weimar cinema and the 
rise of fascism from his exile in New York under the stated purpose to “effectively implement 
the cultural aims of the United Nations,”23 Agamben’s definition becomes even more evocative 
and important. As Agamben states, gesture turns significant for “human beings who have lost 
every sense of naturalness”24 and “the more gestures lose their ease under the action of invisible 
powers, the more life becomes indecipherable.”25 As a description of Kracauer’s situation, 
                                                 
19 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 7. 
20 As quoted in ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 53. 
23 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. v. 
24 Agamben, Means without End, p. 53. 
25 Ibid. 
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Agamben’s definition proves to be especially succinct, since he links this sense of loss to the 
accompanying impulse in which the bourgeoisie “succumbs to interiority and gives itself up to 
psychology.”26
This focus on the “minutiae,” the small gestures recorded on celluloid, indicate how 
much Kracauer’s work was defined by a conceptual sense of scale that moved from  the small 
details or “clues” to the large-scale thematics or psychology of the social text and its audiences. 
In doing so, the minute and marginal elements illuminate the larger aspects, so that Kracauer 
works on the basis of a mode of inversion in which scale is redefined in order to locate a 
conceptual and political dimension in filmic fragments and traces. That is, large-scale national 
and historical phenomena are encapsulated by the unobtrusive and small surface phenomena of 
the cinema as gestures, and in Kracauer’s case these correspond to the clues that can be settled as 
the inner psychic dimensions of the individual in relation to the nation. The sustained spell that 
both Kracauer in particular and Weimar Expressionism as a filmic mode in general have exerted 
for film scholarship is to understand film as the outwardly or externalized material 
manifestations of inner states of being and vice versa. Hence this mode of inquiry is premised on 
a radical break with “natural” perception. The fractured mind searches for hidden clues in the 
minutiae and detritus as a way of explaining the major forces in the interconnected but hidden 
networks of power. Given the large-scale atrocities of fascist power and the unfathomable 
question of how “all of this” could have happened, this mode of analysis indicates a means of 
response towards films as historical documents that could provide answers. 
Walter Benjamin has responded to this question by insisting that the “current amazement 
that the things we are experiencing are ‘still’ possible in the twentieth century is not 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
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philosophical.”27 Indeed, he continues, this “amazement is not the beginning of knowledge – 
unless it is the knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable.”28 Like 
Kracauer, Benjamin is concerned with the conditions that make fascism possible but he locates 
the response in a different conception of history that does not assume a teleology of progress in 
which fascism is treated as a “historical norm.”29 Likewise, through his emphasis on minutiae 
Kracauer exhibits a close affinity to Benjamin’s understanding of the philosophical treatise as a 
mode of thinking through sustained endurance, which Benjamin describes with the image of the 
fragmented mosaic. The “proper mode of contemplation,” Benjamin writes, is characterized by a 
return in which “[t]irelessly the process of thinking makes new beginnings, returning in a 
roundabout way to its original object.”30 For Benjamin, the continual return to the “fragments of 
thought” provides the insight that the “relationship between the minute precision of the work and 
the proportions of the sculptural or intellectual whole demonstrates that truth-content is only to 
be grasped through immersion in the most minute details of subject-matter.”31
Kracauer’s focus on the gesture can therefore be understood in Benjamin’s terms as an 
enduring dedication to an immersion in the minute details, but also through Agamben’s terms as 
a concern with the cinematic image not in its “mythical rigidity,”32 but rather in its real aspect 
                                                 
27 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt and trans. Harry Zohn, (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1968), p. 257. (Emphasis in original.) 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne, (London: Verso, 1996), p. 28. 
31 Ibid., p. 29. 
32 Agamben, Means without End, p. 55. 
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since “the element of cinema is gesture and not image.”33 Agamben follows Gilles Deleuze here, 
who, in Agamben’s formulation, has demonstrated that “the cinema erases the fallacious 
psychological distinction between image as psychic reality and movement as physical reality”34 
and instead thinks of them as one. Moreover, the importance of gesture for Agamben lies in the 
fact that it removes another distinction, namely the one which posits the “false alternative 
between ends and means”35 in a transcendent state of separation. Rather, gesture becomes a 
theatrical expression of pure mediality as such. As Agamben states, “gesture is, in this sense, 
communication of a communicability.”36 Yet, because of this mediality of means, gesture also 
expresses the inexpressible, so that it becomes “essentially always a gesture of not being able to 
figure something out in language; it is always a gag in the proper meaning of the term.”37
With this formulation Agamben returns to a realm away from the discrete transcendence 
of categories and moves closer to a Baroque sensibility that does not maintain this distinction. 
Deleuze describes the Baroque as the movements through fragments that fold into each other, so 
that the separation between distinct categories is suspended as movement. Thus, he says, the 
“visible and the legible, the outside and the inside, the façade and the chamber are … not two 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. Agamben refers to Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). 
35 Ibid., p. 57. 
36 Ibid., p. 59.  
37 Ibid. (Emphasis in original.) Agamben uses “gag” here in both senses as an object in a mouth that prevents 
speech, but also a “gag” on stage as an actor’s improvisational gesture to compensate for the inability to remember 
lines.    
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worlds since the visible can be read … and the legible has its theater.”38 In these relational folds, 
according to Deleuze, lies a “perspectivism as a truth of relativity,”39 which constitutes a variant 
of relativism. However, this Baroque relativism is one that is not “a variation of truth according 
to the subject, but the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject.”40 Thus, 
in the Baroque Deleuze registers a theatrical mode of understanding that “entails neither falling 
into nor emerging from illusion but rather realizing something in illusion itself, or of tying it to a 
spiritual presence that endows its spaces and fragments with a collective unity.”41 This mode of 
expression has its analogy in Agamben’s concept of gesture, which is at once an end, as 
“communication,” and at the same time its means, the “communicability,” which cannot be 
separated from each other. 
At the same time, this illusory “spiritual presence” in fragments can be defined along 
another trajectory of investigating such figurations. As a theory of the Baroque mode of 
expression, Walter Benjamin’s Origin of the German Tragic Drama remains the most sustained 
inquiry into a particular form of figuration which he defines as allegory. In his investigation into 
the qualities of the image, Agamben notes that the image is defined by a tension between, on the 
one hand, the “reification and obliteration of a gesture,”42 in which case the image appears 
isolated as an “imago… or as symbol.”43 On the other hand stand gestures that preserve 
                                                 
38 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993), p. 31. (Emphasis mine.) 
39 Ibid., p. 21. 
40 Ibid., p. 20. (Emphasis mine.) 
41 Ibid., p. 125. 
42 Agamben, Means without End, p. 55. 
43 Ibid. 
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movement, which Agamben associates with the “image flashing in the epiphany of involuntary 
memory.”44 In this quality, the image “always refers beyond itself to a whole of which it is a 
part.”45 Here Agamben invokes Benjamin with the epiphany of involuntary memory, which 
Benjamin would call the experience of “shock.”46 More importantly, however, Agamben’s use of 
the term gesture as pointing to a larger entity of which it is itself an inseparable part suggests a 
profoundly allegorical quality along Benjaminian lines. Benjamin refers to this figure as a 
“schema,” which “determines the character of allegory as a form of writing.”47 “As a schema,” 
Benjamin continues, allegory is “at one and the same time a fixed image and a fixing sign.”48     
Benjamin insists on a radical departure from allegory understood as an inferior form of 
signification or a particular and stilted variant of the symbolic. Instead, allegory is, as he says, 
not “a mere mode of designation, …but a form of expression… just as writing is.”49 What he has 
achieved with this approach is to demonstrate, in Deleuze’s summary, that allegory is “a power 
of figuration entirely different from that of the symbol: the latter combines the eternal and the 
momentary, nearly at the center of the world.”50 In opposition to this, Deleuze continues, 
Benjamin’s understanding of allegory “produces a history from nature and transforms history 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Cf. Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, pp. 160 – 161. 
47 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 184. 
48 Ibid. In the original: “Ein Schema ist sie, als dieses Schema Gegenstand des Wissens, ihm [dem Allegoriker] 
unverlierbar erst als ein fixiertes: fixiertes Bild und fixierendes Zeichen in einem.” Cf. Walter Benjamin, Ursprung 
des Deutschen Trauerspiels, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996), p. 161. 
49 Ibid., p. 162. 
50 Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, p. 125. 
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into nature in a world that no longer has its center.”51 Even in its classical manifestations, as 
described by Angus Fletcher, “in the simplest terms, allegory says one thing and means 
another,”52 and thus “destroys the normal expectation we have about language, that our words 
‘mean what they say.’”53 These brief sketches around the term allegory suggest its proximity to a 
mode of figuration in which the visible and the legible, or the means and the ends, are no longer 
distinct categories but instead point to an altogether different conception of how these terms 
should be seen as emblematic for dimensions of meaning that are staged as gestures of endurance 
or as hieroglyphics in which the visual and the legible merge. 
The reason this is relevant is because, understood in this line of argument, allegory 
defines a way to begin to conceptualize the vast area of the figure of writing in the cinema. For a 
number of reasons, it seems, writing in film is taken for granted, to the point that it does not 
merit observation. Part of this is due to its self-evidence, or what we could call the “quiddity” of 
the image of writing in the sense that writing “is what it is” in the image or that writing merely 
indicates the “sign of a sign.” But once we pay attention to the phenomenon within the ecology 
and economy in the field of vision, the use of writing in the cinema becomes less self-evident or 
“natural.” In its self-evidence, then, writing constitutes a double inflection in the same way that 
gesture communicates communicability. Jacques Derrida speaks of such self-evidence as a 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 2. 
Here Fletcher also points out the term’s Greek etymology: “allegory” derives “from allos + agoreuein (other + 
speak in the assembly or market). Agoreuein connotes public, open, declarative speech. This sense is inverted by 
allos. Thus allegory is often called ‘inversion.’” Therefore, Fletcher continues, “the political overtones of the verb 
agoreuein need always to be emphasized, insofar as censorship may produce devious, ironical ways of speaking.”  
53 Ibid. 
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paradigmatic example for the “blindness to the text,”54 which replicates what he calls elsewhere 
the “privileged unity of sound and sense,”55 within which “writing would always be derivative, 
accidental, exterior, doubling the signifier.”56 In this respect, writing within the image seems to 
acquire the same status, since the relation between the filmic image and the writing within it 
seems to replicate the division of privilege that Derrida defines as the “metaphysics of 
presence”57 of speech and logos in opposition to “writing” as a notational system that designates 
“not only the physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic inscription, but also, … 
beyond the signifying face, the signified face itself.”58
When Derrida’s work was taken seriously in film studies, its initial importance lay in a 
reconceptualization of its concerns, in particular, for the organizing structure of film history and 
genre studies, which as Peter Brunette and David Wills call it, are both grounded in an “appeal to 
a concept of dominance [that] seems… to rely, once again, on the finding of an essence that 
imposes order on recalcitrant particulars.”59 But Brunette and Wills are equally wary of the idea 
of figuration in film studies, since for them it signals a “return to a phenomenological, quasi-
                                                 
54 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 
p. 251. 
55 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1976), p. 29. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., p. 23.  
58 Ibid., p. 9. 
59 Peter Brunette and David Wills, Screen/Play: Derrida and Film Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), p. 44. 
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religious perspective”60 in an idealism of immediacy that ignores the “materiality and mediacy of 
the signifier”61 and thus by “necessity obliterates the complexities always attending 
representation.”62 In their project, the work of criticism requires a framework that can locate that 
which escapes signification and pays attention to the “gaps of a text… as aporias representing 
important points of articulation between its inside and outside.”63 The difficulty in this work that 
Brunette and Wills make evident here lies both in the incipient didacticism that is inherent in any 
formulation of methodology and in the apparent impossibility to escape within this methodology 
certain categories, so that even a concept such as aporia stands in as a function of representation 
rather than something which elides this function.  
However, their interstitial definition of the filmic text points to the potential of figuration 
again in a reconceived understanding of the relation between the “inside” and the “outside” of a 
text. Brunette and Wills propose to move from analogy as an idealist “figure of visual 
resemblance” to the concept of “anagram as a figure for a cinema to be read as writing.”64 The 
most extensive work of anagrammatical film criticism that emphasized the significance of 
writing in film to date has been Tom Conley’s work, who, in his Film Hieroglyphs, has followed 
this trajectory of writing in film to the point where “writing and film become hieroglyphic,”65 so 
that the film work takes on a rebus-like form which destabilizes its coherence and “yields an 
                                                 
60 Ibid., p. 58. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., p. 56. 
63 Ibid., p. 59. 
64 Ibid., p. 88. 
65 Tom Conley, Film Hieroglyphs: Ruptures in Classical Cinema (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
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infinity of reflections”66 that ultimately define an “active process of viewing that knows neither 
time nor history.”67 It would be unfortunate if this approach remained the definitive investigation 
into the category of writing in film because Conley’s theoretical outline of the ramifications of 
the hieroglyphic dimension of writing in film limits itself to the declension of his insight through 
various permutations that, in analogy to his formulation of the “law of the letter,” end up 
“forcing its signs to circulate by and through each other and to promote a reading that knows no 
control other than the maddening closure of its redundancy.”68     
Because of this tendency to celebrate the seemingly liberating potential of filmic writing 
as hieroglyphics from the burdens of history, such attempts at taking seriously the modalities and 
implications of signification are often dismissed in terms that suggest a theoretical form of 
hedonism implicit in frequent references to such catchphrases as the “pleasures of the text” or to 
jouissance. Moreover, as Paul Bové has demonstrated, the ways in which deconstruction has 
“come under attack for its failures to understand ‘history,’ to produce real historical 
knowledge,”69 have made it possible to uphold the “neopragmatist efforts to negate and displace 
theory with ‘practice,’”70 in order to provide aid and comfort through this “false hierarchical 
binary.”71 These are but two reasons why this has unfortunately also resulted in the 
representation of the work of deconstruction as a caricature of licentious scholarship, which over 
                                                 
66 Ibid., p. xxviii. 
67 Ibid., p. xxxi. 
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69 Paul A. Bové, In the Wake of Theory, (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, University Press of New 
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70 Ibid., p. 6. 
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the years has been more or less grotesquely pursued by its academic opponents but which by 
now has been successfully entrenched in its representation to the general public. The recent 
obituary of Jacques Derrida in the New York Times is an appalling example of this. The obituary, 
entitled “Jacques Derrida, Abstruse Theorist, Dies in Paris at 74,”72 was penned by Jonathan 
Kandell, a reporter and author of the 1985 Avon book Passage Through El Dorado, who in 1990 
became embroiled in a minor journalism scuffle around allegations of plagiarism when he was 
dismissed by The Wall Street Journal.73 In the obituary, in stark contrast to the modicum of 
decorum that this genre ostensibly necessitates, Derrida was bizarrely caricatured as a 
vainglorious charlatan, whose work and legacy were variously summarized as “murky,” “turgid 
and baffling,” and as “undermining many of the traditional standards of classical education” 
                                                 
72 Jonathan Kandell, “Jacques Derrida, Abstruse Theorist, Dies in Paris at 74,” New York Times, Sunday, 10 October 
2004, sec. 1A, p. 1(F). 
73 Kandell had written a story profiling innovative managers in Soviet and Eastern-European economies during the 
perestroika period for The Wall Street Journal that was published on March 30, 1990. The article seemed to draw 
extensively on the book Communist Entrepreneurs: Unknown Innovators in the Global Economy by one John W. 
Kiser, III, without any references or acknowledgments. While he confirmed that he was familiar with the book, 
Kandell claimed he had perused it only once and had not consulted it again for the article. He refused to publish an 
annotated correction to include a reference to the book and was subsequently fired from the Wall Street Journal. In 
turn, Kandell sued the paper alleging that his journalistic reputation had been tarnished by his dismissal. A brief 
overview of the incident is provided by Daniel Lazare, “A Case of Plagiarism at the Wall Street Journal?” Columbia 
Journalism Review (January – February, 1991): pp. 6-7, which concludes with the observation that journalistic work 
often results in articles which inevitably repeat “many of the same anecdotes and much of the same information” as 
others. Lazare also offers a number of statements by a parade of Kandell’s former colleagues who vouch for his 
“judgment” and proclaim him “wholly honorable.”    
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while being “associated with divisive political causes.”74 The piece culminated with the 
observation that Derrida had “confessed” to harboring the desire of becoming a professional 
soccer player as a young man.75
There is, then, a need to curb both the conceptual license to instrumentalize 
deconstruction as a means to liberate criticism that, in Conley’s terms, “knows neither time nor 
history,” and a serious need to revisit the insights of Derrida, if only to counter the way in which 
his work of deconstruction has been besmirched. As a means to do so, the possibility of 
reïntegrating the work of Walter Benjamin with Derrida’s reflections on writing offers a 
promising trajectory. The conceptual proximity and intellectual connection between Benjamin 
and Derrida has occasionally been established, so, for example, by Eric Santner, who notes that 
“in a language anticipating Derrida’s critique of Western phonocentrism, Benjamin suggests that 
the greatness of the baroque lay precisely in its insight into the irreducible elegiac dimension of 
signification.”76 Benjamin’s Trauerspiel also indicates that the anagrammatic approach of 
Conley must be reconceptualized in its proper historical dimension. Benjamin, in anticipation of 
                                                 
74 Kandell, “Jacques Derrida,” p. 49A. 
75 Ibid. Kandell left out through which interrogation techniques this information was obtained. After the publication 
of this vindictive and arrogant missive, an open letter in response to the newspaper by Samuel Weber and Kenneth 
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“Times Select” automatically assists users who enter the search query “Jacques Derrida” with the helpful response 
“Did You Intend to Search for Jacques Deride?” 
76 Eric L. Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), p. 11. 
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Conley’s approach, notes that “in the anagrams… and many other examples of linguistic 
virtuosity, word, syllable, and sound are emancipated from any context of traditional meaning 
and are flaunted as objects which can be exploited for allegorical purposes.”77
For Benjamin, however, the mode of allegory is crucial for its “strange combination of 
nature and history.”78 Prefiguring Agamben’s discussion of the dynamic antinomies within the 
image as both a “reification and obliteration of a gesture,”79 and therefore, as he states, “the 
imago as death mask or as symbol,”80 Benjamin establishes the historical dimension of allegory. 
As he puts it, in the symbol “the transfigured face of nature is fleetingly revealed in the light of 
redemption,”81 which corresponds to Agamben’s notion of the “obliteration” of the gesture. In 
contrast to this, and corresponding to what Agamben calls the “reification of gesture… as death 
mask,”82 Benjamin argues, stands the allegorical way of seeing through which “the observer is 
confronted with the facies hippocratica of history as petrified, primordial landscape.”83 
Benjamin continues this insight and states that in allegory history “enters” as writing, or, as it has 
                                                 
77 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 207. 
78 Ibid., p. 167. 
79 Agamben, Means without End, p. 55. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 166. 
82 Agamben, Means without End, p. 55. 
83 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 166. The “Hippocratic Face” (Latin facies Hippocratica) 
denotes a cachectic or morbid appearance of the face. It is “applied to the shrunken and livid aspect of the 
countenance immediately before death, or in a case of exhaustion threatening death: so called because described by 
Hippocrates.” Cf. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “Hippocratic.”  
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been translated, “when… history becomes part of the setting, it does so as script.”84 Thus, 
Benjamin declares, “the word ‘history’ stands written on the countenance of nature in the 
characters of transience.”85
The conceptual return to Benjamin and Kracauer for a historical thinking by way of 
allegory in film studies has recently been developed by D.N. Rodowick in his study of what he 
terms the figural, which he initially defines as a “semiotic regime where the ontological 
distinction between linguistic and plastic representations breaks down” 86 and thus enlists it as a 
way of “deconstructing the opposition of word and image and for creating new concepts for 
comprehending the figural as a transformation of discourse by recent technologies of the 
visible.”87 In the course of outlining a comprehensive theory of the figural, Rodowick also 
returns to Kracauer and Benjamin for their rejection of traditional philosophy as an “obstacle to 
understanding the social knowledge embedded in mass cultural phenomena and the space-time of 
everyday life.”88 That is, as Rodowick argues, for both Benjamin and Kracauer “neither 
traditional art… nor idealist philosophy… can comprehend the social hieroglyph because nature 
has been transformed by capital, and the isolated interiority of the aesthetic subject has 
                                                 
84 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 177. In the original: “Wenn mit dem Trauerspiel die 
Geschichte in den Schauplatz hineinwandert, so tut sie es als Schrift.” Cf. Walter Benjamin, Ursprung des 
Deutschen Trauerspiels, p. 155. 
85 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 177. In the original: “Auf dem Antlitz der Natur steht 
‘Geschichte’ in der Zeichenschrift der Vergängnis.” Cf. Benjamin, Ursprung, p. 155.  
86 D.N. Rodowick, Reading The Figural, or, Philosophy after the New Media (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2001), p. 2. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., p. xiv. 
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disappeared into the mass.”89 While Rodowick shares the critical impatience with Kracauer’s 
From Caligari to Hitler, for which, in Rodowick’s words, Kracauer’s later work served as a 
“historiographic correction,”90 he determines that one of the crucial aspects of Kracauer’s 
thinking “concerns the special epistemological status of mass cultural phenomena, a status that 
demands that they be cataloged and brought to the attention of an informed reading that can 
unlock their knowledge.”91
Thus the affinity of Kracauer with Benjamin, for Rodowick, centers around Kracauer’s 
idea of the “representational characteristics of both photography and history as modes of 
alienation, as cognitive apparatuses that are able to name and thus to call virtually into existence 
phenomena that might otherwise be lost to thought.”92 This occurs precisely because “social life 
is understood here as having an indeterminate, multiple, and fragmentary character that 
overwhelms individual perception and reduces it to unconscious thought.”93 The task of the 
cultural historian, then, is defined by these ephemeral figures and characters which need to be 
comprehended as “the archive of historiographic concepts that hold those figures available to 
articulate the object of history by establishing the conditions of its intelligibility.”94 This is where 
Rodowick establishes the link to Benjamin’s Origin of the German Tragic Drama and to a 
section of his “Epistemo – Critical Prologue” in particular. In this “prologue,” a rigorous 
introduction to his study of allegory that at times approaches esoteric dimensions, Benjamin 
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develops the notion of the constellation as an analogy when he states categorically that “ideas are 
to objects as constellations are to stars.”95 To derive at this point, Benjamin faults the scientific 
method in which a systematic approach demands coherent completeness but which ultimate 
succeeds only in the “attempts to ascertain the truth in mere cognitions and cognitional 
patterns.”96 Moreover, this attempt is characterized by the “ambition to grasp the truth… in an 
encyclopaedic accumulation of items of knowledge.”97 Against this ambition, which in the 
original Benjamin calls Anmaßung or “arrogance,”98 he posits a notion of “discontinuity” in 
which phenomena “are divested of their false unity.”99 Only through this divestment is it possible 
to arrive at ideas because ideas “are not represented in themselves, but solely and exclusively in 
an arrangement of concrete elements in the concept: as the configuration of these elements.”100
While Rodowick does not explicitly make use of Benjamin’s definition of the 
configuration here as the arrangement of disparate and fragmentary elements, he traces a 
dialectic through the affinity of Benjamin’s work on allegory and Kracauer’s Theory of Film that 
arrives at a definition of the “historical idea.”101 This idea follows neither the historicist demand 
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that history be represented objectively as a demonstration of how “it has actually been,”102 nor 
does it require the amassing of mere quantities of information as fact, save, perhaps, for the 
figure of the collector, who, as Rodowick cites Kracauer, “reveals a theological motif, ‘as if fact-
oriented accounts breathed pity with the dead.’”103 Rather, the concept that Kracauer develops as 
the historical idea is the development of “a new terrain in which a wide variety of primary 
historical material distributes and organizes itself, illuminating previously unthought patterns of 
intelligibility.”104 Beyond this, Rodowick states, Kracauer’s historical idea acquires its ultimate 
significance “because it fuses the particular and the general in a way unavailable to philosophical 
knowing.”105
These iterations through a wide-ranging area of critical thought may suggest some of the 
theoretical foundations with which the phenomenon of writing in film can be approached here. 
Tracing a conceptual line of argument through the work of Agamben, Kracauer, and Benjamin, 
the relevance of Rodowick’s category of the figural for an understanding of writing in film 
determines that it is not mere anagrammatical play. Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier has done 
much to shift the analysis of writing in film from anagrammatical play to a sustained definition 
of cinécriture. Rodowick notes that Ropars-Wuilleumier develops her theory of filmic 
                                                 
102 The famous dictum from Leopold von Ranke’s 1824 History of the Latin and Teutonic Peoples 1494 to 1514, 
which, with feigned modesty, declared the task of the historian to “merely say how it has actually been.” (“Er will 
bloß sagen, wie es eigentlich gewesen.”) 
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this context, nor does he note that Kracauer was only one of two critics who reviewed Benjamin’s Origin of the 
German Tragic Drama extensively at the time of its publication. 
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hieroglyphics from a triangulation established by the “common interest of Freud, Derrida, and 
Sergei Eisenstein in pictographic scripts (the rebus, the hieroglyph, the Japanese ideogram) as 
the model for figural activity that confounds the phonocentric model of signification.”106 With 
this focus, Rodowick argues, Ropars-Wuilleumier succeeds in developing a grammatology that 
overcomes “the difficulties that film has posed for both linguistics and literary semiotics.”107 As 
Rodowick puts it, Ropars-Wuilleumier aims in “her textual criticism, then, to focus on those 
films in which one can detect ‘privileged fracture zones,’”108 in order to disrupt “the mutual 
transformation of the cinematic and narrative codes as a process in which the latter stabilize the 
former”109 and to demonstrate, instead, that this transformation is a “potentially destabilizing one 
that fragments narrative through the possibilities intrinsic to cinema.”110
As Dana Polan outlines, Ropars-Wuilleumier’s contribution is her focus to concentrate on 
a “modernist conception of writing in which a dispersive force intrinsic to writing breaks up any 
ultimate coincidence of signifier and signified.”111 In this respect, Ropars-Wuilleumeur is 
celebrated by Polan as one who “has brilliantly realized the potentials of deconstruction.”112 The 
problem, however, with this approach of deconstruction lies in its inherent potential for an 
aesthetic formalism, which, as Dana Polan argues, “paradoxically turns deconstruction into one 
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more idealism.”113 Without an acknowledgment, Polan continues, of the fact that “we live in a 
world not just of difference but of differentiation, of the rigid enclosing of energy into 
hierarchies and territories,”114 deconstruction ultimately becomes a substitute for another idealist 
esotericism. In Polan’s astute formulation, that is, if we fail to analyze how “this world positions 
its subjects in specific ways, … we run the danger of turning all issues into endless replays of 
one abstract issue.”115 This, then, is the point at which a return to Kracauer becomes possible 
again in his goals of finding significance in the “casual configurations”116 that the screen reflects 
in order to delineate what he calls “something unaccountable…, something not to be inferred 
from circumstances within the normal field of vision.”117
The way in which writing in film will be looked at in the following is determined by 
these theoretical inflections. That is, this investigation retraces Kracauer’s social hieroglyphs in 
order to look at them as allegorical gestures which define “legibility” and inscription as a form of 
grammatological constellations within the movement of images. This approach, however, does 
not rest on a false binary between “textual analysis” and its “contextual” counterpart, but rather 
attempts to define the terrain of inquiry anew by taking seriously the insights of the figural and 
the allegorical that both fundamentally redefine the intrinsic relation of the text to its “outside.” 
Instead of establishing from the outset the fictitious and factual boundaries as posited by the 
filmic texts, this study moves towards a subjunctive dimension within which the hieroglyphic 
and the allegorical operate, or, to borrow Rodowick’s formulation, towards investigating the 
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“heterogeneous space of their cohabitation”118 in which these two categories interfere. In other 
words, while much of the material that forms the basis of this study is derived from the primary 
texts and its analyses, secondary material and contemporaneous documents are equally given 
attention inasmuch as they are addressed by the films themselves. 
Neither does it posit a study of audiences through any definition of a spectator position as 
psychoanalytic or ideological because the insights that follow here do not necessarily become 
actualized by real audience members or remain merely latent as a particular positional 
spectatorship. Rather, this work is animated by an understanding of how films engage actual or 
potential audiences within a social field in the active attempts to define values. In their discursive 
strategies and mechanisms as well as the modes of figuration they offer, films afford insight into 
the traces of those lines of conflict around which both social and affective values are established 
in a mutual engagement within culture. However, these figurations of value are not immediately 
legible or transparent. As Marcia Landy demonstrates, “films do not provide a transparent or 
univalent sense of the culture and social life.”119 Instead, they take on the character of social 
hieroglyphs. Therefore, she continues, “in the creation of value, the problem that confronts the 
critic… is to understand the social character of these hieroglyphs,”120 so that we can 
“comprehend the affect that is entailed in producing not merely monetary but social value as a 
means of producing the folklore of consensus.”121   
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In this respect, I aim to reïntegrate the findings of deconstruction with historical research 
so that a position of scholarship can be redefined which looks again at how these films yield 
insight into the ways in which their hieroglyphics manifest themselves through subject positions 
in order to define social value. As will be demonstrated, writing in the German cinema functions 
as a pervasive mode through which questions of authority are articulated. The hieroglyphic 
configurations that are spelled out by the writing on the screen stand in reference to a higher 
power of veracity that affirms the presence of a larger organizational regime. Instances of 
writing, then, become the inscriptions through which these structures of power acquire legibility 
and, conversely, become visible as hieroglyphs. Ultimately, then, this figural regime determines 
the question of the political constitution of the state because the struggle for authority and its 
legitimacy as an organizational system becomes embodied in the baroque or allegorical forms of 
writing that inscribe the body politic into the films.  
Accordingly, these figurations that I describe in detail and at length are in a Derridean 
sense present yet absent, but their marks are nonetheless evident through their allegorical 
manifestations. For this reason I also do not offer a sustained critique of ideology, even though 
the insights derived here have been defined by a history of ideas and an ideology of discipline 
that moves across various historical periods in a cross-section of German filmic images over the 
decades. This also implies the question of the “usefulness” of theory, which, to invoke a 
formulation of Gilles Deleuze, is always untimely, “especially today, because the times are not 
right.”122 That the question which assumes a difference between a theory “about” the cinema and 
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of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 280. 
  25
“the concepts that cinema gives rise to”123 is a fundamentally false distinction is one of the 
lasting achievements of Gilles Deleuze, but the question occasionally needs to be revisited, in 
particular when it involves a topic that is notoriously difficult to examine “theoretically,” as it 
were, since fascism in 20th century German history had such actual and devastating 
consequences which seem to transcend such facile distinctions. For these reasons, there has been 
a long and unfortunate resistance in German film studies to take seriously the insights of 
deconstruction. In order to avoid the ramifications of “theory,” German approaches to film 
studies can be frequently defined through lines of inquiry that fork either into a branch of 
quantification and sociographic enumeration, which Benjamin would have dismissed as 
“cognitional patterns,” or that return to a version of ideology critique, which provides the 
comfort of an identity through the illusion of a critical distance, which, in turn, turns the 
scholarship of German cinema into a clinical rather than a critical approach. 
In their introduction to Friedrich Kittler’s Grammophone, Film, Typewriter, the 
translators provide a specific historical account of the reasons for this resistance. As they state, 
“when poststructuralist theorizing crossed the Rhine from France in the late 1970s, it was not 
received with open arms.”124 As they explain, this was due to the fact that the German Left, itself 
struggling for legitimacy and challenged by structuralist and poststructuralist criticisms of Marx, 
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“was quick to resort to the ubiquitous Irrationalismusvorwurf,”125 a charge that, “given National 
Socialism’s mobilization and exploitation of the strong antirational tradition on German 
thought… carried considerable weight in Germany.”126 These challenges notwithstanding, the 
entrenched defensive position that German scholarship has frequently taken over the decades in 
combating the insights of poststructuralism may carry less weight at this point and may at long 
last have subsided to some degree by now.127 Tim Bergfelder calls attention to the vibrant history 
of the study of German cinema and the general interest in the field that it has commanded, which 
has resulted in a “commitment to cross-cultural scholarly exchange that has been a characteristic 
feature of German film history in recent decades.”128     
In these debates, however, Thomas Elsaesser notes the tendency of defining Weimar 
cinema and thus, by extension, the imaginary of the future of the German cinema to come after, 
through films that resist meaning and retain a rebus-like character of what he calls “picture 
puzzles.”129 He accounts for this tendency as predicated by a “set of formal and stylistic devices, 
whose equivalences, inversions, and reversals facilitate but also necessitate the spectator 
construing ‘allegories of meaning’”130 for these films. Because of this construction, he argues, 
Weimar cinema exerts a fascination on critics that, in a variation of his descriptive terms, 
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continually turns into a “hypnotic hermeneutics.”131 What I aim to demonstrate in the following 
chapters is that, while the focus on writing in these films often takes on the quality of delirious 
stupefaction, it does not follow that we have to lose our critical faculties in the face of 
performing the work of investigating the “hypnotic” or “hermeneutic” forces that writing in film 
imposes.132
In Elsaesser’s assessment, the work of the film historian remains that of the hermeneut, 
who finds the clues, which, in turn, yield a submerged meaning that serves to reconstruct the text 
in its fullness, absent another imaginary that would have defined these textual reconstructions in 
other terms. This hermeneutic work belongs to that of the historicist detective, reconstructing 
after the fact how it has been, after entropy has shattered everything into ruins and fragments, so 
that all of these are turned into potential clues in the waste land of facticity. Instead, I aim to 
define a different mode of detection by seeing the allegorical manifestations through the 
reconfiguration of figures. Tom Gunning proposes a different concept of detection as well, 
which, via Benjamin, locates “the dynamics of the detective story not in the scrutiny of clues but 
in the optical exchange between interior and exterior.”133 According to Gunning, Benjamin 
develops this exchange as a way to understand the cinema “as not simply deceiving or creating 
illusion but as articulating the dialectic of interior/exterior, the relation between the private 
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dreaming self and the public space of production and history.”134 Gunning uses the analogy of 
the detective story to outline a strand of thought in Benjamin’s Arcades Project which posits the 
“uncanny experience of transformed vision, glimpsing a presence where it is not, a space where 
it does not belong, and triggering… ‘the flash of wakened [sic] consciousness.’”135 The 
development of this dialectic suggests a necessity to pay attention to the transitions and 
inversions between the interior and the exterior, which writing in film as a figural construct 
indicates.        
There is, however, another dimension to the preoccupation with the emblematics and text 
fragments of writing in film because, to invoke a common cliché, in doing so, the work seems to 
lose itself in the “details” and thus, ultimately, loses sight of the “big picture.” If the following 
will read more as detailed descriptions culminating in the meticulous reading of the uses of 
writing in the films that seem to be incidental and marginal and thus outside of the focus of 
criticism, then Benjamin’s use of the concept of the “anecdotal” may be of relevance here. In a 
discussion on the “street uprising of the anecdote” Benjamin’s asserts that it is the anecdote 
which “represents the strict antithesis to the sort of history which demands ‘empathy,’ which 
makes everything abstract.”136 Benjamin continues by dismissing empathy as “this is what 
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reading newspapers boils down to.”137 For Benjamin, the cheapening sentiment of empathy 
renders everything as a gauzy abstraction, a projection mediated by a comforting sense of 
absence, and turns the work of the historian to an entry into a list of comparisons for large 
constructs or “large contexts.”138 Thus historical work is degraded to the level of a newspaper 
reader who might nod his concerned head, bask in the comfort of compartmentalizing his 
identity, and continue to go about his business. By contrast, anecdotes encapsulate a form of 
“street insurgence.”139 The anecdote “brings things near to us spatially, lets them enter our 
life.”140 What really matters, therefore, Benjamin states, is that  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Spivak develops a much more productive understanding of marginality that does not reaffirm the centrality of the 
“center,” but rather demonstrates the crucial importance of the margins by going back to marginalia as the location 
of textual criticism since in “the early print culture in the West it was in the margins that the so-called argument of 
the paragraph or set of paragraph was written.” Cf. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “The New Historicism: Political 
Commitment and the Postmodern Critic,” in The New Historicism, p. 281. Along these lines, the work of noting 
instances of writing in film itself replicates the function of the scholar as a “scribe” or “rubricator,” in early modern 
productions of text as the one who takes dictation and copies the text, as it were, noticing moments of importance 
that are inscribed into the text like signatures or colophons. As a figure, here, mise-en-abyme, from its heraldic 
origins, also finds details within emblematic images that encapsulate and thereby replicate the larger history and 
genealogy of a name within the minute and the marginal.  
137 “‘Einfühlung’ darauf läuft Zeitungslesen hinaus.” Cf. Walter Benjamin: Das Passagen-Werk, vol. 5, bk. 2 of 
Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989), p. 1014 (emphasis in 
original). Eiland translates this passage as “‘empathy’: this is what newspaper reading terminates in,” a version 
which shifts emphasis away from Benjamin’s colloquial tone of disgust at the reductive effects of reading.  
138 Benjamin, “First Sketches (entry Iº, 2),” p. 846. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
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“The true method of making things present is: to represent them in our space (not to represent 
ourselves in their space). Only anecdotes can do this for us. Thus represented, the things allow 
no mediating construction from out of ‘large contexts.’”141  
 
In order to make this work possible, the archival work of the last decade and the primary 
research that has resulted in meticulous reconstructions of final film versions and the 
documentary material around the conditions of production that are now preserved in different 
media, accessible in formats such as DVDs, CD-ROMs, and websites, has been instrumental. In 
this sense, these documents confirm the value of archival work that makes it possible to analyze 
figures into which is inscribed a history that becomes “readable” only much later on. This also 
makes it necessary to return to the canonical film works of German cinema. According to Tom 
Cohen, the encounter with canonical works “often involves a systematic reversal of value-
polarities and significations, a machine-like pre-inscription by which works already have entered 
the socialized or symbolic sphere of interpretation.”142 Thus, Cohen argues, instead of 
maintaining an ossified preservation of value, “canonical works are often preserved and 
transmitted… because they have the power to radically disfigure the very values they are, once 
inscribed, used to uphold.”143 The films that will be discussed in this study are in this sense 
canonical, but they have also already been defined as such by Kracauer, whose catalogue of 
films in From Caligari to Hitler constitutes a canon in and of itself.   
An instantiation of this archival inversion that Cohen suggest is evident in the work of the 
Weimar censorship board, which meticulously documented every single film’s structure in 
                                                 
141 Ibid. 
142 Tom Cohen, Anti-Mimesis from Plato to Hitchcock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),  p. 262. 
143 Ibid. 
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sequences and documented every intertitle on censorship cards prior to its release. The 
bureaucratic records of the censorship board, then, preserve the skeletons of the narrative and 
record the nodal points that anchors the flow of images through written text in these films, a 
great percentage of which have been lost. These lost films are now preserved and commemorated 
in the archive of censorship titles, cards, and descriptions. Of the extant films, the censorship 
board records have served as and continue to provide one of the most important means to 
reconstruct these films as accurately as possible. The archive that has been created by the 
bureaucratic necessity to regulate popular culture thus also serves another function. Since 
intertitles in silent cinema were historically the least important part of the film, especially 
because they were easily discarded for international circulation and replaced with differing titles, 
they constitute the frayed ephemeral edges of the image flow. As such, intertitles as writing in 
the film remain in the archival records as inscriptions after the images have faded away like old 
photographs or the film stock has disintegrated. In an ironic reversal, the bureaucracy of 
censorship gives the hope of permanence to the material record of these lost films, so that writing 
in film has become their excessive remainder with a fragmentary but profound residual value. 
Kamilla Elliott’s work marks a definitive break from what she calls the “celluloid 
Laocoön”144 on the basis of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s 1766 work on the boundaries between 
the poetic and visual arts, towards a reconceptualization of the relations between “words” and 
“images.” With regard to intertitles, she develops a critical catalogue that demonstrates how 
“visual/verbal categorizations break down at every level in the hybrid arts of illustrated novels 
and worded films.”145 These hybrid instances, as she argues, put “pressure on Lessing’s most 
                                                 
144 Kamilla Elliott, Rethinking the Novel/Film Debate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 11. 
145 Ibid., p. 16. 
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central categorization: the temporal and spatial dichotomy of words and images.”146 For 
intertitles in silent film, to paraphrase Elliott, the notion of interruption or distraction “occupies a 
definitional place in discussions”147 of film. As a means to move beyond the imagined 
confinements of intertitles, the films of F.W. Murnau have often been regarded as exemplary. 
Indeed, Murnau’s films serve as a useful starting point to develop an outline of some 
ramifications that writing in film establishes. Murnau himself contributed to this debate when he 
discussed the emergence of sound films and the future of the cinematic image. In an article 
entitled “Films of the Future” from 1928, Murnau states the following: 
 
“I believe the cinema as a world power can offer possibilities beyond our imagination…The 
Chinese have an old saying: a picture is worth ten thousand words. I believe that this new 
invention, the sound film, will prevail … and there will be films with actors speaking their lines 
from beginning to end. Maybe before these words are printed will you see such a picture on the 
screen. In certain areas the spoken word will obstruct the images … [but] I don’t believe that all 
films will be talking pictures. The silent film will remain and develop into its perfect form, a film 
without a single written line. Films can be understood without explanatory titles that interrupt the 
flow of the action. I have tried this myself … Television and radio will bring the film of the 
future into the houses of the audience with the turn of a key… I don’t know how to make films. 
Future developments will make our current efforts seem like child’s play, like the stuttering of an 
insecure tongue.”148       
 
                                                 
146 Ibid., p. 18. 
147 Ibid. 
148 F.W. Murnau, “Films of the Future,” McCall’s Magazine, September 1928, pp. 27, 90. Reprinted in filmfaust 12 
(February 1979): 24 – 30. (Translation mine.) 
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While Murnau’s innovations and contributions to the cinema as an art form are well 
established, such as his signature stylistics of depth of focus, the “unchained camera,” his 
elaborate mise-en-scène, compositional arrangements, and lighting techniques, his films at the 
same time have often been relegated to the status of craftsmanship. That is, while Murnau is 
rightly considered one of the greatest directors in the history of the cinema, he is at the same 
time, the least intellectually controversial or conceptually significant. It is this peculiar 
conjunction that characterizes the current status of Murnau as a director. Conversely, however, 
while his films seem immediately accessible, his persona as a director remains enigmatic. 
Murnau’s films, then, demarcate an interesting blind spot. They are considered important artistic 
works and yet they need not be elaborated as artistic contributions. This means that Murnau’s 
films exemplify a form of self-evidence, which, in itself, is an effect that erases its own causality. 
In turn, the selfsame figure of Murnau as a director becomes yoked with the self-evidence of his 
images, so that a consideration of his work is inevitably tied to the images themselves. In other 
words, the figure of the director disappears as the images appear to begin to speak for 
themselves. Thus he has been established as a master craftsman whose unprecedented vision 
gave rise to a liberated camera, free from the confines of space, and as a cosmopolitan figure 
who was equally at home in the studios of Berlin as he was in Hollywood. 
In his use of writing in film across national boundaries, Murnau demonstrates an 
intriguing recourse to a particular signature of limitation. This signifying figure traverses 
Murnau’s filmic work overall, namely his haunting repetitions of a moment in which the desire 
for a visual geography of boundless space encounters its limit in what might be termed the letter 
of the law. Such recurring limit points delineate a visual crisis that Murnau’s films configure 
across various permutations of his films: from the morbid landscapes of phantasmagoria in 
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Nosferatu to the expulsion from paradise on the oceans of the Pacific in Tabu. In these limit 
points that are configured as instances of writing, the inscriptions define a mode of 
subjectification in which writing posits itself as the limit point of desire and is therefore reflected 
back as subjectivity. If this corresponds to the expressed desire by Murnau to develop a “perfect 
form” of the silent film, then it indicates the importance Murnau placed on the configurations in 
which restrictions were transcended.    
Gilles Deleuze demonstrates that Murnau’s recourse to a particular mode of subjectivity 
is inherently linked to a process of desire which explicates how writing becomes what Deleuze 
terms “an abstract universality”149 that posits an “immediate life which has no need of 
language,”150 whereas “the intertitle or piece of writing shows the law, the forbidden, the 
transmitted order.”151 Deleuze’s delineation of intertitles as a set of boundaries which positions 
life in relation to the law and transmission by way of its mediality determines a consistent visual 
figuration of writing in Murnau’s films. These figurations enforce a boundary of inscription onto 
images against the vectoral forces of desire that attempt to escape these boundaries. In this 
confrontation, Murnau develops a visual theory of writing as a force that thus determines the 
ways of subjectification and at the same time enacts its virtual potential for transcendence. 
Since more than half of Murnau’s oeuvre has been lost, this assessment can only be made 
through his extant films in this respect, five of which are readily available and still in circulation 
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as well as through four lesser-known films.152 By investigating two instances of the recurring 
tropes of boundaries through Murnau’s use of letters, titles, and intertitles, we can see Murnau’s 
exemplary ability, in Elsaesser’s terms, to “naturalize artifice”153 as a means to encapsulate the 
desire for transcendence for which his textual limit points define visual boundaries. To put it 
differently, as a means to configure the desire to escape the processes of subjectification, 
Murnau’s films are “marked by fluid boundaries – junctions that trace the subtle connection 
between entities rather than their clear demarcation,” as Lucy Fischer has demonstrated in her 
study of Murnau’s Sunrise.154 These fluid connections evince a desire that constantly attempts to 
escape demarcations, in particular the boundaries of self that are imposed by the social contract 
as legible manifestations in writing.  
In Nosferatu the concept of reading is directly linked to the ability to understand the 
vampire, Nosferatu. Briefly, the film involves the vampire Count Orlok, who becomes interested 
in an old house, located next door to the home of two young lovers, Ellen (or Nina)155 and 
Jonathan Hutter (or Harker), in the town of Wisborg. On behalf of a real-estate agent, Hutter 
travels to the Carpathian to finalize the contract for the house with the Count. Warned by the 
concerned local townsfolk, who give him a copy of a book on vampires, he nonetheless spends 
                                                 
152 The five most well-known films are Nosferatu ( 1922), The Last Laugh (1924), Faust (1926), Sunrise: A Song of 
Two Humans (1927), and Tabu (1931), as well as the four available ones The Burning Earth (1922), Phantom 
(1922), Tartüff (1925), and City Girl (1929).  
153 Thomas Elsaesser, “Secret Affinities,” Sight and Sound 58, no. 1 (winter 1988/89): 35. 
154 Lucy Fischer, Sunrise: A Song of Two Humans (London: BFI Publishing 1998), p. 8.  
155  The characters’ names differ in the various versions of this film that are available, since Murnau wanted to avoid 
any similarity with the characters’ names in Bram Stoker’s novel Dracula, from which he had borrowed extensively, 
for legal reasons.   
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the night in the Count’s castle. Hutter ridicules the book and casually throws it away to 
emphasize his inability to register the power of the written word. Furthermore, he is unable to 
“read” the physical signs of the vampire’s markings on his neck that have appeared after he has 
spent the night.156 Dismissing the marks as mosquito bites, he fails to understand their 
significance. Indeed, in his letters to Ellen he demonstrates a remarkable lack of understanding 
his surroundings. It is Ellen, therefore, who will use and process the knowledge of the book on 
vampires, driven by “a strange compulsion” as an intertitle informs. The Count seems to be the 
recipient of Ellen’s “strange compulsions,” and decides to travel by boat to the visit the town and 
his new house, bringing with him death and pestilence to the town until Ellen’s desire brings him 
to her and her sexual sacrifice precipitates his death in the morning light. 
As a narration, the film itself is structured within the textual framework of a book, so that 
the writing implies a spectator as a reader of the texts within the film already. The film begins 
with a commonplace image in the cinema, the opening of a book. It is an anonymous account of 
the “Great Plague in 1838” that befell the town of Wisborg. Since the author is dead, designated 
on the cover sheet of the book by three crosses, the enunciating voice of the images to come is 
itself a “nosferatu” or an “undead.”157 This voice of the narrating subject will return as an “I” in 
                                                 
156 Cf. Ursula von Keitz, “Der Blick ins Imaginäre: Über ‘Erzählen’ und ‘Sehen’ bei Murnau,” in Die Metaphysik 
des Dekors: Raum, Architektur und Licht im klassischen deutschen Stummfilm, ed. Klaus Kreimeier (Marburg: 
Schüren, 1994), p. 83. 
157 The etymological origin of the word nosferatu remains apocryphal. Thomas Elsaesser states that it is a 
“Romanian word for ‘the undead.’” Cf. Thomas Elsaesser, “Six Degrees of Nosferatu,” Sight and Sound 11, no. 2 
(February 2001): 13. The producer of the film, Albin Grau, is cited as relating the story that he listened to an account 
of a Serbian peasant who witnessed firsthand the exorcism of a nosferatu, Serbo-Croatian for “undead.” Cf. Lotte 
Eisner, Murnau (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), p. 109, and Fred Gehler and 
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the intertitles sporadically until the end when the titles state that “I have learned” and “all was 
quiet.” It speaks, therefore, beyond the grave to the spectator, who will, in turn, witness the 
characters’ achievement or failure to comprehend the text itself. This instance of the mise-en-
abyme that the film actualizes is likewise reflected in the notion of subjectivity, which constantly 
returns to a position of indeterminacy throughout the film.  
In particular the character of Ellen, who becomes the causal agent of the destruction of 
Nosferatu by delivering its redemption into death through her own sacrifice, remains enigmatic. 
She is the one who communicates with both Hutter and the Nosferatu telepathically across the 
vast distances of space. Her final work before her submission to the vampire is a needlepoint 
pillow with the ornately written message Ich liebe dich. This token of “I love you,” however, 
does not indicate the recipient of this message because in its ambiguous appeal it addresses both 
Hutter and Nosferatu. These “misdirected” instances of communication emphasize the fluidity of 
subjectivity here, since desire is articulated here through the potential of misrecognition. By 
contrast, the notion of the contract ostensibly establishes a firm legal clarity. As Count Orlok 
introduces himself via his agent and a letter written in cabalistic gibberish, the intertitle indicates 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ulrich Kasten, Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau (Berlin: Henschelverlag, 1990), p. 41. Given his traditional classical 
education in secondary school and his subsequent studies in philology, Murnau, who had to change the name to 
“Nosferatu” from “Dracula” to avoid his obvious plagiarism, would undoubtedly have noticed the homonymous 
Latin nos ferat, “he may carry us,” and may have derived great pleasure out of such implications. In addition, the 
fact that the ship which carries Nosferatu across the seas is named Demeter adds another degree of allusion, since, as 
Evans Lansing Smith explains, Demeter is the “mother of Death” because in Greek mythology she is the “mother of 
Persephone, whose yearly abduction into Hades was reënacted during the Classical Mysteries of Eleusis.” Cf. Evans 
Lansing Smith, “Framing the Underworld: Threshold Imagery in Murnau, Cocteau and Bergman,” Literature/Film 
Quarterly 24, no. 3 (July 1996): 24.         
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an accurate translation of the secret writing as an exchange for contractual clarity, which will 
form the basis for a real-estate contract, a territorial move that will allow the Count to inhabit the 
ruins of the warehouses that face Ellen’s cottage. The enunciating voice in the intertitle here is 
that of a translator, rendering in plain language what has been obscured by the enigmatic signs. 
This notion of clarity is then reinvoked when the same contract is once again laid on the table in 
Orlok’s castle. 
The Count, however, ignores the exchange which the contract stipulates when he notices 
Hutter’s amulet with a photograph of Ellen. Mesmerized by her beauty, the Count forgets the 
original reason for his guest’s visit as she ostensibly becomes the object of his desire. This 
intiates a shift from the written contract to the photographic memento of Ellen in an exchange of 
looks between Hutter and the Count that suggests a transferal of desire via the image as a 
substitute. “Your wife has a beautiful neck” reads the intertitle, but the title is, like the 
photographic image of Ellen, a mere reproduction that serves as the relay through which the 
Count can channel his desire to imprint his own physical marks onto Hutter that night. That is, 
the photographic image of Ellen replaces their contractual obligations and instead becomes the 
linkage for the bond that is to be established between Hutter and the Count. A similar counter-
current of desire occurs soon after and traces the interconnectedness between the characters as 
entities. While the image seems to depict Ellen who is on the shore eagerly awaiting and 
beckoning the arrival of Hutter, she is dressed in black and surrounded by crosses, which posits 
the Count as the recipient of Ellen’s desire against the normative construction of the narrative.158 
                                                 
158 While Robin Wood does not notice the ramifications of this profound dissolution of the boundaries of the 
normative subject, he does register that Ellen desires a “kind of demonic alternative husband,” so that it appears that 
“Jonathan and Nosferatu are really the same character.” That is, their union is consummated through the 
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Siegfried Kracauer seems to register as much when he notes Murnau’s “faculty of obliterating 
boundaries between the real and the unreal”159 in this respect. The film articulates a desire as an 
appellation towards Nosferatu and as an embrace of the destructive force that he brings with him. 
The assumed boundaries that the film invokes turn out to function as reciprocal channels of 
desire and communication, so that the basis for distinguishing between such registers of 
limitations is dissolved. This mechanism of dissolution will become a fundamental mode in 
Murnau’s films and it extends to another dimension as well. 
The contractual writing and its communication are hidden in hieroglyphic abstraction, as 
in the opening scenes when the Count’s letter to his mediator and representative in the Wisborg, 
Knock, arrives and is rendered in cabalistic abstractions, emphasizing a limitation of knowledge 
by postulating a spectator who cannot decipher the hieroglyphic writing. As a remarkable 
instance of critical investment, the work of Sylvain Exertier seems to exemplify a historicist 
detective in this context for its possibility of reading clues. In his article “La Lettre Oubliée de 
Nosferatu,” published in the French film journal Positif, Exertier goes to astonishing lengths to 
decipher the letter in its cabalistic, secret, and occult meanings.160 Exertier interprets the 
cryptograms in a hermeneutic process, as he uncovers their inherent meaning, steeped in fidelity 
to the “occult” and “esoteric” tradition. Moreover, he declares, that the letter to Knock, in fact, 
corresponds to the letter with the plot development of the film overall. That is, each cryptogram 
                                                                                                                                                             
substitutional figure of Ellen, who becomes the contractual item of exchange between them. Cf. Robin Wood, 
“Murnau I: Nosferatu,” Film Comment 12, no. 3 (May – June 1976): 8. 
159 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 78. 
160 Sylvain Exertier, “La Lettre Oubliée de Nosferatu,” Positif,  no. 228 (March 1980): 47. (Translation mine.) 
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has its function in the letter to announce the Count’s journey and his intentions and in this sense 
encapsulates the desire of the Count. 
While acknowledging the brevity of the letter’s duration on the screen, Exertier 
nonetheless marvels at the meticulous craft with which the letter has been rendered faithful to an 
esoteric reading, indeed, faithful to its very legibility itself, despite the fact that “it is impossible 
to notice the meaning [signification] of this text during the few seconds of its duration on the 
screen [passage à l’écran].”161 He attempts to demonstrate with the deciphering of the occult 
codes that the letter contains and enacts, in a reversal of the heraldic function of the mise-en-
abyme for the overall film, a potential spectator with the eyes of the occultist. What Exertier 
achieves here is to develop a sense of how Murnau uses writing to posit and define subjective 
positions. The attention Exertier accords the production design, then, demonstrates that there can 
be subject positions in relation to the text on the screen that transcend the limits of temporality. 
In other words, a legible subject position has been established that remains outside the confines 
of the film itself, but nonetheless finds its articulation in Exertier. His work, then, is not only that 
of the hermeneut but becomes that of the historian whose subject position in the present is 
addressed by the minute artifacts of the past.     
Such an emphasis on how a reading viewer might be postulated in Murnau’s films also 
animates Ursula von Keitz’ investigation in which she defines a particular kind of subjectivity 
that Murnau’s films engender and engage. In the same manner in which Nosferatu suggest the 
                                                 
161 Ibid., p. 51. Exertier also notes that this might be Murnau’s “wink to the occultists,” particularly given its 
legibility to a reader conversant in occultist cryptograms: “Ce qui étonne dans ce texte est sa relative lisibilité, les 
texts ésotériques étant généralement écrits sous la forme de grimoires, illisibles sans l’aide d’une grille, que seuls 
possèdent le magiste et son correspondant. Ici chaque signe est signifiant, Nosferatu ne craint donc pas d’être lu par 
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force of subjectification that writing imposes, both Phantom (1922) and The Last Laugh operate, 
in von Keitz’ terms, as a visualized Verschriftung (a process of “scripturalization”) that 
incorporates the viewer.162 Whereas Nosferatu invokes a temporal disjunction by which the 
viewer “enacts” a reading of the images and is consequently subjectified in the position of a 
reader, Phantom, based on Gerhart Hauptmann’s novel, dissolves the viewer into the space of 
writing itself.163 Its opening shot shows the author Gerhart Hauptmann himself, holding a book 
in his hand and looking directly into the camera. His gaze then turns left where a match cut 
shows a house on a meadow. The film, then, forces the viewer into the “writing” of the author 
Hauptmann, whose gaze leads us into space of the house, where the protagonist Lorenz Lubota 
begins to write his life’s story into a blank notebook, which, in turn, dissolves and frames the 
film as a flashback account of his writing. 
Von Keitz notes the intriguing ambiguity with which frames and boundaries are dissolved 
by an “unhinging of the signs – both written text and sound – from the source of their 
production, which leads to the animation of the signs themselves.”164 In this sense, the viewer 
becomes a “witness of a process of consciousness” by which the act of writing “visualizes” and 
actualizes its own process, authorized by the presence of both the real and the fictitious author in 
the image. In turn, the gaze of the camera articulates the “vision-object”165 of the writer, hence 
                                                 
162 Ursula von Keitz, “Der Blick ins Imaginäre,” p. 85.   
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the eyes of the writer and the viewer’s are fused in a doubled point of view that is both subjective 
and objective, both detached from and defined by the source of its production.166 Murnau’s 
achievement, according to von Keitz, is to emphasize this process of subjectivization through his 
use of the “unchained camera,” exemplified most remarkably in his film The Last Laugh. In the 
film’s contemporary criticism, as well as in Murnau’s own recollection, the film celebrated the 
fact that this was a film without any intertitles at all. Kamilla Elliott notes that the irritation with 
intertitles can be found “among hundreds”167 of reviews and critical accounts of film during the 
1920s.   
Von Keitz limits herself to a notion of subjectification in the sense of the secondary 
identification process that the camera apparatus entails. The film documents the gradual and 
tragic decline in status of a hotel porter, who, as a figure of authority epitomized by his uniform, 
loses this position of power as a figurehead representative of the hotel. Embarrassed by this, he 
attempts to cover up the loss of social standing through a pretentious clinging to delusions of 
grandeur. He is finally demoted to the position of washroom attendant in the basement of the 
hotel where he awaits his death. The Last Laugh, von Keitz asserts, is characterized by shifts 
between “objective viewing” and “subjective points of view” that allow the film to “mediate the 
consciousness of the protagonist.”168 This is literalized, then, in a sequence where the protagonist 
reads his letter of dismissal as his eyes attempt to focus on the word Schwäche (weaknesss). A 
                                                 
166 This process would more accurately describe a prominent instance of Murnau’s use of an intertitle in Sunrise, 
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medium close-up shows the porter’s adjusting his glasses, which is followed by an extreme 
close-up where we see through his point of view the blurring of the letters. Von Keitz here does 
not interrogate Murnau’s own claim that The Last Laugh represents the epitome of images and 
has approximated the ideal of cinema, since in Murnau’s words, “an ideal picture needs no 
titles.” 169 As Murnau hopes, the future of the medium will lie in films that severely restrict titles 
and thus and ultimately move towards a method of “[s]ymbolism that would obviate titles.”170 
He draws a literary analogy here to James Joyce, whose work, Murnau states, “picturizes the 
mind.”171  
Remarkably, despite these claims, The Last Laugh incorporates an extraordinary amount 
of writing into the film beyond the significant intrusion of the one intertitle that introduces a coda 
to the film. For von Keitz, however, the subjectivization process that Murnau’s films mobilize 
are produced by the cinematic apparatus itself in a form of empathy. Thus, she argues, the 
relation between spectator, protagonist, and point of view is triangulated by the way in which the 
film “concretizes the referential perception, which in [Murnau’s] previous films had been 
established only through the interaction of language and image, by always already shaping the 
images in the manner of how the protagonist perceives his environment.”172 Here Murnau might 
concur, since, for all intents and purposes, the film adheres to his stated goal to find the images 
for the ideal, that is, “titleless” picture. All the more disconcerting, then, is the question of how to 
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integrate the decisive intervention that the film’s one prominent use of an intertitle stages.173 
After the protagonist is demoted and reduced to working in the basement lavatory, the image 
sequence portends a tragic ending. The camera closes in on him as he sinks down alongside the 
bathroom wall, alone, exhausted, and humiliated, and slowly awaiting his inevitable death. 
However, an intertitle suddenly and without narrative motivation appears. 
“The author taking pity on our hapless protagonist and his life,” the intertitle declares, 
“the film will now change the outcome of the story,” whereupon the porter inherits a fortune by 
one of his lavatory patrons, “A.G. Money,” and his fate is reversed. He becomes a guest in his 
own hotel and indulges in all the luxuries available. He leaves the hotel by horse carriage, 
celebrated and cheered by all around him, guests and staff alike, and invites a beggar from the 
street to join him and sit next to him in the carriage. While some critics define this as a moment 
demanded by UFA for economic reasons to ensure a “happy” and thus popular ending174 or even 
see it as a “critique of capitalistic fairytales that the self-reflexive rapture seems to suggest,”175 
Kracauer avers that the “concluding sequence corroborates its introductory caption in that it 
expresses the author’s disbelief” in his own fabrication and thus “[t]hrough its second ending the 
film underscores the significance of the first one.”176
It is through this concept of fabrication that the social character of the intertitle becomes 
legible. The film has continued a vector of abject desire, and thereby, according to von Keitz, has 
created a degree of identification in which the self and the other merge through empathy, since 
                                                 
173 An issue which is conveniently ignored in most accounts, including Murnau’s own. 
174 Cf. Stephan Schindler, “What Makes a Man a Man: The Construction of Masculinity in F.W. Murnau’s The Last 
Laugh,” Screen 37, no. 1 (spring 1996): 32.  
175 Ibid., p. 31. 
176 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 101. 
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the film’s equation of the camera with the inner “eye” of the protagonist has suggested a means 
of obliterating the boundaries of the self.177 But the intervention of the intertitle affirms that the 
powers of subjectification lie elsewhere. The “authorial” intervention asserts authority and its 
powers of definition as a benevolent force at the moment when the force of transference towards 
empathy is at its greatest. The pity with the petit-bourgeois porter, who has pursued a delusional 
attempt to identify himself with real authority figures, has created a troubling mode of 
identification for a sense of self. When the intertitle appears, then, the self is reconstructed in 
relation to a larger power.178 This conforms to what Thomas Elsaesser has outlined elsewhere as 
a “particular historical subjectivity: that of the German petit-bourgeois, identifying himself with 
the State.”179 Elsaesser relates this to Benjamin’s gnomic observation of the “aestheticization of 
politics” in fascism. The pleasure that the intervention of the intertitle generates, then, lies, in 
Elsaesser’s terms, in the “pleasure of being seen by others,”180 the pleasure that is categorically 
denied to the porter in his pitiful desire for respect. The intertitle reverses this denial and imposes 
                                                 
177 Stephan Schindler reads this notion of identity through the category of constructed gender differences via the 
power of the gaze. He asserts that the film confronts the spectator with a “schizophrenic twist” in power, since the 
porter exhibits an appearance anxiety that is determined by the “gaze of women” who construct the “doorman’s 
imaginary identity” through the power of “the female gaze that grants and destroys male sovereignty, a power which 
the film seems to display as female character deficiency when it is used against men.” Cf. Schindler, “The 
Construction of Masculinity,” p. 36.  
178 This moment is still extremely effective, even today. In screenings of the film in front of actual audiences there is 
often a gasp of relief or cheer audible when the intertitle appears.  
179 Thomas Elsaesser, “Primary Identification and the Historical Subject: Fassbinder and Germany,” in Narrative, 
Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader, ed. Philip Rosen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 
544. 
180 Ibid., p. 545. 
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a force of subjectivity which binds the audience to a different identificatory force again. It allows 
the experience of the “pleasure of being seen,” as Elsaesser defines the “pleasure of fascism, … 
of placing oneself in view of the all-seeing eye of the State”181 again. 
These observations may serve to indicate some of the directions that this study of the 
writing on the German screen will follow. In the following chapter I trace the figurations of how 
authority is articulated through writing in two films that define the arc of the Weimar Republic 
and its cinema, Robert Wiene’s silent film The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920) and the early 
sound film by G.W Pabst, Kameradschaft (1931). Chapter three investigates how writing is used 
as a social force that in both Mabuse films and M by Fritz Lang inscribes vicious patterns of 
circularity in the inescapable movements of legal logic that allegorize a Teufelskreis or “vicious 
circle” as a form of punishment through entrapment. Chapter four returns to the figure of 
authority, but this time through a close reading of the archival documents of censorship decisions 
in the early years of the Weimar republic that have recently become available for scholarly 
inspection. Through these I reconstruct a historical figure that has all but disappeared, namely 
Carl Bulcke, the first head of the Berlin censorship board from 1919 to 1924. In his legal 
decisions, preserved as written records, the contested constructions of citizenship become legible 
                                                 
181 Ibid. Against this subjectification and the imposition of the boundaries of self that the writing here generates, 
Murnau posits writing in a different figure that invalidates the law of the letter as moving against the currents of 
desire in the final images of his last film Tabu (1931), filmed and set in Polynesia. In the final scene a young boy 
drowns in the ocean in a desperate attempt to swim after the boat that is carrying his illicit lover away. He dissolves 
in death along with the letters that have spelled out the social constraints against their love, namely the word 
“taboo.” As the letters “drown” in the ocean along with him, the constraints are finally dissolved in a Romanticist 
gesture that suggests a transcendence in transience, in an oblique analogy to the inscription of John Keats’ 
gravestone as “one whose name is writ in water.” 
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as they are enacted by the nameless bureaucrat who attempts to understand the figurations of the 
films’ ideal audience and who attempts to intervene in them on behalf of the state. 
If Bulcke serves as the proxy figure for the state, then Nazi film renders this imaginary 
figure as a suffering body. In marked contrast to the uses of writing in Weimar cinema, Nazi film 
eliminates some very specific figurations of writing by returning to a rhetoric of passion via 
scriptural marks, stigmata, and signs of suffering. In chapter five I delineate these allegorical 
modes of inscription through the star figure of Emil Jannings in Ohm Krüger, one of the most 
popular films at the height of Nazi power. Chapter six examines the difficulties early post-war 
German film encountered in its attempts at reärticulating the conceptions of the state, which is 
evident in their return to an insistent and obsessive use of writing, by looking at two films by 
Wolfgang Staudte, Die Mörder sind unter Uns and Rotation. Staudte is a figure who himself 
embodies some of the divisions and constraints of the period after the war from which a divided 
Germany emerged. The ways in which he constructs a political consensus in these films, I 
contend, demonstrate incipient figurations of the power of the state that are still constructed as 
allegorizations, but which relegate their faith into religious iconography. An epilogue suggests 
further trajectories of the lines of argument that have been delineated through Rainer Werner 
Fassbinder’s 1979 film Die Dritte Generation about the convergence of terrorism and the media 
in which the inflationary use of writing becomes a visual assault, and the 1998 film 23, based on 
actual events surrounding the death of a computer hacker in 1980s West Germany, whose 
activities resulted in both an imaginary delusional paranoia and his actual persecution by state 
authorities. 
Ultimately, however, if this work may indicate the already-known, if it only confirms that 
for which we have already settled the terms of explanation, then it merely reflects the trouble that 
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the continuing insistence of a historicism as the mode of determining “what it was really like” 
exerts. In other words, the problem with the “already-known” is analogous to the problem of 
historicism in that it assumes the responsibility of historical work to be a static exercise of 
confirmation. In this case, the potential for the confirmation of the received consensus or the 
recognized frameworks of understanding history may have at least been arrived at in dynamic 
terms as a heuristic process of investigation into some of the unexplored elements of writing, 
which, to its credit, would make it a means of generating a knowledge of limitations or a return 
to the basis of these limitations once again. If this is the case, then the writing on the screen will 
be inflected again into the diffuse and centripetal movements within the vast stream of images 
once more and it will have found another figure for its completion by folding back into itself, no 
longer to be noticed. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE FIGURE OF AUTHORITY IN THE CABINET OF DR. 
CALIGARI AND KAMERADSCHAFT 
 
 
 
In any historical account of the importance of Weimar cinema, its imaginary narrative implied by 
the arc of the trajectory among its well-known works from The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920) to 
The Testament of Dr. Mabuse (1933) seems almost too self-evident and portentous, almost too 
“German Expressionist” in its sense of catastrophic fate and conjecture of rampant powers, and 
must therefore invite a certain scholarly skepticism. Siegfried Kracauer’s From Caligari to 
Hitler and Lotte Eisner’s study The Haunted Screen have cast their long shadows on this period, 
so to speak, and imposed a sense of interpretive and deterministic inevitability. Indeed, Thomas 
Elsaesser’s recent reässessment of Weimar cinema takes this uncanny “convergence of image 
with its object”1 as its basis to investigate how we should account for the fact that Weimar 
cinema “allowed such a ‘fit’ between film and history to remain convincing for so long”2 in 
order to declare that in all likelihood no knowledge “will dislodge that now quasi-existential 
                                                 
1 Thomas Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After: Germany's Historical Imaginary (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 3. 
2 Ibid., p. 4. 
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bond between a group of films and the subsequent fate of the society that produced and 
consumed them.”3  
For Elsaesser, this historical imaginary is “perfectly understandable”4 and at the same 
time no longer necessary or relevant as anything other than a historical imaginary to be defined 
as such. Understandable, that is, because the horrors of the Nazi years were so fundamentally 
unimaginable that “history itself in this case required the in(ter)vention of an imaginary” that 
could render “the unspeakable to enter into an order of temporality and discourse, however 
inadequate and banal.”5 This imaginary, Elsaesser continues, allows an “unrepresentable history” 
to be configured through the “illusion of a hidden truth” into a “symptomatology, so perfectly 
readable – with hindsight.”6 As a countermeasure, therefore, Elsaesser proposes to “restore” and 
“give back” to Weimar films “some of their other possible futures, rather than keep them the 
ones that history (the historical imaginary) seems to have locked them into.”7
This is a remarkable project, not least because it corresponds to an apodictic state of 
thinking which Elsaesser has declared elsewhere for the “idea” of the German cinema, namely 
that now “we can afford to pay a little less attention to [its] best-known periods: the 1920s and 
the 1970s.”8 Are we “done” with these decades? Can we now lay to rest the disturbing relations 
between Weimar cinema and Nazism? Is it possible to ascribe to this cinema a difference in 
understanding which restores and redeems it from the taints of its unfortunate future? In other 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 36. 
4 Ibid., p. 4. 
5 Ibid., p. 35. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p. 7. 
8 Thomas Elsaesser, ed., The BFI Companion to German Cinema (London: BFI Publishing, 1999), p. 112.  
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words, have we finally determined its legacy as a future, or “come to terms” with its history in a 
sense that echoes but inverts the way in which the term Vergangenheitsbewältigung implies an 
overcoming of history by “working through” the past as a form of “coming to terms with the 
future” or Zukunftsbewältigung? Elsaesser himself poses such a declaration as a rhetorical 
question and asks “how far do we need this imaginary today? Are we still looking to films for 
explanations of Nazism?”9 before he shifts the terms of the discussion of Weimar cinema in 
order to “relieve” it from “the grip of symptomatology” in a kind of reverse exorcism that 
counters its seemingly insurmountable and perpetual demonization.10
Sympathetic as we may be to the appeal of this tendency – and who would not want to 
lay to rest once and for all the spectre of fascism? – there is something unsettling and perturbing 
itself in such categorical declarations of finality. Elsaesser charts a fundamental significance in 
the methodology that a select number of films in the cinema of the Weimar period have come to 
stand in for or represent an entire explanatory apparatus that narrativizes their function as 
epiphenomenal “clues” to a history to come, so that the “film critic or historian has to turn 
detective, alert to every index or clue”11 in his role to verify the outcome which the cluster of 
these films are proposed to have signaled toward. Precisely because the films’ status as a 
prefiguration of the Nazi period leaves them locked into this duplicitous constraint they seem to 
be destined to encourage a “special hermeneutic activity.”12 Presumably, then, this kind of 
hermeneutic investigation, which the films themselves seem to invite and facilitate, is no longer 
                                                 
9 Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After, p. 36. 
10 Ibid., p. 438. 
11 Ibid., p. 31. 
12 Ibid., p. 5. 
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necessary once we unhinge the films from their inevitably situated chronology of proximity and 
understand their function in the historical imaginary. Instead, Elsaesser’s promise is an approach 
that opens up another possibility of returning to the past, of salvaging the films from the 
impossible burden of their future, so that they can be looked at anew and need not be marshaled 
as evidence in order to explain their function as historical documents once more.  
While the value of this undertaking may be relevant and perhaps even liberating for a 
reäppraisal of this period in cinema history, it does not necessarily follow that we should accept 
that the films, in Elsaesser’s words, work only because of their systematic refusal “to be ‘tied 
down’ to a single meaning.”13 As he determines, this quality makes these films particularly 
suited to “resist reference” and thus serve to call for a “spectator constructing ‘allegories of 
meaning,’”14 which, in turn, enables the films to lend themselves to be solicited for the 
development of a historical argument. In other words, just because there exists the necessity of a 
meaning that needs to be derived “allegorically” after the fact, does not invalidate the problem 
that there is a fundamental process of allegorization which takes place already in the films 
themselves. Even though the films that stand in for this particular type of imaginary lend 
themselves to an allegorized or symptomatic reading, we might need to postulate that films 
constitute certain modes of allegorization from the outset. In the case of German cinema, then, 
this categorical principle of allegorization came into stark relief once the cinema became the 
legitimate grounds for historical investigation. That is, how is this process of allegorization 
generally “hidden” in such a way that we do not recognize it as a process in and of itself so that 
we can only accept it as a symptom for the desires of historical interpretation rather than 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 4. 
14 Ibid. 
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understanding the issue of allegory as symptomatic for its own interpretive construction in the 
process? And finally, what if we did restore to these films a certain sense of “duplicitous 
innocence,” a paradoxical concept that Elsaesser invokes in his introduction?15 Perhaps then it 
will become possible to chart different trajectories in the study of films for a period that has so 
frequently been used to elucidate the question of how nation and history are conjoined in the 
cinema. Elsaesser’s shift allows for a reconceptualization of a number of these categories that 
have been yoked under the rubric of Weimar cinema, yet this shift does not absolve us from 
abandoning these terms altogether. Rather, it becomes precisely necessary to return to the films 
and investigate the parameters by which they need to be approached in order to determine their 
continuing relevance. 
First and foremost, it should alert us that a concept such as “allegory” is so frequently 
invoked by Elsaesser and yet, at the same time, most often seems to refer to a kind of transparent 
notion of self-reflexivity as a meta-discursive secondary effect that the films generate. In this 
sense, allegory becomes the blind-spot that remains permanently visible and yet nonetheless 
diverts attention from itself by functioning so immediately while seeming accessible. Or, to put it 
in a more succinct way, as Tom Gunning has stated, “few film historians have paused to reflect 
on the great resurrection of allegory within silent cinema.”16 Despite the stylistic prevalence that 
Elsaesser accords the allegorical dimension of Weimar cinema, he does not grant the mode any 
other significance apart from its apparently tempting ability to structure interpretive schemata for 
the film historian, whose task, it seems, is merely to develop a process of verification in 
                                                 
15 Cf. Ibid., p. 12. 
16 Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang: Allegories of Vision and Modernity (London: BFI Publishing, 2000), p. 
26. 
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retrospect. In this sense, allegory functions for Elsaesser as a “mere mode of designation,” 
which, as Walter Benjamin states, is a prejudicial misconception of the importance of allegory 
because allegory is “not a playful illustrative technique, but a form of expression, just as speech 
is expression, and, indeed, just as writing is.”17 This indicates the importance of understanding 
allegory not merely as a secondary “symptom,” but as a primary and profound mode of 
signification, which, precisely because it seems as self-evident as speech and writing appear in 
their expressive functions, is usually relegated to a level of illustration. 
The debates on the allegorical dimension of the German cinema that Elsaesser intends to 
put to rest here might best be understood as a gesture towards a conception of progressive 
history, which can be divided into discrete entities. Here, however, the argument is not so much 
defined as a nostalgia for the past but rather as a reconstruction of the present and its concerns 
with history. In this respect, Elsaesser obliquely engages Eric Santner, who defines a particular 
“semantic field” in which critical “discourses, primarily poststructuralist in inspiration, appear 
committed to the vigilant and radical critique of what are taken to be the narcissisms and 
nostalgias central to the project of modernity – namely Enlightenment faith in progress.”18 In 
their discursive structure, these critiques turn into “discourses of bereavement [that] see in the 
harrowing labor of mourning one’s various narcissisms and nostalgias a source of 
empowerment.”19  As Santner demonstrates, these critiques frequently are developed with an 
affinity to a Benjaminian definition of the baroque, since “Benjamin suggests that the greatness 
                                                 
17 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 1996), p. 162. 
18 Eric L. Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), p. 7. 
19 Ibid., p. 11. 
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of the baroque lay precisely in its insight into the irreducible elegiac dimension of signification, 
which for Benjamin is to be seen in the allegorical mode.”20
Elsaesser does not reserve much patience for this critical affinity, nor does he allow for 
the validity of a fundamental merging between the task of the critic and the area of exploration, 
which, in Santner’s terms, determines that the historian finds herself “marooned in a world of 
ruins, fragments, stranded objects that thereby take on a textual aspect: they demand to be 
read.”21 There might be ascribed a disingenuous, even narcissist, motive in the hermeneutic 
desire succumb to these demands, yet the fragmentation that accompanies the leveling of 
meaning into such ruins does not only entail a reässembly of random recombinations. Rather, 
since these elegiac readings yield the failures and limit points of interpretation and, in doing so, 
point to the aporias of historical understanding, Santner continues, “one must wonder whether 
the elaboration of those failures… can also be understood as a gesture of genuine anamnesis and 
mourning toward the Holocaust and its victims.”22 Recently, important critical directions have 
been opened up that continue this work of anamnesis without reducing it to a mode of narcissist 
recognition of the critical self in the limit points defined by the nexus between memory and 
history. Giorgio Agamben, for example, has deliberately refused to accept the aporia that leaves 
unexamined the condition of camps because it reduces them, as he states, to “the place in which 
the most absolute conditio inhumana ever to appear on Earth was realized: this is ultimately all 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
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22 Ibid., p. 13. 
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that counts for the victims as well as for posterity.”23 Instead, Agamben seeks to investigate the 
conditions of the camps in light of an understanding that they constitute the “nomos of the 
political space in which we still live.”24 Gil Anidjar, for example, has continued this demand for 
examination by providing a far-ranging investigation into the linguistic conditions of the camps 
that make visible, as he calls it, “the theologico-political history of absolute subjection.”25                                     
What this means is that the inevitability of fragmented interpretations, which arises out of 
the radical ambiguity and the rebus-like quality that constructs the teleology of Weimar cinema 
into a field of “picture puzzles,”26 should not be understood as a foreclosure or end to the kind of 
appreciation and “‘serious’ study”27 Elsaesser wants to establish in its stead. But, once Weimar 
cinema has been “liberated” from its future interpretations, this approach does not, in turn, 
liberate us from the necessity of taking its principles of allegorization into account or allow us to 
dismiss it as a by-product of  a mere hermeneutic desire. That is, rather than relegating the films’ 
mode of allegorization to an epiphenomenon which arises from the secondary effect of the urge 
for understanding, it becomes necessary to explain and chart its pervasive filmic prevalence and 
manifestations by other means. If we are to take seriously once again the films of the Weimar 
period, we must ask why it is that the presence of allegorization is something that transcends any 
particular generic or thematic boundaries and whether this, then, indicates a cinematic mode of 
                                                 
23 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 37. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Gil Anidjar, “Muslims (Hegel, Freud, Auschwitz),” in The Jew, The Arab: A History of the Enemy (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 140. 
26 Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After, p. 4. 
27 Ibid., p. 14. 
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expression that forces us to reconceive the framework that we impose on historical 
periodizations and which serve as the basis for the historical imaginary that Elsaesser invokes.  
Moreover, if it is a fundamental presence that we can locate in a range of films, it seems 
important to reconfigure the “will-to-interpretation” not as a felicitous, inevitable, or 
inconsequential result but, rather, as an integral element inscribed into the films in order to 
determine the trajectories that have been submerged within the constraints of Weimar cinema’s 
imaginary, which, after all, is what Elsaesser proposes to do as well in his project to make 
possible a “different look at Weimar cinema.”28 However, this project demands that we return to 
the very films that have been established as the interpretive canon that stands in for Weimar 
cinema’s historical status and have functioned as its representatives. The questions that need to 
be asked, then, in order to delineate the tasks and responsibilities of the film historian are the 
ones that Weimar cinema can now open up for us again and are to be found in a Weimar cinema 
reëxamined. 
Here, then, is a symptomatic conjunction across the trajectory that unites two films 
commonly thought to form milestones from the beginning and the end of Weimar cinema, 
namely The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Robert Wiene, 1920) and Kameradschaft (G.W. Pabst, 
1931). In Robert Wiene’s film, The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, the small town of Holstenwall is in 
the grips of fear because of a series of murders. During the course of an investigation into these 
mysterious murders, suspicion falls on a traveling carnival performer who calls himself Dr. 
Caligari and his attraction, a somnambulist named Cesare. Fleeing from the investigation led by 
the protagonist Francis, Caligari is traced to the local insane asylum, where Francis asks to see 
the hospital’s director and discovers, to his surprise, that the director and Caligari are one and the 
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same person. In order to shed light on this seemingly bizarre and inexplicable convergence, 
Francis enlists the help of three members of the asylum’s staff and at night they ransack the 
director’s study in search for answers. Going through his books and manuscripts they come 
across a 1726 compendium published by the University of Uppsala on somnambulism, which, as 
an intertitle explains, is the director’s “special field of study.” In this tome they discover the story 
of one Dr. Caligari who, as we read now page for page on the screen, “toured the fair grounds of 
certain small towns of northern Italy accompanied by his somnambulist Cesare” and committed a 
series of murders in these towns by enslaving the somnambulist and “compelling him to carry 
out his will.” Because the scenarios described in the compendium are identical to the ones that 
Holstenwall has endured, Francis begins to search frantically through the director’s diary. 
On the pages of the diary, Francis discovers a joyful entry that reads as a title on the 
screen “finally – finally – they have reported the admission to the asylum of a somnambulist.” A 
image sequence then provides the flashback which recounts how pleased the director is to accept 
the “specimen” of a somnambulist among his patients. The director verifies the patient’s status as 
a somnambulist by flipping excitedly through an old book, presumably the Uppsala 
compendium, and becomes so ecstatic that he rips apart its pages. The flashback sequence is 
punctuated by iris-opens and iris-closes in which the group is shown reading eagerly in the 
lower-screen left and which underscore that what is seen on the upper screen-right corresponds 
to what Francis and the hospital staff are reading on the pages. The act of reading and the 
manifestation of the text occur on same plane on the screen, but the movement between the act of 
reading itself and that which is conjured up by the reading is marked by the iris transitions. 
Along with Francis and the trio of doctors, we read but do not yet see on the screen what the 
doctor-director reveals in his diary, namely that “the irresistible passion of my life is being 
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fulfilled,” which is to “learn if it is true that a somnambulist can be compelled to perform acts 
which, in a waking state, would be abhorrent to him.” From this written entry an intertitle 
declares that the director is “in the grip of an obsession,” and we see the director, obsessed by his 
desire for knowledge, clutching the compendium. Another title states that he is about to convince 
himself that he “must become Caligari.” In the subsequent image sequence we see the director 
ambling in a frenzy toward the camera while he is still clinging to his book. He pauses, looks up 
and his right hand gestures traces across an imaginary line. As he turns around, the imaginary 
writing he has traced with his hand now becomes manifest across the screen in concrete letters, 
demanding that he become Caligari: “Du musst Caligari werden” they spell for him across the 
sky, on the walls, and on the ground below him, as he attempts to grasp and capture the letters 
until the name “Caligari” begins to encircle and enclose him with ever-increasing size and he 
flees from them in despair. When this scene is concluded, the four readers look up slowly, aware 
of the gravity of what they have just read and what we have witnessed as a manifestation of their 
text. 
The famous dilemma that Caligari imposes on its narrative is that the entire film is 
finally revealed to have originated from the imagination of an asylum’s inmate who has 
recounted the film as a story to a fellow inmate. The narrator, it turns out, is Francis, who has 
integrated the benevolent figure of the asylum director into his fictional or imaginary narrative. 
Much has been made of the reversal that this ending implies,29 but what is hardly ever mentioned 
in the debates surrounding this film is the prominence and integral importance of writing 
throughout the film, which is consequently reduced to an account of the articulated speech by a 
delirious narrator. What the sequence “proves” is how Caligari and the insane director have 
                                                 
29 Cf. David Robinson, Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari (London: BFI Publishing), 1997. 
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become one, compelled and driven by the written demands on the screen, but this process of 
identification is subsequently recorded in writing and provided as visual evidence in writing on 
the screen. This indicates that writing throughout the film has material consequences in the sense 
that it provides the instances of subjectification, while at the same time, it serves as the trace of 
this subjectification as a record on the screen. By impelling the director to “become” Caligari, 
the writing on the screen enacts its own inversion of the boundaries between self and other. What 
we read on the screen are the expressions of the inner thought processes of the director, made 
manifest outwardly in abstraction as writing.  
Almost to the letter, this inversion corresponds to a concise definition of Expressionist 
film, in which, as Lotte Eisner formulates it, “exterior facts are continually being transformed 
into interior elements and psychic events are exteriorized.”30 In this framework, the director’s 
mental state is rendered as a material manifestation, in writing, on the screen. The letters thus 
serve as evidentiary “proof” for all to see that the director is compelled by an idee fixe, yet, 
paradoxically, it is through this very fact that the writing proves, or documents, his inner state of 
being that it cannot purport to possess any truth claims within the image. Ostensibly, the basis for 
proof can be found in the diary, the written account of the director, which, by virtue of having 
found its group of investigating readers, has now given rise to the image sequence, which, in 
turn, documents the director’s insanity. However, the image sequence as the manifestation of an 
act of reading does not carry with it any sense of validity yet. The readers of the diary look at 
each other after the sequence, as if what they have just read can prove to them the director’s 
obsessions and hallucinations. Yet how is this fact determined? This privileged moment of 
                                                 
30 Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen: Expressionism in the German Cinema and the Influence of Max Reinhardt, 
trans. Roger Greaves (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 15. 
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insight stands in sharp contrast to the self-evident status of the text of the academic compendium 
or the diary as a confessional mode. In other words, the images of letters seen by the director, the 
readers, and the spectator do not correspond to a text that has been read through an act of 
deciphering, but instead the letters are the secondary manifestations of another text that must 
remain enigmatic. The writing on the screen is therefore not a depiction of what the director has 
written in his diaries, nor is it the visual manifestation of the particular text that the investigators 
are reading. It becomes instead a substitute for a moment that cannot be rendered unequivocally, 
either as an image or as a written text. 
This moment describes the dissolution of the boundaries between subject and object. The 
subjective thought processes of the director now appear as objective letters, while the letters 
dictate to him which subject he is to become. In this process of subjectification, the voice that 
compels him to do so is objectified as letters in motion. On the one hand, this is a visual attempt 
to render internalized speech in graphic terms as the obsessive voice that is haunting the mind of 
the director. In this sense, the letters are merely the graphic manifestation of speech in the same 
manner by which intertitles indicate speech, with the added temporal dimension that makes 
visible the process of utterance through the movement of letters. Here, however, the voice 
becomes more than speech itself, because its articulation emphasizes the mechanical, and 
therefore non-subjective, quality of its manifestation. At first, the written letters appear in a 
movement that suggests a slow and gradual, even musical pace,31 until this rhythmic structure is 
                                                 
31 In a footnote, Lotte Eisner notes the “strangely distorted ‘Expressionistic’ lettering” of the original intertitles, 
absent in the prints circulating at the time of her writing. But, she notes, a remnant of this expressionist technique is 
still evident in the “hallucination scene, when the doctor, swept along by his obsession, perceives the written phrase 
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abstracted to the point at which the letters are punctuated on the screen as if typed by an 
imaginary typewriter. The category of the typewriter suggests a machinic presence of force, the 
apparatus of which cannot be made visible because it stands outside the frame of the image. 
Nonetheless, its effects are materialized on the screen as letters that demand the director’s 
accedence and submission to its authority. This force dictates the subjectivity the director is to 
inhabit and thus deprives him of his free will, a condition that has provided the basis for the 
director’s fascination with somnambulism in the first place. He has, in turn, become the object of 
this fascination himself and is now reduced to an instrument of the force that haunts him. 
The transition from text to image as we see in the act of reading should not, therefore, 
indicate that the written text on the pages is in any way more “real” or more material than the 
image sequences we see. In fact, a movement in the opposite direction occurs, since the 
distinction between text and image in this sequence is suspended and conflated into segments of 
seemingly equal valid forms of textual documentation until the film turns this mode of 
presentation into the fundamental question of the indeterminate status of the boundaries between 
imaginary and real manifestations throughout. In this mode of leveling, academic writing from 
the University of Uppsala can bestow its authority towards an equivalent textual value of the 
written diaries, so that the hallucination scene, in which the director “reads” the voice he hears, 
carries with it the same weight of significance that the ancient and dusty compendium from the 
venerable Swedish institution conveys. By incorporating such a wide range of written registers, 
the film projects a mythical idea of textual space in its juxtaposition of the lore of a Southern 
Italian oral folktale with its concordant clinical examination recorded by a Scandinavian 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘You must become Caligari’ flashing and undulating across the narrow entrance to a garden of flat spiny trees.” Cf. 
Eisner, The Haunted Screen, p. 21.  
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academic institution. In this respect, the film employs differing registers of scale that gain equal 
value, so that rumored tales and academic compendia can attest to the same phenomena and the 
written record of a madman becomes verified as fact through the images that ostensibly show an 
objective representation of his deluded inner state of being. 
Yet, this externalized subjectivity as manifested through writing belongs itself to the 
framework within the overall narration, which has already been established as the spoken 
account of an old tale. The textual implication that these differing registers of text all belong to 
the voice of a narrator who, therefore, has enunciated them as writing might attest to the ease 
with which film as a form is capable of integrating a variety of media within it. Conversely, the 
use of graphic writing as an indication for the objective status of the text here might emphasize 
the tenuous status of the filmic text itself, which by necessity undermines its own foundations. 
We might dismiss these concerns as another instance through which the pervasive principles of 
deconstruction can be verified once more. In doing so, the film would be reduced to demonstrate, 
once again, that the text cannot maintain the premises it purports to uphold, were it not for the 
fact that this notion of a destabilizing force field interferes with the boundaries between speech 
and writing. That is, here we no longer have a clear-cut division between speech as a category 
that defines a subject and writing as its objective correlation. Instead, there is a reversal of the 
relation between text and reader to the point that cause and effect are no longer distinguishable 
categories. Writing is the consequence of the tale of Dr. Caligari, recorded in academic 
compendia, but this record, in turn, causes the director to become Caligari.  
Friedrich Kittler has used this film in the context of his declaration that “[t]he age of 
media... renders indistinguishable what is human and what is machine, who is mad and who is 
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faking it.”32 Kittler emphasizes the dissolution of boundaries at work in the film so that “the film 
frames the action in a way that represents not only the transvaluation of all values but also their 
enigmatization.”33 In this process, Kittler asserts, the film imposes its technological superiority 
over the medium of reading, which, within the framed tale of the insane narrator, becomes a 
struggle between two different media. In this version of the narrative, Kittler states, the charlatan 
Caligari “is conquered by an order whose disruptions not coincidentally have cost the lives of a 
municipal office worker and a useful aesthete, two people, moreover, who are interested in 
books.”34 However, once the framing story puts into question the authority of the narrator and 
the structure of order that accompanies it, the “bourgeois media love” for reading and books is 
rendered obsolete, “[a]s if the film attempted to uncover the pathology of a medium that 
entwined reading and loving but has abdicated its power to film.”35 Now it is no longer possible 
to differentiate between charlatan and authority figure because the film has rendered them 
interchangeable. For Kittler it is because of film’s capacity as a recording technology that this 
difference can no longer be registered. “It is precisely this indistinguishability between framed 
and framing story, between insanity and psychiatry, that does justice to film technology,” he 
states.36 With this impasse, the act of reading has lost its groundedness as a private act, that is, as 
a state of bourgeois subjectivity. Following Kittler’s argument, this would indicate that there is 
also no differentiation at work between acts of reading and the forms of writing that appear on 
                                                 
32 Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 146.  
33 Ibid., p. 147. 
34 Ibid., pp. 146 – 147. 
35 Ibid., p. 147. 
36 Ibid. 
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the screen. This category of dedifferentiation, however, is correct in its premise but not in the 
conclusion that Kittler derives from it.    
While Kittler is right to emphasize the importance of indeterminacy here, he does not 
give the film enough credit for the extraordinary complexity with which the film insists on this 
process of dedifferentiation. For Kittler, the notion that “an asylum director is directed by 
hallucinated writings to become Caligari in the framed story is simply a film trick.”37 This is an 
unfortunate assessment that threatens to undermine the force of his argument to understand the 
mediality of film and its conceptual confluence with the rise of psychiatry as an institutional 
discipline. Because of his focus on the discursive shifts necessitated by the technological 
implications of the medium film, Kittler is one of the few critics to take note of the presence of 
writing in the visual terrain of the cinema. However, his reductive emphasis on the deterministic 
effects of film as a medium obscures the significance of his observations. Indeed, Kittler 
reproduces a considerable segment of the writing on the screen in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari in 
order to invoke the prominence of books here: “Somnambulism. A Compendium of the University 
of Uppsala. Published in the year 1726: Thus reads the Fraktur-lettered title of the book that the 
asylum director studies in order to learn everything about a historical ‘mystic, Dr. Caligari.’”38 
Kittler suggests that this is an indication of seriality as a fundamental characteristic of filmic 
technology and therefore sees no difference between the reproduction of images and the 
reproductions of text within these images. Both are part of the serial machinic complicity that 
constitutes the medium film. In this sense, Kittler replicates the mode that he ascribes to the 
medium film, namely its automatic leveling of difference until the doppelgängers in film echo 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 148. 
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their own production as they “film filming itself” and thus “demonstrate what happens to people 
who are in the line of fire of technological media.”39 He does not, therefore, register the 
fundamental gaps that open up in this chain of signification when writing appears as an integral 
part of the image. 
Instead, writing and images are flattened so that they create a hypnotic effect in their 
interplay. Kittler writes that Dr. Caligari, “according to the film’s subtitle, ‘under the domination 
of a hallucination’ reads a sentence in white letters written on the walls of the asylum: ‘YOU 
MUST BECOME CALIGARI.’”40 This is remarkable in its inaccuracy because Kittler is, in 
general, very deliberate and precise in his line of reasoning. By “subtitle” Kittler presumably 
means intertitle and this appearance of the title suggests its status as an objective description for 
the images to come. Its authority as an utterance, however, is indeterminate because its presence 
asserts a facticity precisely at a moment when this facticity is no longer tenable. Moreover, there 
are several replications of this command in the sequence and the sentence variations are rendered 
in movement as a form of typing into the image itself and not merely as a ready-made inscription 
to be read “on the walls.” In fact, there are no “walls” in the image any longer, since the 
inscriptions manifest themselves across the image rather than on a material writing surface. 
Given Kittler’s investigation into the mediality of the typewriter in conjunction with the 
inventions of the gramophone and film, this neglect seems infelicitous, since it would underscore 
the focus of his argument about the machinic force through the medium of the typewriter.41 The 
                                                 
39 Ibid., p. 149. 
40 Ibid., p. 148. 
41 However, in defense of Kittler’s general thesis, originally published in 1986, that “media determine our situation” 
(Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, p. xxxix) it should be noted that this might be more of a record of Kittler’s memory 
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writing machine here is beyond the frame of the page, so that the surface for inscriptions extends 
outward into the dimensions of social space itself. 
In fact, Kittler explicitly links Nietzsche’s conceptual philosophy to the instrument of the 
typewriter, since “[w]riting in Nietzsche is no longer a natural extension of humans who bring 
forth their voice, soul, individuality through their handwriting,” but rather “humans change their 
position – they turn from the agency of writing to become an inscription surface.”42 This reversal 
is given an image in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari. What becomes manifest on the screen, then, is 
a force that orders the doctor-director to inhabit another subjective position. The ultimate 
subjection that occurs, therefore, is that the authority figure of the doctor, reader of academic 
compendia, is reduced to a figure of a captive viewer before the machinic text in movement. 
With its emphasis on the type-written graphics of moving letters, this force “hammers” its 
command of becoming other onto the image and thus alludes to a moment where, as Nietzsche 
says, a “crude fetishism” is at work which “sees doer and deed everywhere: it believes in the will 
as cause in general; it believes in the ‘I’, in the I as Being, in the I as substance, and projects the 
belief in the I-substance onto all things – only then does it create the concept ‘thing’.”43 Here the 
writing reverses this misapprehension and demonstrates a force that is no longer attached to 
individual subjects, with voice or speech as their agency. Rather this force subjects people and 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the filmic experience. Part of the difficulty in working productively with the phenomenon of writing in film is 
that its appearance as a cinematic sensation does not necessarily allow for its accurate or adequate reproduction. 
Once film has become commodified as a storage device that allows for interactivity such as freeze-framing and 
instant playback on VHS-tapes or DVDs, this issue of recollection may no longer pose as much of a problem.       
42 Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, p. 210. 
43 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer, trans. Duncan Large (1889; 
reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 18. (Emphases in the original.) 
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compels them to actions against their will. Nowhere in the film, however, is this force grounded 
in any individual object or thing itself.  
The fundamental discussions of the narrative frame that Kracauer initiates with his focus 
on the reversal are therefore misguided. Kracauer asserts that the framing story subverts the 
film’s revolutionary potential of exposing “insane authority” that “idolizes power as such.”44 
With the framing device, however, authority becomes benevolent again and the film conforms to 
a sense of submission that would indicate a German predilection towards inaction and a retreat 
into psychological interiority. This, for Kracauer, crystallizes the essential problem of Weimar 
cinema because it makes evident the reasons why revolutionary political change was not 
possible. With their “retreat into themselves,” that is, the German nation prepares itself for an 
internalized “psychological revolution,” as opposed to a political one, “in the depths of the 
collective soul,”45 while fantasizing about change in authority.46 The framing story, therefore, 
“reflects this double aspect of German life by coupling a reality in which Caligari’s authority 
triumphs with a hallucination in which the same authority is overthrown.”47 The problem, 
however, that the film articulates lies in the difficulty of establishing the boundaries between 
“reality” and “hallucination” which Kracauer presumes are so self-evident. Instead, the film 
troubles any potential for this differentiation even more profoundly than Kracauer suggests, 
                                                 
44 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film (1947; reprint, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 65. 
45 Ibid., p. 67. 
46 Ibid. “Down to the bulk of social democratic workers they refrained from revolutionary action,” while dreaming 
about uprising, notes Kracauer. Throughout the book, he reserves a particular sense of disappointment in the 
bourgeois left and a deep disdain for the political failure of the Social Democratic Party.  
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because the force field of writing indicates a power that is not grounded in any recognizable 
institutional form of authority, be it the voice of an individual narrator, the figure of the director, 
or the objectified academic record of the phenomenon of its appearance. This force field 
becomes a figure of pure power, namely, the authority which the figure of authority obeys.  
Contrary to Kracauer’s claim, the film, therefore, makes visible a vast mental territory 
through which runs an exteriorized, ungrounded force that manifests itself in graphic letters. In 
this form of writing, “reality” and “hallucination” are conflated into one and the same field and 
the discrete terms no longer hold sway over their respective definitions. This automatic writing, 
then, dictates subjectivity and negates the illusion of will. In a reversal of cause and effect, 
Kracauer presumes the film to determine a “collective soul” that wills itself into a regression 
toward the comfort of inner states of being, whereas the film makes visible the vacuum in which 
a graphic force of writing can inscribe itself and assert authority through its figurations. Kracauer 
does notice this mode of figuration by calling attention to the “lettering... as an essential element 
of the settings” because of the “close relationship between lettering and drawing.”48 What his 
insistence on subjective interiority prevents him from articulating, however, is the fact that this 
figuration is not grounded in individual will or desire. This is how Kracauer describes the 
sequence: “In one scene the mad psychiatrist’s desire to imitate Caligari materializes in jittery 
characters composing the words ‘I must become Caligari’ – words that loom before his eyes on 
the road, in the clouds, in the treetops.”49 For someone who insists on the importance of filmic 
                                                 
48 Ibid., p. 69. 
49 Ibid. As with Kittler’s work, this erroneous projection might be attributed to the constraints of circumstances. 
While Kracauer had access to the film archives of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, his book is to a 
significant degree a work of memory through which he reconstructs the experience of Weimar cinema in exile.    
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details, which, precisely because of their status as minutiae, provide the “almost imperceptible 
surface data” that offer the “clues to hidden mental processes,”50 this error, in which “you” is 
substituted by “I,” is particularly remarkable. 
Because of Kracauer’s reliance on the concept of an individual will for power, he 
misreads the sequence as inner subjective desire projected onto the screen, where it is the “I” that 
feels the urge to become an imitation of another person. The use of the familiar Du in its 
command suggests a force of power that is not tied to individual desire, yet Kracauer instead 
suggests that the writing here is still an expression of the individual’s voice. The director’s desire 
would merely be a projection of looming words and thus still remain an exteriorized, immobile 
manifestation. Furthermore, what is remarkably absent from this description is a sense of the 
framing within which this sequence occurs, namely the act of reading through the transitions 
between various registers of written texts, and the forces of movement that compel the writing to 
materialize at this point. What Kracauer fails to articulate here is the question of what force is at 
work in the materialization of writing. Since he operates under the assumption that film projects 
inner desires onto the screen, the writing we see on the screen can only be the expression of the 
director’s desire in Kracauer’s logic. But the command that dictates “you must become Caligari” 
as writing indicates a much more sinister structure of power because it moves so easily between 
and across the differing registers of writing and thus attests to its machinic mobility. 
Indeed, Kracauer does acknowledge the force of this machinic mobility in a different 
context. In an effort that must have reminded Kracauer of the declarations of war mobilization 
that surfaced throughout the nation only a few years before the film’s release in February 1920, 
Kracauer mentions a “thorough propaganda campaign culminating in the puzzling poster ‘You 
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  71
must become Caligari’”51 that was distributed across various media. This marketing campaign 
began in early January, weeks before the film’s premiere on February 26, when mysterious ads 
and posters reproduced the phrase in “large, expressionist-distorted writing” in Berlin 
newspapers, poster-boards and advertising pillars.52 The shift in frame to include this extratextual 
information from the public sphere is important for Kracauer because it encapsulates the faith in 
the power of marketing strategies and techniques, reductively referred to by him as 
“propaganda,” and because it enhances the social importance of the film as an event. What may 
have struck Kracauer with this media strategy as well is the extension of the concept of the 
dissolution of boundaries once more, so that what is “real” and what belongs to the realm of 
cinematic illusion merge in magazine advertisements and sign posts on the street and can no 
longer be distinguished. Filmic elements become part of the material world; they are 
incorporated into the real life on the streets as writing elements that compel consumers towards 
mysterious ends.  
Of course, Kracauer exhibits here a familiar sense of suspicion surrounding the use of 
advertising, which has often been imagined and vilified as a dark hypnotic force that drives 
consumers’ patterns of consumption beyond their scope of comprehension. But his observation 
does not imply that the groundbreaking marketing campaign staged by Erich Pommer and his 
Decla production company for the film is a crude replication of the mechanisms of hypnosis. 
This strategy is rather a means by which filmic writing becomes visible and legible as signs and 
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therefore replicates the experience of the city space as a text to be deciphered. Peter Fritzsche has 
called this space the “word city,” in which the sheer number of advertising texts assaults the 
faculty of interpretation and the “act of reading the entire city as a complete work was 
overwhelmed by the larger, ongoing process of just rereading and rewriting.”53 As part of the 
process of enigmatization, the appearance of the mysterious commands that address the casual 
reader, potential consumer, or flâneur, belong to a textual system in which signifiers are no 
longer grounded by a particular meaning or require a particular reader. They form a pattern of 
signification in which writing has become a presence that does not address the individual as a 
reader. The signs solicit their commands and through their presence impose a tapestry of 
signifying markers that punctuate the experience of urban life as enigmatic clues that “puzzle,” 
to use Kracauer’s term, the inhabitant of this environment.  
What this indicates is that the advertising campaign around the premiere of The Cabinet 
of Dr. Caligari understood the writing sequence to be an emblematic moment for the experience 
of the film itself and therefore attempted to replicate this cinematic experience as an enigmatic 
element for urban perception. The central cinematic experience of city life defines the aesthetic 
debates of the time, when urban space becomes a textual encounter. As Anke Gleber writes, the 
activity of navigating urban space becomes a act of “reading,” so that “[f]lanerie as an act of 
deciphering the signs of exterior reality precedes in an associative and en passant way a latent 
disposition of semiotics.”54 As part of this semiotic experience, advertising signs “pervade the 
continuum of the street with privileged signals that are legible in both verbal and pictorial ways” 
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54 Anke Gleber, The Art of Taking A Walk: Flanerie, Literature, and Film in Weimar Culture (Princeton, NJ: 
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and thus “the passages and displays of everyday reality have already been read, that is 
experienced, by the flaneur as a text of images.”55 In contrast to the authorial voice of the 
intertitle that declares the asylum director to be “in the grip of an obsession,” the writing that 
haunts him therefore, in fact, resembles the normal condition of daily experience. However, the 
ability to differentiate between what the signs on the street compel one to do and a concrete 
determination of one’s subjective desires has been effectively suspended. 
The figure of the director, then, encounters writing in the same manner in which the 
urban flâneur will encounter the blinking and moving light advertising signs on the street, except 
that he cannot engage in the detached experience of writing as textuality. Despite its 
anachronistic setting in a 19th century fictitious Northern town named Holstenwall,56 this 
moment is contemporary in the sense that it reïnvokes and prefigures the practice of using light 
and electricity in advertising, a widespread practice that had been banned at the advent of World 
War I, but became rampant again in the postinflation period.57 Already in 1898, an electric ad for 
Manoli tobacco was installed as a “revolving wheel of light high up on the rooftops of Berlin,” 
the effects of which “promptly became a Wilhelmine synonym for ‘insanity’ and the epitome of 
modernity’s maddening changes in human apperception.”58 By 1928, the effect of the urban 
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56 For the legendary significance of the name Holstenwall as supposedly derived from an amusement park in 
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electric illuminations were such that a contemporary description of Berlin notes the “chains and 
streams of light... swarm all around” as “[f]iery wheels swirl, words appear letter by letter and 
are obliterated as if on Belshazzar’s Wall.”59 Here the figure of authority already merges with the 
signs and obeys their commands. Power is acceded to letters and writing establishes its ultimate 
authority as the manifestation of a force that grounds itself in signs. What is missing is a sense of 
the absolute in these random prophesies of writing in light, since everyone can be a divining 
prophet of the city’s texts, yet what is being read is the signature of signs that only advertise their 
own power of signification.     
Replicated on the screen, this condition seems to be the inner conflict of the director’s 
state of mind, but it has now been externalized as a battle between discursive registers of writing. 
In other words, the question the film articulates is which text can ultimately be accepted as 
objective and which inscription shall remain as its record. It is, then, a question of authority and 
where it can be located. Individual reading as an act of evaluating these different registers does 
not suffice because it introduces a sense of terror. When Kracauer asserts that the film in its 
original conception verifies the rampant guilt of an authority turned insane because it “half-
intentionally stigmatized the omnipotence of a state authority manifesting itself in universal 
conscription and declarations of war”60 by ending with the irrefutable evidence of the director’s 
guilt in writing, he reverses the problem of the film. In its final version, with the framing device 
that relativizes the objective faith in the narrative, the film outlines the conditions under which 
the conflict over authority becomes evident. State authority enters the picture because it 
manifests itself as the only force omnipotent enough to stand outside the hallucination versus 
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reality dichotomy. It is the absence of arbitration by a benevolent authority that disturbs the 
film’s faith – and Kracauer’s – in specific writing as the final record of objectivity. The place 
where power can be located is now a technological matter of inscription to which everyone, 
including the highest figures of authority, is subjected. In this respect, the film prepares the 
grounds for a conflict over the modes of signification which demand a different kind of recipient. 
The ultimate reader of the various levels of writing is not the film’s spectator, who is forced to 
relegate the quandary of interpretive decision to the film itself. In the fusion of the film with 
itself as the machinic figuration of meaning, the image itself becomes the highest authority that 
can allow this condition to occur.   
The film makes visible that its radical ambiguity extends even to academic and legal 
inscriptions, which can no longer be trusted on face value because they are no longer grounded 
by a correlation to objective truth. In doing so, the film outlines a terrain that points to the 
absence of traditional figures of authority and thus necessitates a submission to the technology 
that can arbitrate the forces of writing. For a social environment such as Germany in 1919, in 
which questions of legitimacy of the state system were of the utmost importance, this provides a 
crucial correlation for the film’s shift toward the narrative structures of the folk-tale and the 
parable. Like the battles that were fought on the streets of Berlin over the political structures of 
the state that would come to be known as the Weimar Republic, the conflict between competing 
systems of authority is invoked in the film’s formal structure. But this conflict is transferred back 
onto a reactionary, outdated narrative structure, against which the machinic forces of writing 
manifest themselves. The film thus allegorizes a struggle over systems of government; that is, the 
legitimacy of the body that will constitute the final arbiter of the law and implement its 
enforcement through writing. It may create the sensation of an embattled subjectivity, a retreat 
  76
into the “shell” of the individual, in Kracauer’s phrase, but this sensation may only be the 
response of a shell-shocked spectator who witnesses the battle over the final legitimacy of 
authority spelled out in letters on the screen. Written on the screen is the command to witness 
what happens when the agents of authority are no longer capable of exerting it. In this respect, it 
is a visual correlation to the oath, a performative act that testifies to the solemn intentions of the 
speaker.61  
The crisis of legitimacy that is enacted in the systems of writing on the screen as an issue 
of authority closely follows Agamben’s discussion of the differing foundations of power, namely 
auctoritas and potestas.62 Agamben links the attempts to define the ultimate locus of power 
through either one of these concepts to a philosophical crisis that “seems to run into almost 
insurmountable obstacles and aporias.”63 As Agamben explains, the Roman concept of 
auctoritas functioned in private law “in order to confer legal validity on the act of a subject who 
cannot independently bring a legally valid act into being.”64 As a concept this notion of a 
transference of power is still present in the form of authorization, but Agamben emphasizes the 
implied category that auctoritas determines a relation in which by law “there must be a 
relationship between two elements (or two subjects): one endowed with auctoritas and one that 
takes initiative in the act in the strict sense.”65 As he continues, these subjects can “coincide” in 
one person or element, but “if there is a gap or incongruity between them, the act must be 
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completed with auctoritas in order to be valid.”66 He notes that this is not an act of representation 
but rather the result from the condition of propriety as the physical right of a person. 
In this condition, however, there is a moment of transference which establishes 
auctoritas, which Agamben locates in the linguistic shift to auctor fio, that is, the subjectification 
of power through a passive construction as “I am made auctor,” rather than the active declaration 
of being as actor sum (“I am auctor”).67 This moment of reversal that confers impersonal power 
is where the aporia lies, since it defines a “power that suspends or reactivates law, but is not 
formally in force as law.”68 Agamben specifically connects this to a paradoxical moment of 
invalidation, or as he puts it, a relation that is “at once antagonistic and supplementary.”69 In 
Agamben’s description, this manifests itself as an exceptional condition where “auctoritas… 
appears in its purest and most pernicious form when it has been invalidated…, when it lives as 
mere writing in absolute opposition to the law’s being in force.”70 Agamben notes the affinity 
here to a Benjaminian category of allegory as the essential condition where a “power that can at 
once ‘grant legitimacy’ and suspend law exhibits its most proper character at the point of its 
greatest legal inefficacy.”71
Agamben also highlights the rediscovery in treaties on legal philosophy of the category 
of auctoritas as a foundational condition for conceptions of the state in the 1920s as an indication 
how this philosophy “kept pace with the growing weight that the authoritarian principle was 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Cf. Ibid., p. 77. 
68 Ibid., p. 79. 
69 Ibid., p. 80. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
  78
assuming in the political life of European societies.”72 But what is remarkable in this respect is 
that the philosophical aporia as a fundamental condition for the legitimacy of authority has 
already found its image on the screen. The moment at which writing in film appears, then, 
allegorizes this conceptual bind of power and authority and extends it to another condition that 
Agamben links to this crisis and which was invoked by the power vested to Augustus by the 
Roman magistrates. “The ‘august’ life,” Agamben notes, “can no longer be defined through the 
opposition of public and private.”73 In fact, this opposition is invalidated in the figure of the 
sovereign, who “expresses an auctoritas in his very person, only because in ‘august’ life public 
and private have entered into a zone of absolute indistinction.”74 This embodiment of authority is 
linked to a suspension of the distinction between public and private, a condition that could be 
extended to the moment of writing on the screen, which implores the spectator to bear witness to 
the suffering of authority and thus makes the physical experience of the loss of power a public 
spectacle, yet one which is borne out in private in the seats of the movie theater. In this 
figuration, Michel Foucault’s admonition on the operations of power is confirmed. As Foucault 
argues, the exercise of sovereignty is not invisible or obscured within a social matrix, since it is 
“exercised… by virtue of [a] heterogeneity between a public right of sovereignty and a 
polymorphous disciplinary mechanism.”75                
This would also help explain the apparent contradiction between writing as a figure of 
authority and its expression as a machinic force of delusion. It appears the most powerful at the 
                                                 
72 Ibid., p. 81. 
73 Ibid., p. 83. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Cf. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972 – 1977, ed. Colin Gordon, 
trans. Colin Gordon et al (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 106. 
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moment when it is merely an expression of individual madness, but the condition of this delusion 
is extended to the spectator as a reader of signs who is forced to experience the condition of 
insanity rendered as an objective state of being. In this allegorical struggle, writing is, in a 
variation of Agamben’s description, “what remains of law if law is wholly suspended.”76 
Kracauer’s sense that the film expressed a subversive commentary on the delusions of an 
“unlimited authority that idolizes power as such”77 is therefore not necessarily misguided. But it 
is the shock with which these empty delusions are spelled out on the screen that allegorizes the 
connection established by Kracauer between Caligari and a figure like Hitler. However, it is not 
on the narrative level of the coda sequence, which revalidates authority by erasing the 
significance of what has become before, through which this connection is established. Rather, the 
writing on the screen spells out the fundamental fiction on which authority is based, yet by 
fusing the deranged figure of authority with the figure of the law in writing, the film replicates 
the effect of what Agamben calls “the ideology or a fictio intended to ground the preeminence of 
auctoritas in relation to potestas thus becomes a figure of law’s immanence to life.”78 Under 
these conditions, the physical authority of the person becomes the originary source of power in 
the moments when the structural systems of law are no longer effective, a situation, as Agamben 
reminds us, that happened “precisely in the years when the authoritarian principle saw an 
unexpected rebirth in Europe through fascism and National Socialism.”79              
                                                 
76 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 80. 
77 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 65. 
78 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 84. 
79 Ibid. 
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Georg Wilhelm Pabst’s 1931 early sound film Kameradschaft ends with a disturbing 
coda that, according to Pabst’s own accounts almost three decades later, was never viewed by the 
public, but which extends this battle over paradoxical conceptions of power into a different mode 
and allegorizes the failure of writing as a legal fiction. Pabst recounts that the film’s narrative, 
which celebrates the heroic efforts by German coal miners to rescue their French counterparts 
buried underground, concludes with a moment of avowed sentimentality, an expression of “hope 
that a friendship forged in the face of adversity will endure.”80 Following this moment of hope, a 
scene depicting the reconstitution of the borders that separate the French from the German 
mining shafts shifts the film’s jubilation to an ominous note. According to Pabst, audiences never 
witnessed this ending because, to his knowledge, there “was not one movie theater screening the 
film that did not simply decide to edit out the final part” and he paraphrases the theater 
management’s responses as such: “Sure, when the workers are orating, there is applause; but, 
once the ending is added, why, then all the people go home depressed!”81 Most contemporary 
reviews, even ones written several weeks after the film’s opening night, refer explicitly to the 
final scene and the prints in circulation at the time contained the ending, but versions without the 
coda were apparently shown in some theaters in the following months, including the Capitol 
Berlin, the film’s premier theater, where the ending was removed from the print a day after the 
opening.82 When the production company submitted the film to be classified officially as 
                                                 
80 Georg Wilhelm Pabst, “Über zwei meiner Filme,” Filmkunst: Zeitschrift für Filmkultur und Filmwissenschaft 
(1960): 21 – 24. Available online at Deutsches Filminstitut http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/dt2tp0044e.htm. 
81 Ibid. 
82 For the reception of the film and an evaluation of the reviews, see Hermann Barth, Psychagogische Strategien des 
filmischen Diskurses in G.W. Pabsts Kameradschaft (Munich: diskurs film Bibliothek, 1990), p. 192 and pp. 199 – 
215. 
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“educational,” it did so without the ending because, in the words of the evaluatory board, the 
educational certificate could only be awarded “once the confusion and incoherence of the final 
ending had been removed.”83 Siegfried Kracauer calls the film’s conclusion an “acid epilogue,” 
in which “Versailles wins out” once again and the “victory of bureaucratic wisdom” is thus 
satirized.84 In his review of the premiere, the influential critic Herbert Ihering bemoans the 
removal of the ending as a “severe detriment” because the coda provides a contrast to the film 
which would otherwise end in the “cheap pathos of reconciliation,” but then notes that he has 
already been informed of the decision to reïnstate the original ending.85         
This debate over the necessity and the function of the ending already indicates the 
contested status of the film’s political and ideological allegiances, an issue that would later apply 
to the biography of Pabst himself, but what Pabst identifies here as a mere issue of the emotional 
dispositions of the film’s theater audiences becomes a problem of formal signification that 
manifests itself in the larger problem of how to conclude the film. In other words, the very 
argument surrounding the question of what shape the film’s definitive form should take attests to 
a fundamental ambivalence in its direction or movement, which the film attempts to overcome 
by various strategic means. According to the film’s critics, these strategies either do not succeed 
                                                 
83 Quoted in ibid., pp. 217 – 218. (Translation mine.) The original decision of the Bildstelle des Zentralinstituts für 
Erziehung und Unterricht as quoted here states that “[i]n dieser … Fassung wird die Grenze wieder aufgerichtet, 
und deutsche und französische Beamte unterzeichnen ein Protokoll darüber. Wegen dieser Unklarheit konnte die 
Anerkennungskarte der Bildstelle erst ausgestellt werden, nachdem die Unstimmigkeit beseitigt war.”   
84 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 240. 
85 Herbert Ihering review in Berliner Börsen-Courier, November 19, 1931, quoted in Barth, Psychagogische 
Strategien des filmischen Diskurses, p. 192.  
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in conforming to the inherent logic generated by the narrative or they are questioned in terms of 
the efficacy in their designs to solicit appropriate affective responses on the part of the audience.  
Either position, however, assumes that the removal or inclusion of the film’s original 
ending is sufficient in and of itself to reframe and determine the meaning of the film as a closed 
system. But, as I want to demonstrate, the process of framing a conclusion to the film begins 
much earlier and this process serves as an attempt to arrest a movement that the film itself 
generates. That is, instead of locating a problematic within the ideological content of 
Kameradschaft or of speculating on how the reception by actual or postulated audiences can be 
controlled, I want to shift the focus towards the question of how the film enacts its successive 
instances of framing and how it ultimately concludes this process. What the film achieves is to 
bring into relief the problem of how its mode of expression allegorizes its own predicament of 
control. It does so by emphasizing and making explicit its recourse to allegory and can therefore 
illuminate the necessity of understanding this concept as a fundamental aspect of signification 
for German film in general instead of dismissing it as a secondary effect of the spectator’s 
belated desire for hermeneutic textual coherence.                      
Kameradschaft (“Comradeship”)86 takes its premise from actual events that took place in 
Courrières in the Pas-de-Calais region of Northwest France in March 1906, and transposes them 
                                                 
86 The term is equivalent to the English word “comradeship,” but, in the context of the film, the title also refers to 
the mining nomenclature “Kameradschaft” as a technical designation for the entire crew, unit or mining detail 
employed in a colliery. Cf. Hermann Barth, Helga Belach, et al., eds., Kameradschaft / La tragédie de la mine: 
Drehbuch von Ladislaus Vajda, Karl Otten, Peter Martin Lampel nach einer Idee von Karl Otten zu G.W. Pabsts 
Film von 1931 (Munich: edition text + kritik, 1997), p. 25, footnote 17. 
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into the present of the 1930s.87 The Courrières colliery catastrophe, one of the worst disasters in 
the history of mining, exacted 1,100 lives and necessitated arduous salvage operations that lasted 
for several weeks. On March 12, 1906, two days after the network of pits had been devastated by 
a huge underground explosion, a crew of German rescue workers arrived from the colliery 
Hibernia in Gelsenkirchen, a mining town in the Western German industrial region Ruhrgebiet, 
approximately 200 miles away. While this team was “particularly adept at undertaking rescue 
operations in burning mines” and the German miners’ arrival signaled the compassion and 
concern of the international community, their contribution, unfortunately, was limited to the 
removal of bodies.88 Nonetheless, the presence of these specialists “did much to restore 
confidence” and “led to a temporary reduction” of Franco-German political tensions.89  
Pabst’s film fictionalized these events and turned them into a rescue mission of recovery, 
in which the German mining crew locates their French counterparts and brings them safely to the 
                                                 
87 This shift in temporal registers is not necessarily self-evident in the film. Indeed, in the recollections from 1960 
cited above, Pabst himself speaks of the film’s “European” perspective, i.e., “first and foremost… the French-
German relations,” and declares that, since the state of these relations “was equally important in 1929, 1930 as it is 
today,” he and the screenwriter Karl Otten decided to “adjust the events of the case by 13 years, that is to 1919.” Cf. 
G. W. Pabst, “Über zwei meiner Filme.” However, as Hermann Barth points out, “the error in comprehension that 
Kameradschaft takes place in 1919 and not in 1931 is rampant in film historiography,” an error Pabst succumbs to in 
his own recollection as well. Barth cites three reference points in the film’s dialogue that would date the diegetic 
time to the 1930s, namely the allusions to the French occupation of the Ruhr area from 1923 to 1925, to the high 
unemployment rates in 1930, and to the emergency decrees of Chancellor Brüning. Cf. Hermann Barth, Helga 
Belach, et al., eds. Kameradschaft, p. 25, footnote 18.             
88 Robert G. Neville, “The Courrières Colliery Disaster, 1906,” Journal of Contemporary History 13, no. 1 (January 
1978): 37 – 38. 
89 Ibid. 
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surface. Pabst emphasized the contemporaneïty of this historical moment of working-class 
solidarity prior to World War I, so that it could be extended to the present by concluding with 
triumphant festivities of fraternization between the French and German miners. However, this 
celebration of international understanding is qualified by a sinister transition from the events 
above to the restored mineshafts below. With the joyful music lingering on the soundtrack, a 
slow fade-in opens to a medium close-up of the words Frontière 1919 in stark white block 
letters. Below this inscription, two border guards, one German and one French, look at each 
other solemnly through metal bars as if they are looking at their own mirror image. The next shot 
reëmphasizes the visual reciprocity staged in the image sequence. Two bricklayers on either side 
of the bars are positioned at the feet of the guards. They are smoothing over the final touches on 
the cement foundation which holds the bars of the border and then get up to leave with their 
equipment. Positioned this time on the reverse side, the camera pulls back to reveal a German 
guard standing in the exact position and in similarly rigid posture as his French counterpart. 
Above him, etched into stone in gothic typeface, the words Grenze 1919 are visible. 
The boundary that is restored in the final sequence here constitutes the dividing line 
between the French and the German mineshafts. The aperture, the closure of which the last scene 
depicts, was created at a moment in the film when such divisions into national categories were an 
impediment to the naked survival of the miners underground and therefore underscores the 
arbitrariness of these categories. In this sense, Kracauer is right to attribute a satirical level of 
meaning to this sequence because it emphasizes a populist notion that national boundaries are not 
only artificially drawn, but rather indicative of a petty bureaucratic sense of propriety and 
protocol, which in its myopic emphasis on order fails to see its own limitations. Moreover, this 
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desire for order, ironically, transcends specifically “national” stereotypes because it unites the 
French and German official in their celebration of order restored.  
Kracauer sees the symmetry of the composition as having a satirical effect, because it not 
only accentuates the limitations of a legalistic frame of mind, but also because it subtly 
highlights the inexorable collusion between capitalism and nationalism. Furthermore, since the 
ending was also frequently misunderstood as a critique of the Treaty of Versailles, Kracauer 
attributes the failure of the film to communicate unequivocally its symbolism to Pabst’s 
“unfamiliarity with symbolic language.”90 While this is a nod on Kracauer’s part to affirm 
Pabst’s allegiance to a kind of realism and objectivity in his films that do not need to resort to a 
crude form of symbolist fancy, there is, however, an added dimension in the irony of the 
repeated gesture between the two officials. In the mirroring of the two sides of the border, the 
framing of the image resembles a screen for both sides, through which the camera travels by 
aligning itself freely on either side of the officials’ perspectives.  
In this composition, therefore, the screen itself has become a mirror and we witness two 
officials recognizing their shared duty as the mirror images of each other. This may be an 
instance of what Gilles Deleuze, in reformulating a term borrowed from C.S. Peirce, explains as 
a dicisign, which “refers to a perception of perception” and which “usually appears in cinema 
when the camera ‘sees’ a character who is seeing; it implies a firm frame and so constitutes a 
kind of solid state of perception.”91 This moment of “cementing” the frame is repeated as a 
literalization of the image, since we see a boundary being reconstituted and solidified by an act 
                                                 
90 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 241. 
91 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 32. 
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of mutual perception of the guard’s mirror-image. At the same time, the image itself is mirrored 
in a writing which is not merely referential, that is, as Kracauer would say, a “symbolic 
language,” but rather self-referential in the sense that it both expresses its own limitation and it 
demarcates a limit point as the image of a limit.                                          
This insistence on the finality of a definitive meaning as a mode of demarcation through 
writing is evident from the outset of Kameradschaft, which appeals to notions of power and truth 
by establishing its credentials through the written word. After the title of the film Kameradschaft 
is presented in a title,92 the film offers a dedication “to the miners of the world.” With this 
proclamation the film offers itself up as a gift of consecration, but it is not yet clear from this 
beginning within what contextual framework this act of dedication occurs. The event of a 
dedication usually functions as an act of memory and celebration, but since this title is followed 
by another, lengthier title, which declares that “the story of ‘Kameradschaft’ is founded on fact 
and takes place in the coalmines by the frontiers of France and Germany,” the respect that a 
dedication lays out to the addressee is qualified by the subsequent titular remarks. The factual 
foundation is explained in lengthy titles explaining the historical background that provides the 
basis for the film. In the act of reading these explanations, the proposed viewer as postulated in 
the address of the writing on the screen consents to accept the premise that the film will serve as 
a dedication, while at the same time the writing promises that the film will define for the viewer 
the terms within which the plight of the miners of the world will be developed.     
Through the act of dedication and the factual situation that provides the basis for the film 
the initial writing, therefore, evokes the question of audience on both an implicit and a 
                                                 
92 Here “title” refers to the technical term that indicates an insert between the flow of the image track, akin to an 
intertitle, and unlike a subtitle, which denotes writing that is superimposed onto the image track.    
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theoretical level. In its act of dedication, the film presents itself to “the miners of the world” and, 
through such a gesture, envisages an international, if not global, audience comprised of workers 
who will see themselves portrayed as workers on the screen. Addressed as the recipients of this 
film, miners thus become the “implied” audience as stated by the intertitle. Nonetheless, the 
tribute also indicates a political position that the film proposes and imposes. In the act of 
dedicating the film to the miners, any potential or actual audiences are addressed as witnesses 
who, through the act of seeing the film, will provide a testimonial verification of what it means 
to be a miner and what the consequences of this notion of identity will be. The writing that 
initiates the film is thus linked to the question of identity from the outset. Moreover, given that 
the cinema functions as a mass medium, the film speaks to the masses by articulating itself as a 
means of differentiating a group within the mass of audiences into a distinct category of identity.  
This notion of identity through differentiation is what allows Russell Berman to posit the 
structural and textual “ambiguity” of Kameradschaft. He locates a mode of signification that 
through “the very manner with which the film attempts to assert its message of solidarity turns 
out to demonstrate its instability.”93 This process, Berman establishes, results in a futile appeal to 
a utopian community, futile precisely because the film displaces its own terms of argument “into 
another terrain of struggle,” while leaving the structure of difference in place.94 According to 
Berman, the film, therefore, ontologizes the process of “struggle and mastery”95 which defines 
the proletarian community by insisting on a homosocial force that radically excludes women and 
                                                 
93 Russell A. Berman, “A Solidarity of Repression: Kameradschaft (1931),” in The Films of G.W. Pabst: An 
Extraterritorial Cinema, ed. Eric Rentschler (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), pp. 116 – 117. 
94 Ibid., p. 118. 
95 Ibid. 
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does not see its own repressive complicity in this construction of sexual identity and difference. 
Moreover, in this notion of a proletarian community, “solidarity appears to be a version of crowd 
control,” in which, in an act of “self-negation,” the “mass is turned against the mass” and thus, 
ultimately, the utopian rhetoric of the film is undermined “by the discipline of a male socialism 
that arrives just in time to save the capitalist organization.”96 As a result, Berman concludes, the 
film fails to resolve the problematics it has set out to overcome and thus serves as a paradigmatic 
instance of the feeble rhetoric of a naïve internationalism.     
The importance of Berman’s analysis of this failure lies in his understanding of the film 
as a process or movement, since it becomes “crucial to pay close attention to the nature of the 
social bonds represented in the course of the film and not only to the terms of the social contract 
announced at its conclusion.”97 In other words, in his assessment of the cinematic text, Berman 
hints at the relation between the film’s conclusion and the forces it has set in motion throughout 
its duration. Within this process of movement Kameradschaft oscillates between two limit 
points, determined by the film’s celebration of instrumental technology  – both in thematic terms 
as a technological struggle and in formal terms as a sound film – and by the rhetorical 
enunciation in speech of a unity beyond particular languages. Either of these limit points, 
however, converges around the question of how boundaries can be framed and determined. The 
film indeed exhibits an intense “anxiety about borders,”98 because, once established boundaries 
are obliterated, “the organization of space goes out of control, and in both cases – in the formal 
construction of the film and in the content of the narrative – the answer to the crisis is 
                                                 
96 Ibid., p. 121. 
97 Ibid., p. 118. (Emphasis mine.) 
98 Ibid., p. 122. 
  89
technological progress.”99 But in his focus on the spatial configurations that the dissolution of 
boundaries opens up, Berman no longer considers the film’s larger trajectories of movement 
along which the chain of signification travels. Instead, he decides to put aside the category of 
movement that he has invoked for the significance of the film and now reöntologizes the textual 
construction as postulated by the film in terms of an ideological resolution to the contradictory 
situation the film poses, rather than continuing to examine the film as a durational event 
unfolding in movement.     
In this respect, Berman can be said to describe a process of reterritorialization at work in 
the film. In the subterranean space of the mines, national boundaries are obsolete in the sense 
that they no longer perform any useful function and have become an impediment to the 
subjugation of nature. Within this space, an international brotherhood of solidarity should 
become possible. But this reörganization of the territory of the mines through the instance of the 
dissolution of boundaries imposes a new set of “libidinal repression,”100 which the film 
circumvents by framing the miners’ struggle as a technological fight against nature. In this 
struggle, they are united as a brotherhood beyond the limitations of national identity. Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari explicitly link such a process of redefinition to the intricate question 
of the mechanistics of language as a “machinic assemblage,” where “content” and “expression” 
of “bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another” are 
placed alongside an axis with a “collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of 
                                                 
99 Ibid., p. 123. 
100 Ibid., p. 122. 
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incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies.”101 What Berman suggests but does not quite 
articulate, then, is the issue of how the category of individual identity in Kameradschaft cannot 
be separated from the problem of its configuration within a larger collective. The shifts of 
displacement function here as a form of enunciation that attempts to delineate, or, more 
precisely, redefine the limits within which the social body that has already been assembled 
underground as a collective can be articulated once again. But this problem of temporal 
repetition forms part of the film’s larger project as a fundamental question and Berman’s way of 
framing it as a territorial shift in which the text ultimately negates and cancels out the force of its 
own ideological or political desire obscures its status as a question of movement.        
Because of this, however, it would make sense that the concluding sequence, which 
comes before the epilogue of the reïnstitution of the borderlines, figures so prominently in 
Berman’s argument. In a jubilant ceremony at the border, the two groups of miners convene and 
embrace each other under the banners of the French tricolore and the Weimar Republic German 
flag. A jovial, plump German miner, Wilderer, searches out his newfound friends in the crowd 
with the words “where is the arch-enemy? Where is the arch-enemy?” and then kisses and 
embraces the young French boy with whom he had been trapped by exclaiming “there you are, 
my little arch-enemy!”102 Amid the cacophony, music and chants of hooray, the French foreman 
                                                 
101 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 88. 
102 In the original “Wo ist der Erzfeind? Wo ist der Erzfeind? Wo ist der Erzfeind? Da bist du ja, mein 
Erzfeindchen!” This affectionate catachresis echoes the incongruity between friendship and comradeship, which are, 
as Chris Hedges points out, often erroneously equated: “Comradeship,” Hedges writes, is “often mistaken for 
friendship, but is in fact the very opposite” and he cites a study on warrior culture which concludes that “the 
essential difference between friendship and comradeship is that friendship creates ‘a heightened awareness of the 
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Jean begins to orate from the flatbed of a truck down to the crowd below, to offer his gratitude 
and to extol the importance of unity: “Here we are all miners together, and it is because we all 
are miners together that you came and brought us back to the surface … And because the borders 
are behind us, there are but two enemies left for us - gas and war!”103 Berman considers the 
rhetoric of this speech “sloganeering,” because it is based on the assumption that the “public 
language of political leaders” suffices to “articulate a collective identity.”104 The limitation of 
this interpretation lies in its implicit connection to a kind of speech-act theory, where the public 
declarations are understood to serve as a performative utterance that, in and of itself, defines the 
community. Because the film also articulates its own ideological limits, this faith in the 
constitutive power of speech is obviously misguided and must therefore fail to achieve its 
promises because it cannot be maintained beyond the moment of its utterance. This critique, 
however, fails to address the real dilemma of the sequence because it focuses on the rhetoric of 
the moment and is therefore a static element within the larger textual movements of the film.      
The problem here goes beyond the rhetorical dimension to the very concept of language 
itself, which the film attempts to articulate meticulously. This linguistic frame is rendered in 
                                                                                                                                                             
self,’ while comradeship is predicated on ‘the suppression of self awareness.’” Cf. Chris Hedges, What Every 
Person Should Know About War (New York: Free Press, 2003), p. 119.         
103 The full speech in the original French is as follows: “Camarades! On est là tous mineurs ensemble. Et c’est par ce 
qu’ on est tous mineurs ensemble que tu m’a remonté du fond. Et c’est toujours par ce qu’on est tous mineurs 
ensemble que le camarade Kasper a fait sauter les barreaux de la grille à treize-cent-quinze. Et c’est aussi par ce que 
derrière notre frontière à nous il n’ y a que deux ennemis: le gaz et la guerre! Là, je vous dis, il faut jamais oublier 
ça: on est tous mineurs ensemble! Merci, camarades! On ne vous dit pas ‘adieu’, mais ‘au revoir’! Auf 
Wiedersehen! Auf Wiedersehen! Auf Wiedersehen!” 
104 Russell Berman, “A Solidarity of Repression,” p. 117. 
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visual terms, as the progressive chain of figuration in which this sequence is embedded, as well 
as in the acoustic dilemma of a speech that may fail to find recipients beyond its moment of 
articulation. As Berman points out, “speech, to which the film ascribes the power to assert the 
identity of comradeship, turns out to be inadequate,” if not contradictory, because it is followed 
by a speech “insisting on the limits of speech.”105 Wittkopp, the German counterpart to the 
French foreman and the one who initiated the spontaneous organization of the rescue operations, 
feels compelled to respond to the speech, the language of which he did not understand: 
“Comrades, what the French comrade said, I did not understand. But what he meant, that we all 
understood.”106 In Berman's interpretation, speech here is rendered as “secondary… vis-à-vis a 
more effective mode of expression – meinen rather than sagen – and the construction of the 
collective is thereby shifted from rational communication to an irrational domain of opinion and 
non-verbal semiosis.”107 For an early sound film, this is a remarkable qualification, especially 
given that, as Jacques Derrida has demonstrated, the status of speech is always privileged as 
                                                 
105 Ibid. 
106 The full speech in the original German is as follows: “Kameraden! Was der französische Kamerad gesagt hat, 
hab’ ich nicht verstehen können. Aber was er gemeint hat, haben wir alle verstanden. Weil es egal ist, ob Deutscher 
oder Franzose, Arbeiter sind wir alle! Und Kumpel ist Kumpel. Wir halten zusammen, denn wir gehören zusammen. 
Die französischen Kameraden sollen leben! Glück auf!” This scene echoes a previous scene in which the manager of 
the German mine informs his colleague in France via telephone about the impending arrival of the rescuers and 
takes credit for instigating the operation. Berman mentions that the telephone as a technological instrument is used 
by the management of the German mine to inform his French counterpart, but neglects to add that this conversation 
takes place in French and does not draw out the implication that the capitalist management is already unified by 
technology and that, moreover, they do not encounter “speech” as an impediment to communication.   
107 Berman, p. 117. 
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primary in relation to writing,108 but Berman introduces a categorical division within this 
problematic of primacy and immediacy between irrational “opinion” and “non-verbal semiosis.” 
This means that the speeches that seem to conclude the film articulate a limit point where 
words no longer suffice and a different register needs to be evoked. Berman separates this into 
rational speech and irrational meaning, but the term that resonates in Wittkopp’s use of the word 
meinen is not merely “opinion,” which is what Berman seems to understand it to be, but rather 
the more fundamental definition of meinen as a verb indicating intention. The film, therefore, 
enacts the very problem of the limits of speech and language and thus necessitates a coda that 
spells out the implications of the inadequacy of speech, because in the potential capacities of 
sound, language enters as a problem in the determination of the limits of meaning. In opposition 
to Pabst’s own later recollection, this coda or qualification is not demanded by affect – because it 
would somehow “depress the workers” or give them hope – but rather draws the affective 
dimension of intention to its logical consequence. Spoken language, therefore, is inadequate to 
convey meaning and intention. Because the film embraces the technology of sound to such a 
degree, Berman says, it both “prefigures the use of sound in propaganda” and the subsequent 
reliance on the radio in Nazi Germany and he bemoans the demise of an “older media culture” in 
                                                 
108 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976), p. 29: “This determination is by rights anterior to all the eventual differentiations that could 
arise within the systems of terminology…. [and] it would have to be admitted that the immediate and privileged 
unity which founds significance and the acts of language is the articulated unity of sound and sense within the 
phonie.” Derrida continues, “[w]ith regard to this unity, writing would always be derivative, accidental, particular, 
exterior, doubling the signifier: phonetic.”    
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which a “verbal literacy – individual reading in a private sphere – belongs to an increasingly 
distant past.”109
This ambivalent relation of culture and technology, in fact, characterizes Pabst’s own 
wavering position towards the medium sound. In an article from 1929 entitled “The Reality of 
the Sound Film,” Pabst declared enthusiastically that, after his erstwhile skepticism of the 
intrusion of sound into the coherence of the filmic image, he now saw the potential of the sound 
film as a promise towards a “world language”110 and embraced its “perfect reality.”111 As Pabst 
writes, “the silent film has its boundaries, … it is impeded by the primitivism of the impulses 
prior to the word, impeded by the unequivocalness of the merely visible.”112 But, in an 
illustration of what Wolfgang Jacobsen calls Pabst’s rapid responses shifting between rejected 
and reconstituted allegiances in a complicated world, which ultimately render him a tragic figure 
as a “torn individual, a conservative avant-gardist,”113 Pabst wrote a contrarian assessment eight 
years later. In 1937 in “Le role intellectuel du Cinéma,” Pabst declared that “despite the rise of 
the sound film, I am convinced that text itself in film is of marginal relevance, [because] what 
counts is the impression of the image.”114 This fundamental ambivalence, coming after an initial 
                                                 
109 Berman, p. 124. 
110 G.W. Pabst, “Realität des Tonfilms,” in Film-Kurier, June 1, 1929, reprinted in G.W. Pabst, ed. Wolfgang 
Jacobsen (Berlin: Stiftung Deutsche Kinemathek, 1997), p. 127. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. In the original: “Aber der stumme Film hat Grenzen. ... [S]o ist der stumme Film durch die Primitivität der 
vor den Worten liegenden Regungen, die Eindeutigkeit des nur Sehbaren gehemmt.” 
113 Wolfgang Jacobsen, “Ein konservativer Avantgardist. Ein Vorwort,” in G.W. Pabst, ed. Wolfgang Jacobsen, p. 7. 
114 As cited in Günter Krenn, “Meister im Zwielicht – Betrachtungen zu vier Literaturverfilmungen von G.W. 
Pabst,” in Geheimnisvolle Tiefe: G. W. Pabst, ed. Filmarchiv Austria (Vienna: Filmarchiv Austria, 1998), p. 32. 
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reluctance but then the enthusiastic embrace of the new technology, which Pabst sees at first as a 
new potential but later comes to think of as a threat to the image, is registered by Berman in 
Kameradschaft already.  
Within the division that yields sound as the innovative technology but produces a 
concomitant decline of literacy into the white noise of the “irrational domain of opinion,” 
Berman locates the failure of the film’s intention and echoes a reactionary understanding of the 
function of mass media as part of a technology that comprises an obstacle to reasonable 
communication, which presumably is the domain of the bourgeois reader of print media. To 
counter to this assessment, a shift away from Berman’s suggestion of the limitations of sound 
toward the attempted movements of signification at work in the film is necessary. If the 
inadequacy of speeches necessitates the coda in which solidified writing takes precedence over 
the moment of elation and defines the possibility of reframing boundaries, we need to follow a 
corresponding movement backwards into the domain of signification by noise and then further 
back to the level of signification that adheres to that of the silent cinema. The sequence that 
precedes the final moment of celebration dramatizes the use of noise and the technology of 
sound as well. While a group of French and German miners is trapped in the locomotive 
chamber and they are resigned to await their death together, the telephone miraculously rings and 
a German miner answers the call of a French worker who has been instructed not to give up and 
call the various connections for the telephone lines down below in the shafts. When the German 
miner finally answers, his voice is enough and there is no need to communicate beyond the noise 
that indicates another human being. The voice on the other end of the line indicates the presence 
of bodies in the locomotive chamber and this moment of triumph is punctuated by bilingual cries 
back and forth of “hallo! hallo!” and “allô? allô?” until all of the Germans yell “Oui! Oui! Oui! 
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Oui!” into the speaker. The relief lies in the connection itself, because what matters here is pure 
sound, albeit transmitted, rather than speech and the shift to a different linguistic register is 
instinctive rather than acquired, belonging more to an automatic glossolalia of affirmation and 
jubilation in which the Germans can now speak. Their collective voice affirms itself through 
technology and signals its presence over a territorial distance that suddenly no longer constitutes 
a threat.     
This distance bridged by the technology of the telephone and the presence of a 
connection then is similarly amplified by the knocking sounds produced when the miners trapped 
in the locomotive chamber bang on the pipes to signal their location to the communal rescue 
team who begins to return the signals. In an increasingly frenzied cacophony of drumming on 
pipes, the noise of the rescue signals merges with the relieved communal laughter and screams of 
the trapped miners to become a communal expression of shared relief and hope. This sound 
carries over through a fade-out into black which then reveals a newspaper headline of the “latest 
mining disaster news” to announce that the “German rescuers will leave the hospital on 
Sunday.”115 As the headlines linger on the screen a lengthy sound-bridge of celebratory marching 
music begins to connect the newspaper writing to the subsequent scene of the festivities along 
the border that will constitute the penultimate closing sequence described above.  
The transition therefore emphasizes the connection between the celebratory speeches at 
the border and the unbridled screams of relief earlier through the newspaper headlines, which, 
seen in its transitory function here, already serves to indicate the divergence between the scene 
before and what the writing in the headlines necessarily obfuscates, namely the physical 
                                                 
115 In the original: “Dernières nouvelles de la catastrophe minière: les sauveteurs allemands sortiront de l’hôpital 
dimanche.” 
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connection between the saved bodies and the immediacy of sound. Conversely, this rescue scene, 
in which the telephone and sound serve as the prerequisite basis for the final speeches, is itself 
prefigured by a sequence in which a fundamental misunderstanding on the level of pure images 
occurs. This famous sequence comes just a few minutes before the rescue by telephone and it 
involves the two speakers of the celebration. A lone French miner, Jean, bangs a pipe with his 
wrench, at first desperately, then increasingly slower and with a resigned acceptance of the 
futility of the gesture. A single German rescuer, Wittkopp, covered in a gas mask, hears the noise 
and follows it toward its source, while repeatedly screaming a muffled “hallo?” and “is there 
someone?” through his mask.116 When the French miner sees him in his gasmask from afar he 
mutters in horror “les Allemands” and bangs on the pipe in desperation, louder and faster as the 
German figure approaches him. 
His incessant banging accompanies a close-up of the masked face when the sound of the 
rhythmic clanging, reminiscent at this point already of the fire of a machine gun, yields to 
explosions. With this sonar cue the film flashes back to Jean in his uniform as he stares 
traumatized at the carnage unfolding before his eyes and suddenly finds himself locked in hand-
to-hand combat with a German soldier wearing a gasmask. They struggle desperately in the 
                                                 
116 The muffled cries in the original of “Hallo?” and “Ist wer da?” might serve as a complement to the argument 
Berman presents when he examines the ambiguity of sound in the film: When the fiancée of one of the miners 
hitchhikes back to the mines, she is picked up by a nun who asks her if she has relatives in the mine. She hesitantly 
replies, “mon frère et son ami.” Berman makes productive use of the homology of the phoneme “son” as a 
possessive pronoun and a noun to extrapolate the importance of “son, ami” or “friend sound” for the film. Cf. 
Berman, p. 123. Similarly here, then, in this framework, a layer of ambiguous sound through “Ist wer da? Ist wer 
da?” becomes a muffled homology to “Isses Verdun? Isses Verdun?” to underscore the subsequent flashback by 
alluding to the name of an infamous battleground scene of World War I trench warfare.       
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trenches with both hands pushing into each other’s faces, Jean’s face distorted by pain and fear 
and the German soldier’s face abstracted into a grimace of death by his gasmask. The battle is 
replicated in its movements exactly and the soundtrack continues with the exact moans and 
painful grunts as the film returns to the scene underground where the two figures are reënacting 
the same fight as in the trenches. Finally, Wittkopp manages to subdue Jean as his mask is 
pushed off and he knocks him unconscious. He holds Jean’s head tenderly as he nods and looks 
knowingly at the breathing apparatus on the floor that was the source of Jean’s mortal anxiety.  
Because this sequence highlights the replicability and similarity of a traumatic and 
potentially deadly misunderstanding to the moment of rescue through both the soundtrack and 
the image-track, it simultaneously opens up the question of how to differentiate between the 
situation of threat and the possibility of salvation. What the sequence, therefore, emphasizes is 
that a mutual understanding cannot be achieved through images alone. Indeed, the image track 
duplicates the problem by asserting that the face of the enemy might at the same time be the face 
of salvation and the differentiation between the two cannot be achieved by sight alone. The 
flashback scene must therefore be located as the beginning of a larger movement towards a 
duplicity of meaning that culminates in the speeches of international solidarity and its subsequent 
negation by the official act underground. Precisely because the image of the face in the gasmask 
has become indeterminate and the sound of drumming on pipes in a plea for rescue is equal to 
and indistinguishable from the cacophony of the battle, the film intervenes here by reaching to 
another dimension of signification, toward what Wittkopp will call meinen, “intending,” in his 
final speech. This means that the image sequence becomes a moment of deliberate allegorization 
because we know that behind what looks to be the grimace of death is, in fact, the face of Jean’s 
savior. That is, the gasmask, which up until only a few years before had both figuratively 
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represented and literally defined the face of the enemy has now been reärticulated and separated 
into two inherently conflicting modes of signification while retaining the force of its original 
meaning. The fact that the image of death can now mean the possibility of salvation constitutes 
an act of imposition that transfers and disperses the menacing image sequence of a man in 
gasmask approaching into a gesture of hope that cannot be maintained on this level of 
signification.       
Seen this way, Kameradschaft follows a trajectory or movement of figuration that, in a 
sequential culmination towards definitive limit points, attempts to frame meaning by introducing 
a crisis in the potential definition of the image. The close-up of the face in a gasmask becomes 
duplicitous in the sense that it cannot be understood as self-evident any longer and becomes 
doubled in its meaning to incorporate its own negation while oscillating and moving between 
these two frames of modality. Thus the image constitutes a limit point of meaning and must be 
complemented by some other force of signification that provides a defining and conclusive 
framework. However, since speech and sound are subject to the same limitations, the coda takes 
on a dual function. Certainly, the coda undermines a sense of immediacy in the transparent 
capacity of speech as the mode for understanding celebrated by the miners, but it makes this 
visible of a figural level. The problem is defined on a temporal level as well. Given that the 
speeches are produced for the moment, the momentary unity as evidenced by the intended 
meaning of the speakers, cannot be sustained and the union is merely temporary. In other words 
language as speech does not suffice to uphold the moment of a union towards a communion that 
is defined as standing outside of or apart from communication. The coda then becomes a 
necessary supplement to indicate a limit point in the relation between sound and image. 
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When the film replicates the sealing of the borders through the official act of a signature, 
it therefore also concludes a movement that indicates the impossibility of resolving the question 
of identity unless it is defined and delineated through the act of writing. The official inscription 
serves as the final act of imposition and, because of this privileged status, maintains its power of 
subjection and demarcation. Order has been restored, albeit on a different level. Faced with the 
difficulty of how to envisage a continuation of the community it has established, the film now 
submits itself once more to the power of subjection that writing carries with it. That is, in order 
to maintain the level of meaning as intention the way it is articulated in the speeches the film 
needs to move outside this framework to establish a final boundary in writing. But since this 
final boundary is the image of a boundary as it is inscribed into the image, the movement thus 
replicates itself into an allegorical relief. Rather than demonstrating the “irrational semiosis” of 
the speeches of mutual understanding, as Berman has posited, the film’s conclusion demonstrates 
the necessity for a shift that constitutes a leap of faith: as an official imprimatur, the film 
inscribes the words frontière and Grenze into the image to indicate that its mode of signification 
has reached its own limit point.  
In the mirror image on the screen in which the two officials look at each other from both 
sides of the border, the image ends as an allegory of boundaries, precisely because it restricts and 
encloses the space that has been opened up by the miners, but it does so in an emblematic 
manner to indicate that at this point signification must end. The mirrored gesture that emphasizes 
the similarity between the two officials renders them identical, and so the film arrests the lines of 
flight it has set into motion and freezes them into the relief of writing as an act of finality. 
Neither the image of the face as a mask nor the technology of sound can be understood 
unequivocally for itself any longer, nor is the miners’ territory legible in terms of nation or 
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community unless it can find its expression in a different register as writing. Instead, the 
community of miners must be defined once again by an imposition, not from above, but from 
below, as it were. Because the film demonstrates the slippage between speech and intention, it 
resorts to the question of how a community can be defined by showing how the act of definition 
is tied to identity as a mode of inscription. In the space that has been deterritorialized, the state, 
through its official representatives who embody its power by proxy with the seal and the 
signature, intervenes and redefines the boundaries.117 What the conclusion of Kameradschaft 
then indicates is the complicity between the foundation of state and the act by which a group 
defines itself from a mass of bodies. The miners’ ability to see themselves united replicates the 
same mechanism that drives the power of the state to delineate and define its members. The 
gesture that underscores this mechanism is the salute mirrored between the two officials which 
encapsulates and inverts the unity that the speeches have extolled. The continuation of unity can 
only be guaranteed by the representatives of the state and the question of who defines this 
community has been relegated and externalized into writing once more.     
What makes the coda so disturbing, in other words, is that it describes as inevitable and 
conclusive the emergence of the system of the state at the moment a potential community has 
been defined. Indeed, the state appears because the film has invoked the problem of 
representation to underscore the question of the reproducibility and dissemination of a 
community in relation to the celebratory orations of the moment. Absent from the moment of 
                                                 
117 The final dialogue emphasizes this with its insistence on order: When the German border guard is asked by his 
French counterpart “allors, maintenant, tous est en ordre?” he replies, “Ordnung muß sein.” The final lines of 
dialogue then conclude “Na, das hält wieder. Herr Kollege, haben Sie das Protokoll fertig?” to which the French 
official replies “Oui, voilà.”  
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triumphant elation is a reference to the notion of translation, because the miners understand each 
other completely and purely without having to communicate through different linguistic 
registers. In this sense, they are engaged in the celebration of relinquishing the necessity of 
translation, a giving up of the task of translating. This task of the language of translation, as 
Walter Benjamin has argued, is closely connected to a revelatory anticipation of a “pure 
language” by the demands on translation to give “voice to the intentio of the original not as 
reproduction but as harmony, as a supplement to the language in which it expresses itself, as its 
own kind of intentio…” in order to ensure that “the work reflects the great longing for linguistic 
complementation.”118 Ultimately, Benjamin concludes, “[w]here a text is identical with truth or 
dogma, where it is supposed to be ‘the true language’ in all its literalness and without the 
mediation of meaning, this text is unconditionally translatable.”119 In pointing to the sacred 
dimension of this unconditional translatability, Benjamin locates a capacity where “pure 
language… no longer means or expresses anything but is, as expressionless and creative Word, 
that which is meant in all languages.”120
In a secularized form, this utopian moment is what we witness in Kameradschaft as a 
communion in spirit between the representatives of the international working class. Their 
speeches are “unconditionally translatable” and therefore unconditionally understood because 
this sequence makes manifest what it is that translation, according to Benjamin, should strive for, 
namely to hint at “the predestined, hitherto inaccessible realm of reconciliation and fulfillment of 
                                                 
118 Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator,” in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, 
trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 79. 
119 Ibid., p. 82. 
120 Ibid., p. 80. 
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languages.”121 For a sound film, in which languages are particularized and their plurality is thus 
highlighted, this communion through the fulfillment of language marks an important gesture 
because it echoes the potential of a universal language that the silent film has often been 
understood to strive toward. But because this moment appears in speech, the conjunction of 
sound and image that creates a supralinguistic harmony is of momentary duration. Instead, it 
seems as if the situation that the film offers here cannot be maintained as the conclusion of the 
film, but rather anticipates a necessary commentary to follow, which will invert the fervent 
enthusiasm of unity and expose it as a momentary illusion. In his discussion of translation, 
Walter Benjamin understands this necessity as the “disjunction” between language and content 
that “prevents translation and at the same time makes its superfluous,” a situation which 
Benjamin links to the mode of irony.122
 Yet it does not suffice to indicate that the film might therefore follow the necessities 
inherent in the textual mechanisms of signification. Rather, the transition to the allegorical 
sequence indicates that the film understands the strains that the reliance on speech imposes on 
the sense of community it attempts to summon. When Wittkopp extols the workers’ transnational 
community in his speech, since “German or French, it does not matter  - we are all workers and 
miner is miner,”123 he insists on a community that is founded on a form of social identity, which 
he considers an essential quality, that is, a state of being, instead of a result of historical forces. 
The community that Wittkopp evokes, therefore, is one not founded on nationalist assumptions 
                                                 
121 Ibid., p. 75. 
122 Ibid. 
123 In the original, his statement “Kumpel ist Kumpel” conveys the working-class denomination of Kumpel as 
“miner” but Kumpel also carries with it the notion of “mate” or “pal.” 
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of linguistic difference, or one that transcends the categories established by social hierarchies and 
structures, but rather one where these differences are beside the point. The question of how to 
reproduce this community in the medium of film, however, must be articulated on a visual level. 
The shift, then, to the allegorical coda is ironic, precisely because irony is the figure that 
exemplifies the difficulty of community, which the film has evoked and now brings to its 
conclusion.  
Nonetheless, this ironic commentary extends beyond a mere subversion of the naïve 
enthusiasm of the moment. The allegory of the limit point that concludes the film implies that the 
film has reached its own limits of how to inscribe a sense of community and replicates in a 
gesture of acceptance the fact that writing imposes an identity which sound cannot reproduce. 
The figure of the allegory, however, indicates an awareness of the failure of representation. The 
degree to which allegories must be understood as self-reflexive figures that express their own 
inadequacy of expression is what Paul de Man insists on. “Allegories,” he states, “are always 
allegories of metaphor and, as such, they are always allegories of the impossibility of 
reading.”124 In the recourse to the allegorical figure, the coda provides an ironic counterpoint, but 
the irony here serves as a “parabasis,” a digressive and disruptive commentary which reveals the 
“discontinuity between two rhetorical codes” and thus serves a discursive interruption.125
                                                 
124 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 205. Moreover, de Man continues reflexively, this statement must be 
understood as “a sentence in which the genitive ‘of’ has itself to be ‘read’ as a metaphor.”  
125 Ibid., p. 300. It might appear unseemly to solicit Paul de Man’s work in the context of a study of images of text in 
the wake of fascism. In a circuitous response to the question “Is Now the Time for Paul de Man?” the title of a panel 
at the 119th annual MLA Convention in 2003, de Man’s contribution to the problem of allegory might be a way to 
rehabilitate his deconstructive reading method in order to move beyond entrenched and unproductive notions of the 
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What this disruption makes visible, then, is a process of figuration which comments on its 
own utopian dimension while positing the state as the ultimate arbiter because it of its power of 
finality. The state gives its “seal” to the status of the final border and arrests the movement of 
disruption, while at the same time defining itself in national terms as a defined entity. Thus, in 
this final instance of allegorical displacement Kameradschaft fuses the power of writing with the 
power of the state but, at the same time, yields in submission to this power of inscription. It 
inscribes and records its own failure to sustain the moment at which it has given voice to the 
hope of a lasting solidarity beyond borders and now positions the state as the destiny of its own 
implications. When Pabst understands this allegorical coda as gesture of caution that theater 
owners would have recognized as “depressing” for the people, he articulates a critical awareness 
of the film’s power to demand submission in the face of its mechanism of signification.  
The solution provided by the coda narrates precisely its own failure to offer a solution to 
the dilemma of how a true sense of community can be defined or even imagined outside of 
language and identity. Instead, the submissive gesture in accepting the power of the seal and 
signature as inevitable might explain the angry responses by both Berman and Kracauer. “In 
effect,” as Berman declares in a rather peculiar metaphor in this context, “Pabst’s proletarian 
community is still-born.”126 Kracauer sees this film as an instance of how German socialist 
thought, especially in its Social Democratic variant, had “degenerated into anemic abstractions” 
and thus we see mirrored in the film the apathetic “exhaustion” suffered by German socialists 
                                                                                                                                                             
importance of deconstruction. To invoke the larger debate again is perhaps untimely, but befits a project, which, in 
Jacques Derrida’s words, represents “the at least necessary condition for identifying and combating the totalitarian 
risks in all ... forms.” From Jacques Derrida, “Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man’s War,” 
in Mémoires: for Paul de Man, trans. Peggy Kamuf, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 242.          
126 Berman, p. 117.  
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from the “dead weight of an outworn ideology.”127 While these may be valid charges against the 
efficacy of Social Democratic ideas as articulated by Pabst’s film, a careful reading of the 
allegorizing coda indicates that the “abstraction” at work here carries with it a more complex and 
self-reflexive dimension than Kracauer or Berman give the film credit for.  
Pabst stages the figure of allegory within a trajectory that moves from the mask to oratory 
to the signature and the inscription of a final boundary. From the shock through a misrecognition 
of the face of the redeemer as the mask of the enemy he moves to a communion of the workers 
that transcends linguistic differences. But by culminating with the “exhausting” abstraction of 
the power of the state to demarcate its limits, Kameradschaft poses the question of how, exactly, 
this sense of inexorability can be represented. What the film achieves, then, is a profound 
understanding of the limits of representation in relation to a political rhetoric of images that 
restricts and reïfies differentiation through an act of writing. Seen in this way, the film’s hope 
lies not in the technology of sound, which confirms the difficulty of communication, and 
certainly not in the seal of the state, but rather in the silent and shocking moment of recognition 
when the mask of the enemy is understood as a human face that belongs to the same community. 
Kracauer’s sense of “exhaustion” can therefore perhaps be found in the struggle for this moment; 
it is significant that the French miner collapses in panic and faints before he sees his German 
counterpart behind the gasmask. 
The film thus places a difficult burden of responsibility on its audience: it insists on a 
different register which would enable us to see the process of allegorization in the same way that 
we know the intentions of the face behind the gasmask, the meinen of the image, as it were. In 
this sense, the film, indeed, capitulates by acceding the power of naming to the state. The 
                                                 
127 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 242. 
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inscription of the border that reterritorializes the space within which the nation is defined occurs 
precisely in the absence of a people or a community and in fact seals off, or encloses, this space. 
The absurdity of this gesture nonetheless does not mask its savage consequences. The 
bureaucratic desire of the state for its orderly demarcation organizes any potential communal 
space, including the one found in a threatening smithy of a kind of subterranean frontier land, 
into an abstract delineation of boundaries that must not be crossed. With this gesture the film 
signals its own failure to uphold the promise of a communal utopia; because it allegorizes its 
own limit point, the final sequence provides an image for the film’s aporia.  
This aporia demonstrates the limit of an imaginary community and leaves the spectator 
trapped in the face of the writing on the wall, since the border line that has been inscribed serves 
to imprison us as well as to keep others out. With this allegorical conclusion, the film comments 
on its own enthusiasm and renders it in “awkward heavy-handedness,” which, according to 
Walter Benjamin, is “essential to allegory.”128 The conclusion may therefore very well be 
understood as an act of cruelty in the violent manner that Benjamin ascribes to the 
“emblematist,” who “drags the essence of what is depicted out before the image, in writing, as a 
caption.”129 No wonder, then, that the theater owners in Pabst’s recollection did not see the 
satirical dimension that Kracauer ascribes to the epilogue. Neither is the ironic reversal of the 
film “liberating” in the sense that through its coda a definitive means for action becomes 
possible. It is, therefore, all the more ironic that the theater owners’ decision evoked by Pabst 
would be based on an idea that imagines the speeches as a more uplifting conclusion. Instead, the 
failure of intention is what we are left with. The film “means well,” the Meinen that Wittkopp 
                                                 
128 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 187. 
129 Ibid., p. 185. 
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evokes, but the awareness of the futility of such intentions in the face of the power of the state to 
impose its powers of inscription ultimately demands an act of submission. The potential 
community found in the masses is ultimately folded into the cruel acceptance of an entity that 
seems to exist before and outside of this community, namely the power of demarcation that is 
represented by its state servants. Its ability to permanently encode boundaries enables a seamless 
return to written treaties and documents. It is this mode of communication that remains 
ultimately translatable and eminently reproducible. The union extolled by Wittkopp and his 
French comrade has already been established in the bureaucracy of the state much more 
efficiently.     
In the triangulation of the transitory and fleeting speeches subsumed under the tension 
between the two modes of inscription a force field of signification is established. It is on this 
level that we can return to the relevance of Kracauer’s concern with Weimar cinema again, 
because what we are confronting then is a politics of the image that moves beyond the mere 
excavation of ideological deep structures. Neither does it constitute a focus on crude 
psychologism, despite Kracauer’s subtitle which offers a “psychological history of the German 
film” and his copious use of such terms as “mentality” or “psychological disposition.”130 It is 
important to note that in his introduction Kracauer asserts the necessity to consider cinematic 
phenomena such as the close-up as indicative of the capacity of films to “fulfill an innate mission 
in ferreting out minutiae.”131 Kracauer thinks here first and foremost of the fundamental elements 
that constitute the filmic image and the gestural dimensions recorded on celluloid: borrowing the 
term from Horace M. Kallen, Kracauer understands these minutiae as paramount for an 
                                                 
130 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 6. 
131 Ibid., p. 7. 
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understanding of the cinema because they contain the “‘visible hieroglyphs’ ... permeating both 
the stories and the visuals” that remain to be deciphered in order to determine “the inner life of 
the nation from which the films emerge.”132
This mode of deciphering corresponds to a desire of what Carlo Ginzburg calls the 
“evidential paradigm” for the epistemological method of conjecture through inadvertent and 
seemingly marginal “clues,” a method which, as Ginzburg demonstrates, is nonetheless firmly 
grounded in the “conjectural paradigm of semiotics.”133 Ginzburg delineates how this paradigm 
of classification, from its ancient origins in the venatic knowledge of traces, marks and tracks to 
the medical conception of diagnosis on the basis of symptomatic readings or psychoanalytic 
interpretations of the unconscious, is closely linked to a philological or semiotic method, which, 
“based on discarded information” and “on marginal data,” yields productive insights precisely 
because these fragments escape “conscious control.”134 Kracauer, whose own methodology is 
deeply indebted to this conjectural paradigm and thus allows him to establish the “retrospective” 
divination of his historicism,135 uses it to determine a specific national character or the nation’s 
“inner life” in order to establish a particularized notion of identity that can be imposed on the 
definition of an entire nation. 
Ginzburg shows how this far-reaching epistemological method must also be linked to 
progressive developments towards more effective forms of social and disciplinary control. He 
                                                 
132 Ibid. Kracauer’s use of the term “visible hieroglyphs” is cited here from Horace M. Kallen, Art and Freedom, 
vol. 2 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), p. 809.   
133 Carlo Ginzburg, “Clues: Roots of an Evidentiary Paradigm,” in Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method, trans. 
John and Anne C. Tedeschi (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 117 – 118.  
134 Ibid., p. 101. 
135 Cf. Ibid., p. 117. 
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examines the manner in which the epistemological project of individualizing classification is 
connected to the attempts of obtaining solidified degrees of specificity and unalterable 
characteristics through a bureaucracy of control in the British colonies of the 19th century. Here 
the implementation of fingerprinting as a method of identification in this period is evidence for a 
conceptual shift in which minutely visible traces and surface marks now provide the ability to 
differentiate and define into “individuals” a mass of people which would otherwise appear 
indistinguishable within the category of race. In order to impose an efficient means of control, 
fingerprinting offered the British colonial administration a more effective way of differentiation 
because it enabled an “indistinct mass” to become “at one stroke individuals, each one 
distinguished by a specific biological mark.”136
As Ginzburg notes, the category of “individuality” derives its ubiquity first and foremost 
from an administrative necessity for control. This form of control works along similar lines with 
the general modalities of discipline and mechanisms of power that Michel Foucault describes in 
the process of “disciplinary partitioning,” whereby “authorities exercising individual control 
function according to a double mode; that of binary division and branding ... and that of coercive 
assignment, of differential distribution.”137 Ginzburg shows how this differentiation through the 
“prodigious extension of the concept of individuality was in fact occurring by means of the State, 
its bureaucracy and police.”138 In this respect a widespread and diffuse paradigm of analytical 
                                                 
136 Ibid., p. 123. 
137 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995), p. 199.  
138 Ginzburg, Clues, Myths and the Historical Method, p. 123. 
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conjecture found its utilitarian implementation through the increasingly sophisticated 
mechanisms of disciplinary categorization that facilitated identification and control by the state.  
However, the value of Ginzburg’s work lies not only in charting and clarifying the means 
by which various forms of knowledge, be they scientific, folkloristic, divinatory, or disciplinary, 
have been organized within the fundamental framework of this particular epistemological model 
or how they were put to use for pervasive social control. In his account, Ginzburg offers the 
possibility of returning to the paradigm by way of a mode of reasoning he terms “aphoristic,” as 
opposed to “systematic thought.”139 This mode constitutes “an attempt to formulate evaluations 
of man and society on the basis of symptoms and clues; a man and a society that are sick, in 
crisis.”140 While Ginzburg emphasizes the literary nature of this mode of thinking, he also 
underscores its immediate relevance to everyday life and “daily existence,” that is, “to those 
situations in which the unique and indispensable nature of the data is decisive to the persons 
involved.”141 What Ginzburg describes here is a conceptual realm in which large-scale social 
crises manifest themselves in relation to the individual by indirect means. In other words, the 
mode of expression through which the individual can understand his position in relation to an 
“idea of totality” or in relation to a “complex social structure” arises precisely because “the 
existence of a deeply rooted relationship that explains superficial phenomena is confirmed the 
very moment it is stated that direct knowledge of such a connection is not possible.”142
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140 Ibid. (Emphasis in original.) 
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142 Ibid., p. 123. 
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What this indicates is how a variety of social forces and forms of knowledge are 
constructed but, at the same time, indirectly accessible, because, as Ginzburg formulates it, even 
“[t]hough reality may seem to be opaque, there are privileged zones – signs, clues – which allow 
us to penetrate it.”143 These “privileged zones” determine a confluence in which epistemological 
and social force fields converge in order to become expressed as a sign. This process of 
manifestation is what we might call a general mode of significance, but it corresponds more 
concretely to the indirect form of expression of allegorization that Walter Benjamin calls a 
“schema,”144 because once the object of investigation becomes allegorical it is imbued with an 
external, not inherent, significance and it “remains behind dead” as a trace of evidence.145 About 
this allegorical object, Benjamin continues: 
 
                                                 
143 Ibid. 
144 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 184.  
145 Ibid., pp. 183 - 184. In the translation by John Osborne the full sentence, which emphasizes the melancholy 
aspect of this investigation, reads: “If the object becomes allegorical under the gaze of melancholy, if melancholy 
causes life to flow out of it and it remains behind dead, but eternally secure, then it is exposed to the allegorist, it is 
unconditionally in his power.” The term exposed here obscures the historical character of the allegorical object in its 
remnant as documentary evidence. Benjamin uses the term überliefert, which indicates a temporal dimension 
through its fragmentary nature: “Wird der Gegenstand unterm Blick der Melancholie allegorisch, läßt sie das Leben 
von ihm abfließen, bleibt er als toter, doch in Ewigkeit gesicherter zurück, so liegt er vor dem Allegoriker, auf 
Gnade und Ungnade ihm überliefert.” Perhaps Osborne is thinking here instead of the term ausgeliefert, which 
would resonate with an exposure to someone’s mercy as well. Cf. Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels in Walter 
Benjamin: Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, bk. 1, Abhandlungen, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser  
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1978), p. 359. 
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“[I]t is now quite incapable of emanating any meaning or significance of its own; such 
significance as it has, it acquires from the allegorist. He places it within it, and stands behind it; 
not in a psychological but in an ontological sense. In his hands the object becomes something 
different; through it he speaks of something different and for him it becomes a key to the realm 
of hidden knowledge; and he reveres it as the emblem of this. This is what determines the 
character of allegory as a form of writing. It is a schema; and as a schema it is an object of 
knowledge, but it is not securely possessed until it becomes a fixed schema: at one and the same 
time a fixed image and a fixing sign.”146
 
This for Benjamin constitutes the “wealth of ciphers”147 that enable the allegorist to 
articulate them within a system of signification of a different order. In order to emphasize these 
schemata of “hidden knowledge” encapsulated by allegory, Benjamin makes reference to a 
commentary by the 19th century romantic theologian Franz von Baader, in which Baader declares 
that “everything we see in external nature is, for us, already writing, a kind of sign-language, 
which nevertheless lacks the most essential feature: pronunciation; this must quite simply have 
come from somewhere else and been given to man.”148 Benjamin understands this excessive 
dimension of meaning as that which the allegorist then articulates “‘from somewhere else’..., by 
no means avoiding that arbitrariness which is the most drastic manifestation of the power of 
knowledge.”149 Significance, in other words, is acquired in allegory through indirect means 
displaced to the point of arbitrariness; that is, it is articulated or pronounced from “elsewhere,” 
                                                 
146 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 184. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Franz Xaver von Baader (1765 – 1841), “Über den Einfluß der Zeichen der Gedanken auf deren Erzeugung und 
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yet its presence throughout “external nature” as ciphers or clues is, paradoxically, grounded in a 
system of signification that follows specific and recognizable emblematic schemata which 
nonetheless need to be read and deciphered. 
 Thus we can establish a structural connection between Kracauer’s project of tracing the 
“clues” that Weimar cinema provides and the Benjaminian concept of allegorical schemata that 
manifest themselves as a particular mode of expression. Ginzburg’s description of how 
intricately political and social operations of the state might become entangled in this conceptual 
process of relating minute details to a systematic totality should remind us of the fact that 
formations of power and control operate on both micro- and macro-dimensions of scale. This 
conjunction, therefore, indicates why the pervasive use of writing on the screen does not merely 
constitute a thematic or, worse, an  ornamental element, but rather must be seen as a fundamental 
mode of expression. Through this mode we gain access to indirect “clues,” which, precisely 
because they are so entangled with daily existence, must be understood as “mute forms of 
knowledge in the sense that their precepts do not lend themselves to being either formalized or 
spoken.”150 Moreover, as Ginzburg shows, these conceptual forms are not in and of themselves 
liberating, because they may operate and be employed within disciplinary modes of coercion, 
persuasion or control.  
Benjamin’s category of allegory as an operative schema is important in this respect since 
it underscores the twofold aspects of its manifestation as a convergence between “fixing sign” 
and “fixed image” at the same time. In this sense we need to take into account both the mode in 
which allegorical schemata become “fixed” or arrested into images, as well as the mode that 
mobilizes and reörganizes signs within signification as such. A temporal dimension, however, 
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needs to be introduced into this doubling modality. In the allegorical mode of signification 
temporal movement is frozen or arrested into expressions or, as Benjamin puts it, “in allegory the 
observer is confronted with the facies hippocratica of history as a petrified, primordial 
landscape.”151 This image incorporates the traces of history as they are etched into the human 
face, which becomes the form where “[e]verything about history that, from the very beginning, 
has been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed in a face – or rather in a death’s 
head.”152 As a mode of expression, then, allegory records the traces of history “in the stations of 
its decline.”153 What Benjamin emphasizes, however, is that this corresponds to a dimension of 
scale in which minutiae and totality, historical monumentality and individual particularity, 
coëxist on one plane, so that allegory becomes the “form in which man’s subjection to nature is 
most obvious” and which therefore “gives rise not only to the enigmatic question of the nature of 
human existence as such, but also of the biographical historicity of the individual.”154 From this 
we can draw a parallel between allegory as a record that arrests the movements of history and 
stages them in expressive relief and its status as a fragmentary and dated remnants of a larger 
structures, or as Benjamin declares, “[a]llegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in 
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the realm of things.”155 In this respect, allegories constitute repetitive gestures that express their 
own character indirectly or allegorically while at the same time calling attention to their material 
status as allegories.                            
The political implications of this insight for the cinema are marked out by Giorgio 
Agamben when he insists that “the element of the cinema is gesture and not image.”156 In his 
explication of the necessity to conceive of images as gestures, Agamben builds on Deleuze’s 
concept of movement-images and notes that images are “animated by an antinomic polarity” 
between the “reification and obliteration of a gesture,” which is “the imago as death mask or as 
symbol,” and the encapsulated preservation of a larger movement of which the images are a 
part.157 In its function as a mode of meaning, gesture, like a march or a dance, doubles as a 
movement that cannot be separated from either its duration or from the process of its meaning; in 
this respect, gesture opens up access to the means by which it means. Gesture thus communicates 
its “communicability” and, therefore, makes visible “the sphere of a pure and endless 
mediality”158 without any transcendental reference point at which the state of mediality would be 
resolved. Rather, gesture means its own manner of signification while saying nothing so much as 
the circumstances of its own restriction.  
What this also implies is that gesture marks the moments at which a limit point of 
communicability is reached, or, as Agamben formulates it, “the gesture is essentially always a 
gesture of not being able to figure something out in language,” an inability he likens to a gag” in 
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its original restrictive sense.159 This displacement of communicability which, when faced with a 
blockage, shifts into a different register of expressibility demonstrates the pervasive range of 
gestures and must be taken literally. When speech encounters an obstacle and can no longer be 
voiced or articulated, gesture attempts to take over. In this sense, writing in film must be 
understood in its gestural qualities as a displacement of that which cannot be articulated as 
image, as speech or otherwise into writing. It is on this level of gesturality that Agamben locates 
the sphere of pure politics because gestures become a record of the means that are endured in the 
gesture. In other words, in gestures are arranged the attempts at recovery and reclamation of a 
loss of ease and a “sense of naturalness,”160 which leads Agamben to the apodictic declaration 
that “in the cinema, a society that has lost its gestures tries at once to reclaim what it has lost and 
to record its loss.”161
The remarkable implications of this observation can be connected to the project Kracauer 
sets out for himself as well if we follow Agamben’s assessment that “the more gestures lose their 
ease under the action of invisible powers, the more life becomes indecipherable.”162 This is the 
realm that Kracauer establishes as his terrain of study when he determines that it is necessary to 
extend what he calls “the normal field of vision” in order to include the element of “something 
unaccountable” in the attempt to explain the rise of fascism in Weimar Germany.163 The 
predilections and dispositions that he evokes are recorded on the screen as “imperceptible 
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surface data” that supply the “clues” that need to be deciphered by the film historian.164 
Kracauer’s frame of reference that renders his project as an exploration of the psychology and 
“mentality” of a nation might therefore be understood, in a variation of Agamben’s terms, as a 
bourgeois myopic obsession which “succumbs to interiority and gives itself up to 
psychology.”165
Instead of neglecting or dismissing Kracauer’s mode of explanation, this frame of 
reference might rather be understood productively as a way of explaining the necessity to take 
seriously the cinema’s ability to record the figural and gestural instances that determine the 
politics of signification and thus yield the figural “clues” around which a sense of history can be 
determined as allegories. Because these figurations take the form of writing in relevant instances 
of Weimar cinema, it becomes necessary to trace and highlight these patterns. Like gestures and 
allegories, the functions of the writing on the screen are doubled, but because in its indexical 
component writing appears merely as writing, rather than as a figural inscription rendered in 
writing, its relevance might be obscured precisely because of its seeming self-evidence. If we 
take seriously the politics of the gesture in Kameradschaft, where the allegory of its own 
exhaustion for representation beckons the representatives of the power of the state, we can see 
this notion extended to Fritz Lang’s films that continue the trajectory of writing as a conflicting 
force of power that establishes and delineates the social order. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE LETTER AND THE LAW: MOBILIZATION AND ARREST 
ACROSS FRITZ LANG’S MABUSE FILMS AND M 
 
 
 
To determine the status of writing in these films as significant moments around which questions 
of the state are articulated, a closer look at such instances in another important film, released 
only two years after The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari and directed by Fritz Lang, the epic two-part 
film Dr. Mabuse, The Gambler (1922) is necessary. Lang was originally scheduled to direct The 
Cabinet of Dr. Caligari and is frequently said to have invented its famous narrative framing 
device.1 As was his wont, Fritz Lang, in a typical attempt at self-aggrandizement, apparently 
embellished a conversation with Lotte Eisner when he told her that he had originally planned to 
open Dr. Mabuse, The Gambler with a fast montage sequence depicting significant current and 
recent Weimar political events: from the Spartakisten street fights during the uprisings of the 
winter of 1918/1919, the rightwing coup attempts to overthrow the government by military 
                                                 
1 For more thorough discussions on the narrative framework and the Rahmenhandlung question see Prawer, Jung, 
and Schatzberg, eds., Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari: Drehbuch von Carl Mayer und Hans Janowitz zu Robert 
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remnants such as the Brigade Ehrhardt and others in the Kapp-Putsch of March 1920, to the 
murder of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Walter Rathenau in June of 1922 by the nationalist 
anti-Semitic “Organization Consul.” This prologue sequence was to be followed by an initial 
large-scale intertitle that exclaimed “Who is behind all this?” and another title in which the word 
“I” would rush feverishly toward and impose itself on the spectator. The source of this voice 
would then be revealed in the image that now constitutes the first scene, namely Dr. Mabuse, 
who stares directly into the camera since he is seated in front of his dressing room mirror, while 
he is about to begin the selection of his disguise for the day from postcard photographs fanned in 
his hand like a deck of cards. Tom Gunning has investigated Lang’s claims for the prologue 
sequence and dismisses its veracity while taking note of its “confused political thinking” that 
traces socialist uprisings, military coups, and rightwing terror and equates them into the acts of 
one individual agent as a form of “political obscurantism.”2
As has been demonstrated, Lang was prone to recollect events of his life that often seem 
to have been taken straight out of pivotal scenes from his own films and, moreover, used to tell 
them in such a manner that befit their dramatic structures almost too smugly and precisely.3 
Nonetheless, despite its apocryphal nature, the potential prologue sequence indicates Lang’s 
recollection of the film as one that invokes the violent political struggles for a system of control 
within the state, albeit rendered in melodramatic terms as the subversive work of a single 
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mastermind criminal. Mabuse’s counterpart is the State Attorney von Wenk, a peculiar 
adversary, because, as a bland civil servant, he does not comport himself like a dashing 
individualist action hero, nor does he convey the demeanor of a detective who solves his case 
through sharp-edged ratiocinations or logical deductions. Instead, von Wenk is the direct 
bureaucratic representative of the state the very foundations of which are under siege. He reports 
frequently to his office where he uses the telephone, reads correspondence and receives visitors. 
At the same time, his lank body and high forehead suggest an aristocratic reserve and an East 
Prussian sobriety which offers a cinematic character image that would delight a phrenologist. In 
order to gain access to the illegal gambling dens throughout the city where “The Great 
Unknown,” as von Wenk calls his target, is operating, he receives an informant’s list with the 
locations and corresponding passwords (his “open-sesame” key, as a dialogue title will later 
state). These code words are innocuous terms such as Ananas (“pineapple”) for the Palais 
Andalusia, Schlepper (“trawler”) for a Weinstube on Schifferdamm, Marmor (“marble”) for a 
café on the Wienerstraße, and so on. To converge the work of the spectator with that of the von 
Wenk on screen, Lang offers the decoding of these clues as a visual reference to perceptive and 
nimble readers among the film’s audiences, who would have been able to discern the derivations 
of the passwords as humorously associative rather than random, since the code words correspond 
in a playful manner to the names or locations of their applicability, so that the “ship” in 
Schifferdamm becomes “trawler,” “marble” is linked to Viennese architecture, and the exotic 
fruit “pineapple” effects an open door into the Andalusian palace. 
Von Wenk’s mode of operation is therefore leveled in analogy to that of a spectator, 
namely, to process information, to sift through records and documents, and to assemble 
fragments of knowledge into a larger coherent whole. Mabuse, in contrast, is the one who 
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orchestrates campaigns of deception and misinformation. His character is introduced with a 
crime that is minutely choreographed and executed. In a synchronized effort, a courier is 
attacked on a train while transporting the secret documents of a Dutch-Swiss trade agreement, its 
title page contrats commercial exposed, as if by x-ray vision into his briefcase. The documents 
are then thrown into a moving taxi, whose subsequent accident is staged in order to enable 
Mabuse to take possession of the folder with the treaty. Rumors begin to circulate and when 
news of the disappearance of the treaty spreads, the stock market turns into a selling frenzy 
(“Baisse!” a title informs) because revelation of its details might jeopardize the actual 
implementation of the agreement. Mabuse buys all the stocks when they have dropped to their 
lowest point and then lets the treaty surface intact. An intertitle shows news wire services 
reporting the recovery of the treaty, concluding with the phrase “no cause for alarm,” and the 
market turns on this information. “Hausse!” declares the German intertitle.  
Conforming to the public persona he liked to maintain, Fritz Lang considered himself an 
archivist of his time and, indeed, the film’s subtitles for its two parts are Part I: The Great 
Gambler – A Portrait of the Time and Part II: Inferno – A Play About People of Our Time.4 Both 
Lotte Eisner and Kracauer discuss this film as a sign of the times and as a direct representation of 
contemporary life, while numerous reviews praised the film for capturing the Zeitgeist.5 Such 
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claims of authenticity and accuracy have been part of the discourse around the medium cinema 
from its inception and, as such, do not carry much relevance, but this remarkable consensus 
enables us to consider whether the uses of writing in the film should be considered as part of the 
apparently evidentiary and thus documentary character of the film or whether they serve another 
function. Lang himself was an avid chronicler and archivist of his time and “thought of himself 
as a newspaper reporter,” who developed a meticulous “habit of reading newspapers with a pair 
of scissors at hand to clip items to file into categories in folders.”6
The image of the director as a conduit and information processor who assembles news 
items, fragmentary documents, and pieces of trivia, and then reärranges these disparate elements 
into a larger cinematic context is an intriguing concept that goes beyond such traditional 
definitions of the filmmaker’s work as that of the metteur-en-scène, the creative genius, or the 
studio auteur. Moreover, this mode of collecting calls attention to the importance of fragmentary 
details in Lang’s films and emphasizes the archival quality that Lang’s obsessive attention to the 
verisimilitude of details desired to achieve and allows us to consider his film as a terrain where 
the various trajectories of forms of knowledge and information intersect. In these moments of 
interference, Lang’s film conveys a constellation of the elements of daily existence, the 
anecdotal detritus of information as filtered through the newspaper and magazine media, and its 
concomitant commonsensical explanations of the public sphere. Already from a strictly auteurist 
point of view, this would justify the focus of our attention to the seemingly marginal details, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Press, 1974), p. 81. Patrick McMillan in his Lang biography The Nature of the Beast, p. 86, cites three contemporary 
reviews: “‘A mirror of the age,’ declared Das Tagebuch. ‘An archive of its time,’ agreed Vorwärts, the leading 
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scraps of paper and clippings of writing that Lang has recorded and assembled in his films, as it 
were.  
The terrain of conflict for the film is marked out from the beginning as a struggle for 
control of information and manipulation of knowledge that circulates in the social realm. The 
struggle over information and perception, however, has an added degree of sinister implications. 
Mabuse is not only a manipulator of information and the dissemination and circulation thereof 
but also of perception as such. He is able to hypnotize people from a distance and one of his 
disguises is as Sandor Weltmann, an Indian fakir who offers public performances of experiments 
in “mass suggestion,” trance, hypnosis, and other psychic phenomena. He also runs a psychiatric 
practice as Dr. Mabuse, which offers him insight into his patients’ subconscious mental 
processes. In the focus on how Mabuse’s hypnotic powers are associated with the control of 
vision and perception, many commentators have observed Mabuse’s “control of the gaze” and 
the “primacy of Mabuse’s look within this system” of perception.7 When von Wenk comes 
across the target of his manhunt for the first time at the gambling tables in the back rooms of the 
Palais Andalusia, Mabuse is playing under the guise of the Dutch Professor van den Gruich. Von 
Wenk, himself in disguise and now looking like a heavily drinking nightclub patron, sits down at 
the other end of the table but does not yet know whom he is facing. He tempts Mabuse as van 
den Gruich by displaying a wallet bulging with a large stash of banknotes. The professor 
responds to this temptation by removing an unusual pair of square spectacles and, by toying with 
them in his hands, begins to refract light beams into von Wenk’s face. As Mabuse stares down at 
the pair of glasses, the stare of his piercing eyes seems to be reflected in the light as well. An iris 
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close-up focuses on von Wenk’s struggle with the threat of a gradual descent into hypnosis and 
then on the vectors of light emanating from the spectacles. A confused von Wenk stammers that 
these seem to be “Chinese spectacles,” which Mabuse confirms with the ominous intertile “Yes, 
from TSI-NAN-FU!!” Another shot, from Mabuse’s point of view and visually emphasized by 
two mask bars that wipe into the image from either side of the screen, shows von Wenk slowly 
losing control over his action. This is followed by an extreme close-up of Mabuse’s piercing 
eyes. When Mabuse deals von Wenk his pair of cards, the Six of Clubs and the Two of 
Diamonds, a close-up shows how their numeric values dissolve into letters: Tsi – Nan and F-U, 
respectively. The state attorney looks up and we see the staring face of Mabuse, eerily radiated, 
while only the faces of those around him gradually fade into black. His suspended head pulls in 
the camera’s perspective until the screen frames his entire face. An intertitle announces his 
demand that “you take!” another card.        
Because this is the first moment when von Wenk experiences the power of Mabuse first-
hand, this scene is characterized by the remarkable optical effect through the use of matting and 
its disorienting tracking shot that seems to pull the camera lens and, along with it, the spectator’s 
helpless gaze towards Mabuse’s eyes. The scene has notably been commented upon as early as 
Rudolf Arnheim’s 1932 work Film als Kunst. Arnheim discusses the concept of the “relativity of 
movement” and “the absence of the sense of balance”8 with the particular example from the film, 
since it disorients the spectator: movement and the spectator’s relation to it is used in this scene, 
“in which, in order to demonstrate the power of a mysterious man, his face appears small against 
a dark background, glides forward swiftly, growing larger, until it becomes so huge that it 
                                                 
8 Rudolf Arnheim, Film as Art, trans. L.M. Sieveking and Ian F.D. Morrow (1932; reprint Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), p. 102. 
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occupies the whole screen.”9 The scene orchestrates a triangulation of three perspectives as the 
camera slowly tracks closer in the direction of the illuminated face of the staring Mabuse, now 
seemingly detached from his body and hovering in midair, so that it seems as if his magnetic 
gaze is pulling the spectator, in lieu of von Wenk’s point-of-view, inexorably closer toward him. 
Kracauer comments on the hypnosis vignette as an example of the omnipotent scopic power of 
Mabuse, since the scene shows him to be a “devouring creature” as his “face gleams out of the 
jet-black screen, then, with frightening speed, rushes to the foreground and fills the whole frame, 
his cruel, strong-willed eyes fastened upon the audience.”10 The visual effect is certainly 
spectacular. Tom Gunning in his careful description of the scene calls it “visual pyrotechnics” 
and notes how the “camera movement follows the trajectory of the gaze, giving it an almost 
ejaculatory power.”11 Gunning places this sequence within the larger context of an integral 
aspect of Lang’s fascination with the connection of optic trajectories and regimes of power and 
the discussions of medium film itself as an instrument of hypnosis and mass suggestion, since 
“Lang’s alignment of the power of cinema with hypnosis pulls in a broader discussion on the 
nature of film, one intimately linked with... concerns about the effect of this new medium.”12 The 
vectors of the gaze make explicit the link between Mabuse’s eyes, power and control.13
                                                 
9 Ibid., p. 103. 
10 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 83. 
11 Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang, p. 109. 
12 Ibid. 
13 In the open-source encyclopedia Wikipedia, an “open-market” forum for the collection of general information, 
contemporary knowledge and commonsensical explanations to which anyone can contribute, this scene is also 
described with an apocryphal anecdote. In the anecdote, contemporary critics of the film are said to have derided the 
scene by noting the rack-pull effect of the movement described by the camera with a commentary on the distance 
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However, because the focal point in the visualization of this triangulation is the gaze, one 
of the fundamental aspects in theories of the cinematic apparatus, Tom Gunning restricts his 
discussion to this particular aspect in the sequence, without developing a similar rigorous 
theorization for the status of the writing in this powerful sequence. The letters that spell Tsi Nan 
Fu are relegated to a secondary category, namely “words”: they are “magical” or “mysterious,”14 
but nonetheless they are merely words for Gunning, who focuses on the interplay between the 
“ray of power”15 and the recipients of the gaze as it is localized in the exchanges of looks 
between the two antagonists. What is neglected, then, in his emphasis on the ocular aspect of 
power is the transposition and exchange of this power into writing. The letters encapsulate the 
power of the Mabuse’s gaze, so that his hypnotic force is externalized and detached from the 
physical connection to his eyes. At the same time, they contaminate the field of vision through an 
act of imposition, in the same way that inner voices might compel a schizophrenic, but detached 
from a specific subjectivity. This notion of contamination is further underscored when the State 
Attorney cautiously lifts up his cards again. From underneath, the letters Tsi Nan Fu are now 
emanating in an eerily radioactive, almost neon-light-like glow as if they are burning through the 
gambling table. The field of vision of the representative of the state is now a contested terrain 
between his autonomous perception and the searing letters that are burnt into his sight. 
Moreover, the space on the screen has been contaminated as well, since the letters now radiate as 
if they are originating from a light source outside of the diegetic space, which makes itself 
                                                                                                                                                             
covered: “new German record, 1. 2 meters.” The anecdote is cited in Günter Scholdt, ed., Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler: 
Roman/Film/ Dokumente, (St. Ingbert: WJ Röhrig Universitätsverlag, 1987). Cf. entry 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mabuse.    
14 Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang, p. 109. 
15 Ibid., p. 108. 
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visible from underneath the table and points to a source from which a powerful energy flows into 
the terrain of the gambling den. 
To describe this struggle as a territorial conflict, therefore, in which competing regimes 
of power and energy vie for the vision of von Wenk, is not as far-fetched or inconsequential as it 
might seem. The fact that Tsi-Nan-Fu is the place of origin for the spectacles makes the word 
itself a sufficiently Orientalist enigma to conjure up inexplicable mechanisms of power and 
mysterious forces beyond the scope of rational, that is Western modes of explanation or 
comprehension. As such, its use in this context might not need to be investigated further unless 
understood as a trope of convention to connote an exoticist locus of energy. But Tsi-nan-fu also 
corresponds to the old German transcription of the Chinese town of Jinan.16 The name Tsi-nan-fu 
thus carries with it echoes of an important part of the belated, but, because of this, even more 
fervent German colonialist enterprise that culminated in the late 19th century with the imperial 
expansions under Emperor Wilhelm II and that ended unceremoniously and definitively with the 
Treaty of Versailles. The fact that Mabuse in the diguise of van den Gruich is repeatedly 
identified as a Dutch national and that the film begins with a Dutch-Swiss trade agreement, lends 
credence to an associative connection here, because the Netherlands provided the German 
Emperor with a place for his exile after his abdication and were themselves a nation with a 
significant number of colonial territories under their control. 
                                                 
16 Cf. entry Kiautschou in Deutscher Kolonial-Atlas mit Illustriertem Jahrbuch 1910, herausgegeben auf 
Verlanlassung der Deutschen Kolonialgesellschaft, bearbeitet von Paul Sprigade und Max Moisel, Berlin 1910, p. 
33ff. Reprinted online by the German pedagogical site Zentrale für Unterrichtsmedien im Internet e.V. at 
http://www.zum.de/psm/imperialismus/kolonialatlas10/atlas19.php. 
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The capital of the Shandong province, Jinan was one of the primary towns to which the 
sphere of influence extended after the German Navy had seized the harbor city of Qingdao 
(transcribed as Tsingtau in German) in 1897 and imposed a “zone of protection” (Schutzgebiet, 
the official nomenclature for all German colonial territories) for the region of Jiao zhou (German 
Kiautschou), which remained under German control until the Japanese invasion in late 1914. The 
German aspirations for colonial possessions in Qingdao were driven by strategic naval interests 
as well as the promise of access to the vast reserves from the coalmines in the Hinterland.17 In 
order to achieve these goals, industrial interests were bundled in a syndicate that organized and 
facilitated the construction of the railroads between the harbor city of Qingdao and the coalmines 
around Jinan under the auspices of two German companies and thus affirmed the German 
military and political strength in economic terms. To a large degree, Chinese resistance in the 
area to these activities by the railroad company, the Schantung-Eisenbahngesellschaft, and the 
mining company, the Schantung-Bergbaugesellschaft, coïncided with the so-called “Boxer 
Rebellion,” one of the long-simmering resistance movements across Northern China that erupted 
with particular violence in 1900. This rebellion against foreign occupation was brutally and 
savagely repressed by the European powers, but it served to undermine the tenuous Western 
                                                 
17 For an overview of the German colonial occupation of Qingdao, see the catalogue for the 1998 exhibition 
Tsingtau in the Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin, especially the article by Klaus Mühlhahn, “Deutsche 
Vorposten im Hinterland: Die infrastrukturelle Durchdringung der Provinz Schantung,” available online at 
http://www.dhm.de/ausstellungen/tsingtau/katalog/auf1_13.htm. The railroad connections from Kiautschou to 
Tsinanfu were completed in 1904, so that “Tsinanfu was officially opened for international trade on January 1st, 
1906.” Cf. Hans Heinrich Joseph Meyer, ed., Das Deutsche Kolonialreich: Eine Länderkunde der deutschen 
Schutzgebiete. Zweiter Band: Togo, Südwestafrika, Schutzgebiete in der Südsee und Kiautschougebiet (Leipzig and 
Vienna: Bibliographisches Institut, 1910), p. 535.  
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fantasies of a subordinate and pliable Chinese population and shook to the core the foundations 
of legitimacy on which the self-image of a benevolent and paternal colonial ruler rested.  
What shines through with the illumination of the letters Tsi-Nan-Fu, then, cannot be 
reduced to a mere exoticism or a facile moment of kitsch in which incantations of alien names 
substitute for the presence of a mysterious force of power. Rather, into the field of vision of the 
state attorney a violent force interferes, through which is refracted the history of a loss of 
territorial influence and the fear of savage uprisings against legitimate and preördained forms of 
authority. Moreover, this conflict is rendered as a battle of will over control in the very same 
terms that characterize the German colonialist adventure. A description from 1910, in part 
published to coïncide as a commemoration of 25 years of the colonial German enterprise, puts 
the territorial struggle in grandiose providential terms by stating that a 
 
“struggle both peaceful and martial in kind has begun, … in which, under the mighty breath of 
the white race’s energy, even those independent East Asian realms on the Pacific coasts that are 
not yet within the political control of this race have awakened from their cultural slumber and 
have entered this arena of wrestling.”18
 
The author makes reference to the “Boxer confusions” (“Boxerwirren”)19 and moves on 
to determine that 
                                                 
18 Cf. Georg Wegener, “Das Kiautschougebiet,”  in Hans Heinrich Joseph Meyer, ed., Das Deutsche Kolonialreich, 
p. 502. In the original: “Ein Ringen, friedlicher und kriegerischer Art hat begonnen... Unter dem mächtigen Anhauch 
der Energie der weißen Rasse sind auch die einzigen nicht unter ihrer politischen Herrschaft stehenden Gebiete der 
pazifischen Küsten, die noch unabhängigen Reiche Ostasiens, aus ihrem Kulturschlummer erwacht und beginnen 
mit in jenes Ringen einzutreten.”   
19 Ibid., p. 500. 
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 “nowhere on earth are there today more fundamental, deeper oppositions and differences 
between races and civilizations than here in East Asia, where only in most recent times the white 
race, to its astonishment, was forced to learn that the question whether nature had preördained it 
as the ruler of the globe had, in fact, not yet been determined in its favor, but that the deciding 
battle in this respect has precisely only just commenced.”20
  
Evidently, these concerns echo the contemporary fears of the early Weimar Republic, but 
it is therefore all the more noteworthy that, once again, questions of the relation between the state 
and its power are redirected and articulated around instances of writing on the screen. The 
“battle” that is staged, then, takes place over the obstacles and impediments that might challenge 
any “preördained” legitimacy of power and is replaced as a question of “energy,” since von 
Wenk is only able to resist Mabuse’s attempts at incapacitating him through an exhausting effort 
of sheer will as he slumps forward into hypnotic sleep. When Lang invokes this in form of a 
colonialist struggle in the sequence as a cinematic replication, he nonetheless returns to this kind 
of thinking through a popular reïmagination by framing it as a fundamental battle on a scale of 
destiny and providence in which race, civilization and the idea of nation converge. The letters 
“Tsi-Nan-Fu” thus project a struggle of territorial legitimacy within the realm of civilizations and 
return it to the gaming table as a manifestation of a mental confrontation between two 
adversaries. Tom Gunning describes this sequence merely in terms of its metacinematic 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 502. In the original: “Nirgends auf der Erde gibt es aber grundlegendere, tieferreichende Underschiede 
und Gegensätze zwischen ... Rassen und Gesittungen als hier in Ostasien, wo die weiße Rasse erst in allerjüngster 
Zeit zu ihrem Erstaunen erfahren mußte, daß die Frage, ob sie von der Natur zur Beherrscherin des Globus bestimmt 
sei, tatsächlich noch gar nicht zu ihren Gunsten entschieden ist, sondern daß eben erst der entscheidende Kampf 
darum beginnt.”   
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meditation on the power of the cinematic apparatus itself and as an inventory display of the 
“devices of the cinema,” such as “lighting, framing, masking, editing, camera movement ... that 
have been associated with hypnotic power in this brief sequence.”21 But the use of writing here 
suggests that the letters, nonsensical as they may sound, encapsulate an association with a 
particular national trauma, which, moreover, almost renders the representative of state authority 
impotent to act on its behalf. Mabuse’s hypnotic power at this moment rests on the capacity to 
induce a catatonic state of compliance in his victims who become his automata. For any other 
hypnosis sequence in the film, however, Mabuse is capable of inducing this loss of autonomy in 
consciousness primarily through his eyes, whose stare does not even need to be reciprocated in 
order to have its desired effect on his victims. The sphere of influence determined by his power 
is generally restricted to the territory of vision.  
By contrast, this sequence offers a privileged moment for witnessing the source of 
Mabuse’s powers, since it equates the spectator’s point-of-view with that of the state attorney 
and, in doing so, demonstrates one of the points of vulnerability that are part of the range of 
tricks Mabuse employs to his advantage. With extraordinary effort, von Wenk is able to resist 
this attempt at hypnosis and Mabuse now encounters the potential limits of his powers for the 
first time. Mabuse is not aware of his counterpart’s identity at this point, but we know that it is 
the representative of the state who suffers in this struggle, expressed in the glow of the nominal 
letters that reveal one of the secret sources of Mabuse’s craft. Because the state attorney is 
investigating in official capacity, the writing on the screen serves a memento of his sacrifice. 
Gunning identifies a Langian fascination with the “connections between Mabuse’s gaze and the 
                                                 
21 Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang, p. 110. 
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role of spectatorship,”22 but any pleasure generated by the oscillation between an awareness of 
the apparatus and the illusions it may effect are vitiated through the appearance of writing. That 
is, part of Lang’s fascination here with the cinematic pleasure of depicting the act of hypnosis 
has to do with the fact that the effect the words have on von Wenk obviously do not have a 
reciprocal effect on the spectator. The letters represent the threat of hypnosis without actually 
causing it in the spectator. They are both cause of the hypnosis and yet remain a secondary, 
representative record of the effect. While the words are thus merely a trace of the physical 
coercion inflicted on the body of the representative of the state, they nonetheless function as an 
emblematized inscription of his suffering at the same time. The letters thus stand as a tribute for 
the physical and mental efforts on the attorney’s part to resist this coercion in the service of the 
civic good that he represents. This means, however, that the writing here offers a disciplinary 
correlative to the visual pleasure of substitution that Lang evokes. The state representative is 
subjected to Mabuse’s power and the writing documents this for us, but the price for the act of 
witnessing his suffering is rendered externally as a reminder in the seemingly nonsensical 
incantation of the phrase Tsi-Nan-Fu, made visible by inscription. Because of its status as a 
memento, the notions of guilt and atonement that this inscription invokes are revisited when the 
state attorney is subjected once again to hypnosis. 
In a build-up to the climactic showdown when the state attorney finally recognizes his 
nemesis, von Wenk is told by the psychiatrist Dr. Mabuse about the phenomenon of hypnotic 
powers and is subsequently advised to visit a performance by the hypnotist Sandor Weltmann, 
Mabuse’s most spectacular impersonation, who, as a title announces, specializes in “experiments 
in mass suggestion, sleepless hypnosis, trance, natural magnetism, the secrets of the Indian 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 111. 
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fakirs, the secrets of the psyche,” and “the subconscious in man and animal.” The invitation is 
intended as an elaborate trap to dispose of the state attorney. With a large and receptive audience 
in the auditorium, Weltmann’s opening experiment, as announced by a dialogue title, is a 
demonstration of a “typical case of mass suggestion such as is the power base of Hindu Fakirs.” 
In this associative chain the fear of alternative modes of power is projected onto the figure of the 
other, but returns as a projection itself for the supposed entertainment of the masses who are 
willing to submit to the power of the other. Weltmann conjures up images of a caravan across a 
desert landscape on the stage after the curtains have been raised. The audience is astonished and 
mesmerized to witness the mirage of the caravan move towards them, descend from the stage 
and enter the auditorium in a procession down the center aisle until Weltmann erases the illusion 
with an authoritative gesture of his hand grabbing the air, to take away the spectacle he has just 
suggested to the masses. This gesture is sinister in part because everything Weltmann does is 
performed with his left hand, while the sleeve of his right arm remains permanently buried in his 
coat pocket. The emphasis on the left hand might seem like a utilitarian visual shorthand to 
indicate Weltmann’s deviance and abnormality. When he writes letters with the instructions to be 
obeyed under hypnosis, the focus on the movements of the left hand subtly underscores this 
notion of deviance. Yet there is a more oblique level of significance to the missing right hand, 
because such an absence suggests a reference to World War I, given the ubiquity of maimed and 
wounded veterans of the war on the streets at the time. But Sandor Weltmann’s name indicates 
an absence of a specific nationally identifiable origin, since the pairing of the exoticized Austro-
Hungarian first name with his last name, after all, suggests he is a “a man of the world” and 
therefore from no specific location or region. This is underscored visually by his menacing mane 
and beard which resemble those of a mendicant Fakir, juxtaposed with his elegant deportment as 
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a tuxedo-clad cosmopolitan – an emphasis that orchestrates paradoxical registers of a proto-
fascist fascination with an exotic figure who possesses Aryan “Hindu” powers, but is nonetheless 
marked as a threatening, nomadic outsider, capable of shifting and adjusting to any environment, 
which would thus incorporate a paranoid anti-Semitism within his figure as well. 
On the other hand, however, his wound is a visual reminder of a potential military 
sacrifice and as a memento he wears a military medal resembling the Iron Cross below his left 
lapel in his disguise, but since any determinate allegiance to the category of nation is called into 
question by the additional conflicting identifiable markers deployed here, he remains an 
enigmatic figure in and of itself. His appearance, then, obscures his essential characteristics to 
the unsuspecting observer and indicates Mabuse’s potential to employ symbolic markers such as 
wounds and medals, much as he is the manipulator of the filmic image itself, to his advantage. 
Because this is emphasized in a sequence which deals with the manipulation of the masses, it 
invokes issues of power and knowledge. Both the filmic and actual audiences are witnessing the 
power of the cinema itself to create illusions, but are at the mercy of the illusionist mechanisms 
that make this possible. We know that Mabuse is a manipulator of symbols and semblances, but 
are incapable of intervening in the process of their unfolding, which, after all, is the condition of 
the cinema itself. In other words, we have already been subjected to learn how to recognize the 
clues and signs that are associated with Mabuse’s manipulations, but the state attorney has not 
yet learned to recognize the signs as clues. The representative of the state is not yet capable of 
recognizing the manner in which destabilizing forces are undermining its foundations. In a 
reversal, then, the figure of authority that should act on behalf of the people is rendered 
powerless to understand the evidence of manipulation and will now be made to suffer.        
  136
Tom Gunning’s focus on the metacinematic aspects of this sequence are therefore 
insightful in terms of the particular signature that traverses Lang’s work, but through this focal 
point in attention certain fundamental issues of the state and suffering are obscured. Gunning 
describes the scene of the caravan as a “sort of super-cinema, appearing first on the curtain and 
then expanding into three dimensional haptic space.”23 He discusses the relevance of this 
sequence in terms of a conjunction of the film’s actual audience with “Weltmann’s mini-movie” 
in which the “mise-en-abîme of the audience perceiving and applauding ... becomes an emblem 
for the issues Lang raises about enunciation in this film.”24 The importance of this scene, 
according to Gunning, lies in the fact that it marks the epitome of Mabuse’s power, insofar as it 
now extends to the cinematic apparatus itself, but that this is the moment at which Lang enacts a 
“dialectical reversal.”25 Since Mabuse’s power has been characterized by his skill at 
“manipulating the ‘empty’ forms of modernity,” such as “the disembedded co-ordination of 
space and time; the fluctuations of the money economy; and the gambler’s surrender to the 
mechanics of desire,”26 this power must now confront its counterpoint as a “visionary moment,” 
a signature instance for a Langian filmic system in Gunning’s explanatory model. For Gunning 
these constitute exemplary instances of recognition in Lang’s films, which “trigger a moment of 
realisation and interpretation, a reading of signs, in which the true mechanism controlling reality 
is perceived by a character.”27
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 112. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p. 22. 
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This moment arrives for von Wenk when he avails himself to another of Weltmann’s 
experiments. With his one hand, Weltmann writes down the actions the attorney will be made to 
perform, inserts the letter into an envelope, seals it, and hands it to another participant to hold for 
the duration of the experiment as the state attorney and two other participants stare at his actions 
intently and skeptically. Suddenly Weltmann pulls out a luminous crystal monocle and whispers 
the words “Tsi-Nan-Fu!” Von Wenk winces and gulps, as the phrase of the intertitle triggers a 
physical reaction from him through a kind of bodily memory of an unidentified trauma. A 
flashback returns us to their first encounter in the Palais Andalusia, but this time the scene is 
shown from the divergent perspective of a third-party observer to highlight the refracting sparkle 
of the square spectacles and Mabuse’s slow and deliberate incantation of the phrase, again shown 
with an intertitle, while von Wenk’s head is weighed down by the force of this interplay. Back 
on the stage, the confrontation is now structured by an exchange of gazes: von Wenk looks up in 
a shock of recognition and in a geometrically precise and seamless series of overlap-dissolves he 
sees a succession of faces from Weltmann, to Professor van den Gruich, and then to the 
psychiatrist Dr. Mabuse, whose faces all stay anchored and centered exactly on the screen by 
their piercing eyes until the dissolve to Mabuse’s face escapes this vectorial grid of looking by 
slightly shifting the identical stare a few degrees above the position of the previous pairs of eyes. 
An intertitle shows the attorney’s stammering attempt to vocalize his revelation: “Doctor ... 
Doctor Ma ...  --- !” At this point the state attorney has finally recognized the eyes as the 
identifying characteristic that traces all the various personas he has encountered to one 
individual, but Mabuse as Weltmann looks at him even more fiercely so that von Wenk’s his 
eyes roll back into their sockets. He slumps into a hypnotic sleep, while Weltmann’s hand 
gestures gently across his face as if to comfort and assure a sleeping child.  
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The act of recognition, in which Mabuse’s eyes are briefly identified as the locus from 
where his power originates, reverses the mode of surveillance by which the state asserts its own 
supremacy over the process of identification of the individual. Tom Gunning has written on how 
photography as part of “new systems of identification” for criminology entered the popular 
imagination in the 19th century in the transition to photographic records as a means for criminal 
evidence of identity from previous forms of identification, which “frequently depended upon a 
direct and visible mark applied by legal authorities to the criminal’s body, the equivalent of the 
scriptural mark of Cain.”28 In this transition, Gunning notes, the “photograph acted as a ‘new 
mark,’ one which inscribed the deviant body with a socially defined individuality, an 
individuality which rested ultimately on its structural differentiation from all other recorded 
bodies.”29 Lang’s film here takes recourse to this popular fascination with such a mode of 
control, but reverses the direction of its power. Now Mabuse is able to elude the individuating 
technique of recognition by the gaze of the state’s representative and, in fact, uses his eyes, the 
part of the body that remains the most unalterable and the least accessible to a physical sense of 
self, to exert control over the state and render its official powerless and catatonic by pairing his 
gaze with the invocation of a trauma-inducing phrase. Through this process of reversibility, a 
mark will be inflicted on the vision of the state representative, while the sentences for his future 
have been spelled out in the letter that Weltmann has written. A title reveals that in the note 
Mabuse has scripted that von Wenk will leave the auditorium, enter a specific car waiting 
                                                 
28 Tom Gunning, “Tracing the Individual Body: Photography, Detectives, and Early Cinema,” in Cinema and the 
Invention of Modern Life, ed. Leo Charney and Vanessa R. Schwartz (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1995), pp. 20 – 21. 
29 Ibid., p. 34. 
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outside, and drive “at full speed” into a quarry. The letter concludes with the mysterious 
command “Melior!”  
Von Wenk mindlessly follows the commands spelled out in the note inside the envelope. 
He enters the car and drives off and the word “Melior” appears before him in jittery letters in 
mirror-reverse as a long shot of von Wenk in the driver’s seat behind the wheel and windshield 
reveals. A reverse point-of-view shot from behind his shoulder now reveals the word “melior” 
readable from left to right in front of him as the word that “drives” him and serves as the focal 
point of his direction. In an extreme long shot, the letters emanate from his car in the distance 
and move rhythmically sideways down the road to pull him forward in their direction. While 
Deleuze calls the film’s image sequences exemplary for the work of the action-image,30 this 
moment marks an intriguing fusion of a sign within the image of movement. Expressed as a 
configuration of inner compulsion that is imposed from the outside, these two vectors of force 
merge in the signs and letters which are animated by them into an uncontrollable movement. The 
reässertion and redirection of where the force of this movement is headed becomes the dramatic 
impetus of the film. The writing on the screen, then, constitutes a literal figuration of the liminal 
constraints within which the body of the state representative is made to suffer. In most 
commentaries, however, that note the use of writing in the film, like that of “Tsi-Nan-Fu,” the 
word melior does not seem to have any connotations other than to indicate Mabuse’s ability to 
invest nonsensical terms with a mysterious force of meaning. 
Along these lines, even Tom Gunning’s discussion of similar instances of superimposed 
writing in Lang’s films restricts itself to declare them “magical words” that express a kind of 
                                                 
30 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 69. 
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“hypnotic power” or “hypnotic rhythm.”31 But melior as the Latin comparative for the adjective 
bonus, which is defined as “good,” “kind,” “decent,” “useful,” “sound,” or “morally upright,” 
preserves echoes of a Latin incantation, beseeching improvement in an obsessive urge to make 
things “better.” In its homophonic qualities it furthermore suggests an affinity to the word 
misereor, a biblical term from the Latin phrase misereor super turbam, which means “I have pity 
on the multitude.”32 In this form the term has a liturgical connotation that instrumentalizes the 
hypnotic qualities of incantation and directs it at von Wenk, who fixates on the word that drives 
him on. The word is no longer merely an aural hallucination but rather, as in The Cabinet of Dr. 
Caligari, enters von Wenk’s field of vision by inscribing itself into the image. The criminal, that 
is, has managed to inflict a physical mark on the legal representative of the state and this 
infliction is spelled out and made visible for us on the screen. The disciplinary character of these 
moments of writing on the screen therefore emblematizes the suffering that the body of the state 
has to endure and invokes grandiose registers of scale by aligning itself with a biblical notion of 
representation in which the individual body is punished in the multitude’s stead. To underscore 
this point, von Wenk is rescued by his assistants who have chased after his speeding car and, 
shortly before he reaches the cliffs of the quarry, manage to pull him into their vehicle and lay 
him down, pietà-like, with his arms stretched out on either side.  
In an early writing fragment from 1916, Walter Benjamin reflects on the difference 
between the sign (Zeichen) and the mark (Mal) and determines that the “sign is printed on 
                                                 
31 Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang, p. 132. 
32 In the Latin version of the Gospel of Mark, VIII, 2, this is what Jesus says upon seeing the crowd of hungry 
people when he performs his second miracle at the Sea of Galilee.  
  141
something, whereas the mark emerges from it,” since “the realm of the mark is the medium.”33 
Moreover, in contrast to the sign, the mark “appears principally on living beings (Christ’s 
stigmata, blushes, perhaps leprosy and birthmarks)” and it is “always absolute and resembles 
nothing else in its manifestation.”34 In the context of such a definition, we can understand the 
appearance of the mysterious words in the instances of writing on the screen in Dr. Mabuse, The 
Gambler as manifestations of marks rather than signs. They emerge through the body and remain 
physical in the sense that they indicate a bodily sensation of vision, yet they are externalized as 
absolute evidence of their indicative function, namely to point to the displacement of a general 
traumatic suffering onto the singular bodies of authority figures. This is also why they seem 
enigmatic or “magical” because what is important is that the words “resemble” their own 
manifestation rather than representing a particular point of reference in a chain of signification. 
The mark appears as a “sign” of pain inflicted onto the body of the figure of authority and 
becomes an indication of suffering. However, since the mark is “often a warning sign of guilt,” 
Benjamin continues, “it coincides with the sign (as in Belshazzar’s Feast), and the awful nature 
of the apparition is based in large part on uniting these two phenomena, something of which only 
God is capable.”35 In this case, the film mobilizes the spectacle of the apparition as a “warning 
sign of guilt,” but it is rendered here as a conflict of power staged between legitimate authority as 
represented by the state attorney and the nihilist manipulation of signs and symbols as 
exemplified by Mabuse in his various manifestations. But because the cinema itself can be said 
                                                 
33 Walter Benjamin, “Painting, or Signs and Marks,” (1916), in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Vol. 1: 1913 – 
1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), p. 84. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid.  
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to partake in this inflationary system of circulating signs and symbols, made evident once more 
by Weltmann’s metacinematic act of conjuring up the caravan, the question arises what ultimate 
sign could reïnstitute a faith in what is made visible on the screen. 
The translation of Benjamin’s understanding of the confluence between mark and sign as 
“something of which only God is capable” is therefore slightly misleading in this respect. A 
more accurate translation of the passage would read that the “frightening nature of the apparition 
is based in large part on the fusion of these two figures, a power which can only be ascribed to 
God.”36 That is, the frightening admonition introduced by the unification of mark and sign does 
not so much rest on a divine capacity as such, but rather in the sudden appearance of a power that 
stands outside the temporal and the contingent and thus the appearance must be attributed to a 
higher power. This is why Benjamin works with the category of guilt, because the fusion of mark 
and sign serve as a memento or a disciplinary reminder of larger, timeless forces, so that “the 
resistance of the present between the past and the future is eliminated and these, magically fused, 
descend together on the head of the sinner.”37
Given the pell-mell predilection of Fritz Lang and his collaborator at the time, 
screenwriter Thea von Harbou, for orchestrating and incorporating a diverse range of 
mythological, Orientalist and Christian narrative elements into their films such as The Indian 
Tomb, The Nibelungen, or Metropolis, it would not seem remarkable in the least that the film 
                                                 
36 In the original: “In diesem Sinne erscheint es [das Mal] aber zugleich mit dem Zeichen (Belsazar) und das 
Ungeheure der Erscheinung beruht zum großen Teil auf der nur Gott zuzuschreibenden Vereinigung dieser beiden 
Gebilde.” Cf. Walter Benjamin, “Über die Malerei oder Zeichen und Mal,” in Walter Benjamin: Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 2, bk. 2, Aufsätze, Essays, Vorträge, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978), p. 605.  
37 Walter Benjamin, “Painting, or Signs and Marks,” p. 84. 
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here employs an iconography that carries with it biblical associations, but the invocation of guilt 
in connection with the mark transcends the playful pastiche that generally characterizes Lang’s 
ability to integrate a large range of discursive and iconic registers into his films. Instead, the 
melior-sequence articulates a disciplinary moment in which the idea of the social body is formed 
around a conceptualization of guilt. Spelled out on the screen in bold letters is the warning mark 
that indicates the suffering of the state representative on behalf of the larger collective good, but 
its appearance comes after the category of spectatorship has explicitly been raised. 
For the diegetic audience that witnesses Weltmann’s performance the pleasure of 
observation lies in the willingness to accede to a spectacle whereby a few among them will be 
potentially subjugated by a more powerful will. This assent is predicated on a wager or a leap of 
faith, in which the audience members accept that while the boundary between the will of their 
selves and the will of the other may be dissolved, they are indemnified from any actual harm by 
the preördained script written by Weltmann as well as the contextual obligation of the theatrical 
space itself to remain within the framework of mere performance. The disciplinary shift to the 
category of guilt occurs when the writing on the screen introduces a dimension of power that 
signals its exteriority from beyond any confines of the spectacle. The presence of the theatrical 
audience on the screen, who are oblivious to what they are witnessing in actuality and imagine it 
as amusement, is now superceded by a dramatic sequence in which the word melior haunts the 
state attorney, but whose physical suffering we as audience members share since we see the 
stigmata in his vision as well. The spectacle of illusions through which Lang’s films often reflect 
on the nature of reflections, in other words, should not itself be dismissed as a mere diversion or 
a mere spectacle. The apparitions of the word melior then serve as a reminder that the force of 
the power we are witnessing is “real,” even though it may have only been conjured up and 
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orchestrated as a spectacle on the screen. Guilt, then, is an affective response elicited from the 
sequence in the form of knowledge. As if to preëmpt and indict any potential dismissal by the 
audience that this is only a “film,” the writing indicates a shift to a different dimension of the 
struggle for control between Mabuse and the state attorney because it has moved beyond the 
confines of the theatrical space. 
We know more than the audience in the film, because we know the real script that 
Weltmann has prepared for von Wenk to enact and yet we also know that we are powerless to 
intervene in the machinic force of the cinema as it unfolds before our eyes, even as we have seen 
an audience blinded by the illusions Weltmann has created for them. This form of powerlessness 
is replicated on the screen by the state attorney’s impotence to act despite having identified 
Mabuse’s face behind Weltmann’s mask. A collective pleasure in the willful ignorance that the 
diegetic audience of this spectacle had exhibited on the screen is extended here to the actual or 
potential audiences of the film itself. The category of guilt is invoked by suggesting that the 
suffering witnessed on the screen is in a sense being allowed to happen as a manifestation of the 
will of the spectators, who are themselves incapable of exerting a power of interference in the 
machinic trajectory of the images in movement. The scopic desire, then, to witness this spectacle 
of the humiliation of the state attorney is framed as a question of willful loss of will in the same 
moment of reversal that projects onto the other the orientalist fantasies of hypnotic modes of 
power and control, a “rear projection” which Mabuse obligingly produces. As a disciplinary 
instance of film-viewing the film reconfigures this loss as a willful submission which the writing 
on the screen amplifies. 
This amplification extends in another way from the character to the spectator as well 
because of the fact that the use of writing imposes a position of acceptance that takes on the 
  145
semblance of reading. In contrast to “viewing” the film, the act of reading connotes a sense of 
subjectification because it introduces an awareness of self again. The viewing self is made 
subject because it is forced to read the signs on the screen in a Benjaminian moment of shock. 
From a projection outward as a manifestation of will, the writing turns this will back on itself to 
impose an involuntary act of reflection. The fact that this figuration of movement is rendered as 
an instance of hypnosis is ironic because the hypnotic condition within the film expressed as 
writing folds back onto the spectator as a literalized indexical point of reference. It indicates the 
limit point between a reading subject that recognizes the writing as a sign and a self that has been 
subjected to the power of signification and cannot escape this spell. This doubling figure carries 
with it a notion of witnessing in its juridical sense. The writing spells out the conditions of 
subjectification as a loss of will and at the same time relegates a responsibility to the viewer. 
Written on the screen is the command to witness what happens when the agents of authority are 
no longer capable of exerting it. In this respect, it is a visual correlation to the oath, a 
performative act that testifies to the solemn intentions of the speaker. Here the writing is a 
disciplinary act of imposition. At the moments when we witness a loss of agency in the 
representatives of authority, the asylum director in Dr. Caligari or the state attorney in Dr. 
Mabuse, who have been unleashed and let loose into the pure movement of will at the cost of the 
loss of self, the writing arrests itself in a figuration that spells out a demand to the spectator, that 
is, to witness what has been wrought.                 
The final confrontation of the film is rendered as a battle between two competing 
conceptions of the state, a legitimate use of force by the authorities under the control who  are 
confronted with Mabuse’s absolutist declaration that he considers himself a sovereign entity. “I 
consider myself a state within a state with which I have been in battle for a long time” he 
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declares in an intertitle.38 When he is confronted ultimately by the forces of the state, the military 
and the police under the command of the state attorney von Wenk, Mabuse descends into 
madness. Having challenged the legitimacy of the state, Mabuse finds himself in his forger’s 
den, surrounded by all the documents with which he has imposed his control. An intertitle 
declares who this entity is by stating, “the man who had been Mabuse,” and reveals him as 
stammering and incoherent, an invalid who can now be institutionalized. He has been stripped of 
his identity and the power that his name confers is no longer his. 
The film that serves as a successor to this narrative begins with the death of Mabuse, 
whose power has now been transferred to a frenzy of inscriptions. The conflict is highlighted in 
The Testament of Dr. Mabuse, a sound film that, with its 1933 release, coincided with the 
implementation of the Nazis’ control over the German government and neatly bookends a history 
of Weimar cinema beginning with The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari. Apart from their obvious 
similarity in the titular structure, both films invoke the figure of a director of an insane asylum 
who takes his orders from writing. By placing the director back in the asylum as a patient, Tom 
Gunning remarks, “Lang in effect restores the original ending to Caligari.”39 In The Testament of 
Dr. Mabuse, it is a professor of psychiatry who becomes the recipient and medium of the 
commands of the catatonic arch villain Dr. Mabuse, who was an inmate of the professor’s clinic. 
Mabuse has died, but his will lives on through his “testament,” that is, through writing which 
exerts a hypnotic force for social disruptions and terror that Mabuse aspires to. The professor, 
                                                 
38 A more detailed discussion of the importance of this sequence is offered in Chapter 4. 
39 Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang, p. 148. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion on the film’s end, 
which was originally planned to end with the disturbing suggestion of the descent of the figure of authority into 
madness. By placing a narrative “framing device” at the end of the film, in which it is revealed that the entire film 
originated from the deluded mind of an inmate, the benevolent figure of authority is restored to his proper place. 
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Dr. Baum, channels Mabuse’s commands through writing and, in turn, implements and 
disseminates them as a disembodied voice to a gang of criminals in order to bring down the 
structures of society and create a reign of terror. Against this fundamental threat, Inspector 
Lohmann wages a desperate fight, which involves the circulation of messages across various 
media.  
In The Testament of Dr. Mabuse the intervention of the state is rendered as struggle for 
the control over these media, which culminates in a spectacle of decline of apocalyptic 
dimensions. Lucy Fischer demonstrates that the film is structured around linkages of 
“associational leaps”40 rather than an overriding narrative or causal logic. In doing so, the film 
becomes a reflection on mediality and authoritarian control itself as willed into vision by the 
power of thought. Because of this conceptual structure of mental associations, the film fuses a 
conception of the filmic narration as a hypnotic act over the spectator with the associative force 
of the film, so that Lang himself emerges as the hypnotic Mabuse who seems to “‘live’ in the 
consciousness behind the camera eye.”41 This reliance on the fascination of mental power, 
Fischer notes, stands in stark contrast to Lang’s avowed insistence that the film is an anti-fascist 
work.42 Tom Gunning extends this argument separately by stating that the film’s formal qualities 
display a “pattern of dispersal, as if searching for some figure that could command them, make 
them settle into a single association,”43 so that the film’s “narrative force remains disembodied, 
                                                 
40 Lucy Fischer, “Dr. Mabuse and Mr. Lang,” Wide Angle 3, no. 3 (1979): 23. 
41 Ibid., p. 24. 
42 Ibid., p. 21. 
43 Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang, p. 143. 
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… strongly sensed, but not tied to an enunciator character”44 at first. Bringing this dispersive 
force into focus, Gunning continues, is Mabuse’s power that “infiltrates and contaminates”45 as 
writing, which, in turn, encapsulates the way in which “Mabuse’s will-to-power migrates 
through his film, even after his death.”46
The inflationary proliferation of text in the film suggests that writing is the source of 
power, so that the battle the film poses as the solution for the defeat of Mabuse renders his 
antagonist, Inspector Lohmann, as a detective of a different order. While Inspector Lohmann is 
engaged in reading and deciphering clues, he stands in contradistinction to Mabuse’s ethereal 
force, which therefore stages a conflict between abstracted writing that can only be controlled by 
a different force, which is at the same time more archaic and more sophisticated. As Gunning 
puts it, “Lohmann’s undeniable corporeality contrasts with Mabuse’s mute and ultimately 
disembodied image.”47 Yet, the ultimate clue that leads Lohmann to Mabuse is an inscription 
into a window pane that at first appears to be mere scratches on the glass. In the act of 
deciphering the scratches, a laboratory technician treats the scratches with ink, and then presses 
blotter paper onto it, so that the scratches become a form of intaglio engraving. The name that 
emerges from “scratch” is the stuttered, rebus-like utterance “Ma-bu.” The technician then 
manipulates the flat plane of the glass by turning and inverting it and thus demonstrates to 
Lohmann how the scratches were etched into the glass backwards and upside down in an act of 
desperation with a ring on a hand hidden behind a back against the window. 
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 144. 
45 Ibid., p. 145. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., p. 155. 
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Lucy Fischer notes the similarity between this sequence of decoding and the development 
of the film medium itself, since it strongly parallels “the procedure from printing an image from 
film,”48 down to the chemical process and the procedure of lateral reversal and inverse shift 
required to “read a word etched into the emulsion of a film frame as it comes off a reel.”49 
Gunning notes that in this brief sequence, “Lang demonstrates the registers of the sign, from 
symbolic writing, to iconic reflection, all through the index of the trace.”50 While the technician 
is capable of reproducing the circumstances of the inscription, it is still up to Lohmann to 
decipher its significance. The seemingly meaningless sound “Ma-bu” connects with the 
knowledge of his archival memory and he is able to identify that Mabuse “was the doctor from 
the inflation period.” In another associational leap, Lohmann pulls out the documents from the 
archive that contain the files of “Dr. Mabuse, the Gambler,” the title of Lang’s earlier film. The 
real ability to counteract the power of Mabuse, then, is linked to the control of technology in 
conjunction with an archival knowledge of the cinema itself. The metacinematic confluence 
between, in Fischer’s terms, the spectator decoding “the cinematic imagery”51 and its 
reproduction of the filmic process of development is extended into the film itself with Lohmann 
as the reader in command of cinematic history. 
This self-reflexive meditation on the medium is continued in a sequence in which 
Mabuse commands his minions as a disembodied voice from behind a curtain. In an ingenious 
cinematic construction, Kent, a reformed criminal who is trying to prevent his former partners 
                                                 
48 Lucy Fischer, “Dr. Mabuse and Mr. Lang,” p. 26. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang, p. 156. 
51 Lucy Fischer, “Dr. Mabuse and Mr. Lang,” p. 25. 
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from becoming Mabuse’s instruments of terror, and his lover Lily, find themselves in the room 
from which Mabuse issues his commands. Kent shoots at the curtain from behind which the 
voice emerges and the room goes dark. They both tear down the curtain and, as Michel Chion 
puts it, “appear before us, stupefied by what they see before them.”52 In a disorienting reversal, 
Kent and Lily, in shock, are shown standing on the screen as if they are looking out into the 
audience, “as if they were discovering reality – the movie theater and its audience.”53 A reverse 
shot of what they see follows and it is revealed that it is a simulacrum consisting of a cardboard 
silhouette cut-out and a loudspeaker. This is what is “behind the curtain” or the screen for 
audiences as well, a two-dimensional simulacrum that produces the illusion of depth and a 
technology of reproduction. The machinery that makes the illusion possible has been exposed 
and reveals its own status as a simulacrum, “as well as to the situation of spectatorship [and] to 
film itself as a simulation.”54 The voice as such, however, remains unlocalizable and this force 
points to Mabuse’s machinic source of power as a phantom, since, as Chion puts it, “if there is a 
Mabuse, he is in this name without an identity, this body without a voice, this voice without a 
place.”55 In an extension of the cinematic terms of Chion, this power cannot be countered purely 
by a knowledge of the medium or the technology.                      
Chion identifies the power of the voice as an “acousmachine that occupies no-place”56 
and which exerts its control “by tele-hypnosis, or hypnosis at a distance.”57 The recourse to the 
                                                 
52 Michel Chion, The Voice in the Cinema, ed. and trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999), p. 37. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., p. 43. 
55 Ibid., pp. 36 – 37. 
56 Ibid., p. 44. 
  151
voice without a body in the cinema, then, indicates for Chion the presence of the dead, and, he 
notes, ever “since the technological capacity of the telephone and gramophone made it possible 
to isolate voices from the bodies, the voice… has reminded us of the voice of the dead.”58 This 
ethereal presence that at the same time is characterized by the absence of a body needs a 
different kind of force to counteract its control. It is therefore no accident that the figure of 
Lohmann, played by Otto Wernicke, is characterized by an excessive corporeality and physical 
presence.59 His hefty physicality was already pronounced in M, the film in which the Falstaffian 
Lohmann made his first appearance as a figure of the law. His ability to excel in investigate work 
in both films is evident less in analytical skills than by his coercive and authoritarian manner and 
his insistence to seek out physical proximity with criminals. His mode of deducing knowledge 
from clues is always accompanied by the pleasure he derives from smoking his cigars and he 
derives his authority largely through his physical weight. In this dichotomy the abstracted voice 
of manipulation that circulates through writing finds its opposite in a baroque conception of 
authority, that is, in the figure of the state as a corporeal presence whose authority is anchored in 
his body. This figuration of power was frequently embodied by the actor Emil Jannings, most 
notably in the 1941 Nazi film Ohm Krüger.60         
Even though Lohmann is ultimately victorious in identifying the locus of Mabuse’s 
power as the haunting presence in the media he commands, he can only witness the destruction 
                                                                                                                                                             
57 Ibid., p. 33. 
58 Ibid., p. 46. 
59 Lang based the character of Inspector Lohmann on Ernst Gennat (1880 – 1939), a famous detective of the Weimar 
Berlin police force who was known as “the Buddha of law enforcement” due to his obese stature and who became a 
media celebrity because of his involvement in a number of high-profile murder cases.    
60 See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion. 
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of a chemical factory with which the film celebrates the movements of chaos and force it has 
unleashed. Fritz Lang’s M of 1931, by contrast, offers a lengthy treatise on the pervasive 
ubiquity of writing within the social sphere and points to a different conception of citizenship in 
relation to the power of the state. In fact, the film stages itself as movement emanating from 
writing from the outset with its title. Following the production company logo Nero-Film and the 
title “A Fritz Lang Film,” which is acoustically underlined by an ominous bell sound, the 
opening image of the film consists of an abstracted white letter M on a black screen.61 Already 
with its one-letter title, the film situates itself as a textual riddle. The significance and meaning of 
the enigmatic title is far from self-explanatory and relegated to the film’s subsequent unfolding 
of the narrative as a temporal deferment. If one of the textual functions a film title carries with it 
is to promise a fulfillment of the spectator’s desire to achieve a coherent framework from which 
to understand the filmic text in its entirety, then the title here already indicates the importance of 
the clues that the letter “M” must yield for us and thus points to the larger functions that writing 
will occupy within the filmic text. Reduced to a single letter, a fragment of an impending puzzle, 
the title plays with the precarious status of the letter itself: at once categorical as a reduction to an 
abstract archive, with a vast indexical range of possible meanings subsumed under the rubric of 
                                                 
61 Given the precarious nature of a film’s first few frames due to fraying because of circulation and editing for 
international distribution, there are a number of different accounts for this title sequence. In the restored, definitive 
version assembled by the Munich Filmmuseum in 1996 a stylized image of a poster for the film, a drawing of a right 
hand resembling a claw onto which a black painted letter “M” has been drawn in broad strokes, is used as the title. 
Nicholas Garnham in his M: A Film by Fritz Lang (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 4, notes that that the 
film begins with a white letter “M” on the black screen. Reproductions of third title sequence version are given in 
Thierry Kuntzel, “The Film-Work,” in Enclitic 2, no. 1 (spring 1978): 38. Here the title shows an expressionist 
shadow image of a human figure over which an edgy white letter “M” gradually appears.     
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the perhaps ominously foreboding thirteenth letter of the alphabet and with its corresponding 
radical absence of any concrete semantic signification, the letter as letter opens up the initial 
question of how writing will relate to the determination of meaning in this film. 
 With this framework we already encounter a metonymic structure of a larger set 
of issues that the film will propose. This corresponds to what Thierry Kuntzel calls a “micro-
narrative,” which already encapsulates crucial themes to which the film will surreptitiously 
return as “figuration.”62 In his structural analysis of the opening sequence, Kuntzel determines 
that the filmic syntagmatic opening serves as the figuration of a subsequent larger legibility of 
the entire film’s semiotic structure. A child’s voice bridges the extra-diegetic space of the title 
with the diegesis of the film. As the film fades in to depict a circle of children, we have already 
heard a voice beginning to recite a macabre “ring-around-the-rosie” nursery rhyme about waiting 
for a “black man with his little cleaver who is going to make mincemeat out of you.”63 With the 
rhyme’s emphasis on waiting for an inevitable event (“wait, just you wait for a little while…”), 
Kuntzel regards this opening scene as indicative for the overall structure of the film. “Readable 
as a restitution of the film,” he states, the circularity of the arrangement of the children and the 
call to wait serves as the “pre-interpretation” for the subsequent lexical unfolding of the film’s 
narrational codes.64 Rendered enigmatically, the hermeneutic decodings embedded in the 
opening sequence relate back to the question that the film’s title already indicates. “Why ‘M,’” 
asks Kuntzel, in order then to conclude that “the letter belongs, as an initial, to a double textual 
                                                 
62 Thierry Kuntzel, “The Film-Work,” p. 39. 
63 Translation mine. Unless otherwise noted, all references to the film will follow the translation of Nicholas 
Garnham, M: A Film by Fritz Lang. 
64 Kuntzel, p. 41. 
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network: diachronically, to the M(abuse) series in Lang’s oeuvre,” and, “within the film’s 
graphic materiality” it refers across a larger textual register, including the “symbolics” of a 
Baroque Menschenalphabet, where the letter “M is represented by opened legs” as a 
literalization of sexual phantasies which will be put into play in the film.65  
While this can be described as a performative explication of the excessive level of 
meaning that the film’s form gives rise to, it nonetheless indicates how much hermeneutic labor 
the film posits from the outset. In this regard, the film solicits the viewer as a “reader” who, 
summoned by the bell that accompanies the letter, must decipher the coded fragments of textual 
material that are set into motion at the outset of the film. Kuntzel then moves to the famous 
moment in which the compositional structure of the images signifies the murderer’s first 
appearance. At a round billboard – the ubiquitous Berlin Litfaßsäulen – the child Elsie 
Beckmann, returning home from school, has stopped to throw her ball and let it bounce of a 
poster which reads “10,000 Marks Reward – Who is the Murderer?” As Elsie’s ball bounces off 
the poster, a dark shadow of a man in a hat falls across the writing on the pillar. Disembodied as 
a ghost-like shadow the man begins to speak to the naïve Elsie. Here, as Kuntzel argues, we are 
confronted with a “single visual motif of a series of signs of menace, by reference to the 
referential code of German ‘expressionist’ cinema, and, anaphorically in the narrative, to the 
‘Black Man’ of the rhyme – a double reference over which is laid the redundant inscription of 
the word Mörder underneath the shadow itself.”66 Since Kuntzel is more interested in the 
symbolic codes that are at work in this scene, he does not emphasize the literal inscription that 
the images offer here. Rather, he sees this literality as “redundant.” 
                                                 
65 Ibid., p. 43. 
66 Ibid., p. 58. 
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Indeed, there is a deeper structural relation between image and letters in place here. 
Presumably, Elsie Beckmann, as a pupil coming from school, is not yet literate enough to read 
the significance of the warning that the poster proclaims. While she might be able to discern the 
letters or organize them into a sequence of words, she fails to understand the referential quality 
of the writing. The hermeneutic act of discerning meaning here is instead relegated back to the 
viewer, who, as a viewer, becomes a “seeing” reader but one who is powerless to intervene. We 
read the significance of the scene while at the same time image and word converge into a 
composite image: the ominous shadow is inscribed or supratitled as “murderer.” What is 
materially visualized, then, is the “spirit” of the letters, which, in form of the abstract “shadowy” 
disembodiment, returns on the screen as a surface convergence between image and text. 
This is one of the foundational principles with which M organizes a textual imagery 
beyond its inherent narrative functions and thus exemplifies and visualizes what Jacques Derrida 
has termed écriture, the system of “writing” that inscribes any “movements of language” not 
only in its “system of notation” but also as “the essence and the content of these activities 
themselves.”67 Noteworthy here, then, is the fact that M not only visualizes this ideational 
thought process already, but that it furthermore proposes writing in this film as an organizing 
system that drives both the narrative, thus functioning as a textual element, and that it at the same 
time offers itself as a metatextual folding or convergence of “textual images” into a treatise on 
the status of writing in its mode of textuality as such. This oscillating pattern, however, 
corresponds to the way in which writing allegorizes its own process.     
                                                 
67 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1976), p. 9. 
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 This complex doubling operation is consequently picked up in a sequence that is 
designed to exemplify the grid of panic and fear that has swept the city of four-and-a-half million 
people. The representation of Elsie’s murder has been metonymically substituted through a scene 
in which the balloon figure that the murderer has bought her rises up, briefly ensnarling itself in 
telephone wires and then disappearing in the sky. As the grotesque balloon figure balances 
listlessly in the wires, it becomes a crude reference to the soul or animus of Elsie Beckmann that 
in its literally “gaseous state” returns to merge with the air in the sky. As Anton Kaes puts it, in 
this film “[s]ound affirms presence and life; silence connotes absence and death.”68 But we need 
to add another dimension to this parallel equation, namely the movement between sound and 
silence as it is evoked between writing and allegorization. In this metonymic substitution the 
scene points to its own inability for representation as it allegorizes the agony of a child’s death 
through a balloon trapped in electric wires. As if to counterpose the force of this mode of 
representation, the film immediately renders this horrific event in writing. What the film stages, 
then, is the dramatic spectacle of how allegorization generates a frenzy of writing. For this, a 
three-fold line of textual writing in action is introduced. Firstly, the balloon scene is immediately 
followed by an increasing number of newspaper boys who populate the streets and summon the 
public’s interest with their agitated screaming and repeating the initial question “Extra! Extra! 
Who is the murderer?” 
This sequence is matched then with the camera tracking in on the murderer, identified 
through the “Peer Gynt” tune that he has been whistling during the murder sequence, as he is 
writing at a window-sill. The camera closes in over his shoulder until we see him writing in 
manic childish scribbles that, “since the police haven’t published my first letter, I am writing 
                                                 
68 Anton Kaes, M (London: BFI Publishing, 2000), p. 13. 
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today straight to the newspapers. Keep up your investigations. Everything will happen just as I 
have predicted. But I haven’t yet finished.” This moment is crucial in two regards. For one, it 
renders the murderer compulsive through the way in which he writes this letter. At the same 
time, however, it suggests a degree of calculation which reflects his desire to both control and 
predict his actions as well as his corresponding urge to participate and intervene in the public 
discourse generated around him. The murders themselves have to be subsequently “signed” or 
authorized by the murderer through writing. The public event, that is, which the murders have 
already become through the writing in newspapers and posters must be repeated as a kind of 
double publishing: the representation of the murders in writing and the demand for a presentation 
of the murderer’s words in writing.  
In this sense, the film opens up another question that it cannot answer at the end. For how 
are we to account for the murderer’s desire to write, i.e. presumably to reflect and represent 
temporally after the event of the murders? Since the murderer at the end confesses in the 
“kangaroo court,” which the criminals have set up to pronounce justice over him, that he cannot 
control his urges, that he becomes a separate person in his lust to kill, we must regard the urge to 
write as a part of his doppelgänger. The writing we see, then, is the doubled and detached 
writing of a death-drive. It is driven by the desire to reenact the killings through written 
representation and by the irrational impulse to leave literal traces, written clues that will render 
the spirit of the murderer present and manifest for the police to decode, decrypt and decipher.   
The “spirit,” therefore, of Elsie, the spirit of the killer’s drives and the “evil spirit” of the 
deed itself must all be represented in writing so as to either put an end to this continuous chain or 
repeat it endlessly through writing. Hence the film introduces another poster pronouncing the 
same event – murder! – albeit in this case the poster differs marginally from the first one, since it 
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now includes the name of Elsie Beckmann as well. An outraged crowd, of which the spectator is 
part since the camera mingles with the field of vision of the mass, gathers around the billboard. 
Reading the announcement’s text, the voice that is reading the poster out loud becomes 
disembodied and mobilized as free-floating speech and attaches itself to various scenes into 
which the writing as speech is craftily woven. Strains of the writing become part of the public 
discourse of innuendo, rumor and anxiety that organizes the public sphere.69 In Gilles Deleuze’s 
terms, “the indeterminate speech-act” of the rumor here becomes autonomous so that it structures 
and conditions the regulation of the public.70 This is fundamentally characteristic of a 
convergence between image and speech, he continues, in the “talkie,” where “the division” of the 
silent cinema “between the visible image and the readable speech” is superceded by “something 
new,” since “the visible image, denaturalized, begins to become readable in turn, as something 
visible or visual.”71 This, in turn, denotes an important shift in which the filmic images become 
readable and corresponds precisely to the complex duality - image as writing and writing as 
image - that folds itself out and back into the text of M. The sphere of writing, then, that M 
mobilizes, solicits the spectator as a “reader” who is forced to gather the clues provided on the 
screen and render them legible.                   
To underscore the social force of this shift, the next instance of writing in the film occurs 
during a scene in which the panic in the city has spread so pervasively that innocent citizens are 
accosted by angry mobs. A harmless bespectacled man has been found talking to a little girl and 
                                                 
69 The disembodied voice ends up at a Stammtisch in a bar, and by this time the voice has become a reader of the 
newspaper account to his fellow bar patrons congregated at the table. 
70 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 228. 
71 Ibid., p. 229. 
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soon an outraged mass, assuming they have caught the murderer in the act, has gathered around 
him yelling for the police. At this moment, a double-decker bus, on which there is a similar 
commotion, appears and a pick-pocket is taken down the stairs by a constable, while the crowd 
eagerly motions the constable to arrest the old gentleman. The staircase of the bus is adorned by 
a huge display of advertising copy that writes the American chewing-gum brand “Wrigley’s” 
into the screen. While this is in and of itself an instance in which the viewing of the film 
becomes split up or ruptured into two separate levels of temporality as we read the writing and 
follow the course of action simultaneously,72 the moment of the advertisement insists on a sense 
of verisimilitude in the reproduction of the ubiquity of written signs that traverse the public 
sphere in general.73 The effect, then, is to verify and amplify the enigmatic character of signs as 
part of the public sphere. They may seem transparent like a Wrigley’s advertisement, but they 
are put into the service of establishing a spectator who is asked to participate in the decoding of 
signs in the same manner that the members of the public are shown to be eager participants in the 
search for the murderer. Nonetheless, this moment underscores the necessity to demonstrate how 
the mode of deciphering must be connected to the representatives of authority. The fact that the 
                                                 
72 For a larger discussion of the ramifications of this mode of film-viewing, cf. Tom Conley, Film Hieroglyphs: 
Ruptures in Classical Cinema (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). 
73 Wrigley’s advertisements, in general, stood as the epitome of Americanization and modernization that Weimar 
Berlin experienced at the time as a “barrage” assaulting the public eye: “The big city becomes a battleground on 
which the public, with its necessarily weakened nerves, succumbs in accord with the proven expectations of the 
billboard Hindenburgs,” writes Ernst Lorsy on the Wrigley’s Chewing Gum billboards in 1926. As if Lang was 
aware of this polemic, he incorporated it into the production design of the film. Reprinted as “The Hour of the 
Chewing Gum,” in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 662 – 663.  
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actions of an innocent man have been misread as the clues that point to the murderer now 
indicate even more clearly that the terrain of the social sphere needs to be read and deciphered 
properly.        
Thus the function of writing in film that has surfaced here in its phenomenon as a 
reproduction of general signs is immediately subsumed again into the visualization of the writing 
that is mobilized around the murders. The by-then published facsimile of the murderer’s letter 
creates an even more frenetic police investigation, which is depicted as another montage 
sequence of links between writing and action. A heated telephone conversation between the 
Minister and the Chief of Police on the futility of the police-work thus far is visually underscored 
by close-ups of the murderer’s handwriting, followed by a close-up of archived fingerprints. The 
minute fingerprints on the index card are then visually transformed into a huge slide-projection 
of one particular print. What is achieved here is a significant doubling effect where the projection 
of the print fills the entire screen and thus becomes spatially another filmic screen against which 
a shadow image of a spectator is imposed in outline. This “spectator” stand-in, as a metonymy, 
however, is far from passive or disengaged, as it is the silhouette of a detective who attempts to 
find clues in the print traces blown up to gigantic proportions. The question of scale is invoked 
here once again. The traces of the individual handwriting have already been archived within the 
magnitude of the bureaucratic system of control and they lie latent in it as the clues awaiting 
their incipient deciphering by the proper reader. Within the full-scale screen image the missing 
links lie dormant anticipating the moment that will enable a writer to be identified with writing 
that circulates anonymously up to this point. 
This instance becomes representative for the textual detective work that is emphatically 
doubled as the spectator becomes replicated onto the screen. At this point the film emblematizes 
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the counterpart to writing, that is, the act of deciphering and decoding, or, more succinctly, the 
act of reading. This moment of substitution, therefore, posits a technological and bureaucratic 
apparatus for deciphering represented by the anonymous yet meticulous agents of the state at 
work for the social body. The anonymous writer necessitates a corresponding anonymous reader 
from within the bureaucratic system. In contrast to the emergence of the state at the end of 
Kameradschaft, with its allegorical sense of inevitability, the state is present here already in a 
perpetual state of emergency. The problem, however, has been the efficacy of this sense of 
urgency thus far, because it has not been channeled productively yet. The moment of metonymy, 
therefore, in which the spectator is visually integrated into the screen like the silhouette of an 
actual audience member blocking the light beams emanating from the projector, is connected to a 
sense of submission. The enormity of the scale provides an image for the structure of the social 
order that is already in place. Once the microscopic scale of the fingerprint traces has been 
transposed into its new dimension of magnitude it is also no longer recognizable as either a 
human or a letter. Instead, it has become biometric and textual information to be deciphered. The 
individual human that is mobilized and solicited is equated with an agent of the state because the 
screen images here replicate the gesture of mobilization that the posters have introduced in the 
opening sequence of the film.        
What becomes legible here as a visual spectacle is a submission to the minute and 
efficient operations of the state as the reading of the material traces of the print which is assisted 
by a graphological analysis, where an expert is dictating the results of his findings. Writing on 
writing is transformed into speech, as the graphologist registers the minutiae of how the graphic 
traces of the killer’s writing of the word “ball” indicate his “indolence” and “sexual 
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pathology.”74 The theme of the minutiae of writing as the potential hinge from which all clues 
might fall into perspective, analogous to a rebus or cryptography which can be deciphered once 
the key to the textual matrix has been discovered, is then continued as a close-up reveals a 
policeman’s hand carefully opening a piece of paper labeled “Confisserie” with a set of tweezers. 
Once more, this act of visualized “reading” for answers is rendered futile and deferred, since the 
material traces of the paper only consist of sugar crumbs. Yet, the monadic or atomistic sugar 
crumbs have a ripple effect of incredible magnitude: from the location of their discovery a 
compass draws ever-widening circles onto a map of Berlin, suggesting the enormous levels of 
scale that the killer’s handwriting, both in its material content and in its consequences, involves. 
What we witness here are the multifaceted dimensions of writing as it traverses the social space 
and as it is registered graphically in the tiniest letter details to the gigantic traces of a measuring 
instrument across the cartographic grid of the city. Both registers of scale converge on the screen 
and are rendered equivalent in order to emphasize the difficulty of organizing this space as 
legible and as intelligible.    
By this time, both the police and the criminal underworld have taken it upon themselves 
to arrest, in all senses of the word, this chaos of movement and mobilization that has been 
activated. In a sequence that demonstrates the pervasive disturbance and rupture of the 
“legitimate” criminal activities a raid is staged on the Krokodil speakeasy. Here we also 
                                                 
74 Viewers who adhere to classical cinematic conventions of realism might be quick to point out a careless 
continuity gaffe here, since the word “ball” is not part of the writing that has been reproduced on the screen. Such 
absence of explanation notwithstanding, it is certainly plausible within a realistic code to assume that the 
graphologist is clinically examining the killer’s first writing to the police. Yet this moment is nonetheless slightly 
dubious on a temporal level, because it constitutes a reference to Elsie’s ball, which would then situate the writing as 
having occurred after the initial letters.  
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encounter Inspector Lohmann, who will become the figure that embodies state power in its legal 
variant. The assorted criminals are rounded up and one by one they have to run the gauntlet for 
Lohmann, who shows the facility and skill of his practice of reading clues, modes of behavior, 
and suspicious patterns. An identity card of a self-confident criminal is easily exposed by 
Lohmann as a fraudulent, forged document when he shatters the ostensible confidence the 
criminal has bestowed upon this work of criminal craftsmanship, asserting his superiority in 
detective work. Likewise, he manages to pull out an incriminating newspaper page hidden in 
another criminal’s furcoat. As Lohmann portentously unfolds the newspaper, a headline begins 
to form briefly, spelling “MOR…,” which might alert the German spectator to the word for 
“murder” (Mord), but this expectation is frustrated in a visual pun as the letters form the 
newspaper’s name Morgenpost. Nonetheless, the newspaper yields an incriminating clue. While 
it situates the diegetic time, 21st November 1930, it betrays the fur-clad criminal since an 
illustrated article on an “unsolved burglary into a fur shop” has surreptitiously been circled in 
pencil, condemning him to a visit to the “Alex,” the police headquarters at the Alexanderplatz 
that was commonly known as the Alex. 
The raid sets the stage for another large and justifiably famous montage sequence in 
which both the leaders of the crime syndicates (Ringvereine) and the assorted brass of the 
various branches of law enforcement unite simultaneously, having exhausted all possible 
methods of finding the identity of the murderer. The leader of the criminals, Schränker, who 
might be termed the “illegal” but nonetheless legitimate variant of state power, decides at this 
point that it is up to the criminals to catch the murderer. By this time the head of the con-artists 
has graphically substituted the question mark to the haunting question of identity by arranging 
empty nutshells on the table so as to form a large question-mark. This graphic inscription is 
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delegated in a crosscutting to the Chief of Police who concludes his description of the procedural 
work thus far with a resignation of “and then, yes then, the big question mark arises…” Both 
Lohmann and Schränker, independently but simultaneously, at this point come up with the way 
in which their respective method of hunting down the murderer is to be continued, thus aligning 
the force of the law with the force of the lawless and legitimating both as part of the public 
sphere that has been defined and delineated by the ultimate other, the child murderer. Schränker 
announces the utilization of the beggars as the surveillance network already in place on the 
Berlin streets, while Lohmann plans to rely on the surveillance network that is manifest in the 
archives and documents of psychiatry. 
We move from this pivotal point of the establishment of an identical equation between 
crime and the law to another sequence that enacts this connection. The beggars are shown in 
their headquarters as comprising a semi-respectable organization, complete with its own stock 
market (“Hausse in Blutwurst”- “rise in blood sausage shares” announces a beggar’s “trader” as 
he jots down the current stock indices of the sandwich-trade on a large blackboard) and the 
organizational skill to superimpose a surveillance grid over every area of the city. A filing 
system into which is carefully registered every assigned position of the beggar’s zone of 
surveillance will be visually complemented by a sequence in which Lohmann inspects the 
archives of mental institutions, when the close-ups of the pieces of documents again structure a 
visual correspondence between the spectator’s visual absorption of the writing as images that 
coincide with Lohmann’s reading of the documentation of patient data. But this visual bridge 
frames a sequence in which we first witness how the beggar’s surveillance is put into place. 
During this sequence, where the camera follows the perspective of a supposedly “blind” beggar, 
we see a poster for the G.W. Pabst film Westfront 1918 (Germany 1930). This is momentarily 
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crosscut with another equation of the spectator’s perspective with that of the reading Lohmann, 
who by this time is proof-reading and pondering over a typed police report which emphasizes, in 
writing, the necessity to establish the place from where the murderer’s writing has originated. Of 
these two fleeting moments of intra- and intertextuality, the film poster instance, apart from its 
evident registers of verisimilitude, contemporaneïty and authenticity, serves Anton Kaes to 
develop a “new reading of the film M as a war film,” which narrativizes “a city in a state of total 
mobilization prepared to fight the enemy, who takes on the form of an invisible serial 
murderer.”75 While Kaes is interested primarily in the “disintegration of the city’s social space” 
and its relation to Weimar modernity as it informs the film,76 his approach is instrumental in 
delineating seemingly insignificant aspects of the writing in film that serve to yield the 
problematics of a larger set of crucial textual issues articulated in the field of vision that the 
filmic writing establishes. 
Very much in accordance with the intertextual connection between film and social reality 
as pointed to by the film poster within the film – one could indeed very well make the argument 
that a large number of the outcast beggar characters have become beggars as a direct result of the 
devastating effects of World War I – we now encounter the murderer openly in the anonymous 
public sphere as he absent-mindedly views the window display of a cutlery shop and eats an 
apple. During this scene a police detective is searching through the apartment of one Hans 
Beckert, a name that is on a list in his notebook yielded by the patients’ files. We recognize the 
apartment as the scene of the letter writing as the plainclothes detective rummages through the 
                                                 
75 Anton Kaes, “The Cold Gaze: Notes on Mobilization and Modernity,” New German Critique 59 (spring – summer 
1993): 105. 
76 Ibid., p. 108. 
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wastepaper basket to assemble pieces of evidence – a postcard, an empty cigarette pack, and a 
cigar brochure. The anonymous but haunting face of the murderer has thus been given a name 
and, as if to underscore the framing that the establishing of identity between name and face 
achieves, we see Beckert as the murderer framed by the reflection of a geometrical diamond-
shape arrangement of knives through the window of the shop. His gaze upon the commodities 
displayed becomes transfixed and the camera perspective now cuts to his view of the shop 
window. Beckert notices a little girl, equally framed by the diamond pattern, as an image 
reflected in the window. His eyes bulge into a hypnotized stare. 
While this sequence has been frequently described for its formal cinematic ingenuity, the 
visual construction explicitly constructs a conjuncture between the image as commodity-desire 
reflected in the shop window and the understanding of the image-commodity here as the 
hollowed-out fetish that seizes hold of the flâneur according to the terms that Walter Benjamin 
describes in his Arcades Project.77 The constellation that the geometrical arrangement of the 
image of the girl and its reflection inscribe upon the eyes of Beckert cause him to follow her in a 
hypnotic spell. This transformation is further emphasized by another window display, notably a 
bookstore, where a perpetually moving circle as a spiral design draws the spectator’s and the 
flâneur’s eyes into its vortex. Next to the hypnotic spiral is a huge phallic arrow that 
rhythmically pounds its directional vector towards a book in the display as the shrill whistling 
that signifies the appearance of the murderer is heard again. As Beckert is magnetically drawn to 
the image arrangement of spiral vortex, moving arrow and the little girl framed as the animate 
                                                 
77 Cf. Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1991), especially “Part II, 4 – Mythic History: Fetish,” pp. 78 – 110, and passim. A symbolic reading of the 
connotations here is offered in Lotte Eisner, Fritz Lang (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 117. 
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object of his desire between these two inanimate objects, his spell is suddenly interrupted and 
broken by the appearance of the girl’s mother who sternly warns her against such careless and 
unsupervised wanderings on the street as the girl has left the designated meeting point and 
unwittingly has become one with the elusive commodities that organize the optical field of desire 
of Beckert’s gaze. 
This powerful construction initiates a swift narrative response in which the unleashed 
scopic drive of the killer, witnessed and experienced by the spectator’s gaze in a double moment 
of perspectival identification and detached observation, needs to be contained and immobilized. 
This opens yet another parallel montage between the underworld and the law.78 Inspector 
Lohmann, who is informed by the detective assistant of his findings in Beckert’s apartment, 
listens intently to the clues that have been yielded, when he suddenly interrupts the assistant. 
Here Lohmann’s remarkable skills of memory and profound knowledge of the archive that has 
been assembled around the murders, allow him to establish a connection between the name of the 
cigarette brand found in Beckert’s apartment and the clues found at a crime scene. Deductive 
logic by virtue of reason leads him to identify the name “Ariston.” The moment when Lohmann 
pensively spells out the word with his fingers marks the occasion when the identity of the murder 
                                                 
78 The political implications of the repetition of this parallel construction are noteworthy. Thomas Plummer, for 
example, sees this as indicative for the film’s profoundly ambiguous stance: “One cannot be certain whether the film 
implies that organized crime plays a constructive role in society” or whether the film “suggests an unbridgeable gap 
between social classes with little hope for integration.” Such ambiguities, he argues, are ultimately left hanging in a 
sense of “aloofness” from the political status quo and therefore might be representative of the compromise Weimar 
political position of a Vernunftrepulikaner (“republican by virtue of reason”). Cf. Thomas G. Plummer, “M,” in 
Thomas G. Plummer, Bruce A. Murray, and Linda Schulte-Sasse, eds., Film and Politics in the Weimar Republic 
(New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), pp. 79 – 80. 
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has been procedurally determined by the inspector’s ingenious decoding skills. Significantly, 
Beckert is conversely exposed as the murderer by intuitive chance. The blind beggar, a Tiresias-
like figure who sells balloons, marked himself as afflicted by a sign around his neck, recognizes 
the pathological whistling of Beckert. It is thus sound, as proto- or crypto-speech, that ultimately 
betrays Beckert, but it is equally the archival writing that enables Lohmann finally to assemble 
all the diverse clues into a coherent textual framework to be read with ease and facility. 
Accidental sound and archival knowledge, as well as deductive logic and intuitive divination, 
constitute the all-encompassing framework which finally enables the identification of the 
murderer.   
The traces of Beckert’s own writing are uncovered as a scientific verification of 
Lohmann’s logic. In the reflection of his window, which as a motif itself is indicative of the 
movie screen, the sub-textual traces of Beckert’s handwriting are discovered and analyzed, 
replete with the seemingly indestructible material traces of his writing in he form of pencil dust. 
The materiality of this incriminating evidence is echoed in the material sign that a beggar’s hand 
then imprints on Beckert’s shoulder. The chalkmark “M” identifies him for all to see or to 
“read”: he personifies the convergence between signifier “M” and signified “murderer,” through 
which he, in turn, becomes the “floating signifier” in the filmic space that attempts to escape its 
arrest. Yet at the same time, as Kaes puts it, the multivalent sign “M” now “condenses previous 
markings and stigmatizes Beckert,” so that he “becomes trapped in a bureaucratic system that 
disciplines by labelling.”79   
This hunt for the containment and immobilization of that which cannot be contained in 
the textual economy of the film and the social sphere of the diegesis sets up another line of 
                                                 
79 Anton Kaes, M, p. 63. 
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suspense when Beckert is captured in an office-building by the criminals and transported to an 
abandoned factory in which he is to be condemned by a “kangaroo court” of the criminals’ 
collective, who want to take the law into their own hands. Juxtaposed with another instance of 
inspector Lohmann reading, this time a report of the bizarre and not yet procedurally 
comprehensible break-in into the office building by a gang of criminals, it becomes a matter of 
time whether the common law of the legal system or the “natural” law of the criminals will 
prevail. Beckert is placed in front of the assorted criminals who demand that he be executed, 
according to the “natural law of mothers,” for his crimes of passion that go against their norm of 
crime as an economic enterprise. Here, the film sets up a precarious balance between the justice 
as personified by the “common-sense” law of the criminals and justice as abstract in the form of 
the legal apparatus. While Beckert’s “appointed” defense counsel points to the fact that his very 
compulsion exonerates him from any responsibility as a sick man who must be placed under the 
protective custody of the state, the criminals deride this as another instance of the failure of the 
legal system, which would invariably unleash a “vicious cycle” of the “paragraph 51.” This 
paragraph in the legal code that denotes Unzurechnungsfähigkeit, literally “non-accountability” 
by reasons of insanity, they argue, would only postpone justice until Beckert escapes or is 
liberated by an act of amnesty and the entire circle of killings would begin anew. 
In this sense, the precarious state of judgment or closure is put into question. For it is here 
where the very question of “accountability,” judgment, and the final and unequivocal arresting of 
meaning, where action, result, and consequences of Beckert’s crimes merge with the 
problematics of writing in the film and thus brings back the question in regard to the status of 
writing. What is articulated in the vehemence with which the criminals reject the defense 
counsel’s argument is, beyond the narrative code, the desire to bring to a halt the “vicious” 
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nature of the hermeneutic circle, to once and for all put a stop to the dangerous oscillation 
between writing and meaning that allows for uncertainty and deferment of a final “reading” of a 
sentencing. Beckert is the uncontainable element that personifies, and therefore allegorizes, that 
trace which disturbs the easy convergence of text and definitive meaning.  
He thus becomes the Derridean trace which is always virally embodied in any form of 
writing, suppressed by a rational desire for reason and immobile and stabilized meaning. Only 
the sudden appearance of the law in the form of the police can temporarily halt this cyclical 
movement. As such, the “organic representation” that organizes the film, argues Gilles Deleuze, 
“retains its final ambiguity,” since “we do not know whether the situation will emerge from it 
modified, re-established, cleansed of the crime, or whether nothing will be like it was before, and 
crime, always destined to take on new forms” will resurface.80 In this regard, Deleuze continues 
elsewhere, M articulates the problem of judgment itself, for “it is the very possibility of judging 
which is called into question.”81 Lang, Deleuze argues, thus “invents a Protagoras-style 
relativism” where the question of judgment is “hardly motivated by truth.”82 This, then, reflects a 
fundamental condition of the film as text itself: “it is as if there is no truth any more, but only 
appearances, … [E]verything is appearances” or “false images,” and “yet this novel state 
transforms rather than suppresses the system of judgment.”83 In fact, the undecidability within 
this “novel state” is further emphasized by the hand that finally lays claim on Beckert’s shoulder 
to transport him from the make-shift court to the legitimate system of law. From “in the name of 
                                                 
80 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, pp. 152 – 153. 
81 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, p. 138. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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the law” spoken here as the disembodied voice that “belongs” to the hand, the film shifts to the 
final reading by a court session “in the name of the people.” But the finality of this reading is 
superceded by the allegorical image of three grieving mothers, one of whom proclaims in a 
mourning voice that “our children will not be brought back to life by this,” as we “must watch 
them ever more carefully.” In this respect, the film proposes to offer the intervention of the law 
as a solution for an “arrest,” but it ultimately follows the logic of the legal lack of accountability, 
or the paragraph 51 of Unzurechnungsfähigkeit invoked at the kangaroo court, to its end and 
comes to rest on the allegorized faces of motherhood who lament the limitations of justice 
accorded in the system of law. 
Dana Stevens points out that “M inscribes here in its final instants the sovereignty of 
film’s newest technical resource, the voice,”84 as the problematics of writing vanishes in favor of 
pure speech. But M already anticipates the subsequent development of writing into a “pure 
force,” moving away from the convergence between signifier and signified as postulated by M, 
into a “centripetal spiraling in all directions, reproducing itself senselessly” in Mabuse.85 Writing 
thus serves in this film to “acquire a new materiality, regardless of what it purports to ‘sign,’”86 
indicative of a “visual thematic of inscription” in Lang’s films to put into image a “kind of mise-
                                                 
84 Dana Stevens, “Writing, Scratching, and Politics from M to Mabuse,” Qui Parle 7, no. 1 (fall – winter 1993): 59. 
The essay bases its analysis on an older version of the film that does not contain the long-lost final image of the 
mothers on a bench as it appears in the restored Munich version. In Stevens’ version, the voice of a mother, 
however, is heard, disembodied, over a black screen. The interpretation, therefore, is valid but neglects to take into 
account the process of aural allegorization that, even without the final images, renders as abstract the individual 
voice as one of motherhood itself.  
85 Ibid., p. 68. 
86 Ibid., p. 70.  
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en-abîme of the entire history of writing.”87 However, this notion of writing as a force unleashed 
is ultimately linked back to the question of the law as a social order in M and is therefore not as 
deliriously liberating in its subversive dismantling of the cohesion between signifier and 
signified as Stevens asserts. Anton Kaes remarks that there is no “conclusive evidence” that 
undeniably links Beckert to the crimes and that the film, therefore, “invites us at least to entertain 
the possibility that Beckert might be one of those who wrote letters to the press” in a misguided 
“hankering for recognition.”88 This interpretation is possible, Kaes continues, because of 
Beckert’s urge for a “self-affirmation, publicly performed and ecstatically acted out,” so that it 
becomes a form of “self-incrimination as a psychotic break from life’s seriality, from an 
outsider’s expendability.”89  
The importance of the work that Kuntzel, Stevens and Kaes have provided lies in 
registering the film’s textual operations as limit points, but their observations must be looked at 
in conjunction with each other in order to investigate how the system of judgment is 
“transformed” here, in Deleuze’s terms. This is all the more important because Kaes suggests 
that for Lang the film was “a work that explored how a single misfit could tear an entire city’s 
social fabric.”90 This particular assessment runs counter to the vehemence with which the film 
insists on the reïnforcement and inevitability of the social fabric across the various strata and 
scales that the film traverses. It is noteworthy, therefore, that such an understanding of the film 
would emphasize the ruptures and breaking points that are asserted as the direct result and social 
                                                 
87 Ibid., p. 73. 
88 Anton Kaes, M, p. 72. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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consequence out of the presence of the “misfit” or the outsider and accept this conclusion as 
given throughout the film. Instead, it seems important to account for the manner in which this 
conceptualization of the tenuous fragility of the social order imposes itself on our understanding 
of the film and where we must locate the reasons for such an effect. In other words, do we need 
to accept the logic of inexorability that posits “M” as the ultimate outsider who must be 
exorcised from the community in order to reëstablish the social order? 
Given that the film employs the notion of totality for the representation of the social 
structure this question seems even more relevant. The amount of writing that is mobilized 
throughout the film serves as a means to designate the urban space of society as one of “chaotic” 
links or random connections. The elements of writing are established as seemingly irrational 
juxtapositions that nonetheless follow a particular logic of dissemination and circulation in the 
social network of information. Writing serves thus as a rebus-like enigma on the surface in need 
of a resolution through the social forces it has mobilized. The film employs this system of 
designation in order to postulate the kind of “reader” as citizen who is equipped to trace and 
arrange it into a semblance of coherence, and offers this reading entity ultimately in the 
conjunction of Schränker’s organized structure of surveillance and Lohmann’s structures of 
control within a totality of “law” enforcement. When it comes to the issue of judgment, however, 
it is crucial for Deleuze that Lang’s films point to a preservation of the “system of judgement 
[sic],”91 albeit one that is transformed through the relativity of appearances, so that it imposes 
itself as a burden on “the side of the viewer, to which the conditions of possibility of judging the 
image itself are given.”92
                                                 
91 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 139. 
92 Ibid. 
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This mechanism of transference indicates another crucial instance of figuration in which 
a cycle of movement can only be arrested or resolved via a recourse to allegory, but since here 
the resolution involves the very conditions that determine a definite judgment, this means of 
engaging the viewer is not a matter of positioning an idealized or implied spectator but rather a 
disciplinary mode of establishing a social order. Much has been made of the ambivalence that 
makes it difficult to determine a political position for  M, since it seems to generate a notion of 
empathy for Beckert, while aligning itself easily with the resentment of the angry masses against 
him. This, famously, prompted Joseph Goebbels to record in his diary entry enthusiastic praise 
for the film because it takes a stance “against humanitarian sentimentality” and predicts that one 
day Lang will be the director of the Nazi movement.93 Lang’s own legend surrounding his life 
and escape from Germany would later work against this association, but his allegorization of the 
mode of discipline that structures the film remained in place and would continue unabated 
without him. Reteïrated as a spectacle of judgment, M already points to the power of the 
individual, who can absolve himself of responsibility by abdicating the definition of who does 
and who does not belong to the community to the power of the mark which manifests itself at 
first only as a sign or a cipher on the screen. In relegating the question of accountability to a 
circulation of forces which celebrate the law as a spectacle, the film points out how little such 
categories as empathy and compassion mean at the moment of judgment unless its claims of 
justice are measured against itself. 
                                                 
93 Quoted in Anton Kaes, M, p. 73. The use of the term Gefühlsduselei (a kind of “sentimental wallowing”) in the 
original is noteworthy for its complete lack of nuance, since it does not even take into account a potential political 
position and caricatures the film’s effects as a strong response to cheap affectivity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: TITLES AND WRITING IN EARLY WEIMAR CENSORSHIP 
DECISIONS 
 
 
 
In an elaborate archival project completed in 2003, the Deutsche Filminstitut in Frankfurt 
catalogued and then digitized for online retrieval all extant censorship materials, board 
correspondences, and censorship decisions for 890 films made between 1920 and 1938 by the 
Film-Oberprüfstelle Berlin, the “Superior Film Examination Board,” which was part of the 
Ministry for the Interior in the German Reich. This board was established in response to the 
problem of how to deal with censorship concerning the medium film on a national level after the 
end of World War I and the abdication of the Emperor. Ursula von Keitz describes the dilemma 
posed by the newly drafted constitution of the Weimar Republic in 1919, which specified in 
article 118 the fundamental “principle that ‘No censorship will take place.’”1 The freedom of 
                                                 
1 Ursula von Keitz, “Films before the Court: The Theory and Practice of Film Assessment 1920 – 1938,” trans. Cyril 
Edwards at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/dt2tai10.htm (link under “Zensurgutachten”). (A note on the URL: 
For the long period of archiving, all individual pages on the DIF website were subsumed under the following 
umbrella web address and therefore could only be accessed through the main portal http://www.deutsches-
filminstitut.de/dframe12.htm. Through this link, the specific web location of the censorship decisions can be found 
through the site map on this main page by following the link in the category Recherchen to the entry entitled 
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expression was guaranteed in the constitution which stated explicitly that “[e]very German has 
the right, within the limits of the general laws, to express his opinion freely by word, in writing, 
in print, in picture form, or in any other way.”2 In the constitutional drafts of February 1919, this 
article included the important addition, “no censorship, especially no preliminary evaluation of 
stage or motion picture performances, will occur.”3 However, states von Keitz, “the authors of 
the Weimar Reich Constitution remained suspicious of the relatively youthful medium of the 
cinema and its public,”4 so that “a special regulation applied to the cinema from that point: ‘in 
the case of films, however, regulations which differ from the above may be prescribed by law.’”5 
Under the considerable pressure from conservative forces, the National Assembly established 
regulatory laws that were ratified on May 12, 1920, by the Social Democratic President Friedrich 
Ebert on the basis of the votes from the members of all ten parties represented in parliament 
except for the left-wing splinter party USPD, whose members voted against censorship.6 This 
clause of exception, which granted the state the legal right to regulate the cinematic exhibition 
and the circulation of film and which was articulated as the Reichslichtspielgesetz or RLG that 
went into effect on May 29, 1920, indicates the exceptional importance that the status of film, or 
                                                                                                                                                             
Zensurgutachten. However, all URLs in this document are hyperlinked. The main page for all censorship materials 
is located at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/dframe31.htm.) 
2 As reprinted in Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, eds., The Weimar Republic Sourcebook 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), p. 50.  
3 Martin Loiperdinger, “Filmzensur und Selbstkontrolle: Politische Reifeprüfung,” in Geschichte des Deutschen 
Films, ed. Wolfgang Jacobsen, Anton Kaes, and Hans Helmut Prinzler (Stuttgart: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 1993), p. 482. 
4 Von Keitz, “Films before the Court.”  
5 Ibid. 
6 Cf. Loiperdinger, “Filmzensur und Selbstkontrolle,” p. 482. 
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“light plays,” occupies in the framework of a national democratic constitution to be developed, a 
framework that otherwise would allow for a relative but considerable degree of artistic and 
aesthetic autonomy.7
Following this law, two film censorship boards, or “film examination agencies,”8 were 
established in the main film production centers Munich, responsible for film productions 
originating in Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, and Hessia, an area which overall accounted for 
roughly a tenth of all films produced, and Berlin, responsible for the remainder of the Reich and 
foreign films. The Berlin agency also served as the final arbitrator in decisions in its position as 
the “Superior Examination Board” and as the “Board of Appeals,” a status that in practice often 
led to considerable disputes in correspondences between the Munich and Berlin agencies. After a 
lengthy controversy surrounding questions of competence and whether the appropriate domain of 
jurisdiction for film evaluation lay within local communities, individual states, or the Reich, the 
two boards were instituted in order to enforce the regulatory efforts of evaluating a motion 
                                                 
7 In December 1926, the so-called “filth and trash law” (Schmutz- und Schundgesetz) was enacted, which added 
literature as the second artistic category subject to censorship, with the crucial difference, however, that an act 
censorship could only be initiated on appeal after the publication of a literary work, so that publishing before any 
impositions of a limitation of circulation was always possible. See Christine Kopf, “‘Der Schein der Neutralität’ – 
Institutionelle Filmzensur in der Weimarer Republik” at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/news/dt2n13.htm.      
8 Filmprüfstelle and Filmoberprüfstelle are translated literally as “film examination agency” and “superior film 
examination agency.” Both the Munich and Berlin agencies could issue decisions which were binding for the entire 
area of the Reich. However, final decisions in appeals or on controversial cases were made in Berlin as the “superior 
film examination agency” within which the “film examination agency” was integrated. Abbreviated as FPS and 
FOPS respectively, the superior board was also often called the OP in artistic circles and the press, but here the term 
censorship board is used throughout for all agency decisions, unless the distinction between the various branches of 
the agency is relevant.      
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picture for its propriety and to grant it a certificate of clearance for its release. These debates 
formed part of the many challenges faced by the first democratic government of Germany, the 
so-called Weimarer Koalition, a coalition of Social Democrats and the liberal-centrist parties 
Zentrum and DDP. 
While legally subsumed under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, the censorship 
boards were separate agencies with members appointed through the Ministry. In order to be 
approved for exhibition in the Reich, each individual film had to be submitted with an 
application for a censorship board permit and was then subjected to the examination process, 
which, as specified in the RLG paragraph 5, included “the film strip itself, the film title, and its 
accompanying text in word and writing,” as well as its advertising and publicity material.9 A 
presiding member of the censorship agency, in conjunction with four assistant members, then 
assessed and reviewed all of these parts for every single foreign or domestic film to be exhibited 
in public and determined whether approval for circulation of the film could be granted. 
Following approval, each film was issued a “censorship card” that contained a record of the 
permissible segments and titles for the film. By law it was specified that the evaluating and 
presiding civil servants of the boards, appointed by the Minister of the Interior on the basis of 
suggestions submitted to the Ministry, were to be “distinguished persons of pedagogical and 
artistic stature.”10 Paragraph 9 of the RLG further outlined the overall constitution of the boards. 
Apart from the civil servants employed in the service of the state, assistant evaluators were to be 
                                                 
9 Original paragraph at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/collate/collate_sp/se/se_link_01.htm: “Die Prüfung der 
Bildstreifen umfaßt die Streifen selbst, den Titel und den verbindenden Text in Wort und Schrift.” 
10 Reichslichtspielgesetz RLG May 12, 1920, § 9, Abs. 2. The German formulation is “Die Beamten sollen 
Persönlichkeiten von pädagogischer und künstlerischer Bildung sein.” Document available at 
http://www.documentarchiv.de/wr/1920/lichtspielgesetz.html. 
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comprised of one quarter of members of the motion picture industry, one quarter of members 
“well-versed in the arts and literature,”11 and one half of members experienced in the areas of 
public welfare work, people’s continuing education, or youth welfare services. 
These were the constituents that convened for all film permit decisions, which consisted 
of a film screening, followed by a closed-door assessment and confidential hearing, and a fact-
finding decision. In general, this meant that the board committees were always comprised of a 
supervising civil servant and the four board members, two of whom had to be from the area of 
public welfare and one of whom had to be from the area of “film commerce” for each decision.12 
In practice, however, it was permissible for the presiding board member to make an evaluative 
decision independently, if the majority of assisting members agreed to this procedure. The 
assistant board members were appointed to the position for a duration of three years by the Reich 
Minister of the Interior, “on the basis of lists of suggestions submitted by interested bodies.”13 
The evaluative contributions by the assistant board members were to be submitted “to the best of 
their knowledge and belief” and without prejudice, as ascertained “by handshake” by the 
presiding board member.14 Youngsters between the ages of 18 and 20 were to be consulted in 
cases deciding whether a film exhibition was permitted to include minors. Any violations against 
this law, including the attempt to circulate either nationally or internationally a film or parts of a 
                                                 
11 Ibid., § 9, Abs. 1. Specified as appointments of “der auf den Gebieten der Kunst und Literatur bewanderten 
Personen.”  
12 Ibid. § 11, Abs. 1. The German Lichtspielgewerbe implies “film commerce,” “film industry,” or “film trade” and 
therefore could indicate both film production or film exhibition. 
13 Ursula von Keitz, “Films before the Court.” 
14 RLG, § 10. 
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film that had been evaluated and denied an exhibition permission, were punishable with a prison 
sentence of up to three years or a fine of up to 100,000 Mark or both.15       
While von Keitz in her account is justifiably suspicious of the constituents appointed to 
these boards, they did belong to the three main areas of expertise as defined legally, the “moving 
picture industry,” “arts and literature,” and the realm of “social welfare, education, or youth 
work.” Von Keitz notes that “[r]epresentatives from the areas of film criticism or film production 
were conspicuous by their absence,”16 but it is not necessarily evident in what ways she 
understands “film production” to be different from the “motion picture industry,” since “film 
commerce” was the legally defined category from which acceptable members could be 
appointed. In fact, von Keitz neglects to mention a remarkable formulation in the law which 
specified that in the selection of members from the area of film commerce, “the employees and 
workers in this trade are to be considered in sufficiently adequate numbers.”17 Moreover, the 
attempt to emphasize the legal stipulation of the artistic and literary credentials of the board 
members is evident, for example, in the appointment of Thomas Mann to the Munich censorship 
board in 1920 as well. As a prominent author and vocal supporter of the newly established 
democratic Weimar Republic, Mann was, however, apparently “frequently indisposed” and 
                                                 
15 RLG, § 18. Remarkably, the severity of this punishment was equally applicable in cases when a film permitted for 
adults only was screened before minors. By law, Jugendliche, or minors, were defined as persons above the age of 
14 and below the age of 18, in distinction to children below the age of 14. A more general legal frame included 
Heranwachsende, or adolescents, which was defined as up to the age of 21.    
16 Von Keitz, “Films before the Court.” 
17 RLG, § 9, Abs. 2: “Bei der Auswahl der Beamten und Beisitzer aus den Kreisen des Lichtspielgewerbes sind die 
Angestellten und Arbeiter dieses Gewerbes ausreichend zu berücksichtigen.” 
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therefore unable to fulfill his obligations for the evaluation of films for long.18 In this 
proportional division and with the broadly conceived area of representation, the constitution of 
the boards acknowledged the potential divergence of interested parties so that, in theory, 
conflicts between these factions could be addressed and mitigated. Moreover, in the first few 
years of censorship board decisions, at least nominal efforts were made in a number of 
precarious cases to include hearings by representative experts such as diplomats for international 
issues. Adolescents as the legally stipulated “youth representatives” were heard and their 
opinions taken into account for decisions on exempting a film’s exhibition restriction for adults 
only, that is, whenever important issues concerning the mental health and morale of minors 
would be assessed. 
Von Keitz puts the existence and constitution of the censorship boards into a larger 
theoretical context, since she attributes the exceptional status of film in this respect to a particular 
differentiation of its mimetic character that is taken as social transparency. As she states, 
 
“[t]he difference in the way in which literary media and visual media, particularly film, were 
treated, which formed the basis of the new legitimation of censorship after the event and its legal 
justification, suggests that images in this phase were perceived primarily in terms of their 
referentiality to social reality - in contrast to literary texts or dramatic productions.”19
       
The assertion of exceptionality is noteworthy because it allows for a documentation and 
record of the degree to which film was taken seriously by the emerging state through its 
                                                 
18 Cf. the materials on film censorship, assembled by Herbert Birett, a retired Munich librarian, on his personal 
website dedicated to documents and original materials pertaining to the history of German cinema at 
http://www.kinematographie.de/LSG1920.htm. 
19 Von Keitz, “Films before the Court.” 
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representative civil servants in the decisions of the censorship boards. Weimar law specified five 
absolute criteria, the presence of which would necessitate the prevention of any public 
exhibition, but in practice these criteria could be interpreted broadly and divergently. As 
paragraph 1, article 2, of the RLG elaborates, a film is to be denied public exhibition as 
determined by examination when “a projection is suitable or likely to endanger the public order 
or safety, to offend religious sensibilities, to have a demoralizing or brutalizing effect, or to 
endanger the German reputation or the relations of Germany with foreign states.”20 A crucial 
modification that denied any film public exhibition in case it was “likely to endanger the vital 
interests of the state” was added in 1931.21 Finally, a fifth and exceptional criterion for granting 
                                                 
20 Reichslichtspielgesetz, § 1, Abs. 2. A reproduction of the original legal text in its 1931 version is available at 
http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/collate/collate_sp/se/se_link_22.htm. It is also cited in Christine Kopf, “‘Der 
Schein der Neutralität.’” The RLG was modified twice with slight procedural changes between 1920 and 1930. The 
assessment of fees and rates associated with the evaluation procedure was legally changed at least fifteen times 
during the hyperinflation period in 1923.   
21 In October 1931, in one of the state-of-emergency declarations (Notverordnung) by the Reich President, the 
following adjustment to the first paragraph of the RLG was made and a primary and foremost criterion, preceding 
the ones that particularize the definitions of this infringement, was added: As articulated now in § 1 of the RLG, a 
film was to be denied public exhibition “if an evaluation of the motion picture determines that it is suitable or likely 
to endanger vital interests of the state.” In doing so, the interests of the state were now legally spelled out as the 
primary function of film censorship. In the original, a permission is denied “wenn die Vorführung eines 
Bildstreifens geeignet ist, lebenswichtige Interessen des Staates oder die öffentliche Ordnung oder Sicherheit zu 
gefährden, das religiöse Empfinden zu verletzen, verrohend oder entsittlichend zu wirken, das deutsche Ansehen 
oder die Beziehungen Deutschlands zu auswärtigen Staaten zu gefährden.” Prior to this decision, another major 
change involved the so-called “Lex Remarque,” which restricted and limited the permission for the screenings of 
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permission to project a film in public applied in all cases determining whether “youths under the 
age of eighteen” were to be included in the granting of permission to screen the film. In addition 
to the criteria listed above therefore, paragraph 1, article 3, declared that all films for which “it is 
feared that they might exert a detrimental influence on the moral, mental, or hygienic 
development of adolescents or that they might overstimulate their imagination”22 were to be 
prohibited from being screened before minors. In certain cases, the Ministry for Defense was 
able to impose restrictions on a film as well. 
Significantly, the RLG also included a so-called “tendency clause” or Tendenzklausel, 
which asserted that no film was to be denied permission solely “for its political, social, religious, 
ethical, or ideological tendencies as such.”23 This clause, drafted early on and prominently 
incorporated in the RLG as the second provision in paragraph 1, was especially important 
because it allowed for films to have a particular point-of-view, or an “ideological tendency,” but 
they could not be denied permission for their inherent point-of-view as such. This would indicate 
that the inherent structure and meaning of a film was legally inviolate as an artistic entity, save 
for the five criteria of exception, and therefore this clause already codified into law the principles 
of an incipient New Criticism in relation to the status of the work of art in and of itself and as an 
internally coherent artifact. Moreover, this clause also regulated that a film was not to be denied 
permission for “reasons external to its own content,” which meant that the context of any public 
                                                                                                                                                             
films of “scientific or artistic merit” for “select circles.” This change was implemented in March 1931 in response to 
Lewis Milestone’s 1930 film All Quiet on the Western Front. 
22 Ibid. The original reads that films denied permission are those “von welchen eine schädliche Einwirkung auf die 
sittliche, geistige oder gesundheitliche Entwicklung oder eine Überreizung der Phantasie der Jugendlichen zu 
besorgen ist.”   
23 Ibid. In the original, “ideological tendencies as such” reads “Weltanschauungstendenz als solcher.” 
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debates or controversies on the material or content of the film could not be held against its 
potential exhibition or form the basis of rejection. Paradoxically, of course, this assertion of the 
film as an autonomous entity was belied by the following caveat in the commentaries to the RLG 
that the evaluation of content “should only occur insofar as conclusions can be drawn on the 
presumptive effects on the attendant during a screening.”24       
This judicial line of reasoning is very significant because it establishes the idea of a 
benevolent state which, through its representatives, can be trusted to uphold the interests of the 
mental well-being and sensibilities of its subjects by recognizing the merits and demerits of a 
film as an object in itself. In the same manner that the censorship board was charged with the 
protection of youth, its duty to prevent certain films from reaching a public attests to the board’s 
role as an instantiated representative of the state’s responsibility for the welfare of its subjects. 
Thus, the legally codified prevention of film on the basis of its presumed effects stands counter 
to the recognition of a film as its own discrete entity and the citation of the potential influences 
on a film’s attendants demonstrates a political will based on the “logical impossibility of 
determining a film’s future effects ex ante.”25 These elaborately and legally contradictory 
compromises can also explain the initial disputes surrounding the competence and legitimacy of 
the film boards as institutions because the enforcement of film censorship prior to the Weimar 
Republic was restricted to the domain of local authorities, which most often meant police 
                                                 
24 Christine Kopf, “‘Der Schein der Neutralität.’” Kopf, however, does not clarify that this passage is not found in 
the actual law itself, but rather stems from later legal commentary to the RLG. In the original:  “Die mutmaßliche 
Wirkung bei der Vorführung auf den Besucher.” Of course, “the attendant” is masculine in German, but in the 
practice of censorship decisions the spectator invoked was often explicitly or implicitly feminized as a helpless 
viewer who could not control a film’s effects or impact.    
25 Loiperdinger, “Filmzensur und Selbstkontrolle,” p. 484. 
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departments under the auspices of the individual states or Länder and the federalization of this 
ability to enforce orderly “community standards or safety,” which often formed the basis for 
earlier local censorship decisions, indicated a significantly diminished regional power in favor of 
the state as one cohesive entity. Apart from the logistics of enforcement, the challenges posed 
here are directly related to the question of the legitimacy of the state’s powers, since conservative 
forces were suspicious of the Ministry of the Interior to enforce an adequate degree of censorship 
and to impose it on a nationwide scale as they sought to rely on the more restrictive, because 
more malleable, definitions of order through notions of “local” acceptance and propriety. 
Ultimately, the motion picture laws and the subsequent prevalence of the censorship boards 
reäffirm how seriously the power of the medium film was taken at the time, even if its virtues 
and values were not necessarily acknowledged in the RLG but rather dismissed as insidious. 
Furthermore, the jurisdiction entrusted to the representative civil servants of the state the 
ability to deduce specific subject positions in the general spectator across differentiating 
categories of identity and the legitimacy to base their decisions on the recognition of these in the 
films evaluated. What thus gets codified in this respect through the establishment of the 
censorship boards is not just the detriments of individual films, but rather the institutionalization 
of the modes of recognizing the citizen in film through the fault lines along the definitions of 
what is permissible and what is objectionable. In the censorship decisions, therefore, we can 
delineate an idealized formulation of the imaginary relations between the state and its subjects, 
while these relations are encoded as issues of the protection of citizens for the sake of their own 
well-being and safety, so that they are indemnified from the rampant powers of the medium 
imposing on their attention and taxing their imagination. 
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The assumed ability of film to interpolate its values and influence the character and 
mental constitution of its viewers, albeit with a relative differentiation between innate adult and 
youthful imagination, thus defines a power that can impose a subject position onto its viewers. 
Because this power competes directly with the state’s ultimate exceptional right to do so in 
defining its subjects, it becomes the duty of the censorship board to enforce the limitations of 
such spheres of influence in public and thereby curtail any conflicting or countercurrent 
impositions of power. In other words, even before and beyond von Keitz’s concept of a specific 
“referentiality” to a social reality, it is the imaginative power of film to shape subjectivity that 
directly competes with the domain of the state and its instruments to define identities by law. 
Therefore, this singular competing power necessitates a regulation of its potential forces because 
it constitutes a challenge that directly infringes on the interests of the state, a power which no 
other art form can aspire to, and thus requires an institutionalized “ideal” or representative 
audience in the censorship board which evaluates any and all of a film’s specific or potential 
subjective effects prior to its release for a general public, where such effects of subjectivization 
might become actualized. 
It should obviously come as no surprise then that because of this understanding the 
decisions in the practice of the censorship boards were often extremely prescriptive, rigidly 
conservative as well as fundamentally biased, and alarmingly so in the later years of the Weimar 
Republic. While it is, therefore, accurate to state that the “norms of censorship reflected the 
standards of the conservative establishment,”26 the early practice of censorship impositions 
cannot be easily subsumed within such categories. Thus, it is also slightly misleading to state that 
                                                 
26 Thomas Elsaesser and Michael Wedel, eds., The BFI Companion to German Cinema (London: BFI Publishing, 
1999), p. 48. 
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in the general practice of censorship “[a]fter 1922, film could be censored if it threatened the 
vital interests of the state.”27 It may certainly be relevant to investigate how threats to the state 
were conceptualized in the first few years of censorship decisions, but the legal codification of 
the “vital interests of the state” as determined in relation to the medium film was not established 
until 1931.28 This insight also structures the line of argument offered in the accompanying 
materials provided by the Deutsche Filminstitut as well as the essays by von Keitz and Kopf. In 
such structural emphases, the historical evaluation predicates itself on a mode which helps to 
understand the basis on which the rise of conservative to fascist forces to power in the Weimar 
Republic can be explained and the later developments towards increasingly repressive decisions 
can be put into a context. While this explanatory mode may certainly be necessary again, it also 
confirms what Thomas Elsaesser terms the special “imaginary” status of Weimar, which keeps in 
a bind any material to be evaluated from this period within a particular frame of reference as if in 
a vise, so that any understanding constantly returns to the already-known by “adding to the 
Weimar cinema’s ‘historical imaginary,’ that is, providing mutually confirming metaphors 
between the film text and the context.”29
The danger, as Elsaesser asserts, is that this repetitive mode of explanation ultimately 
only yields a degree of self-evidence that prevents new means of thinking and remains 
committed to confirm what has long since “settled into historical clichés.”30 Accompanying these 
clichés and, to a large extent, according to Elsasesser, defining them in the first place, are the 
                                                 
27 Sabine Hake, German National Cinema (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 31.  
28 In conjunction with the October state-of-emergency declarations (Notverordnung). 
29 Thomas Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After: Germany’s Historical Imaginary (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 76. 
30 Ibid. 
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works by Lotte Eisner and Siegfried Kracauer, so that “‘Expressionist film’ and ‘Weimar 
cinema’ continue to signal ready-made, self-evident identities, the former slanted towards the 
artists that produced the films, and the latter focusing on the society that consumed them – two 
halves of a whole that to this day spells Germany’s national cinema.”31 Indeed, Lotte Eisner’s 
Haunted Screen articulates the conceptual modalities around the hieroglyphic materiality of 
Expressionism and thus defines the terms of the debates to come early on. In her discussion, for 
example, of Dr. Mabuse, Der Spieler, Eisner remarks that in the film “the objets d’art shine out 
insistently, Expressionistically, as if they are infused with an insidious latent life.”32 And, she 
continues, these objects cease to be part of the setting, but rather become enigmatic because 
“[t]heir luminous presence makes the silence more and more oppressive, and they are as it were 
the hieroglyphs of an ineffable solitude and despair.”33 When Kracauer, by comparison, 
discusses Weimar cinema, even his chapter headings, such as “Forebodings,” “Procession of 
Tyrants,” “Destiny,” “Decline,” “Brief Reveille,” to “Murderer Among Us,” have a remarkable 
similarity to the intertitle chapters of a silent film that makes his narrative, which, following 
Elsaesser’s logic, might be termed a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, sound like the 
Gruselkabinett (or “cabinet of horrors”) of Expressionism that the title of his study suggests.34 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 21. 
32 Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen: Expressionism in the German Cinema and the Influence of Max Reinhardt, 
trans. Roger Greaves (1952; reprint, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), p. 242. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Cf. Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film (1947; reprint, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).  
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This narrative provides, in Kracauer’s formulation, “a secret history involving the inner 
dispositions of the German people.”35
Elsaesser delineates the means by which such mutually reïnforcing and self-affirming 
modes of imagination apply when it comes to debates on German national cinema and he 
demonstrates that such imaginary narratives become intertwined with the very subject of the 
historical investigation itself. Eisner and Kracauer serve as the two originating nodal points for 
the imaginary framework within which Weimar cinema is evaluated and interpreted. In this 
convergence these imaginary narratives merge to become ineluctably yoked so that one might 
say that historical explanations take on a labyrinthine Expressionist character themselves until 
they constitute what Elsaesser calls a “Möbius strip,”36 where fact and fiction, history and text, 
become interchangeably fused. Elsaesser’s exceptional work into the mechanisms of this peculiar 
imaginary, however, carries with it the danger of a prescriptive sense of boundaries and decorum 
as well, because his evocative visual metaphor defines the terrain of inquiry by reducing it to the 
limits of an inescapable surface area of entrapment. To paraphrase another of Elsaesser’s 
apodictic assessments, the historian engaged in the cinema of the Weimar Republic therefore 
inevitably becomes involved in what might be termed a “hypnotic hermeneutics.”37 However, 
while Elsaesser’s lasting achievement may be that he detaches Weimar scholarship from this 
symptomatic grip that the hypnotic power of the image exerts on the historian, he insists that 
even the most canonized Expressionist films which have come to epitomize the mysteries of 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 11. 
36 Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After, p. 4. 
37 Cf. ibid., p. 62. In discussing the force with which The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari still frames film scholarship, 
Elsaesser speaks of the power that exerts “such a hypnotic as well as hermeneutic fascination on the critics.”  
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Weimar cinema “intervened politically – perversely, perhaps – by refusing to take sides, by 
resisting referentiality, which is to say, refusing to be used either on behalf of rhetoric or 
reality.”38
Precisely this resistance to referentiality implies a larger, more definitive terrain of 
meaning where the artistic negotiations with the social realities of Weimar can only be 
determined by the viewer as hermeneut, and these encounters document a dimension that 
“testifies to something else, in the end no less historical,”39 even when or especially if they are 
only discernible as a figuration, whose “apocryphal character merely adds to its allegorising 
gesture,”40 as Elsaesser remarks, for example, in response to Lang’s account of the social 
realities he claimed to have incorporated into his exotic fantasy Halbblut. The challenge posed 
here is linked to the very question of how the boundaries between fact and fiction are to be 
delineated, that is, in order to prevent the error, which, according to Elsaesser, “posits a structural 
convergence between story and history,”41 and to the question of whether it is permissible to 
analyze Weimar cinema as a set of clues or a “symptomatology, so perfectly readable – with 
hindsight,”42 a mode of evidentiary analysis Elsaesser even goes so far as to describe with the 
term “foolish.”43 According to Elsaesser, the historical analyses of Weimar cinema require, 
therefore, a distinction between a proper, sober-minded approach and a “hypnotic” hermeneutics 
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 97. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., p. 105. 
41 Ibid., p. 30. 
42 Ibid., p. 35. 
43 Cf. ibid., p. 97. 
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of symptoms in constant danger of becoming contaminated by the effects of its very object of 
study. 
The quandary of how these distinctive epistemological boundaries can be drawn 
accurately points to a territorial dimension in the fundamental sense as a field of inquiry because 
they are defined by the notion of what properly belongs to its area and by the problem of how to 
disambiguate between “clues” that provide an erroneous reading. This reading, in turn, only 
yields the febrile fallacy of conjecture as its own symptomatology, and its opposite methodology, 
namely a reading that rejects clues and disavows symptoms in favor of, in Elsaesser’s 
formulation, an “anti-idealist” de-demonization that make visible “a dynamics of assimilation 
and exclusion marking the nation and its national imaginary… once these have become the 
primary sites of subjectification and intersubjectivity.”44 Elsaesser’s invocation of the proper 
terrain of analysis against the opprobrium of an allegorical hermeneutics of symptoms is itself an 
instantiation of the equal impulse that motivates the censorship board as a site of subjectification 
in its determination of the detrimental effects and the means by which it prunes a filmic text from 
its symptomatic deformities. Elsaesser’s theoretical achievement, therefore, ultimately lies in the 
fact that his work elevates and forces Weimar film scholarship to culminate in an awareness of 
the metadiscursive level at which fiction and fact contaminate their own boundaries until they 
comprise the obverse of each other.45 On this level, a movement within and between these two 
                                                 
44 Ibid., p.  438. 
45 This is not to suggest a return to a mode of analysis between material registers indebted to the New Historicist 
understanding that, in Stephen Greenblatt’s formulation, requires the means to “develop terms to describe the ways 
in which material – here official documents, private papers, newspaper clippings, and so forth – is transferred from 
one discursive sphere to another and becomes aesthetic property,” although it does follow a different conception of 
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registers of the dimensions where instances of allegorical signification are produced does not 
only become possible but, in fact, necessary again. 
In this respect, an assessment of the legitimacy of the terrain of inquiry points to another, 
seemingly irreconcilable aspect that needs to concern the film historian when we take into 
account von Keitz’s claim that the censorship board was engaged in the transparencies of 
referentiality alongside Elsaesser’s determination that “the cinema entered the public sphere in 
the early 1920s, not, as its implacable avant-garde critics had hoped, by ‘realistically’ 
documenting the class conflicts and social injustices, but by a bricolage appropriation”46 in 
which various elements of high and low culture become assembled and reconfigured to the point 
that they lose any grounded connection to referentiality and instead emerge as enigmatic 
allegories. In other words, a cinema fundamentally and structurally driven by gestures toward 
allegorization and by elements of meaning almost completely detached from referentiality is 
nonetheless evaluated by an institutionalized agency which serves as its primary hermeneutic 
“interpreter” to determine the modes of subjectification. This institution is the censorship board 
as the primary reader of filmic texts for the sake of safeguarding the public from detrimental 
effects through interpretive viewing acts that postulate these effects as actual, declare them 
“effective” and, therefore, produce a register that posits them as “real.” 
Moreover, in its privilege of determining the suitability of films for screenings, the 
censorship board evaluates these effects in order to serve as the primary instance which defines a 
film’s possible subjectivizing forces and regulate the film accordingly. At this juncture, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the boundaries of such registers. Cf. Stephen Greenblatt, “Towards a Poetics of Culture,” in The New Historicism, 
ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 11.   
46 Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After, p. 97. 
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therefore, the question of identity and the issue of how identity relates to the subject position for 
an inchoate national state both need to be addressed as a relevant element in the analysis of the 
source material of the Deutsche Filminstitut again. Since the censorship board’s determination of 
the subject position who will be adversely affected by the film viewing and the assessment of the 
potential threats to interests vital to the functions of the state both occur in the oscillation 
between transparency and allegorization, the very acts of interpretation and evaluation by the 
censorship board that posit a viewing subject need to become the focus of investigation in order 
to establish how these mechanisms are determined to be at work.  
For this concern, the early decisions of the Berlin censorship board prove to be a 
particularly interesting case, since the board’s institutionalization during the first Weimar 
coalition government came immediately after a time of severe inner upheavals and regional 
challenges from the left and the right that threatened the newly established sovereignty of the 
nation, most dangerously by the March 1920 Kapp-Putsch, a four-day putsch by disgruntled 
rightwing militia factions that brought the country to the brink of civil war. These events were 
closely followed by or coïncided with communist workers’ uprisings in the Ruhrgebiet, 
Thuringia, Hamburg, and in the Middle German industrial areas Halle, Leuna, Merseburg, and 
Mansfeld, all of which escalated and were terminated through brutal acts of suppression by local 
militia and police forces.47 While the Weimar constitution was significantly shaped by the 
constitutional scholar and first Minister of the Interior, Hugo Preuß, the film censorship board 
was established under the leadership of Minister Erich Koch-Weser, a lawyer and member of the 
                                                 
47 For a chronological account and for primary documents relating to the early years of the Weimar Republic, see, 
for example, Wolfgang Michalka and Gottfried Niedhard, eds., Die Ungeliebte Republik: Dokumente zur Innen- und 
Aussenpolitik Weimars 1918 – 1933, Munich: dtv 1980.  
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liberal-centrist party DDP, from the ranks of which, along with the Social Democratic party 
SPD, all ten Ministers of the Interior were provided in succession to the Republic until 
November 1923 when the conservative Karl Jarres took over.  
The fact that the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior until November 1923 was 
governed by liberal democratic party members in coalition arrangements facing various crises 
and significant existential threats to their own legitimacy and constitutional state power makes 
the work of the censorship boards in these early years more important than the overview 
provided by von Keitz would suggest. As she states, the problem posed by the board’s 
establishment was that it was “perched between the status of judiciary body and executive body,” 
so that “[t]he persons who in the last resort decided whether to permit or forbid films were both 
judges and administrators.”48 In this respect, the film censorship board was an institutional entity 
that was charged with a complicated balancing act of not only determining the boundaries of 
filmic violations to their public exposure, but also with establishing and administrating these 
limitations in a coherent and congruent manner and ultimately with affirming and enforcing such 
decisions by judicial decree. 
Von Keitz dismisses the first four years of the work of the censorship board in favor of 
the familiar narrative lamented by Elsaesser when she summarizes that “[u]ntil 1924 the Berlin 
Film Censorship Headquarters was headed by the author and senior executive officer Dr. 
Bulcke,” who “was dismissed and succeeded in 1 March 1934 [sic] by the lawyer Dr. Ernst 
                                                 
48 Ursula von Keitz, “Films before the Court.” 
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Seeger.”49 “Seeger,” she continues, “was a typically conscientious civil servant who had no 
problems in complying with the change of government on 30 January 1933,”50 that is, when the 
Nazis took over power. As the nation’s “top” censor, Seeger encapsulates the banality of a 
bureaucrat who nonetheless undergirds the instruments of power. In other words, the constitution 
of the board and its decisions do not merit further investigation until the point that it was run 
under the auspices of the opportunistic and obsequious magistrate Dr. Seeger, which would then 
explain and confirm the ease with which the media industry was incorporated into the 
construction of a fascist state. The characterization of Seeger’s personality might by no means be 
inadequate, but von Keitz’s summary obscures a more complicated picture regarding his 
promotion to succeed Bulcke at the censorship board. In doing so, she inadvertently again 
accepts the limitations that follow the structural framework Elsaesser delineates for a discussion 
of Weimar cinema and thereby prevents a more nuanced understanding of the complications in 
the early years of the censorship board. The March 1924 dismissal of Bulcke came at a time of 
restructuring in the Ministry of the Interior during the first conservative-centrist government of 
Chancellor Wilhelm Marx and the Minister of Interior Karl Jarres, but Seeger had been an active 
member of the censorship board from the start, that is, he did not accede to the post and enter the 
domain of censorship from an outside position. Seeger had been prominently engaged in the 
drafting of the RLG laws in 1920, and had been involved with film regulations and film 
censorship affairs in an official capacity since 1915. He had already been made an associate 
                                                 
49 Ibid. The chronological error lies in the typography of the translation, not the original. Nonetheless, even the 
accidental conflation of temporal events separated by a full decade follows the same logic of a historical narrative of 
inevitability.   
50 Ibid. 
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member of the censorship board in 1921, which he later ran until 1933 when he was entrusted to 
oversee the Film Section of the Ministry of Propaganda until his death in 1937, where one of his 
obituaries praised him for his “clean and just stance in censorship matters.”51  
By contrast, Bulcke is still a relatively unknown if not enigmatic figure, and von Keitz 
does not even provide his first name nor any additional information regarding his person.52 
Nonetheless, from the outset the responsibility for allowing a film to be shown finally rested on 
the head of the censorship board, who, with the support of the assistant board members, was 
entrusted to safeguard the public order and decide in lieu of the public as a representative of the 
state in case a film was liable to infringe upon this order. In the privilege of censorship, the 
monopoly of power of the state as a sovereign entity is affirmed and ultimately any expression 
against this sovereignty is determined as a “willful declaration against the state.”53 Thus these 
decisions provide a nexus point where the presumed vital interests of the state coïncide or 
conflict with those of the public and therefore offer the possibility of evaluating the self-
definition of the state as determined by its ongoing representation through its civil servants and 
magistrates, in this case Bulcke himself as the final arbitrator. His censorship decisions often 
concerned particular textual or visual passages, the removal of which would reverse exhibition 
prohibitions, and they were always issued as legal declarations of fact findings. Most often, 
however, these declarations of fact are couched in sophisticated evaluations through a very close 
analysis of the film in question and the legal discourse adheres to a highly developed sensibility 
                                                 
51 Obituary “Ministerialrat Dr. Seeger,” Film-Kurier, August 18, 1937, original reproduced at  
http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/collate/collate_sp/se/se_link_42.htm.  
52 Likewise, Martin Loiperdinger neglects him entirely by making no mention of Bulcke’s name. 
53 Cf. Martin Loiperdinger, “Filmzensur und Selbstkontrolle,” in Geschichte des Deutschen Films, p. 479. 
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to the nuances of meaning and a generous stance in respect to the artistic and commercial efforts 
of film production. However, as a fundamental premise and in keeping with the legal basis of 
censorship, Bulcke was guided by the assumption that the medium film was important enough to 
warrant reservations against any screenings until they were lifted by a censorship board’s 
declaration of clearance, which, in accordance with the legal foundation, resulted in a “de facto 
primary general prohibition against exhibition”54 so that a film would not infringe on the 
interests of the state.  
This is certainly not to say that decisions were purely based on a capricious political 
restrictionism, since the formulations in the decisions of the early years of the censorship board 
convey a sense that they were guided more by a general understanding of social decorum and a 
particular idea of the public good, for the benefit of which the board members were willing to 
subject themselves to the mass of image material churned out by a productive industry as 
protective guardians. In this respect, the board members, and Bulcke especially as the signature 
holder of the decisions, take on a paternalistic sacrificial position in order to make protective 
decisions of propriety in lieu of the larger public for which they regulate their imagination. Sober 
value judgments and detached indifference structure the general evaluations in response to 
images that are often described in the decisions as “debased” or “sensationalistic.” Nonetheless, 
even when a film received the harshest assessment of the absence of any merit, with the criteria 
most often invoked through the words Kolportage (“pulp fiction”), Schund (“trash”) or 
reißerisch (“sensationalist”), the board provided the film petitioner with degrees of intervention 
and changes that would enable a film to be shown in public. The criteria of value here are 
noteworthy, because Kolportage carries the connotation of “colportage” without its religious 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
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dimension, as a form of “peddling” or “hawking” pulp-fiction material to the baser instincts, as 
does “reißerisch,” which indicates an almost delirious sensationalism.55
The board’s function in this regard is less restrictive than regulatory in the sense that its 
suggestions of trimming potential excesses of coarse sensationalism can regulate and control the 
channeling of the public’s inevitable response to the stimulation of images against its own good, 
to the point that the decisions offer specific and minute suggestions to remove or alter details so 
that the film can evade prohibition. This protective assessment of a film’s effects, which 
nonetheless was grounded in a understanding of the coherence of its own internal visual and 
textual elements, was the main responsibility of the censorship board. Consequently, however, 
this development was guided by a general rigidity concerning the appropriate representations of 
subjectification and thus the decisions articulate the disciplinary positions of the subject in 
relation to the conceptions of how the state imagines itself through its representatives. In the 
Filminstitut’s documents Bulcke emerges as the person most actively involved in the cultivation 
of the board’s benevolent paternal and protective disciplinary approach. As the first chairman of 
the superior censorship board and the one responsible for the final instances of decisions, Dr. 
Carl Bulcke was also at the time a prominent author of poetry and novels as well as a lawyer. He 
had been a state attorney in the city of Essen before he moved to Berlin in his position as a state 
attorney to work in film censorship affairs. Until his dismissal in 1924, Bulcke chaired most of 
the hearings on controversial films and under his imprimatur as state attorney, Bulcke’s and thus 
                                                 
55 The censorship board of appeals decision B.210.21 signed by Bulcke for the film Die Große Sensation (Adolf 
Abter, D 1921) spells out the definition of what makes a Schundfilm or a “trash film”: “Characteristics of a trash 
film are the lack of psychological motivation, a heightened lust for sensation, the inferior quality of the content, the 
inveracity [Unwahrhaftigkeit] of the representation, and the sentimentality [Rührseligkeit] of the plot.”  
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the censorship board of appeals’ decisions were final and could not be appealed. Nonetheless, 
very little archival information about Carl Bulcke remains available or survives in reference 
sources and his figure seems to have all but disappeared from chronicles of the period. 
In the decisions and the lines of reasoning offered, however, the declarations that are 
issued with the signature of attorney Bulcke, whose name serves as the chief assessor of the 
dangers to the public good, point to a person who, with imperturbable judicial calm and in 
command of a self-assured logic that justifies his own righteous decisions, parses the filmic 
evidence before him without fail and assesses their possible transgressive harm when the 
standards of the times are measured and weighed against this potential. Here, a figure of Bulcke 
emerges which is akin to the heroic figure of the state attorney von Wenk in Lang’s Dr. Mabuse, 
Der Spieler, who, with his level-headed and no-nonsense approach, is willing to descend into the 
depths of society and subject himself to great personal risk, in order to protect a guileless and 
easily manipulated public in depraved, chaotic times, yet ultimately emerges unscathed. Such 
characteristics would correspond closely to the stereotypical public imagination of an East 
Prussian aristocratic heritage and they fit Carl Bulcke as well. Elsaesser’s caution 
notwithstanding, a mode of inversion is in effect here as well between the fictional and factual 
dimension, as analyses of Weimar cinema are wont to develop. Indeed, there are a few 
remarkable similarities between the fictional character von Wenk and the public persona of Carl 
Bulcke, which suggest an interesting convergence between these two realms, and which might 
even indicate that Lang modeled his protagonist who fights for the legitimacy of the state in a 
time of existential crisis against the subversive and extraterritorial criminal Doctor Mabuse at 
least in part on Dr. Bulcke himself. 
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Carl Bulcke was born April 29, 1875, in the East Prussian city of Königsberg and studied 
law at the University of Freiburg before he became the district or “state” attorney in the city of 
Essen. Following the work of his later colleague Ernst Seeger, who became involved with film in 
1915, Bulcke seems to have been appointed to work on film censorship matters during World 
War I by the arch conservative politician, economist, and former colonial affairs officer Karl 
Hellferich, the Minister of the Interior of the Reich from May 1916 to November 1917. At this 
point, film censorship, which had been centralized and streamlined by the Prussian Ministry of 
the Interior around 1910 as a preventative prohibition practice requiring local law enforcement 
clearance, was directly affected by the ongoing war at the time and became actively involved in 
shaping morale. A strict Prussian war missive was issued in December 1914, a few months after 
the beginning of the war, which specified that “all films are to be prohibited that as a result of 
their superficiality and shallow insipidity are no longer suitable for these current serious times.”56 
The particular approach required for the determination of which films were “suitable” and 
“serious” for a contemporary public seems to have been incorporated very effectively by Bulcke 
and his colleagues and, indeed, such appeals to the contemporary situation or the state of affairs 
“in these times” can be traced in numerous censorship board decisions. Frequently, decisions 
were structured in their formulations by invoking the touchstone of “these times” throughout the 
Weimar practice of film censorship. 
When Bulcke was selected as the chief film censor in 1920 his position on all decisions 
was still listed as “state attorney” until he was promoted to Oberregierungsrat, the equivalent of 
a “senior magistrate,” in late 1921. Seeger, as a devoted career civil servant, whose 
commentaries on the RLG would make him a prominent legal figure as well, was appointed as 
                                                 
56 Cited in Loiperdinger, p. 522. 
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part of the Berlin censorship board around the same time. Bulcke, on the other hand, was known 
at the time as a lyrical poet and novelist as well, whose works “mark him as an exceptional 
depicter of reality, especially of the one in his East Prussian homeland,” according to the entry 
on him in the twelve-volume 1924 - 1930 edition of the renowned Meyer’s Encyclopaedia.57 He 
collected art in his spare time58 and wrote more than a dozen works, with the novels Ein Mensch 
namens Balzereit (1917) and Tapferer Cassio (1930) as his most successful, along with novellas 
and poetry. He was also the first chair of the original lobbying and trade organization for authors, 
the Schutzverband deutscher Schriftsteller, founded in 1909. This work and his writing career 
ran parallel to his service as a state attorney, first in Essen and later in Berlin. While it is difficult 
to discern the content and subject matter in Bulcke’s literary work, the title of all of his novellas, 
and some of his novels, contain numerous references to female given names (Sweet Lilli,” “Poor 
Betty,” “Silke’s Love,” “Beautiful Frau Schmelzer,” and so forth). They certainly suggest an 
abiding interest on his part in the perils and tribulations of young women.59 When exactly Bulcke 
                                                 
57 Meyers Lexikon, 7th ed., vol. 2 (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1925), p. 1063, s.v. “Carl Bulcke.” More 
recent German encyclopaedias have removed Bulcke from their pages entirely. If Bulcke surfaces at all, his name is 
now more prominently connected to that of the Expressionist poet Paul Zech, whom Bulcke publicly but without 
consequences accused of plagiarism.   
58 A 1913 oil painting by the Impressionist painter Lovis Corinth, “Suitors in Battle with Ulysses,” from the 
“collection of Dr. C. Bulcke, Berlin,” is now part of the collection of Kunsthalle Bremen and listed at 
http://www.kunsthalle-bremen.de/kunsthalle_inhalt/sammlung/gemaelde_listen/CD.html. 
59 As an example for the fleeting fame of literature valued during its contemporary incarnation, the fate of Bulcke’s 
books might serve as a particularly noteworthy one. Despite his numerous publications in his lifetime, none are 
available in the prestigious archive for German literature, the Deutsche Literaturarchiv in Marbach, where his name 
is listed only in conjunction with the correspondence archives of other authors. Cf. the online DLA catalogue 
http://www.dla-marbach.de/startseite/index.html. Very little about Bulcke’s life or his work can be sufficiently 
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died, either on February 2 or 24, 1936, at the age of 60, is unclear and the fact that even the date 
of his death cannot be easily confirmed attests to the facile indifference with which his life has 
faded from the records, a sentimental predicament that might best be paraphrased by an allusion 
to the title of one of his last novels, namely, “and thus you spend your brief days” (Und So 
verbringst Du Deine Kurzen Tage). 
Since Lang would be familiar with the constitution of the censorship board and very 
much aware of the negotiations required in determining which material was to be included and 
which sequences were to be excised, his directorial choices for Dr. Mabuse are telling. 
Moreover, Lang’s penchant for insisting on the integrity and coherence of his films, as well as 
his reluctance to negotiate for editing compromises, would indicate that he would have been 
inclined to probe the limits of the censorship board. When the initial censorship evaluation, on 
May 17, 1922, as chamber V, number B5827, agreed to allow exhibition of Dr. Mabuse, Der 
                                                                                                                                                             
confirmed. Of his literary works, a few are available in libraries or in used book stores, but most of them follow the 
sentimental predicament explained above that is echoed in the paraphrasing of the 1930 title of a late novel of his 
“and thus they spend their brief days.” In any case, as far as is discernable, Bulcke seems to have written at least ten 
novels, four volumes of novellas, published two individual volumes of poetry, and selected travel writings. His 
poems were occasionally anthologized. My research indicates that his novels are Ein Altes Haus (1898), Treibsand 
(1900), Das Tagebuch der Susanne Övelgönne (1905), Silkes Liebe (1906), Die Reise nach Italien; Oder, die Drei 
Zeitalter (1907), Die Trostburgs (1910), Ein Mensch Namens Balzereit (1920), Und So Verbringst Du Deine Kurzen 
Tage (1930), and Tapferer Cassio (1930). Among his novella volumes are Die Süße Lilli/Der Trauerflor (1911), Die 
Arme Betty (1914), Katharina (1918), Die Schöne Frau Schmelzer (1919), and Nikoline von Planta (1930). His two 
volumes of poetry are Die Töchter der Salome (1901) and Gedichte (1905). Evidently he also wrote a novel on 
student life entitled Schwarz-Weiß-Hellbrün. A posthumous work of travel writing, Die Rote Zauberinsel 
Helgoland, was published in 1938.    
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Spieler, 2. Teil. Inferno60 with the insistence on the modifications of two drinking scenes and a 
battle sequences with its accompanying titles, the production company appealed this decision on 
the spot. This appeal is noteworthy and rather puzzling because it indicates how fervently the 
production company insisted on particular scenes and images and suggests Lang’s deliberate 
involvement in maintaining the integrity of his film. 
The board had merely taken offense at two aspects of the film. It reprimanded the film for 
two early “brutalizing” sequences of a drunken orgy with Mabuse and his henchmen, as well as 
the interior scenes of the final street fight between the police and the barricaded henchmen 
because they showed them operating with impunity from inside Mabuse’s hideaway. Therefore, 
the board found, the sequence frivolously depicted the ease with which a handful of criminals 
could keep police and military authorities at bay from a single domestic dwelling in a dangerous 
and inacceptable manner, which constituted both a “brutalizing effect” and a “threat to public 
order and safety.”61 The board declared that the drinking sequences were to be excised and the 
                                                 
60 An inherent characteristic of the work with archival material is that the marginalia tend to stand out in more 
prominent relief. As the documents have lost their immediate relevance and their use value has faded, incidental 
aspects such as typography, transcription errors, layout, and punctuation become more starkly visible. So, for 
example, in the record notification that serves as the caption for the censorship decision: The decision is billed as 
record B.5827 for the following: “Betrifft den Bildstreifen ‘Dr. Mabuse, 2. Teil Inferno’.” (Punctuation transcribed 
exactly as in original.) Below this, the caption continues categorically, “Ein Spiel von Menschen unserer Zeit.” 
While this sentence properly belongs to the film’s full title, it stands on its own, without framing punctuation. 
Orthography seems to become destiny, as the auxiliary title caption is not included within the original quotation 
marks, and so the official board record acquires its own caption: “A play of people of our times.” See 
http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb069z.pdf.     
61 The original documents of all three decisions, the censorship board’s B.5827 and the two decisions by superior 
board of appeals B.27.22, are available in one file at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb069z.pdf. 
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street battle scenes modified to the extent that the intrusion into the hide-out by the authorities 
and the ultimate defeat of Mabuse’s gang would instead be emphasized. Instructions for editing 
the sequence to this effect were offered. The board requested the elimination of the images of 
actual shootings, active street fighting, and images of dying law enforcement personnel. It 
suggested a cross-cutting between images to highlight the fervent preparations of the gang in 
conjunction with the storming of the hide-out, and specifically allowed the dramatic telephone 
conversation between state attorney von Wenk and Mabuse in his hide-out with the 
accompanying titles where von Wenk demands that Mabuse surrender to the forces of the state. 
With these relatively modest modifications the film was cleared for a general release for adults 
only. The board did not take exception to any instances of writing or any of the titles as such in 
the film. 
This initial evaluation was chaired and signed by the examiner, a “Fräulein 
Wachenheim,” her last name and salutation only indicating that she was likely a young, and 
definitely unmarried woman. This is all the more interesting since the presence of a young 
woman in charge of determining for the public the appropriate elements of a film such as Dr. 
Mabuse runs counter to the conceptualization of the censorship board as an inherently 
conservative protector of the state’s interests and therefore by necessity populated with 
obediently reactionary civil servants. Since there are no further indications in the documents 
regarding the full names or even the background of any of the members of the board, there can 
be no definitive determination of this woman’s identity within the scope of this project. It is very 
likely, however, that the Fräulein Wachenheim in question was the German politician, social 
worker, and labor historian Hedwig Wachenheim (1891 – 1969). 
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Wachenheim came from a prominent Jewish banker’s family in Mannheim, but had 
decided early on and against her mother’s wishes to study in Berlin at the Soziale Frauenschule, 
the “Social School for Women,” founded by the revolutionary social reformer and prominent 
economist Alice Salomon (born 1872 in Berlin and died 1948 in New York). As a student, 
Wachenheim was already active in the Social Democratic Party SPD as well as engaged in the 
care and welfare work for disabled war veterans. In 1919, she was a founding member of the 
Arbeiterwohlfahrt, a charity organization devoted to the social care and welfare of workers as 
well as to workers’ rights. In such an official capacity, she would certainly have been qualified to 
preside on decisions as a member of the censorship board, in particular because of her 
accreditation as someone professionally active in public welfare work. Wachenheim was forced 
to emigrate in 1933, first to France and England, and then in 1935 to the USA, where she worked 
occasionally at the New School for Social Research. After the war, Wachenheim returned to 
Germany with the US Army Government to help with the reëstablishment of workers’ welfare 
and the reconstruction of the German social system. In 1951 she went to the University of 
California at Berkeley to complete her historical study on the German Labor Movement 1844 – 
1914.62
                                                 
62 Cf. Hedwig Wachenheim, Die Deutsche Arbeiterbewegung, 1844 – 1914 (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1967). 
In the introduction to this work, written in New York in August of 1966, Wachenheim reflects on her own 
involvement in the workers’ movement. She states that she joined the Social Democratic Party as a young woman 
before World War I and became “immediately active,” or, as she describes it, “I posted flyers, collected membership 
dues, was a member of the boards of my town, of my election ward, and my electoral district, held innumerable 
political speeches in meetings, membership conventions and public gatherings, and was a member of the Prussian 
Parliament from 1928 to 1933.” Cf. “Vorwort” to Die Deutsche Arbeiterbewegung, 1844 – 1914, p. vii. She does 
not, unfortunately, consider her work for the censorship board as worthy of note in this description of service. 
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Despite Wachenheim’s acceptance of the film, the production company, as was its legal 
right, appealed the decision immediately. After the petition for a reëvaluation, the final decision 
was relegated to the superior censorship board of appeals with Bulcke as chairman for a 
screening and hearing of the film. This assessment was no longer attended by Wachenheim, but 
now consisted of Bulcke as the chairman, assisted by a professor for arts and literature, a film 
industry professional, and two representatives of the Volkswohlfahrt, that is, a general institution 
of public welfare without indicating specifically whether they were, as Wachenheim would have 
been, part of the Arbeiterwohlfahrt or the “workers’ foundation for welfare.” The production 
company was represented by Lang’s lover at the time and his soon to be wife, the screenplay 
writer Thea von Harbou, who, together with Lang, would have only recently been implicated in 
the mysterious circumstances surrounding the death of Lang’s first wife.63 Harbou had 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, in a reflection on the contributions by the Social Democratic Party to the development of the Weimar 
Republic, she notes the “significance of the bureaucracy for a modern state system” and its contributions to a 
“judicious and just welfare state” in regard to “the ability to participate in the administrative structures of the state 
and, especially, in regard to the voluntary participation in the communities and the institutions of social policy.” Cf. 
to Die Deutsche Arbeiterbewegung, 1844 – 1914, p. 619. More biographical information on Hedwig Wachenheim 
can be found at the website of the foundation for social work that bears her name, the Hedwig-Wachenheim-
Gesellschaft e.V., at http://www.diehedwig.org. 
63 Her identity and the circumstances of her death subject to much speculation, Lang’s first wife, “Lisa Rosenthal,” 
is an abiding mystery in Lang studies. The biographer Patrick McGilligan states that “Lang researchers have tried 
without success to verify her identity” and there is not a single definitive record that would shed light on either her 
life or her death. McGilligan suspects that “Lisa Rosenthal” was a pseudonym and that Lang’s influential friends 
were able to cover up her death by a gunshot wound to the chest. Her death occurred probably in early 1921 in 
Berlin when Lang was already involved in a romantic liaison with von Harbou. It remained an event about which 
Lang, throughout his life, always insisted that it had been a suicide. There is a certain but not definitive possibility 
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collaborated with Lang on the script to Dr. Mabuse and attended the hearing in her function as 
the film’s “dramaturge.” She was accompanied by three other representatives of the film’s 
production company. After a primary hearing, in which a compromise stipulation was offered to 
the production company advising them to edit the film on its own, but in a manner which would 
correspond to its artistic and commercial interests and which would take the general reservations 
of the censorship board into account, the hearing was postponed. When the parties met again, 
von Harbou screened for the board members a reëdited version of “act six,” which contained the 
battle sequence criticized by Wachenheim, and offered to surrender the negatives of the excised 
sequences to the censorship board for safeguarding. The superior censorship board of appeals 
then convened in chambers and announced its final verdict on May 20, 1922 as decision B.27.22. 
In accordance with the original finding by Wachenheim, the film’s application for a public 
exhibition was granted but restricted to screenings for adults only. 
The board, however, revised Wachenheim’s prior decision to curtail the depictions of the 
drunken night of debauchery in Mabuse’s hideout because, even though there was “no doubt as 
to the crudeness of the representation,” the scenes would not linger in viewers’ memories but 
“disappear,” given the film’s “extraordinary multiformity” in its “totality effect.”64 In contrast to 
this license on artistic grounds, the board reversed Wachenheim’s decision and announced strong 
                                                                                                                                                             
that Lang invented the legend of a first wife and her dramatic circumstances in order to embellish his otherwise 
quotidian life at the time. Cf. Patrick McGilligan, Fritz Lang: The Nature of the Beast (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1997), especially pp. 56 – 57 and p. 516.       
64 Censorship decision by the superior film examination board of appeals, Urteil der Film-Ober-Prüfstelle B.27.22 
(Berlin, May 20, 1922), p. 6. In the original: “Nach Festellung der Film-Ober-Prüfstelle ist an der Roheit der 
Darstellung kein Zweifel. Der Bildstreifen ist aber von einer solchen ausserordentlichen Vielgestaltung, dass diese 
Bildfolgen kaum in der Erinnerung haften bleiben und jedenfalls in der Gesamtwirkung verschwinden.” 
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objections on two other, newly determined grounds and imposed severe editing restrictions. 
Above and beyond Wachenheim’s reservations against the detailed depiction of the interior 
sequences because they underscored the ease of insurgence, the superior board opposed the 
overall screening of several exterior image sequences of the street battle, in particular the 
depiction of several wounded and slain police officers as well as images of falling and felled 
soldiers, rising smoke wafting through streets, and images of guns flashing. While Wachenheim 
had accepted the sequence, but instructed against its narrative thrust of emphasizing the 
“brutalizing” depiction of individual criminals capable of escaping their “just punishment” by 
keeping the forces of authority in check,65 she had also cautioned against invoking the memories 
of recent events. The representation of street battles, she had found, hinted at the street 
insurgencies of three years before, which, while perpetrated on the basis of “other motives” as 
Wachenheim acknowledged, had the potential to “introduce a different momentum into the 
excitement of the film”66 by eliciting acts of memory that were just beginning to fade. Since the 
scenes “were reminiscent of these agitated times”67 they should not be included, because, as she 
phrased it, “the public has only recently been appeased in this respect.”68
These reservations were the only aspects that Wachenheim had admonished the film for. 
In stark contrast, the superior board of appeals, chaired by Carl Bulcke, declared that it was 
willing to accept the relevance of the sequence for general dramatic compositional purposes. 
However, the board conceded that, “thematic and narrative necessity notwithstanding, ... the 
                                                 
65 Censorship decision B.5827 (Berlin, May 17, 1922), p. 1.  
66 Ibid., p. 2. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., p. 3. 
  209
realism of the representation appeared so excessively drawn out that this excess was able [sic] to 
incite rousing recollections of the circumstances that befell Germany after the restructuring of 
the state system and that have persisted in the memory of all the living.”69 For the sake of public 
order the number of images and sequences cited by the board were to be removed from the film’s 
prints. An interesting linguistic shift occurs in the reformulation of Wachenheim’s original 
objection as she noted the similarity to recent events. Wachenheim’s observant reaction becomes 
the basis on which an excessive effect of realism is postulated. Even after allowing for a sense of 
immediacy that could have had a profound impact on the board members’ experience of the film 
as well, this emphatic registration of the inciting and “exciting” excess of “realism” seems to run 
counter to the supposed authoritative sobriety of the board of appeals and itself appears 
somewhat excessive. 
The use of the modal verb konnte is therefore all the more remarkable here, since its use 
in place of könnte is syntactically incorrect for postulating a potential effect. While we can 
attribute this umlaut absence to a typing error, it is noteworthy because it changes the intended 
meaning of the sentence. Instead of finding that the sequence could possibly (könnte) remind 
public viewers of recent turbulent events and thus needed to be excised, the sentence reads that it 
was able to effect this recollection (konnte) and so had already achieved an actual effect during 
its screening. The board is ostensibly concerned with any detrimental effects this sequence could 
potentially generate for the viewing public on whose behalf the board makes its decisions. But 
here, despite the abstract use of a depersonified grammatical nominalization of the experience of 
                                                 
69 Ibid., p. 7. In the original: “Doch erschien der Realismus dieser Darstellung so ausgiebig breit, dass diese 
Ausgiebigkeit aufreizend an Zustände erinnern konnte [sic], die sich in Deutschland nach der Umgestaltung des 
Staatswesens abgespielt haben und in der Erinnerung aller Lebenden haften gebleiben sind.” 
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memory or the potential for eliciting it, the representatives for the protection of the state in fact 
concede that they were made to recognize their own recollection of a state in crisis by the film, 
since, apparently, “this excess was able to incite rousing recollections” in the personal memories 
of the board members. At the same time, the superior board’s decision is based in reference to 
the prior decision and thus lets Wachenheim’s memory function as the subjectified instance of a 
public memory. In its declaration the board, in fact, states that residual traumatic turbulences are 
persistently lingering in a public memory and that the sequence is apt to activate their experience 
again. Yet, the board maintains that these memories will only be incurred by the potential 
viewing public in whose name the decision is formulated.       
This insistence on the removal of a traumatic experience of memory is also tied to the 
decision to remove two titles within the film, instances that had not even been brought to 
attention or deemed worthy of note by Wachenheim’s findings. While the prior editing decision 
is concerned with the trauma of violence in its accumulation through the overall effect of the 
image sequences and the brutalizing effect of memory, now there are two specific instances of 
writing to which the censorship board of appeals objects vehemently. The second basis for the 
board’s censorship decision therefore concerns the use of writing in the film in relation to a 
notion of effect that seeks to minimize the trauma of experience as rendered in abstract written 
form. In their decision to ban intertitle 11, the urgent address to a weakling voicing the crude 
appeal “Friss Kokain, Schlappschwanz” (“eat cocaine, you limp dick”), constituting an utterance 
cross-cut with the shootout between the police and the army outside and Mabuse’s henchmen 
inside and which is directed at a gang member who is tempted to surrender, the impotence of the 
authority figures of the police is indirectly alluded to as well because it emphasizes their 
impotence at that very moment of excitement. 
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The lengthy battle sequence, in which the title occurs, takes place over an entire block of 
city streets as Mabuse, three of his cronies, and a gangster moll, Fine, shoot out of windows with 
increasing frenzy and kill a number of soldiers and police officers. When the army reïnforcement 
troops arrive, they lob hand grenades against the barricaded entrances and are finally able to 
storm the house in a scene that is staged to suggest soldiers going “over the top,” that is, with 
uniformed and thus indistinguishable figures leaping across barricaded and obstacle-ridden 
trenches into a territory occupied by the enemy. In this visually well-choreographed sequence, 
the spatial construction of the street battle is effectively counterposed with the scenes from inside 
the building, a directorial decision that Wachenheim questioned. Lang even manages to inset a 
brief instance of writing that serves as a self-congratulatory signature to his visual style when he 
films soldiers mounting their attack from a street corner so that their silhouettes are illuminated 
by the morning light through the gun smoke. The soldiers are crouching next to a store sign that 
reads Photographie (“photography”), an inscription that renders explicit the photographic 
construction of this image and highlights its own pictorial status as a photographic record by 
spelling this out literally within the image.70 In this mayhem, Mabuse’s gangster moll Fine, with 
                                                 
70 Despite Elsaesser’s impatience with reading Weimar cinema as a tapestry of coded clues, there is in this same 
sequence an element of writing in the production design that cannot be explained adequately by recourse to degrees 
of visual verisimilitude. An advertisement on one of the storefronts depicted in the battle sequence announces the 
written words Hapag Loyd Office [sic] on its walls. This is remarkably puzzling on at least three different registers. 
First, it uses the English word “office,” despite its apparent Berlin setting (another store, by contrast, is marked as 
the victuals store of Knut Rattje, a quintessential name for a Berliner). Secondly, it misspells the name Lloyd. There 
may have been a deliberate effort to include English words in the production design for a possible international 
circulation of the film or to invoke a Western setting because the fierceness of the battle might suggest an American 
production. Thirdly, there was indeed a major company named Hapag, the name of an Atlantic shipping line 
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a rifle in her hand, crudely yells at Mabuse’s secretary Spoerri, who is too shell-shocked to 
continue shooting, that he should “chew on some cocaine,” which he proceeds to do, fumbling 
with the powder as he takes it out of his pocket. Momentarily invigorated and beyond himself 
with the aid of the drugs, he picks up his rifle again and continues to shoot at the authorities. 
In general, objections to intertitles as such were not particularly common occurrences. 
Most often, when titles are mentioned as grounds for censorship decisions they involve the 
accompanying image sequences to which the titles are complementary references. In this 
instance, however, the title itself is admonished as unsuitable. Another title in a later scene, when 
Spoerri is interrogated by von Wenk, refers to Spoerri again as a “Schlappschwanz” as well but 
this instance was not singled out for reprimand by the board, despite its obvious reference to 
sexual impotence again. Nor would the reference to cocaine have been enough to cause offense, 
since very early on in the first part of the film Spoerri is identified as Mabuse’s cocaine-addled 
and effete assistant. The definitive reconstructed version of the film, completed by the Bundes-
Filmarchiv, Berlin, and the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Murnau-Stiftung, Wiesbaden, in 2000, accurately 
                                                                                                                                                             
founded in 1847. As an acronym for Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-AG, it was a well-known company for 
transatlantic travels and transcontinental shipments. One of its major competitors was the Bremen-based 
Norddeutsche Lloyd, also known as just Lloyd. These two companies ultimately merged a few decades after the 
release of the film to become the global shipping and logistics enterprise Hapag-Lloyd, but this merger did not occur 
until 1970. Given how much Lang has been celebrated as a prophetic visionary, one might as well include this 
fortunate coïncidence of industrial soothsaying along with his other “predictions.” Finally, however, there was at the 
time a successful Bremen company for automobile parts called Hansa-Lloyd-Werke, which would later become the 
renowned Borgward car company, so the set design signs may have been constructed to suggest a slightly 
fictionalized brand name here.      
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places the intertitle at the exact position at which it is identified in the censorship decision.71 The 
remarkable occurrence of the title lies in the fact that it appears after the images of a smoke-filled 
street and fire, but prior to the image sequence which reveals the woman speaker who is the one 
to utter these words. 
The appearance of the title is thus not immediately attributable to a particular person and 
appears on-screen before anyone can be identified as a speaker, which violates the convention of 
intertitles being shown in between the images to which they properly belong, that is, interrupting 
a sequence of images of speakers in their duration. The title appears without warning during an 
intense moment of fighting, with images shown from the point of view of the battling soldiers. 
As such, then, the title functions as a statement that is uttered without a referent and lingers 
dangerously on the screen, as a command directed at no one and anyone at the same time, while 
the excitement of the battle scene is building. This startling effect is most likely the reason the 
censorship board rejected the title as such and demonstrates how carefully Bulcke had assessed 
the film, since he had noticed the unusual deployment of the title and its free-floating direct 
address to the spectator. One other instance of writing underscores Lang’s compositional skill in 
this respect and serves to illustrate further how Lang and Bulcke seemed to define each other in a 
complimentary relationship where the director as craftsman finds in the state attorney his 
exemplary audience that is proficiently skilled in recognizing and “reading” the artistic elements 
of the filmic composition. It occurs right after the second use of the title “Schlappschwanz,” 
which is not considered a cause for concern. The writing appears on-screen after the house has 
been stormed and Georg, the beastly henchman of Mabuse, worries in prison that Spoerri, the 
                                                 
71 Fritz Langs Dr. Mabuse, Der Spieler. 2 DVD-set, Munich: Transit Film GmbH, 2004, 270 min. 
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“limp dick,” will reveal Mabuse’s whereabouts while he is interrogated by a gentle but 
determined von Wenk.                 
The title that follows, however, is singled out for reprimand along with its related images. 
In this case it is one in which the intertitle, in fact, accentuates an act of writing performed in the 
image. The act of writing shows Georg in prison, defiant to the end, as he paces up and down in 
his prison cell. He takes off his suspenders, but before he ties them to the bars of the cell’s 
window, he pauses, finds a piece of chalk in his pockets, and begins to write on the wall of his 
cell. He scrawls in large letters the words “Götz von Berlichingen,” diagonally onto the wall 
before he proceeds to busy himself with his suspenders in order to commit suicide. Wachenheim 
makes no mention of this instance of writing as objectionable, but Bulcke’s decision finds that 
the writing on the wall, both in the image sequence itself and through its replication as title 21, 
needs to be removed. The depiction of the subsequent suicide, he determines, is acceptable. The 
reasons he gives are, in fact, the same reasons that have been asserted in the demand for the 
removal of the street insurgency sequence, namely, an undesirable effect of imprinting itself into 
memory, which constitutes an act of brutalization. Using the selfsame language employed for the 
first sequence to which he took exception, Bulcke notes the extraordinary quality of the sequence 
and writes that the title, “due to its abnormal nature, is liable to persist in the beholder’s memory 
in a brutalizing manner.”72 As he emphasizes the explicit brutalizing effect that this sequence 
will impose on the memory of its viewers, the criterion that Bulcke asserts here is the persistence 
of a brutality effect that imposes itself on a fragile memory. This criterion is exactly the same 
                                                 
72 Censorship decision B.5827, p. 7. In the original, “diese Darstellung ist geeignet infolge ihrer Ungewöhnlichkeit, 
im Gedächtnis des Beschauers verrohend haften zu bleiben.” The use of the word Beschauer for film viewers is, like 
its counterpart term beholder, rather unusual in this context. 
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one invoked in the objections to the street battle sequence and points to the importance that this 
writing sequence conveys to the board members. 
In its use of the name “Götz von Berlichingen” the writing in the image ingeniously uses 
writing itself to emphasize its status as a code. What the writing encapsulates as an image, 
therefore, is the referential quality of writing itself and the necessity to view the writing as a 
coded clue. The name is a direct reference to the title of Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s 1773 
historical drama Götz von Berlichingen mit der eisernen Hand, an early work by the young 
Goethe, loosely based on the autobiography of the 16th-century Swabian knight Gottfried von 
Berlichingen. The play dramatizes von Berlichingen as a knight of honor who is outlawed 
because of a feud with the Bishop of Bamberg. While von Berlichingen is loyal to the Emperor, 
he becomes a champion of the poor and the play follows his subsequent demise as one of the last 
noble men in a time of drastically changing power structures. As the reluctant leader of a 
populist farmers’ uprising, von Berlichingen dies in the peasant war, embracing liberty while he 
cautions against a new era that will bring “times of deception,” as he is bemoaned with the 
words, “woe to the century that rejected you” and “woe to a posterity that misjudges you.”73 As 
one of Goethe’s earliest works, the play’s subject matter may have been radically provocative at 
the time, but the play itself is perhaps by now considered a minor work of Goethe. However, it 
has become notorious and enduring in the popular imagination for one particular reason, namely 
for a line of dialogue that occurs in Act III, scene 16, uttered by the besieged von Berlichingen in 
response to the demands by imperial troops that he surrender. Von Berlichingen replies to a 
soldier outside his tower, “tell your Captain: For Your Imperial Majesty, I have, as always, my 
                                                 
73 Cf. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Götz von Berlichingen mit der Eisernen Hand.  Ein Schauspiel, Act V, Scene 14, in 
Goethes Werke in Sechs Bänden (Wiesbaden: Insel Verlag, 1952), p. 160. (Translation mine.) 
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due respect. As for him, though, you tell him, he can lick me in the ass.”74 The stage instructions 
specify that at this point von Berlichingen slams his window shut and the scene ends. 
The writing of “Götz von Berlichingen” on the wall is an obliquely coded reference, 
which nonetheless appeals to the explicitly common popular knowledge of this particular 
invective from the play, which most often is reduced only to the anatomical vulgarity it invokes. 
Moreover, the line is frequently misapprehended under the assumption that von Berlichingen’s 
startling use of off-color language is directed at the highest authorities of the Emperor and 
therefore a profound manifestation of irreverence against all authority figures. In fact, the remark 
is couched in a declaration of respect, duly professing loyalty to the court, even as this assertion 
is accompanied by a profanity of stupendous degree. Lang’s inclusion of the brief segment that 
encapsulates the sentiments of one of Mabuse’s henchmen towards authority is telling, whether 
he was aware of the original context or whether he had assumed that it was a generally irreverent 
expression of contempt towards authority. Bulcke’s response in this regard is therefore 
“appropriate” because he recognizes that the writing emphasizes the explicit brutalizing effect 
that this sequence will induce for the viewers. The brutality, however, lies in the coding that 
references another dimension of meaning, and this coding is so exceptional that it threatens to 
persist in memory. The signature of the name inscribed into the image is enough to mobilize the 
                                                 
74 Goethe’s original manuscript of the play contains the full line of dialogue: “Sag deinem Hauptmann: Vor Ihro 
Kaiserliche Majestät hab ich, wie immer, schuldigen Respekt. Er aber, sags ihm, er kann mich im Arsch lecken.” 
Subsequent editions include only the passage “er kann mich -- -- --,” as does the 1952 edition Goethes Werke in 
Sechs Bänden cited above, p. 127. (Translation mine.) Most native speakers of German, however, even those 
unfamiliar with Goethe’s work, would be able to fill in the blanks. Philologists, undoubtedly, have explained 
Goethe’s idiosyncratic use of this invective which specifies the anatomic command as “he can lick me in the ass” as 
opposed to the more common “on the ass” (am Arsch), but this trajectory lies beyond the scope of this project.     
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knowledge of a profanity that would fall outside the realm of representation, but it also 
references a discursive association with peasant uprisings, and, moreover, challenges the very 
legitimacy of an authority charged with the enforcement of civic exclusion, that is, with the 
declaration of someone as an outlaw and the subsequent persecution of the banished subject. The 
writing itself signalizes its radical status, despite its lexical content. This is a radically different 
representation from the original novel’s depiction of this moment, which, as Patrick McGilligan 
cites, is coyly rendered as suggesting the usage of the word uttered by one of “Napoleon’s 
generals… after he had lost the battle of Waterloo.”75  
What is embedded in the categorical rejection of this overdetermined instance of writing 
is the concomitant challenge that has been uttered by Mabuse in a phone call with state attorney 
von Wenk, who, having summoned the armed forces to the battle as well, now makes an ultimate 
attempt to speak to Mabuse, on the phone. He is assisted by an eager telephone switchboard 
operator, when he implores Mabuse to cease his resistance and demands that he surrender to “the 
                                                 
75 Patrick McGilligan, Fritz Lang: The Nature of the Beast, pp. 86 – 87. McGilligan notes that this refers to “le mot 
de Cambronne,” the name of one of the French generals at Waterloo who is said to have uttered “merde” when 
surrounded by the Duke of Wellington’s forces and the approaching Prussian army. Apologists for Cambronne 
insisted that his utterance was, in fact, “la vielle guard muert, elle se ne rend pas” (“the old guard dies, she does not 
surrender”), while Cambronne cloaked himself in silence concerning this misunderstanding for the rest of his life. 
McGilligan here also engages in a kind of Kracauerian ex post facto hindsight when he suggests that the scene’s 
writing expresses another ominous reference which renders “that flourish as a political statement and another 
cinematic augury,” since the writing of Mein Kampf was begun in the Landsberg prison a year after the film’s 
release. Cf. McGilligan, p. 87.     
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power of the state,” the Staatsgewalt,76 just prior to the climax of the street battle scenes. As the 
forces of the state find themselves in a battle over control, Mabuse responds to the state 
attorney’s demands with the absolutist declaration “I consider myself here as a state within the 
state, with which I have been in a state of war for a long time.”77 The title to this declaration was 
not questioned by Wachenheim, but was actually explicitly allowed in her editing suggestions for 
the adjustment of the thematic emphasis in the narrative of the brutal street fight between the 
police and Mabuse’s henchmen who barricade themselves in Mabuse’s house but find 
themselves surrounded and under siege by the authorities. When von Wenk therefore issues his 
command to surrender to the authority of the state by invoking its power, he uses the network of 
communications available to him.78 Tom Gunning notes that this telephone conversation 
ultimately indicates Mabuse’s “downfall,” since the “technological web no longer responds to 
his desires, but carries messages he tries to refuse.”79 His omnipotence of control has now found 
                                                 
76 The original intertitle reads, “Herr Dr. Mabuse, ich fordere Sie auf, der Staatsgewalt keinen Widerstand zu leisten 
und sich zu ergeben!”  
77 The original intertitle reads, “Ich fühle mich hier als Staat im Staate, mit dem ich von jeher im Kriegszustand 
lebte! Wenn Sie mich haben wollen, -- -- holen Sie mich!” Versions of the film with English intertitles translate this 
beginning passage with the lexical equivalent of fühlen as “I feel here like a state within a state with which I have 
been in a state of war for a long time.” This is semantically correct, but the use of the verb “feel” does not convey 
the categorical sense of autocratic entitlement implicit here in Mabuse’s assertion.  
78 Audience members of silent films skilled in lip reading would have been able to discern that von Wenk says 
explicitly “Ich fordere sie unverzüglich auf, sich der Staatsgewalt zu ergeben” (“I demand that you surrender to the 
power of the state without delay”), which precipitates Mabuse’s angry absolutist reply to the state’s intrusion into 
his space by means of long-distance communication.  
79 Cf. Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang: Allegories of Vision and Modernity (London: BFI Publishing, 2000), 
p. 113. 
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a machinistic limitation because technology intervenes, which, according to Gunning, conforms 
to Lang’s fascination with a concept of destiny as an impersonal force or “Destiny-machine”80 
that works “like a vast switchboard with relays connecting it to all the world’s destinies.”81
In this particular instance, however, Gunning’s emphasis needs to be shifted from the 
concept of a technological grid to the notion of control, articulated as “state power.” In the direct 
confrontation between two competing ideas of the state, Mabuse’s against von Wenk’s, the state 
attorney is ultimately victorious because he is assisted in the exertion of control by the female 
switchboard operator. The network of communication is predicated on her labor, which allows 
von Wenk to speak directly to Mabuse and assert the “power of the state” as a verbal utterance 
over the telephone lines, replicated in cinematic technology as writing. Wachenheim issued her 
decision with the suggestion that the battle should be depicted through the perspective of the 
authorities’ victory by showing the results of the siege. Nonetheless, she specified that in doing 
so, the telephone conversation was acceptable as representation and should indeed be allowed to 
be included in the film as part of the battle. To continue in line with the convergence between 
fictional and factual representation, this fictional state attorney is assisted by another Fräulein, in 
this case, the Fräulein vom Amt, or “the office miss,” with “office” denoting the “office for 
telecommunications” or Fernmeldeamt. Siegfried Kracauer, whose contributions helped to 
elevate into consciousness this notion of the female as the “little movie-going shop-girls”82 in the 
Weimar public discourse. As Kracauer states in 1927, fictional film and the lies of social life are 
                                                 
80 Ibid., p. 16. 
81 Ibid., p. 19. 
82 Cf. Siegfried Kracauer, “Die kleinen Ladenmädchen gehen ins Kino,” in Das Ornament der Masse: Essays, 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1977), p. 279. (Translation mine.) 
  220
mutually dependent on each other, because “pulp film and life are usually complementary, since 
the typist-missies [Tippmamsells] model themselves after the on-screen examples.”83 Kracauer 
also wrote about the distorted ways in which the depiction of work by women was represented 
on the screen, when he notes that working women have generally been portrayed in film as 
“cheerful young private secretaries or typists who take dictation for the fun of it and do a little 
typing.”84 This representation, as he calls it, amounts to a “swindle on the screen,”85 especially in 
regard to the psychological demands put on women in an automated and replaceable workforce, 
and requires a perceptual change to understand the “collective body,” in which can be diagnosed 
the “connection between individual illness and those of the society at large.”86
Kracauer, of course, would no longer have had this brief moment of the film in mind at 
the time of his writing, but, while the young woman in the telephone switchboard exchange is 
certainly eager to assist and could therefore be called “cheerful,” her work does enable the state 
to announce its power through the network of communications that are enabled by women at 
work such as her. Kracauer’s assessment of working women in film would not have included the 
switchboard operator, since her appearance occurs for only a brief instance. Kracauer’s focus 
concerned the overall ideological structures in the cinema, where the film culminates in a 
marriage to the boss and the girls’ dreams are fulfilled while they subject themselves to 
matrimony, which has always been a “tested means of transforming them into compliant 
                                                 
83 Ibid. (Translation mine.) 
84 Siegfried Kracauer, “Working Women,” (1932) in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, 
Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), p. 216. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., p. 217. 
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instruments.”87 But what is remarkable is the way in which the switchboard operator is integrated 
here into the overall battle sequence through the editing sequence Lang offers. As the police are 
surrounding Mabuse’s building, the army attacks through the alleys of Berlin as if they were the 
trenches of the Western frontlines, and the state attorney enters a private residence to gain access 
to a telephone. At this moment Lang cuts to the operator, whose work now becomes part of the 
battle. It is a starling moment of a change of visual registers, because the montage effect 
suddenly redraws the lines of the struggle, away from the gunshots and explosions on the chaotic 
street to the calm order of the switch board technology, which locates the ultimate site of control. 
This technology of communication is not accessible to Mabuse, since he needs to rely on more 
archaic modes of transmission, such as hypnotism, illusion, coercion, or manipulation of 
knowledge. 
The final ability of the state attorney to rely on the switchboard operator at his disposal, a 
request for a service that was available and that could be replicated by any citizen with access to 
a telephone, initiates the demise of Mabuse, who will take refuge in his forgery workshop, which 
had enabled him to manipulate the circulation of money for a time and exert his challenge to the 
sole existence of the state. At this point, therefore, the operator now is equal in importance for 
the ability of the state to announce its power through long-distance transmissions, which rests 
with her in her professional role in the same way that the army and police are manifesting the 
state’s might on the streets.88 Lang’s directorial signature works very effectively in such 
                                                 
87 Ibid., p. 216. 
88 A few years later, Erich Kästner (1899 – 1974), the popular author of a best-selling German children’s detective 
story, would use this trope of the telephone operator as the crucial guarantor of justice again in a more playful way. 
His 1929 novel Emil und die Detektive, in which a group of youngsters hunt down a pickpocket on the streets of 
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moments of change and he succeeds in introducing a logical element to the resolution of the film 
through images rather than the narrative. It is the collaboration in concert of the state’s structures 
of authority, from the military to the attorney to the switchboard operator, that prevail in the end 
and determine Mabuse’s destiny. When the house is finally stormed, Fine and another gangster 
have been killed, while Mabuse escapes through the city sewer canals. Mabuse’s raging driver 
Georg has to be subdued by a number of men and is led away to prison, where he will kill 
himself, but not before threatening Spoerri to keep secret Mabuse’s hideout location. Von Wenk, 
however, approaches the trembling Spoerri and gently coaxes him into revealing Mabuse’s 
escape plans with his skillful interrogation techniques and the strategies of empathy employed 
for such purposes. 
Mabuse ends up in his forgers’ den on the verge of insanity and he becomes haunted by 
the apparitions of his past. Trapped by these visions, Mabuse begins to see the instruments of 
forgery become ghost machines that encroach on him as well the ghosts of the dead, and he goes 
insane, surrounded by worthless scraps of paper that were once the means to the exertion of his 
power. Gunning illustrates this scene effectively as the moment where the apparatus that Mabuse 
has summoned turns against him. As Gunning describes the scene, Mabuse is confronted by all 
that he was able to manipulate before, but “[a]ll these things now confront him and declare their 
independence from him,” so that he becomes “their subject now, no longer their enunciator.”89 
                                                                                                                                                             
Berlin, features a character named “little Tuesday,” or “der kleine Dienstag.” Because he is the youngest and 
smallest member of the group he is instructed to wait by the telephone, in case the group needs to coördinate its 
operations, despite his desperate pleas to join his older friends in the chase. At home, Dienstag falls asleep next to 
the telephone, but his towering importance as the communications operator in charge is later celebrated at the 
conclusion of the book.   
89 Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang, p. 116. 
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On a visual level, however, this reversal is achieved because of the concerted effort the state’s 
instruments of power. This is visually emphasized as a battle in which the images of frenzied 
soldiers and the calm efficiency of the female switchboard operator correspond to the same 
articulation of power. The orchestration of this effect is one which Lang constructs very carefully 
in this sequence and he finds in both Wachenheim and Bulcke two professional first viewers who 
are adequately responding to his work and register the finely tuned manipulations in his 
technique far too well for Lang’s filmic vision to remain unchallenged, in particular for his 
visualization of the street battle.                         
Gunning notes the intriguing effect of the film’s final intertitle that accompanies the end 
of the hunt for Mabuse, which Gunning invokes by stating that the “man who could manipulate 
and transform his identity ends up without one  - the man who had been Mabuse.”90 Indeed, the 
intertitle ominously declares “the man who once was Mabuse…”91 as an announcement before 
presenting Mabuse on screen as a helpless, stammering fool surrounded by his worthless 
forgeries, which he tries to collect and organize in vain. The dramatic reduction of a master 
manipulator to a helpless invalid is a powerful image, but even more so in the conjunction with 
the tense shift as announced by the title. The title’s evocation of the name that used to instill fear 
is once again one made without reference to an individual speaker. It is the film itself, 
commenting for the viewer, that utters what we see before us “had been” Mabuse once. This 
temporal reversal, in which the name is retroactively removed from the subject on the screen, 
emphasizes the importance of utterance again or the power that Mabuse once possessed as, in 
                                                 
90 Ibid. (Emphasis in original.) 
91 Original title: “Der Mann, der Mabuse war…” (“the man who was Mabuse…”). 
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Gunning’s term, the “grand enunciator.”92 At this point the film fuses again with the power of the 
state to declare the subject’s identity and has thus cathected the power of articulation back with 
the film as itself the final medium of technology. The force that Mabuse’s name once evoked has 
now been removed and transferred to a different power, which erases his name before he is 
arrested as a mere individual and a subject. This instance of a title without referent does not elicit 
any mention or concerns from the censorship board because it confirms the state’s prerogative. 
In fact, the temporal shift is noteworthy for one other reason, because it could put into 
perspective the unusual grammatical tense shift we find in Bulcke’s appeal to the memories that 
the film was able to invoke in the board as discussed above. 
Given that the language he uses in his decision is phrased in the indicative rather than the 
conjunctive mood, as discussed above and paraphrased as “the film was able to evoke 
memories,” the final title might have had a lingering effect beyond the film itself. Since 
decisions were declared as fact-findings after screenings, we can read the faint echoes of the 
temporal shift in the title that the film deploys replicated in Bulcke’s decision. Prompted by the 
assistance of Wachenheim, Bulcke’s decision on the appeal follows the legal logic of 
Wachenheim and makes her observations the structural basis for his own. In their conjunction, 
therefore, both appear to collaborate in the same manner that their filmic counterparts are 
represented as state attorney and switchboard operator. As if she recognized her role in this 
process of asserting the fact that the state does not tolerate a challenge to its legitimacy, as 
Mabuse insists on doing, Wachenheim anticipates the proper legal challenge to Lang’s film and 
her criteria are then replicated and confirmed by Bulcke’s modified decision in response to the 
appeals challenge by Lang’s production company and von Harbou. 
                                                 
92 Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang, p. 107. 
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In this cooperation, “Fräulein Wachenheim” prepares the groundwork for the evaluation 
of the film and she is therefore, in fact, its “first responder,” as the woman viewer who is at the 
controls of what forms of communication a film may transmit to audiences waiting to become its 
recipients and the one who enables the state’s civil servant to fulfill his role as the regulatory 
enforcer of these audiences to be. What Wachenheim does not notice as objectionable is, in turn, 
enumerated and remedied by Bulcke, whose interest as an author in the tutelage of young women 
is well-documented through the titles of his fictional work. As her superior, the appeals decision 
thus reads as much as a fact-finding evaluation as a pedagogical instance of instruction in the 
discipline of argumentation for the appropriate modes of determining instances of censorship. 
While the public welfare worker Wachenheim, for example, is more concerned with the 
detrimental effects of depicting alcohol intoxication, Bulcke shifts her attention to other 
instances in which moments of brutalization can be established for the film. What is more 
important, Bulcke’s decision asserts, is the writing that results in a quintessential refusal of 
subjectivization. Georg the henchman is professing his ultimate loyalty to a different, extralegal 
authority over and against the state system of justice by taking his own life and “signs off” on 
this act of rejection with a direct insult to the authorities. Likewise, the written reference to 
impotence is to be excised. Here is where the state needs to interfere on behalf of its subjects, 
Bulcke’s decision makes clear, because the writing stands out as unusual and addresses its actual 
evaluating audience in ways that need to be curtailed and regulated before it can be made public. 
After his final intervention, the film was edited to the board’s specifications and had its elaborate 
Berlin premiere a few days later, on May 26, 1922. 
The importance here, as this internal legal discussion on the pages of the censorship 
documents makes clear, is that the representations of the state are refracted through its initial 
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audience, which is comprised only of the board members. In turn, the film reflects back the 
authority of the state in its manifestations on the screen, which are then parsed and evaluated by 
the state representatives before they become an event for the public. The on-screen work by the 
fictitious advocate of the state has been replicated by its actual representatives. While Christine 
Kopf focuses on the “public persona” of the audience as it is constructed through the decisions of 
the censorship board, another dimension is created in which the experience of film by the board 
members becomes a record of these effects as official declarations. Christine Kopf quotes a 
contemporary account of this audience construction in her essay on the practice of film 
censorship. Kopf cites a 1931 polemic by the film and theater critic Wolfgang Petzet (1896 – 
1985) entitled Verbotene Filme, in which he characterizes the average viewer reflected by the 
censorship board decisions. The viewing entity as postulated by the boards “is a strange 
creature,” writes Petzet, “which unites in itself the mentality of a citizen of the German 
metropolis, the German city, and the German village.”93 After listing numerous contradictory 
qualities of this “mysterious entity” of the average viewer, Petzet states that the members of the 
evaluation boards only “know for certain that despite its amazing versatility, it is unfortunately 
foolish and misunderstands completely everything they themselves understand and evaluate 
correctly without fail.”94
But corresponding to this fictitious entity, which is constructed through the illusion of 
certainty as ascertained by the board decisions, there is a counterpart of a viewer that the films 
themselves postulate and that is reflected by the board members as viewers. This “entity” is even 
                                                 
93 From Wolfgang Petzet, “Verbotene Filme. Eine Streitschrift,” (Frankfurt, 1931) as referenced in Christine Kopf, 
“‘Der Schein der Neutralität.’” 
94 Ibid. 
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more elusive and illusively constructed and it manifests itself only at those moments when the 
censorship board takes umbrage at the effects addressed to them directly via the images or titles 
speaking to them. These are the moments when the censorship board members reveal themselves 
in the responses to the films as viewers in and of themselves rather than as the sober relays 
guided by an analytic paternalism that concerns itself only with the potential constructions of 
audience members mediated by the images. When, therefore, a film like Dr. Mabuse, Der Spieler 
succeeds in persisting in the memory of the authority figure of Bulcke and this persistence is 
recorded through an official document, there is indeed an exchange at work that no longer 
benefits from such divisional categories as fact or fiction and a figure emerges which Elsaesser 
would again label as a “Möbius strip.” 
The irony, to invoke another figure of reversal, does not end here, however. Since the 
duration or persistence of film as a medium at the time was so short-lived, the meticulous care 
with which the censorship boards documented the plots, recorded the titles, and provided vivid 
descriptions for the archival records becomes itself a memory of the cinema. Their records 
endured, so that the definitive reconstruction of Lang’s film, for example, relied heavily on the 
censorship materials. As the DVD edition states, “all missing, erroneous, or unusable titles were 
reconstructed with the help of the censorship card.”95 The bureaucratic efficiency of the 
censorship board thus guarantees the accurate reconstruction of films and provides a record of 
films that are no longer extant as well. In the symptomatological obsession of Weimar 
scholarship with historical clues and fragments, the traces of bureaucracy are outlined both in the 
film’s nascent state before it becomes a public event, in its fictional representation on the screen, 
and in its eventual resurrection as a reconstruction from the archives. Moreover, because the film 
                                                 
95 Credits Fritz Lang’s Dr. Mabuse, Der Spieler, DVD-Set, disc 1. 
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has managed to portray the work of the state in its fictional representation, its examination by the 
agents of the state becomes a replication of these representations instantiated and disguised as an 
official act of fact-finding. 
Whether this correspondence can be based on Lang’s ironic sense of humor, resulting 
from his awareness of the decision practices of the film censorship board, which he knew would 
take issue with numerous sequences in his film, or whether this must be regarded as an uncanny 
fit between actual and cinematic history is a moot point,  pace Elsasesser’s cautionary inveighing 
of the impermissibility of moving between fictional and factual boundaries in the analyses of 
Weimar cinema. Most commentaries on Dr. Mabuse, Der Spieler certainly do not fail to find 
significant contemporary similarities between the figure of Mabuse and the political crises faced 
by the Weimar Republic in its early years, with historical events correlating directly, for 
example, with Mabuse’s attempt to subvert the economic stability of the state through artificial 
attempts of inflation or in the street fights between the police forces and Mabuse’s militia that 
uses the cinematic imaging of the Spartacist uprisings against the legitimacy of the power of the 
state. 
It is thus very obviously evident for Fritz Lang scholarship that he based his films in 
immediate response to actual political situations and masterfully integrated these into his works 
under the guise of public entertainment, a sentiment that Lang, who was prone to self-
aggrandizing narratives and anecdotes, did not dispute but actively attempted to maintain 
throughout his life. The possibility of an explanatory vector in another direction, namely that in 
the film Dr. Mabuse such correlations as imaginary cinematic reärticulations of a national threat 
can also be located in the obverse representative figure of the state, is seldom ever entertained. 
Perhaps, apart from the fantastic dimension through which Dr. Mabuse is envisioned as the 
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antagonist to the rather bland and unblemished sobriety of von Wenk, this is the reason why even 
a very meticulous study such as Patrick McGilligan’s biography of Fritz Lang confuses the role 
of von Wenk in the film. While Milligan asserts Lang’s desire to move his work “out of the 
realm of the allegorical” in order to personify his film with “the ring of authenticity,”96 he 
consistently mischaracterizes the position of von Wenk. Since he alternatively calls the character 
of von Wenk a “policeman inspector”97 or a “detective,”98 McGilligan does not notice the rather 
bizarre positional title that is assigned to von Wenk, namely that of a Staatsanwalt, the 
professional equivalent of a district attorney, which, in German, however, carries the legal 
connotation as an “attorney for the state.” McGilligan does note in passing that the film’s setting 
curiously has been displaced from Munich and the Bavarian countryside in the novel on which 
the film was based to the capital, and even though Berlin is not explicitly named in the film as 
the urban setting, it is the city of Berlin, as McGilligan says, “recognizably so to natives.”99
This is certainly a relevant change from the original novel Dr. Mabuse, Der Spieler by 
the Luxembourg native and globetrotting traveler Norbert Jacques, which was originally 
published in serialized form in the Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung newspaper from September 1921 
to January 1922, because it transfers the leap into global exoticism of the novel – from the 
Alpine countryside to the Brazilian jungle, where in the novel Mabuse plans to build an empire  
– back to the quotidian contemporaneïty of the nation’s capital and the center of politics. 
                                                 
96 McGilligan, Fritz Lang: The Nature of the Beast, pp. 80 – 81.  
97 Ibid., p. 81. 
98 Ibid., p. 82. For a long time, research was impeded by the absence of a definitively reconstructed version of the 
film and there are a few versions circulating of Dr. Mabuse in which the intertitles may have been changed or 
altered in this regard out of negligence or for translation purposes.  
99 Ibid. 
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Jacques’ narrative, which in serial form adheres to a specific kind of pulp “literary exoticism,”100 
is now used in the service of a presumably realistic cinematic reportage of daily life, but one 
where Jacques’ idiosyncratic choice to posit the role of the “opponent-in-play”101 to the diabolic 
Doctor Mabuse as a neutral district attorney instead of a more glorious representative of the 
crime-fighting profession remains in keeping with Jacques’ fondness for dramatic Manichaean 
scenarios. The film allows Rudolf Klein-Rogge, playing Dr. Mabuse, to incorporate the 
mannerisms of numerous characters in disguise as and thus renders him as a ubiquitous shape-
shifting force of avatars, in contradistinction to his counterpart, the clean-cut, stoic, but bland 
district attorney von Wenk. In this regard, Bernhard Goetzke, who had already been a famous 
stage actor and had played Death in Lang’s 1921 Der Müde Tod and who was originally from the 
city of Danzig,102 seemed to fit the role of the sober and morally upright law-enforcement 
administrator von Wenk perfectly. Goetzke was later to be typecast as such a figure of authority, 
                                                 
100 Cf. Oliver Ruf, “Segne Mich, Reste Meiner Heimat! Vor 50 Jahren starb Norbert Jacques, der bis heute 
populärste Vertreter Luxemburger Literatur,” in literaturkritik.de, no. 9, September 2004, available at 
http://www.literaturkritik.de/public/rezension.php?rez_id=7378&ausgabe=200409.  
101 Patrick McGilligan, Fritz Lang: The Nature of the Beast, p. 86. The term is his translation of the film premier 
program’s description Gegenspieler. 
102 As befits a peculiar German preöccupation with stereotypical notions of identity at the time, Goetzke’s 
background would be in keeping with broadly conceived notions of character here. Danzig, first as a Pomeranian 
and then a Polish port city, was annexed to Prussia in the late 18th century, and neighbored the region of East 
Prussia. Thus it had retained a sense of defiant independence in line with the other prevailing stereotypical notions 
about the Eastern Prussian qualities of sober-minded practicality and stoicism. Such stereotypes and attitudes would 
certainly augment Goetzke’s star figure in this context.  
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playing the role of district attorney no fewer than eight times in his active film career, which 
mainly spanned the years between 1922 and 1944.103            
Tom Gunning seems to register this intriguing character shift in the figure of justice by 
pointing out the importance of the formulaïc function of the detective story as a sensationalist 
serial to which the film adheres in this context and distinguishes the film from the “rationalist 
puzzle”104 in an economy of signs that characterizes detective fiction as a modernist genre more 
generally. Even though the film follows the sensationalist structure, Gunning recalls, here as well 
the figure of “the detective sketches the ideology of modernity” by “simultaneously reflecting a 
positivist belief in the accessibility of knowledge through close and systematic observation, and 
new systems of social control through a panoptic system of surveillance.”105 Because of this 
emphasis, the state attorney encapsulates such traits, despite the film’s narrative adherence closer 
to the feuilleton structure of sensationalist serial fiction than the detective fiction genre as such. 
While he first calls von Wenk “a detective” in line with such observations, Gunning does take 
note of his peculiar position as a district or “state” attorney. Strangely enough, however, and 
despite his meticulous and wide-ranging skills of observation, Gunning does not seem to give too 
much credence to the significance of the character’s title, since his orthography is 
uncharacteristically inconsistent and careless as it ranges from “state’s attorney” to “States’ 
                                                 
103 Cf. entry “Bernhard Goetzke” in the online film reference site Internet Movie Database available at 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0324553/. He also continued to perform true to type by playing authority figures 
such as a professor and a physician numerous times.  
104 Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang,  p. 89. 
105 Ibid., p. 94. 
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attorney” and back over the course of three pages before settling on the purely nominative “von 
Wenk” for the remainder of the chapter.106
These subtle changes in position emphasize that the confrontation between the 
representative of the law and the master criminal is indeed not staged with a figure of justice that 
is in command of extraordinary mental faculties of ratiocination, deductive reasoning, or the 
ability to interpret symptomatic clues. The importance here lies more in the interplay between 
protagonist and antagonist as a figuration, because both the novel and the film stage this dualist 
competition as a battle arrangement between the figure of an existential threat to the system’s 
stability and order who confronts his corresponding counterpart in the ultimate representative 
figure of safety and legal justice, which is imagined and rendered as the attorney for the state. 
Stephen Jenkins already makes this explicit when he discusses the film as a battle for the control 
of the gaze in both legal and patriarchal terms, so that the primacy of Mabuse’s control of the 
gaze at the outset ultimately finds its defeat by becoming “himself fixed as the object of the gaze 
of the Law,”107 that is, at the moment when he is identified and “Mabuse’s omnipotence is 
cancelled out by the introduction of the counter-presence of an alternative version of ‘the Law’, 
the system of legal power, represented here by State Attorney Von Wenk.”108 Of course, such a 
rendition neglects the durational dimension of the struggle between the state’s representative and 
Mabuse over control while at the same time reducing it to an affirmation of the tenets of the 
importance of the gaze in film, but the constellation of these two antagonistic vectors of force 
                                                 
106 Cf. ibid., pp. 106 – 109. 
107 Stephen Jenkins, “Lang: Fear and Desire,” in Fritz Lang: The Image and the Look, ed. Stephen Jenkins (London: 
BFI Publishing, 1981), p. 66. 
108 Ibid., p. 67. 
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does suggest that the terrain on which the confrontation is being waged depends entirely on a 
reliable abstract safeguarding of the legal power of the state as an institution rather than on the 
concrete procedural skills of law enforcement or the reasoning skills of individual detective work 
and therefore indicates the stability of the state as a concrete entity as the film’s ultimate goal 
rather than the abstract notion of an order of justice restored.    
This battle between an insidious force of harm and the maintenance of stability of the 
state, its interests represented by its attorney, emblematizes the concerns of the film censorship 
board in equal measure, albeit not rendered in such theatrical or histrionic terms, and makes it all 
the more striking that the protagonist of Dr. Mabuse is a state attorney who sacrifices his 
physical and mental well-being and upon whose body all sorts of temptations, hypnosis, and 
mechanisms of power are inflicted.109 In accordance with the RLG, Christine Kopf notes the 
political flexibility of the censorship board and lists a wide range of reasons and interpretations 
which guided the invocation of the absolute criteria in censorship decisions under the guise of 
“neutrality.”110 Kopf makes a special note of the fact that the “early warning system”111 of the 
censorship board was consolidated and integrated within the Ministry of Interior by virtue of the 
fact that a civil servant served as a magistrate, that is, a state-employed administrator was in 
charge of the board, a condition that was not necessarily specified in the RLG laws as such, but 
nonetheless implemented later on. In all these cases, the representatives became the initial 
audience of any film and fulfilled their representative function as a substitutional stand-in for the 
larger public, so that their role as magistrates necessitated a viewing position that imagined a 
                                                 
109 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion. 
110 See Christine Kopf, “‘Der Schein der Neutralität.’”  
111 Ibid. 
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range of subjectivities which could be adversely affected by the subject matter and the images. 
Obviously the censorship materials do not emphasize this sacrificial position as a rule but many 
of the legal censorship declarations are guided by a sense of responsibility and a sensibility 
toward the viewer to come. 
This stands in stark contrast to the general conceptualization of the film censor as a brute 
force of reaction who imposes a narrow-minded framework of propriety, guided by an abiding 
sense of preserving the political status quo, by an obsequious demeanor, and by a fundamentally 
timid sense of aesthetics. Instead, the members of the censorship board in its early years emerge 
as refined and idealized film viewers, who enact their role as state representatives of the initial 
audience through a professional sense of service, where film examination becomes a public duty. 
Moreover, the debate between two opposing sides of conflict, namely the interest of the public’s 
well-being and the commercial interests of the film industry, is staged as part of the examination 
process. On this performative dimension, the evaluative criticism of film is imagined as a court 
proceeding, where all sides are represented by proxy figures. In the case of the film and 
production companies, for example, they are always represented by a “Frau Mellini,” again with 
no further identifying information ascertainable, in lieu of actual proponents from the film’s 
production. That is, if no one from the film’s production is present to assert the interests of the 
film itself, Frau Mellini acts as the spokeswoman for the petitioner in absentia. Her consistent 
presence in many of the records becomes a silent confirmation of the relevance of the film 
industry’s attempts to bring their product to the public. As the advocate for their interests, Frau 
Mellini’s name at least guarantees that it remains as a representative stand-in for those in whose 
name the censorship boards exist in the first place, but it is only the name that remains since 
none of her actual statements were recorded unless they were issued as a mere gesture of appeal.      
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The examination procedures followed a strict format, which was legally codified in the 
documents. First the presence of the interested parties was ascertained and the film screened. 
This was followed by the Entscheidung, the declaration in which the exhibition status of the film 
was defined, with the potential injunction decrees levied against certain elements and parts. Then 
the reasons for this decision were given as the Entscheidungsgründe. Finally, the relevant fees 
for the decision procedure were determined. These parts of the censorship decision were 
recorded and combined so that they could be filed in consecutive order. In case a decision by the 
censorship board was overruled by the board of appeals, both examinations were included in one 
document with two separate but consecutive filing numbers issued. The descriptive part of the 
decision could become very elaborate, with titles and scenes described in meticulous detail over 
a number of pages. Some of the reasons given were equally elaborate, but even a brief decision 
would list the length of the film screened and the visual elements on which the decision had been 
based. All the petitioners who had been at the screenings were listed, but the decision was issued 
as the sole declaration by the chair of the board. No information of the internal discussion or the 
reactions during the screenings were relayed, but in very rare instances the decision made 
references to the particular objections of individual board members in case this objection could 
be codified as a legitimate legal reason for the decision. 
In the cases when titles were part of the reasoning, they were censored because of their 
relation to the corresponding scenes that were admonished. In the early decisions, the titles were 
frequently noted in differing terms, so that the title cards that appeared during the film were often 
referenced in various ways. The general term employed was Titel or sometimes Zwischentitel 
(intertitle) and occasionally rendered as the variant Zwischentext, but in the early decisions of 
1920 other terms such Hintertitel (“background title”) in distinction to Haupttitel (“main title”) 
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or even Untertitel (subtitle) can still be found before the use of these categories was 
streamlined.112 While this might manifest the unregulated early practices of the boards, it also 
indicates that titles were an element of concern from the beginning until the procedure was 
gradually defined and the terms of debate settled. However they were referred to, titles were 
frequently important as such because they were instrumental for the board to determine the 
tendencies, point-of-view, or sentiments of a film, even when they were evaluated in conjunction 
with the depictions that the titles accompanied. As such, then, titles in the censorship decisions 
functioned as clues for the board in order to examine and investigate a film’s documentary 
evidence for its hidden intentions. In rare cases, these intentions became too obvious when titles 
were censored as titles themselves, as described above, because they indicated a threat as a 
linguistic utterance. In these instances, the effects of the writing were circumscribed as a 
discursive problem, so that a title would be “brutalizing” because of its tonal association, its 
inappropriate evocation of slang, its use of demeaning or flippant language, or, most often, as 
encapsulating excessive layers of meaning that needed to be regulated. Equivocal meanings or 
“excessive” uses of language were admonished, most often without explanation except for 
references to the “times” or when they were declared “brutalizing.”  
                                                 
112 For an extremely controversial later case, involving the 1932 film Kuhle Wampe by Bertolt Brecht and Slatan 
Dudow, the board also deployed the unusual term Sprechtitel, or “speaking titles,” which might point to the presence 
of many parties who were not familiar with the usual procedural terms and would explain the different terminology 
used for the benefit of the lay persons involved. Indeed, sixteen people were present for the initial board of appeals 
decision, including experts invited by both the censorship board and the film producers, Brecht and Dudow 
themselves, as well as a “picture reporter” as a representative of the Associated Press. The decision was comprised 
of 29 single-spaced type-written pages.    
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During the time that Bulcke was chairman of the board of appeals, most titles were 
excised for their sexual innuendo or their “crude” references to sexuality, but this practice 
continued without significant changes when Seeger took over the office. Sometimes the main 
title of a film needed to be changed, so, for example, that of Sodom und Gomorrha (1922) was 
required to be changed to “Sodom and Gomorrha: The Punishment,” whereas the title “The 
courtesan of Venice” (Die Kurtisane von Venedig, 1924) was itself indicative of a “sexual 
hypertrophy” and thus needed to be removed.113 An interesting case involved the title of the 1922 
film Der Frauenmarder (“Woman’s Marten Fur,” but the title also alludes to “The Murderer of 
Women”) with Wachenheim in her function as the chair of the examination. The examination 
resulted in the denial of the use of the title because it presented motivations in a degree that was 
too specific and the demand was placed that the title be changed to the “Secrets of Dr. Mort.” 
With this change, however, the film was granted exhibition in the German Reich. Against this 
decision of the censorship panel, four men and Wachenheim, Wachenheim herself raised 
objections and appealed as the chair. This constituted a highly unusual procedure because it 
indicates that the assisting members disagreed with the chair and pleaded for an exhibition 
permission against the chair’s assessment. When the film was accepted by the board, 
Wachenheim’s objection automatically moved the final decision up to Bulcke, who intervened 
and sided with Wachenheim. He declared a prohibition of the film because it depicted 
“disgusting” instances of foot fetishism and necrophilia.114
The titles in Carl Theodor Dreyer’s 1920 film The Witch Woman (Prästänkan), originally 
to be released in Germany as “According to Justice and Law” (Nach Recht und Gesetz), but 
                                                 
113 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb871z2.pdf. 
114 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb366z.pdf. 
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which was later changed to “The Vicar’s Wife,” contained references to many Biblical allusions 
that “played a farcical game with the concept of matrimony.”115 All these objectionable 
references needed to be removed. A title such as the 1922 Das Lebensroulette (“Roulette of 
Life”) was prohibited for its “depravity,” but the film itself was allowed to be screened because 
its merit lay in the presentation of “psychological forms of explanation in the subconscious” of 
an excitable girl, as long as its title was changed to Das Menschenroulette (“Human 
Roulette”).116 Likewise, The main title of the film Die Nacht im Grünen Affen (1922, “The Night 
in the Green Monkey”) was offensive enough to require a change to the name “The Night in the 
Black Mouse,” offered as the film’s alternative title by the censorship board of appeal itself. The 
reasons given, and explicitly specified as mandatory by the appeals board, which emphasized the 
importance of this change, lay in the fact that the board possessed the knowledge that “names 
such as ‘green monkey’ or ‘blue monkey’ were nicknames for bordellos among the Middle-
German regional population” and thus offered an inacceptable incentive and “tasteless” promise 
for movie theater visitors.117 The 1921 rerelease declaration for the film “The Naked” (Die 
Nackten, 1919) was only issued after the demoralizing title was changed to “Sister Martha” and 
the intertitle “I only know one law, my will” was removed.118
Sexual issues sometimes merged with political concerns and the reasoning for the 
decisions became more complicated, even though the five absolute criteria for censorship offered 
a broad range for prohibition declarations. For example, in a 1920 decision the film “Hall of 
                                                 
115 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb969z.pdf. 
116 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb943z.pdf. 
117 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb973z.pdf. 
118 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb976z.pdf. 
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Seven Sins” (Saal der Sieben Sünden, 1919) was declared “brutalizing and demoralizing” 
because it took place in a Chinese-owned bordello, which also provided the opportunity to 
indulge in other vices such as gambling, lesbian love, and opium consumption, “a slap in the face 
of any sense of moral decency.”119 Far from being a clear-cut example for a prohibition 
declaration because of its “thought-deprived plot,”120 the film proved to pose a significant 
difficulty for the chairman of the decision, a police commissioner named Polizeirat Mildner, who 
did not easily command the argumentation skills of Bulcke or Wachenheim and was confused in 
regard to his ability to prohibit the film by finding the appropriate grounds for censorship. The 
bordello activities depicted were obviously demoralizing and brutalizing, Mildner found, but he 
acknowledged that, even more disturbingly, the location throughout the film was implied to be 
Germany. Police commissioner Mildner confirmed this with the logic that a title referred to the 
value of a pearl necklace as “20 000 Mark.” This disturbing currency reference was proof 
positive that the film took place in Germany and thus provided other grounds to be barred from 
exhibition, since this distorted depiction of Germany would likely endanger the German foreign 
relations. For good measure, the police commissioner also worried about the use of a Chinese 
man as the proprietor of a German bordello, which might result in a wrongful representation of 
China and “its cultural rituals” (“ihres Kultus” in the original).121
                                                 
119 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb826z.pdf. 
120 Ibid. “Gedankenarme Handlung” in the original. 
121 Ibid. This stands in stark contrast to the 1922 Dutch film Gij zult niet dooden, (“Though Shalt Not Kill,” released 
as War Sie Schuldig? or “Was She Guilty?” in Germany). In the decision Bulcke admonished the dismissive 
references in the film to Chinese characters such as the titles “Here friend Chinaman invests his money” or “three 
solid bangs [Bumser] with a hard Chinese skull against the wall and entry is assured.” These were to be removed 
without doubt, but Bulcke consulted with advisors from the Foreign Office to determine the insults to “the sense of 
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In this respect, the brevity of the two-page decision, for which the film production 
company at first did not even bother to send representatives and whose interests in the public 
exhibition of the film therefore were voiced by Frau Mellini in lieu of their presence, becomes a 
concise catalogue of confusion, where the police commissioner invokes a number of grounds for 
censorship and determines it is the foreign reputation of the state that is most at issue here. In the 
appeals decision the cooler head of Bulcke prevailed, who, having heard the testimony of three 
experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of the police commissioner’s concerns, 
curtly declared that the film was prohibited because of its self-evident status as “trash” that was 
in and of itself demoralizing to a high degree. Bulcke offered an exemplary line of reasoning that 
seems pedagogically directed at the confusion of the police commissioner who, in his haste to 
find the proper decision, immediately makes the representation of the state the main issue. 
Bulcke, in response, declared that the depiction of Chinese cult rituals and religious ceremonies 
constituted such “obvious nonsense” that any concern about the danger to Germany’s foreign 
reputation or its foreign relations was irrelevant.122 Along these lines, Bulcke also reversed the 
concerns of the censorship board about the use of foreign titles in the 1922 film Oberst 
Rokschanin, which had employed titles in Russian and was at first found to threaten the proper 
mode of evaluation because the use of Cyrillic letters made the titles illegible to the authorities. 
Bulcke advised the chamber to consult the counsel of a translator in such cases, since the 
                                                                                                                                                             
honor” for the Chinese people before allowing the release of the film. See decision at               
http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb709z.pdf.    
122 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb826z.pdf. “Offenbare Unsinnigkeit” in the original. 
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representation of titles in a foreign language would generally constitute the same instance of 
representation as that of foreign habits and landscapes.123
More dangerous were the uses of terms of “incendiary nature” such as “bolshevist,” 
“Spartacist,” or “bolshevism,” the deployment of which was admonished in the 1921 film 
Alarmtopf by Bulcke who reversed the initial prohibition once these terms were removed,124 or 
the more complicated invocation of the conditions of the state in the title for the 1923 film 
Hunger in Deutschland (“Hunger in Germany.”) In a decision by Seeger, a title was found to be 
a direct and obvious attack “against the current constitutional state and economic system,” as 
Seeger determined.125 The film’s original title made the following allegorizing statement, 
“Reaction, Hunger and Misery marched in unison against the fighting proletariat.” The use of the 
terms “fighting” and “reaction” was declared by Seeger to be an attack on the current condition 
of the state by depicting it as an enemy of the working class and thus endangered the public 
safety and order. The title was allowed by Seeger in the version that he modified for the film, 
namely, “Hunger and Misery marched in unison against the proletariat.”126 Seeger was content 
with documentary depictions of the misery of the proletariat as long as the current form of the 
state was not indicted by the titles accompanying the representation. 
                                                 
123 Cf. decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb996z.pdf. 
124 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb186z.pdf. 
125 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb516z.pdf. 
126 Cf. decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb516z.pdf. The original document for this 
decision is no longer extant, but a reconstruction copy is available, which transcribes the term “marched” in error as 
marschietren and invokes a fee list from 1928. It is unclear when exactly the transcript for this decision was made, 
but the decision itself most likely took place in March 1924, so these two references seem to be erroneous 
transcriptions.       
  242
In contrast, however, Bulcke’s legal reasoning was considerably more complicated and 
counterintuitive in a decision involving the depiction of human trafficking and the prostitution by 
Polish Jews in Germany. The film Das Judenmädel von Sosnowice (“The Jew Girl from 
Sosnowice,” 1920), apart from concern about its general subject matter, was found to contain 
“starkly offensive” titles (with deprecating labels such as calling the girl Sarah “Sarahleben” and 
an ironic use of titles of respect that address characters as “his miss daughter” and “mister son”), 
which might elicit anti-Semitic sentiments during screenings and were therefore cause for a 
prohibition by the censorship board. Bulcke reversed the prohibition with the argument that an 
intended effect such as anti-Semitism was hardly discernable in the film, although he upheld the 
removal of the titles. The argument Bulcke offered was that the film did not represent German 
Jews but only Russian-Polish Jews and, moreover, combined two contradictory impulses. On the 
one hand, Bulcke reasoned, it appeared as if the film “attempted to express an anti-Semitic 
tendency,” but this observation needed to be put into perspective with an effort to solicit a certain 
kind of compassion. As Bulcke declared, the film at the same time “elicited a kind of social pity 
for these two foolish and ignorant Russian-Polish Jews.”127  
Here Bulcke’s affinity toward sentimental representations of fallen women is paired with 
a strange conception of a sentiment of empathy that he ascertains in the film viewer, who might 
pity the suffering of these two characters. The decision is remarkable in the sense that Bulcke 
manages to allow a film, for which the possibility of anti-Semitism has been raised as the reason 
for prohibition, by appealing to a viewing position in which the act of film-viewing becomes an 
act of empathy, which works against the apparent or potential tendency of the film itself. The 
conception of a viewer here is precisely the opposite of the ignorant, excitable public that is 
                                                 
127 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb588z.pdf. 
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usually thought to be part of the guiding imaginary that drives the decisions of the censorship 
board members. Of course, Bulcke’s decision could easily be regarded as a cynical legal attempt 
to make available in public a film that would appeal to audiences predisposed to anti-Semitism. 
In other cases, however, Bulcke was very careful to prohibit films with anti-Semitic content and 
even referred to the crisis of the Republic which necessitated emergency laws. In the case of four 
1922 political cartoon shorts, subsumed under one of the titles Ein Modernes Stadtparlament, 
Bulcke agreed with the censorship board that the cartoons were anti-Semitic and furthermore 
asserted that, despite their characteristic cartoon representation which was the legitimate domain 
of satire, such attacks against the parliamentary system were not acceptable at a time when the 
Republic itself was under attack and thus required special protection.128     
As a basis for comparison, Bulcke’s vehement argument for a prohibition of a film that 
invokes similar situations is telling as well. In his decision to prohibit the 1921 film Gross-
Stadtmädels, Teil I (“The Gals from the Big City, Part I”), his line of argument follows a concept 
of naturalism and veracity that the film does not live up to, since the film distorts realistic 
depictions of Berlin which amount to a “social fraud perpetrated against the people.”129 This 
charge results from Bulcke’s observation of the fact that, contrary to real conditions, the film, for 
example, represents naïve girls subjecting themselves to all sorts of adventures, which 
culminates in a depiction of a “kidnapped female minor who escapes a dance bar, where she had 
been forcibly intoxicated with liquor, only to be arrested by the police and be incarcerated 
indefinitely in an educational home.”130 Since this is a fraudulent representation, Bulcke 
                                                 
128 Cf. decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb956z.pdf. 
129 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb472z.pdf. 
130 Ibid. 
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speculates on the reaction of the audience. As he declares, “judging from experience,” part of the 
audience will naturally assume this to be “accurate in life, and thus the population’s healthy 
perspective on life [Weltanschauung] will be corrupted and led astray.”131 The population in this 
case would presumably not be able to maintain a sense of judgment, but, in fact, would rather 
welcome such representations since the film’s “trash effects” would be “greeted with pleasure” 
by the population to its moral detriment.132
However, if a certain acceptance of veracity would contribute to the moral blindness of a 
population which thus necessitated constant vigilance, Bulcke also uses a similar notion of 
empathy to assert a film’s prohibition. In the case of the 1921 film Der Roman eines 
Dienstmädchens (“The Novel of a Servant Girl”) the line of argument is reversed. Bulcke’s main 
concern lies in the film’s use of titles rendered in the Berlin regional dialect, because these titles 
emphasize an undue specificity that would result in the assumption by audience members from 
other parts of the Reich such as Southern Germany or the countryside that it was a “specific 
Berlin-like cynicism, frivolity, or brutality that would be to blame for the moral depravity of the 
times.”133 If these titles were not specifically associated with Berlin, the film might be permitted 
for public exhibition. Nonetheless, Bulcke asserts, the film depicts “the tragic fate of the girl with 
such meticulous accuracy and fidelity that its effect is not merely disturbing but rather 
tormenting and cruel [peinigend und quälend] to a high degree.”134 Since the crisis of moral 
depravity is permanent, the appeal to a filmic effect that goes beyond empathy and results in the 
                                                 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb1060z.pdf. 
134 Ibid. 
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torture and pain of an audience is noteworthy again because Bulcke deploys a notion of filmic 
effect that postulates a film viewer’s response in degrees of reaction. If Bulcke registers a sense 
of empathy and elicits pity for a Jewish prostitute, the representation is acceptable by virtue of 
the legal encoding of his assessment in the degrees of his emotional response. Likewise his act of 
registering the pain and torture inherent in the depiction of the trials and tribulations of a servant 
girl are excessive enough to prevent the film’s exhibition, so that his emotional response to the 
images becomes the legal basis for the decisions.                    
Finally Bulcke’s sense of judicial empathy as a viewer was taxed and challenged in the 
decisions regarding two propaganda films designed to instigate anti-French sentiments and stoke 
a racist imagination in the population, resulting from the French occupation in March 1921 of the 
Rhein area in and around Düsseldorf, Duisburg in the Ruhrgebiet, as well as the separation of the 
Saarland from the Reich. For the film Die Schwarze Schmach (“The Black Shame” 1921) Bulcke 
revised the Munich board’s decision to permit the film’s exhibition and issued a prohibition with 
an elaborate rumination on the effective use of propaganda. Bulcke concurred with the 
assessment of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “albeit not without serious reservations, that, in 
order to prevent inflammatory French propaganda, the impulses for conciliatory relations should 
originate in Germany.”135 Bulcke refers to an awareness that French authorities permit anti-
German propaganda films that are equally inflammatory with titles such as “The Blood Guzzler 
of Verdun” (Der Blutsäufer von Verdun) but nonetheless agrees to a German effort at 
reconciliation. Again the sentence is worth citing in detail, because it contains another 
formulation that is incongruous in its rhetorical logic, even though Bulcke’s point is obvious, and 
suggests the difficulty of reconciling the reaction of Bulcke as a film viewer with that of Bulcke 
                                                 
135 Cf. decision at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb849z.pdf. 
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as the advocate for the state and its diplomatic relations. Bulcke formulates in an elaborate 
grammatical construction that ends up contradicting itself, verbatim that 
 
“The chamber concurs with the Foreign Office, albeit not without serious reservations that, if one 
is to prevent the elimination of inflammatory propaganda instigated by France, the impulse for a 
conciliatory relation must originate from Germany.” (Emphasis mine.)136
 
This is a complicated formulation that ends up codifying a sentiment that precisely runs 
counter to the legal intention asserted by the decision. Lest Bulcke is faulted too much for 
revealing his real sentiments in this convoluted linguistic construction, it might be noted that the 
viewing of this film may have caused considerable excitement that would far exceed that of the 
one registered in Bulcke’s examination for the screening of Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler a year later. 
The burden that is incumbent on Bulcke in this case is the issue of how to reconcile the demands 
of the representatives of the state in its foreign relations with that of his paternal conception of 
the “unbiased viewer” (der unbefangene Zuschauer)137 as an internal subject within the state. 
Since the emotional or empathetic effect of the film’s depiction of the French occupation by 
black soldiers registered in the state representative Bulcke cannot be the basis for his decision, he 
must find other grounds on which to reconcile his findings with the demands of other state 
representatives. 
                                                 
136 Cf. Ibid. In the original Bulcke’s decision states: “Die Kammer ist, wenn auch nicht ohne schwere Bedenken der 
Ansicht des Auswärtigen Amtes beigetreten, dass, wenn man in Deutschland der Beseitigung einer von Frankreich 
betriebenen verhetzenden Propaganda vorbeugen [sic] will, die Anregung zu einer versöhnlichen Beziehung von 
Deutschland gegeben werden muss.” 
137 Ibid. 
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What Bulcke must now resort to is to bemoan the factual use of titles that claim and make 
assertions that are evidently not accurate. The film asserts that numerous German women and 
girls were raped by black soldiers stationed in the Ruhrgebiet. Despite Bulcke’s acknowledgment 
of an emotional dimension that the film “expresses the justified outrage against the occupation 
by the German population”138 he must resort to a line of argument that allows for the prohibition 
of the film on factual grounds. By asserting that a propaganda film must by necessity follow the 
fundamental premise that “despite its compression of events, all occurrences depicted must 
conform to a fidelity of actual representation and must be verifiably true.”139 In this dilemma 
between conflicting emotional demands, Bulcke can only point to the inaccuracies and 
distortions of the film titles that state, for example, that “40 000 black men have been transported 
to the Rheinland” and one that, in Bulcke’s term, “warns” of “new victims of the black shame! 
There are thousands of them already.”140
Against these titles directed at instructing the “unbiased viewer,” Bulcke ascertains the 
factuality of the situation, of which he has been apprised by representatives of the Foreign 
Office. “In fact,” Bulcke finds in the reports from the Foreign Ministry, “there are currently only 
200 negroes in the Rheinland … and the current occupation consists not of black troops but of 
colored troops, namely Arabs and Madagascans.”141 Furthermore, the number of rapes by black 
soldiers as imagined by the population cannot be confirmed, so Bulcke decrees that it is 
                                                 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. In the original: “… muss es darüber Aufgabe eines Propagandafilms sein, die von ihm geplante 
Einwirkung… so einzurichten, dass trotz aller Zusammengedrängtheit der Handlung die die [sic] geschilderten 
Vorgänge wirklichkeitsgetreu und erweislich wahr sind.” (Superfluous repetition in original.) 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
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undoubtedly an exaggeration to assert the possibility of “thousands of such rape cases.”142 The 
prohibition of the film should therefore be declared on the grounds that the titles claim a factual 
basis which would evidently contradict the facts. In such constructions Bulcke sees that the 
desired and intended results of the propaganda achieve two opposite effects, namely a damaging 
of the reputation of Germany in other countries because its propaganda is demonstrably wrong, 
and secondly that the exaggerations and assertions might instill in the viewer a sense of doubt 
that would run counter to the film’s stated intentions.   
The topic of the rape of “German women and girls” by black soldiers is one that seems to 
occupy Bulcke’s imagination throughout these decisions. In some legal cases this trope even 
became the basis for his argument of allowing the depiction of the violation of women over and 
against the case for censorship on the grounds of moral deprivation or brutalizing 
representations.143 It is all the more remarkable, then, that, against his own impulses, Bulcke 
                                                 
142 Ibid. Bulcke’s overall sentiments about the French occupation can be determined in other cases as well. In 
another prohibition decision for the 1921 film Die Schwarze Pest (“The Black Pestilence”) Bulcke notes that the 
propaganda film cannot be shown categorically because it “derides the institutions of the state.” In his decision, 
however, he advises that he would have welcomed a propaganda with “a serious and unsentimental depiction of the 
feeling of shame in humiliation that Germany is suffering through with the occupation of black troops.” Cf. decision 
at http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb848z.pdf. Bulcke did allow a satirical depiction of the 
occupation, the 1923 film entitled Das Ruhrkaleidoskop, because it seemed necessary at the time, albeit with a title 
change to Der Neue Napoleon, since in the reference to the occupied area the caricature could be misconstrued as 
actual conditions.           
143 For example, in the decision involving the prohibition of the 1922 reïssue of the 1919 film Des Teufels Puppe 
(“The Devil’s Doll”), Bulcke notes that value judgments are acceptable in determining a film’s merit for exhibition, 
since, “for example, the depiction of rape” is not “demoralizing” as such “if the context determines that the victim is 
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insists on the exhibition ban of both Die Schwarze Schmach and Die Schwarze Pest, since his 
own fascination with violations of a woman’s honor function so prominently in his fiction and 
his obsession with the politically charged issue of the French occupation reveals him to be very 
receptive to the claims by the filmic propaganda that was attempted to be put into circulation at 
the time. The titles are the place that Bulcke must cling to in order to resolve this conflict 
between his emotional response as a film spectator and the demands placed on him as a 
representative figure by the other representatives of the state, but the pressure of these conflicting 
forces yields the strained legal formulation, with “serious reservations,” of his desire to “prevent 
the elimination” of the inflammatory material coming from France and his wish for a more 
effective propaganda art that is “factual” in these matters. 
In this conflict, Bulcke confirms the traumatic response to the presence of black troops in 
the occupation. Because World War I was in part guided by a colonialist sense of “expansionist 
motives and… notions of racial superiority, German society experienced this presence all the 
more acutely.”144 As Campt, Grosse, and Lemke-Muniz de Faria put it, the presence of black 
soldiers in the Rhineland and the Ruhrgebiet “intensified the trauma of defeat because they 
inverted the established colonial relationship of domination between ‘whites and blacks’ on 
German soil.”145 Indeed, Bulcke’s obsessions echo the contemporary discourse that “stylized the 
                                                                                                                                                             
a woman raped by black troops in the occupied territories.” Cf. decision at                                 
http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/zengut/df2tb272z.pdf. 
144 Tina Campt, Pascal Grosse, and Yara-Colette Lemke-Muniz de Faria, “Blacks, Germans, and the Politics of 
Imperial Imagination, 1920 – 1960,” in The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy, ed. Sara 
Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), p. 207.  
145 Ibid. 
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colonial troops as marauding hordes that raped women and desecrated German culture.”146 In 
this process, the presence of black occupation troops metamorphosed into a febrile fantasy of a 
threat that endangered the foundations of German civilization as a means to displace the post-war 
social anxieties into a mythical “form of Gegenwartsbewältigung (coming to terms with the 
present),” as Campt, Grosse, and Lemke-Muniz de Faria put it.147
One of the significant fault lines where such acts of displacement can be measured are 
thus the censorship decisions on banning these films. While Bulcke is placed in the dilemma of 
reconciling the factual conditions of the occupation with his imaginary obsessions of violation, 
these demands are recorded in the linguistic strains of the formulation with which his decisions 
are argued. However, it would therefore be too facile to dismiss Bulcke as a mere stooge for the 
instruments of power who then allows the projections of the fantasies of a humiliated people to 
be circulated. He must refuse the circulation of the propaganda films. Bulcke’s burden ultimately 
points again to the power of the cinema as postulated by the Weimar constitution. In his position 
he endures a suffering where his experience of empathy as a film viewer renders him liable and 
the crisis of masculinity as an unstable identity and a powerless force that has so often been 
diagnosed in Weimar cinema148 is experienced acutely by its first and foremost spectator, who is 
not Kracauer’s quotidian “shop girl” even if this imaginary spectator is postulated as female, but 
rather becomes Lang’s imaginary state attorney von Wenk.149 If there are other narratives of 
                                                 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Cf. Patrice Petro, Joyless Streets: Women and Melodramatic Representation in Weimar Germany (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 155. 
149 This extends the discussion of the public sphere defined by the cinema in interesting ways. As Miriam Hansen 
has demonstrated, the censorship interventions on the grounds of regulating “pleasure” found their moral equivalent 
  251
history to be developed here, they might no longer follow the well-worn paths that ultimately 
only succeed in outlining the banality of the bureaucrat but which might rather follow the trail of 
what happens to this figure when he begins to recognize himself and his plight on the screen. 
Then the narrative might return to another trajectory, namely the one in which the nameless 
bureaucrat for the state enacts the figurations of a film’s ideal audience but who suffers silently 
in the screening chambers of the film examination agencies for all his imagined subjects in their 
stead. When this private sense of suffering is magnified into an expression on a grandiose public 
scale as the inevitable sacrificial fate of the one who serves as the representative for a people, we 
begin to approximate the affective powers of a Nazi film mobilized on behalf of audiences for 
such a film as Ohm Krüger.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
in the literary and intellectual discussions of the medium, so that, as she puts it, in “adapting patriarchal ideology to 
changes in sexual-social divisions of labour, the cinema was to become a crucial mediator between women’s 
experience and the dominant public sphere in the 1920s.” Cf. Miriam Hansen, “Early Cinema: Whose Public 
Sphere?” in Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. Thomas Elsaesser (London: BFI Publishing, 1990), p. 239. 
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List of film censorship decisions cited 
 
Alarmtopf (Emil Albes, D 1919/20). 
All Quiet on the Western Front (Lewis Milestone, USA 1930). 
Des Teufels Puppe (Kurt Brenken, D 1919). 
Dr. Mabuse, Dr. Spieler (Fritz Lang, D 1922). 
Der Frauenmarder (D 1922). 
Gij zult niet dooden (War Sie Schuldig? George André Beranger, NL 1922). 
Die Große Sensation (Adolf Abter, D 1921). 
Großstadtmädels, Teil I (Wolfgang Neff, 1920/21). 
Hunger in Deutschland (D 1923). 
Das Judenmädel von Sosnowice (Ferdinand Walden, D 1920). 
Kuhle Wampe (Slatan Dudow, D 1932). 
Das Lebensroulette (Siegfried Dessauer, D 1922). 
Ein Modernes Stadtparlament (D 1922). 
Die Nacht im Grünen Affen (D 1922). 
Die Nackten (Martin Berger, D 1919). 
Oberst Rokschanin (Otto Linnekogel, D 1922). 
Prästänkan (The Witch Woman, Carl Theodor Dreyer, SE 1920). 
Der Roman eines Dienstmädchens (Reinhold Schünzel, D 1921). 
Saal der Sieben Sünden, (Arthur Wellin, D 1919). 
Die Schwarze Pest (D 1921). 
Die Schwarze Schmach (Carl Boese, D 1921). 
Sodom und Gomorrha (Michael Kertesz, AT 1922). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE BODY OF THE STATE: ON OHM KRÜGER BECOMING 
EMIL JANNINGS 
 
 
 
In the discussion of films from the Nazi period much attention has been focused on the so-called 
Staatsauftragsfilme, films that were commissioned and supervised by the state, often under the 
direct auspices of the Minister for Propaganda and People’s Enlightenment Joseph Goebbels. 
Indeed, these particular films have come to stand in for what might generally be regarded as Nazi 
Cinema. That is, these films have come to represent the use of the medium during the period of 
German fascism, whereas the remainder of the roughly one thousand films produced in the 
period of 1933 – 1945 is frequently dismissed as escapist entertainment. Recent works have 
begun to redress this blind spot (see, for example, Linda Schulte-Sasse, Eric Rentschler, and 
Sabine Hake) by refusing this dichotomy and looking more carefully at the cinematic means or 
contextual framework according to which we need to understand the cinema of the Third Reich.1  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Linda Schulte-Sasse, Entertaining the Third Reich: Illusions of Wholeness in Nazi Cinema 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996); Eric Rentschler, The Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and Its 
Afterlife (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Sabine Hake, Popular Cinema of the Third Reich 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001). 
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Despite such theoretical and conceptual advances, many studies into the cinema of 
fascism nonetheless seem to be drawn to what might be termed the blatantly obvious attempts of 
manipulation and aggressive foregrounding of politics in these films. In this respect, these films 
are appealing to scholars precisely because they can be clearly demarcated as “propaganda 
films” and, as such then, offer themselves up for inspection. They can stand in for what is 
already known and thus represent Nazi Cinema at its pinnacle of insidiousness. The very 
question of representation, then, is elided from the discussion, precisely because the mechanisms 
of representation seem so obvious as to merit no analysis.  
By looking at one particular film, Ohm Krüger, this study, therefore, aims to investigate 
the question of how the problematics of representation are of crucial concern for this film and to 
what lengths it goes in order to control its mode of signification. In doing so, I want to 
investigate a mode of inscription employed in this film, which relies on the body as a textual 
marker for signification. In this respect, the inscription of the body of Emil Jannings into the 
cinematic text serves a dual function. First, it provides for an intertextual framework from his 
previous films that is reinscribed and reconfigured in Ohm Krüger and thus points to the need of 
reconceptualizing the means of signification in this film, while, secondly, it invokes a mode of 
encoding meaning within the body that demands an investigation into the very category of 
representation itself.  
Here, it is useful to recall the work of Steven Shaviro, who posits the necessity to depart 
from the paradigm of representation that has structured the theorization of the cinematic 
apparatus, by turning our attention to the ways in which the cinema is “inescapably literal” in its 
materiality, so that “the figures that unroll before us cannot be regarded merely as arbitrary 
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representations or conventional signs.”2 Moreover, this insistence of the primary centrality of the 
body here implies significant consequences for an overall understanding of the conjunction 
between the allegorical and material means by which film comes to signify. What follows, 
therefore, is an outline of how the category of representation needs to be articulated in its 
function as part of a larger system of meaning through which Nazi cinema must be understood.       
At the time of its release in 1941, during the frenzy of the German Wehrmacht’s initial 
victories across Europe, Ohm Krüger immediately achieved broad public success and soon after 
received official recognition as a feature which merited a special rating of “politically and 
artistically especially valuable.” It was devised in a climate of wartime propaganda against 
“England,” as Great Britain was commonly called, and was “intended to prepare German 
audiences for the forthcoming invasion of Britain, which both Goebbels and the population as a 
whole believed was imminent.”3 The film celebrates a revisionist historical account of the 
eponymous Boer president Paulus Kruger, nicknamed “Oom” for his alleged avuncular 
qualities,4 who establishes a “Germanic” free nation in the face of British colonial subjugation. 
Thus, in this overall context, such a subject matter should come as no surprise. It seems, 
therefore, easy to determine that, as David Welch noted, “the purpose of the film… is to 
construct a series of principles that Goebbels could apply to the contemporary war in Europe… 
                                                 
2 Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 26. 
3 David Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933 – 1945 (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p. 230. 
4 Note: Orthography is a significant element in the film’s conception of the Boer nation as “German.” Therefore, I 
have decided to use the Germanized Ohm Krüger whenever this version is relevant to the character in the film and 
his imaginary functions in it, whereas I have opted in favor of using the original Afrikaans spelling of Paulus 
Kruger for the actual historical figure and his moniker Oom from the Afrikaans word for “uncle.”    
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by the contrasting use of archetype, in which simple black-and-white images of the enemy are 
manipulated to elicit the desired response from cinema audiences.”5  
The conception of an easily “manipulated” audience is noteworthy, not just because it 
seems to dismiss the complexity of the problem of any empirical audience reception in general, 
but because it insists on a transparency by which the film signals its own intentions – to “elicit 
desired responses.” It is this apparent transparency that needs to be investigated first and 
foremost if we are to understand how such “simple images” are conjoined with a certain “desire” 
to mean or signify in general. In other words, how is meaning generated here in the first place? 
But even if we are to account for a more complicated relation between the audience and the film, 
or the text and its reception, there, too, we might establish a false dichotomy of determining what 
a text’s “intentions” are and then work to uncover the textual gaps and its ideological 
contradictions, perhaps even possibly to locate a spectatorial position that might offer a site of 
potential “resistance” or, conversely, an instance of submission to the desires, workings, and 
figurations of the text.  
Klaus Kanzog has done invaluable work in collecting contextual and archival material in 
order to provide an overview of the majority of German films classified as “politically and 
artistically especially valuable”6 and is careful to acknowledge the difficulty of quantifying 
audience responses. Recalling the screenings of these films in front of a variety of audiences at 
the Munich film museum in 1991 and 1992, he nonetheless states “everyone experienced his 
own affective responses [Ergriffenheit] and aggressions, but any personal discussions … all led 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 231. 
6 Klaus Kanzog, “Staatspolitisch besonders wertvoll”: Ein Handbuch zu 30 deutschen Filmen der Jahre 1934 bis 
1945 (Munich: Diskurs-Film-Verlag, 1994).  
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to the central question of the effectiveness of the mechanisms of indoctrination in the mass 
medium film.”7  
Even Kanzog, however, then shifts to an approach he characterizes as “rigorously object-
specific and text-oriented.”8 This approach allows him to categorize and quantify the 
ideologically desired effects the text has been determined to generate into what he terms 
“normative aspects” (Normaspekte). After an extensive plot summary of the film in question, 
Kanzog then enumerates these normative aspects in terms of their ideological purpose or, more 
specifically, in terms of their disciplinary value system to be imposed on the audiences of the 
film. For Ohm Krüger, for example, Kanzog lists four normative categories that are incorporated 
within the film: state norm, economical norm, patriarchy, and military resistance 
(Wehrhaftigkeit).9 As much as Kanzog’s contributions are important as a scholarship of record, 
these norms nonetheless exhibit a curious problematic. On the one hand they are self-evident 
within the text, yet at the same time these norms need to be categorized and highlighted. Of 
course, given that a large number of these films are still not available for public exhibition in 
Germany, the necessity to include a diagrammatic schema of the ideological content of the films 
makes sense in this respect, but the problematic here points to a larger dilemma.  
The films are obvious and self-evident in their meaning and yet this meaning needs to be 
rendered in a normative framework. In doing so, these films are both normalized in the sense that 
they are understood to conform to identifiable and determinable standards and exceptionalized in 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 7. All translations, unless noted otherwise, are my own. The term Ergriffenheit is used in quotation marks 
in the original.  
8 “[S]treng objektbezogen und textorientiert” in the original. Kanzog, p. 8. 
9 Ibid., pp. 262 – 263. 
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the sense that their intended meaning needs to be prescribed and categorized. As if to amplify 
and solidify this double-bind, a recent publication on Ohm Krüger regrettably still imagines an 
audience that is incapable of understanding the complexity of textual operations by asserting that 
its purpose for the study of the film is “to shed light on how propaganda was often presented in 
the form of a feature film” and to conclude that this will help us study how the “political 
message” in these feature films is hidden so that “the propagandists could best realize their goal 
of molders of public opinion.”10  
The ensuing discussion of the film then fantasizes an audience: it speaks to and for them 
by re-presenting to them the ways in which the film “does an excellent job” of presenting “a 
cordial bond between the president and his people”11 and how it, therefore, “clearly reveals” its 
intentions to “spawn anti-British sentiment,”12 all while accomplishing “its anti-British 
propaganda mission”13 in general. All this achieves little apart from confirming Sabine Hake’s 
admonishment that “[t]he cinema of the Third Reich has never been exposed to the full range of 
critical perspectives available within film studies” and that, indeed, “many of the questions have 
not even been asked.”14   
The following, then, is aimed at redirecting this kind of scholarship toward a more 
instructive understanding of how these films operate. In particular, it seems necessary to 
reëxamine carefully the functions through which these films generate their meaning. This is all 
                                                 
10 Christian W. Hallstein, “Ohm Krüger: The Genesis of a Nazi Propaganda Film,” Literature Film Quarterly 30, no. 
2 (2002): 133. 
11 Ibid., p. 135. 
12 Ibid., p. 134. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Sabine Hake, Popular Cinema of the Third Reich, p. 2. 
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the more relevant since a careful analysis of what constitutes “propaganda” needs to avoid both 
trivializing and minimizing its own subject matter or the possible audience responses to it and 
demonizing and thereby mythologizing it into something that must by this virtue alone withstand 
meticulous scrutiny. In this respect, Marcia Landy has demonstrated the crucial importance of 
identifying how films employ specific and strategic conceptions of community, especially in 
regard to the past as “historical capital” that is “circulated in familiar and affective images” in 
order to generate a production of common sense;15 that is, how films invest and are invested in 
“everyday, contradictory, coercive, and consensual strategies” which can provide us with an 
understanding of “the nature of both coercion and consensus.”16  
Such an analysis will yield a more nuanced and complex insight into the mechanisms of 
how the cinema uses its images and thus can provide us with a larger sense of the importance of 
the cinema in general. More specifically, however, this kind of analysis will enable a perspective 
on the cinema of the Third Reich that understands the medium in its insidious intended and 
potential effects, but at the same time takes it seriously enough not to excoriate it into the 
“ultimate Other of world cinema,” as Sabine Hake has put it.17 “What is needed” instead, she 
continues, “is a theory of popular cinema that neither dismisses the filmic imagination as a mere 
reflection of social reality nor denounces its wish formations as deceptive and false.”18 How 
might such a theory work for a film like Ohm Krüger, which was both a state-commissioned film 
and an immensely popular film?  
                                                 
15 Marcia Landy, Cinematic Uses of the Past (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 229 – 230. 
16 Ibid., p. 234. 
17 Hake, p. 1. 
18 Ibid., p. 18. 
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While the credit sequence of Ohm Krüger bills Hans Steinhoff, the reliable filmmaker 
who was responsible for one of the first films of the Nazi movement, Hitlerjunge Quex (1933), 
as its director (Regie), the film is nonetheless an “Emil Jannings Film.” Steinhoff’s contribution 
is credited as mere “direction” (Spielleitung), whereas Jannings’ role is emphasized by the final 
credit title as “overall control Emil Jannings” (Gesamtleitung). The complex and complicated 
figure of Emil Jannings is crucial to the film, both for the filmic event itself as well as the context 
within which Ohm Krüger was produced and released. The following will attempt to situate the 
markers that make Jannings’ role, in all senses of the word, relevant to the overall understanding 
of the film. 
The project of Ohm Krüger was initiated in close collaboration between Jannings and 
Joseph Goebbels. Already in November 1939 Goebbels notes in his diary that “Jannings is 
developing new material for films for me. A very good Ohm Krüger about the Boer War.”19 
Goebbels’ involvement in the development of the film, while certainly not unprecedented,20 took 
on a more significant aspect since it was the first film to be designated with the certificate “Film 
of the Nation” (Prädikat “Film der Nation”), established April 2, 1941, on the day Ohm Krüger 
passed censorship inspections and two days before its Berlin premiere in the Ufa-Palast am 
Zoo.21 Only four subsequent films were awarded this certificate.22 Indeed, so heaped with official 
                                                 
19 Quoted in Klaus Kanzog, p. 253. 
20 Since 1933 the Ministry for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda had already commissioned 41 films as a 
Staatsauftragsfilm, a film specifically ordered by the state. Cf. David Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema 
1933 - 1945, p. 271.  
21 Kanzog, pp. 253 – 254. 
22 Heimkehr (1941, Gustav Ucicky), Der Große König (1942, Veit Harlan), Andreas Schlüter (1942, Herbert 
Maisch), and Kolberg (1945, Veit Harlan). 
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praise was this film, and especially Jannings’ contributions to it, that Goebbels awarded Jannings 
the “Ring of Honor of the German Cinema” for his performance and Jannings became one of the 
few actors to be included in the official category of Staatsschauspieler.23
In conjunction with the film’s premiere and in the weeks and months leading up to it, 
numerous articles were launched in the press that provided information about the historical 
context of the Boer War with titles such as “That was England – That is England: Murder behind 
Barbed Wire. Devastating Scenes from the new Jannings-Film,” “Ohm Krüger: Hero and Father 
of his People,” and “The Revolt of the Boer People against England’s Rapacity and Arbitrary 
Rule.”24 Jannings himself contributed an article in the Filmwelt magazine under the title “Ohm 
Krüger: Fighting Foremost against England’s Arbitrary Rule.”25 Finally, Kruger’s memoirs were 
republished in Germany at around the same time as the release of the film and included an 
introduction by Jannings.26 In the introduction Jannings enthused about what it means for an 
actor to embody the individual so that the contemporary age understands “the meaning of the 
past.”27 This task, Janning pronounces in a fascist rhetoric fond of substantival constructions, is 
the following: “Representation of man means giving significance to the unique and to the 
historical in the fateful and eternal.”28 For the actor this means to encapsulate in the individual 
                                                 
23 Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, p. 229. 
24 Listed in Kanzog, “Staatspolitisch besonders wertvoll,” p. 264. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Cited in Hallstein, “Ohm Krüger,” p. 138. Hallstein makes particular note of the introduction by Emil Jannings. 
27 Emil Jannings, “Paul Krüger,” in Ohm Krüger (i.e. Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger), Die Lebenserinnerungen 
des Buren-Präsidenten (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag, 1941), p. 7.  
28 Ibid. In the original: “Menschdarstellung heißt Sinngebung des Einmaligen und des Geschichtlichen im 
Schicksalhaften und Ewigen.” 
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fate all that comprises “the inevitable and the laws of the regular.”29 Noting the essential affinity 
between the German people and Paul Krüger’s forefathers,30 Jannings declares that in “his most 
difficult hour, Paul Krüger straightened himself up into the idea that no individual and no people 
can escape the destiny of sacrificing themselves for the sake of the future.”31     
To coïncide with this massive media campaign surrounding the premiere of Ohm Krüger, 
the prolific and respected film and theater critic Herbert Ihering, who had been an influential 
voice in the Weimar theater circles and who had served as a protegé of the young Bertolt Brecht, 
published a hagiographic book on Jannings and his career, replete with a celebratory introduction 
to the man Jannings and illustrated with lavish production still photographs and private shots.32 
While not mentioning the production of Ohm Krüger, the book includes a sequence of 75 full-
page photographs of Jannings, beginning with an image of Jannings and Goebbels in active 
conversation as they are walking along the Wolfgang Lake in Austria, the site of Jannings’ 
country home, and culminating with four images, the juxtaposition of which places Jannings 
squarely at the intersection of history, power, and the cinema: after a number of still photographs 
                                                 
29 Ibid. Original: “Der Schauspieler… muß dahin streben, im Schicksal dieses Einzelnen das Unabwendbare und 
Gesetzmäßige … zu erfassen.”  
30 Ibid., pp. 12 – 13. A footnote in this regard assures readers of the accuracy of this statement by noting, without 
further proof, that “the President confirms that his ancestors came from Germany, but his family does not know 
from which city. He only knows that the forefather of the African branch of his family was married to a French 
woman and that he had to flee for his beliefs.” This, apparently, is sufficient for a “German essence” in character.    
31 Ibid. In the German original, Jannings’ use of the neologist verb emporreißen (literally “to tear oneself up into”) is 
equally awkward in tone: “In der schwersten Stunde seines Lebens hat sich Paul Krüger emporgerissen zu der Idee, 
daß sich kein einzelner und kein Volk der Bestimmung, sich für die Zukunft opfern zu müssen, entziehen kann.” 
32 Herbert Ihering, Emil Jannings: Baumeister seines Lebens und seiner Filme (Heidelberg: Verlagsanstalt Hüthig & 
Co, 1941). 
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from his roles, a photo shows Jannings as he accepts the Staatspreis given to him by Adolf 
Hitler, followed by a private photograph of the actor standing on a street in “the liberated city of 
Danzig” in October 1939. The book then concludes with two production still portraits with 
Jannings rendered as Ohm Krüger.33
In the selfsame manner, Ihering’s text also situates Jannings within this configuration as a 
straightforward narrative of how Jannings has come to epitomize a particular kind of “hard actor 
species which gained strength through infinite adversity.”34 In this narrative, Jannings becomes 
“the architect of his life and of his films” as the book’s subtitle declares. Apparently, Ihering 
bases much of the writing on material from Jannings’ own autobiographical writing, which 
Jannings wrote to coïncide with the 25th anniversary of his work on the screen in 1939.35 This 
material, then, gets worked into a narrative which proclaims Jannings’ roles to be the “organic” 
                                                 
33 Ibid. Illustrations following p. 59. 
34 Ibid., p. 5. 
35 Written as Lebenserinnerungen in 1939. Cf. the posthumously published autobiography Emil Jannings, Theater, 
Film – Das Leben und ich, ed. C.G. Bergius (Berchtesgaden: Verlag Zimmer & Herzog, 1951). In a preface to the 
1951 edition, the publishers claim that in 1939 Jannings refused to allow the typescript to go to print after he had 
received the galley proofs from his then publisher and noticed passages that had been excised, people who had been 
omitted, and found insertions that were “diametrically opposed to what he himself had written.” (p. 3) This seems 
interesting, given the congruence of anecdotes and descriptions between Ihering and Jannings’ autobiography 
passim. Moreover, similar congruences inform two other works on Jannings published during his lifetime, neither of 
which are referenced in Ihering. One is 1000% Jannings [sic] by Munkepunke (i.e. Alfred Richard Meyer), 
(Hamburg – Berlin: Prismen-Verlag, 1930), and Richard Bie (i.e. Richard Biedrzynski), Emil Jannings: Eine 
Diagnose des deutschen Films (Berlin: Frundsberg-Verlag, 1936). See the discussion of these books below.  
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outgrowth of “intuition and sentiment,”36 culminating in his artistic calling toward a new 
challenge. This challenge was to be found in a new definition of film: 
 
“As a true popular art, accessible to the millions, effecting on the millions, film was not only 
required to maintain its significance, but to expand it. Film was given another, dual function. It 
was to serve the people in their desire for cheerfulness, entertainment and exciting human picture 
stories. It was to be simple, commonly understood, clear and in its basic attitude decent and 
healthy. At the same time, however, it was to represent the state itself, its moving forces, its 
ideas, its educational passion. Film should represent the people, the way it is and they way it 
should be.”37
 
What is remarkable about this description, apart from its attempt to reproduce the 
discursive tenor of the rhetoric of National Socialism,38 is how it incorporates into the medium 
film physical human attributes (“healthy”) and states of mind, while simultaneously determining 
it as the material manifestation of a state that in its embodiment as film exhibits human 
characteristics such as desire, passion, and determination. In other words, film represents the 
embodiment of the state inasmuch as the state is the abstract representation of the people. Ihering 
continues by pronouncing the first film that articulates this manifestation of the state as the 
people to be Hans Steinhoff’s Der alte und der junge König (1935), starring Emil Jannings as the 
aging Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm I., because in this dramatic film Jannings realizes “the 
                                                 
36 Ihering, Emil Jannings, p. 43. 
37 Ibid., p. 44. 
38 For important analyses of the language and discourse of Naziïsm, see Victor Klemperer, LTI: Notizbuch eines 
Philologen (Leipzig: Verlag Philipp Reclam jun., 1985), and Sternberger/Storz/Süskind, Aus dem Wörterbuch des 
Unmenschen (Hamburg: Claasen Verlag, 1957).   
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popular and the emblematic at the same time.”39 In his insistence on the convergence between 
“that of the people,” das Volkstümliche, which as a concept indicates an abstraction but 
nonetheless implies a sense of specificity of being grounded in the popular, and the emblematic, 
das Sinnbildliche, as a symbolic abstraction in opposition to the concreteness of the popular, 
Ihering then comes to the figure of Jannings as he who personifies both – the abstract and the 
concrete – within his role as a star. 
Ihering calls Jannings a “star” because, in contrast to films which merely highlight their 
famous actors, he is involved in the construction of the film in its “totality”: a Jannings film is a 
“star-film,” in which “the star is its leader in the spiritual sense.”40 Jannings, thus, is the “guiding 
light” of the film overall. As such, he becomes the “organic” principle around which all of his 
films are organized and which gives his life as an actor a trajectory that turns him into the figure 
that “has carried the German film on his shoulders.”41 Moreover, Jannings comes to embody 
every aspect of his being and his art: “Life and work, being and art correspond with one 
another,” Ihering writes and continues, “there was no break between the public and the private 
sphere” for Jannings, and “thus he remained who he was and became what he is: an artist of 
being and of representation, one who becomes and one who persists.”42  
                                                 
39 Ihering, Emil Jannings, p. 45: in the original “Er [Jannings] sah zugleich das Volkstümliche und das Sinnbildliche 
in diesem Drama.” 
40 Ibid., p. 46. Cf. the original: “Es gibt aber auch einen anderen Starfilm. Einen Starfilm, in dem der Star führend im 
geistigen Sinne ist.” 
41 Ibid., p. 59. 
42 Ibid.: “Leben und Arbeit, Dasein und Kunst entsprechen sich. Es gab keinen Bruch zwischen der privaten und 
öffentlichen Sphäre. So blieb Jannings, der er war, und wurde, was er ist: ein Künstler des Daseins und des 
Darstellens, ein Werdender und Beharrender.”  
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While this descriptive style again follows the rhetoric of a paradoxical apposition, Ihering 
identifies a convergence here which places Jannings on the cusp between the star’s two functions 
as the “embodiments of ideal ways of behaving” and the “embodiments of typical ways of 
behaving,” as Richard Dyer classifies the star image in transition “from gods to mortals.”43 This 
paradigmatic transition from “gods to identification figures” Dyer locates, following Edgar 
Morin, in the “‘embourgeoisement’ of the medium” around 1930 with the advent of sound.44 
Over and against this transition, however, Jannings himself maintains that he belongs to an 
earlier sphere of acting, one where the anarchic idealism and intuitive passion of actors have not 
yet been supplanted by a new form of orderly structure. Indeed, Jannings writes in his 
autobiography:  
 
“Today all of this [the life of an actor] has changed significantly. Social progress has not stopped 
at the theater as well and now actors are placed into well-regulated contractual obligations. I 
would be the last to mistake the benefits of social progress, but no one will misunderstand me if I 
say: the actor has been bourgeoisified [ist verbürgerlicht]!”45
 
Of course, this statement echoes the mistrust and contempt that Nazi discourse exhibited 
for the German, if not European, Bürgertum, and may very well raise suspicions that, editors’ 
claims to the contrary, Jannings autobiography was written in full sympathy with the prevailing 
                                                 
43 Richard Dyer, Stars (London: BFI Publishing, 1992), p. 24.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Emil Jannings, Theater – Film, das Leben und ich, p. 56 (emphasis in original). 
  267
political discourse of the time.46 What is noteworthy here, however, is how Jannings’ own 
insistence on his placement within an older generation of stars corresponds to the overall 
narrative of his autobiography. In it Jannings goes to great lengths to move against the 
potentially polysemous tendencies of his own star image and states that “I realized that from the 
moment that I looked back on my life, all the colorful singularities flowed together into an 
astonishingly organic whole… as if a strong and determined will had sketched out all my 
steps.”47
Confirming this notion of the actor’s figure as a fusion of essence and type, Richard Bie 
offers a “diagnosis” of how Jannings’ image fits into the larger state of the art. His Emil 
Jannings: Eine Diagnose des deutschen Films was published in a series entitled “German 
Subjectivity” (die deutsche Innerlichkeit) and dedicated to “reporting on the essence and 
singularity of those Germans who have mentally guided their fatherland after the war and 
represent an example and yardstick of a new deportment for the German people.”48 In it, Bie 
declares that Jannings’ roles can be attributed to his “descent from generations in his family of a 
nether German breed” which is embodied in Jannings’ roles of “great historical personalities.”49 
Thus, Bie deduces, do we see in Jannings the “unity of the figure” (Einheit der Gestalt), with 
                                                 
46 A notion that would be confirmed by the fact that Jannings was one of the Nazi film industry’s most reliable and 
celebrated star, whose presence in the highest political circles was taken for granted. See footnote 35 for the claims 
made by the editors of Jannings’ autobiography.   
47 Jannings, pp. 5 – 6. 
48 Richard Bie, Emil Jannings, frontispiece. 
49 Ibid., p. 35 
  268
whom “is commenced a new world of filmic reality in which mask and face can no longer be 
differentiated.”50  
Rather than dismiss these kinds of celebration of the star persona as merely contextual 
material, especially in a case such as Richard Bie, whose blatantly hyperbolic and breathless 
summoning of Jannings into the service of Nazi ideology might compel us to disassociate 
Jannings the actor from his roles as they are portrayed in the literature of his time, we need to 
place this material within a larger framework of a problematics of how meaning is generated. In 
other words, Bie’s and Ihering’s efforts must be regarded in their attempts to delineate and mark 
the meaning of Jannings as a figure in his films and as a figuration in which the distinction 
between such categories as the mask and the face no longer apply. The insistence, then, on a 
coherence between mask and face and the remarkable rhetoric that is generated towards the 
establishment of a seamless “fit” between actor and role relies on a specific conceptualization of 
the body.  
Moreover, this insistence indicates a concern with regulating meaning outside the 
audience’s experience of a specific film and it is on this level that studies on the mechanisms of 
propaganda have proven to be the most useful because at the heart of the question of how to 
determine the functions and mechanisms of propaganda lies the issue of how these “propaganda 
films” channel and regulate meaning. For the character that Jannings is said to embody, then, 
these secondary or extratextual efforts to augment Jannings’ films indicate the degree to which 
such sources interfere in the construction of meaning and thus point to the larger issue of how to 
demarcate the interpretive framework that needs to be brought to bear on the “readings” of his 
                                                 
50 Ibid., p. 36. 
  269
films.51 I will return to the question of the textual frame, but for now it is worth noting how much 
emphasis is placed on Jannings’ embodiment of his characters and how much effort is imposed 
upon the creation of a similarity between person and persona.52                                                
                                                 
51 It might be worthwhile to point out that Carl Zuckmayer in his descriptions of German cultural leaders gave a 
very detailed and illustrative account of the figure of Emil Jannings. Carl Zuckmayer’s characterization of Jannings 
in his “secret reports,” intelligence briefings which he wrote in 1943 and 1944 on behalf of the Office of Strategic 
Services, the predecessor of the CIA, have recently been discovered and published. Zuckmayer skillfully sketches 
out the characters and personalities of 150 authors, publishers, actors, directors, and musicians who were prominent 
in German cultural life. On Jannings, an “Überfalstaff” in his words, Zuckmayer writes: “I love this old sow… In his 
appearance, too, he carries somewhat of a lard-faced hog’s head on his mighty shoulders, which, however, also 
conveys the squinty shrewdness, the quiet sneakiness and the clumsy charme of a Bern bear… Even though he is an 
actor, he is a unique figure, designed by Rabelais, carried out by Balzac, drawn by Daumier and painted by 
Breughel, ridiculed by Molière, caricatured by George Grosz. This does not so much relate to his merits as an actor, 
which are very significant, but to his human, or rather, his creaturely appearance. Whether he is indeed a human 
being, I could not say for sure – but certainly he is one of the most amusing creations in God’s bestiaire and zoo. His 
offensive linguistic imagination (in Emil’s mouth the most vulgar gutterspeak achieves a profundity of Lutherean 
proportions), his omnivorous appetite for all matters of the flesh and of pleasure, and even his cunning, fox-like 
sentimentality (crying for the little hare while devouring it) – all of this has class, and the appeal of singularity. ‘This 
guy is one of a kind, he will never come back,’ such a couplet should be intoned by a choir of liveried 
supernumeraries and Cancan dancers with flying skirts on his grave.” Cf. Carl Zuckmayer, Geheimreport. 
Zuckmayer-Schriften, ed. Gunther Nickel and Johanna Schrön (Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 2002), pp. 136 – 138. 
(Translation mine).  
52 Another trajectory that needs to be followed here is the remarkable congruence between the various works 
surrounding Jannings (see also footnote 35). Despite the autobiography’s unpublished status, most works on 
Jannings return to the same anecdotes and stories, as if based on a concentrated effort to streamline the interpretation 
of his figure. A text that notably differs from these accounts is Jean Mitry’s 1928 monograph on Jannings. While 
some of Mitry’s claims are evidently erroneous (he states, for example, that Jannings was born in Brooklyn), they 
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This concern for fusion of character and role is expressed on a different register as well 
for the release of Ohm Krüger. In a special event, a 60-page booklet for the film was printed and 
a number of entries of illustrations in the satirical journal Simplicissimus were dedicated to the 
Boer War and the film,53 on its cover a caricature of “Ohm Jannings,” who muses, “if I did not 
know I was Ohm Krüger, I would imagine I was Emil Jannings.”54 Almost all of the reviews of 
the premiere listed the film as an Emil-Jannings-Film. Jannings was Ohm Krüger. What does 
such an insistence on the correspondence between the actor and his character, between his figure 
and his persona imply here? How does the fusion of Jannings into the figure of Ohm Krüger 
predicate the political significance of the film? What does this indicate for a larger discussion of 
the way in which this film reconfigures its attempts at signification? 
In order to address this remarkable obsession with embodiment, personification, and 
incorporation as a particularly noteworthy instance for the star image of Emil Jannings, we need 
to look at how his body and acting style have been configured throughout his film career. 
Beginning with smaller roles in 1914 Jannings achieved star status with his first major successes 
in Ernst Lubitsch’s Madame DuBarry (1919, English title Passion) and Anna Boleyn (1920, 
English title Deception), and Dimitri Buchowetzky’s Danton (1921). In all three films Jannings 
plays a leader with a monumental corporeal presence in opposition to a figure of abstraction that 
is codified as a different conception of the state as the law. In Decpetion Jannings embodies King 
                                                                                                                                                             
seem to follow a different “legend,” that is, they circulate “unauthorized” rumors and anecdotes about Jannings. Cf. 
Jean Mitry, Émil Jannings: Ses Débuts, Ses Films, Ses Aventures (Paris: Les Publications Jean-Pascal, 1928).      
53 David Welch asserts that the entire edition of the journal is dedicated to the film, whereas, there are, indeed, four 
illustrations with direct references to the film in the issue. Cf. Propaganda and the German Cinema, p. 234. (The 
journal is listed here as Simplizissimus spelled with a “z”.)  
54 “Ohm Jannings” drawing by Olaf Gulbransson on the cover of Simplicissimus, March 19, 1941, vol. 46, no. 12. 
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Henry VIII and he inhabits “the body of the king,” to such a degree that he, “with his enormous 
proportions, controls every setting and every moment.”55 The corpulent figure of Jannings, 
moreover, stands in relation to another figure, that of the state as abstracted force. This process 
of figuration underscores the importance of the dichotomy between body and mind because all of 
these films position Jannings against a figure of writing and bureaucracy in their imagination of 
divergent manifestations of state power and leadership.  
Jannings’ King Louis XV in Passion is an amorous, petulant, and easily distracted king, 
whose primary goal is to consummate his relationship with the enchanting courtesan Madame 
Dubarry, while his minister Lebel attempts to steer the king towards his responsibilities as a 
ruler. Commenting on the representation of power in this film Marc Silberman has pointed out 
how the film complicates a logic of patriarchy: while Madame Dubarry “enters a hierarchical 
social organization as object, exchanged and used by men as a kind of currency,” she nonetheless 
is able to disrupt this process of commodification by virtue of “the play of appearance” and thus 
her ability to “negotiate the social organization as subject because it confuses the very 
absoluteness of the distinction between subject and object.”56 The effect of this shift in power 
relations, therefore, positions the King in a precarious conflict with his status as the embodiment 
of power.  
According to Silberman, the film’s political framework becomes a “conflict” between the 
“scandalous power of female artifice and the representatives of the social order who fall prey to 
                                                 
55 Sabine Hake, “Lubitsch’s Period Films as Palimpsest: On Passion and Deception,” in Framing the Past: The 
Historiography of German Cinema and Television, ed. Bruce A. Murray and Christopher J. Wickham (Carbondale, 
IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp 88 - 89. 
56 Marc Silberman, “Imagining History: Weimar Images of the French Revolution,” in Framing the Past, ed. Bruce 
A. Murray and Christopher J. Wickham, p. 105. 
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its seduction.”57 Ultimately, Silberman locates the source of this conflict in the instability that 
erotic desire introduces in the structures of power. What the film manages to construct is a king, 
who as a representative of patriarchy, is nevertheless not in control of the gaze. It is Dubarry who 
commandeers the eyes of the King and, in fact, the film introduces us to Louis XV as he spots 
Madame Dubarry. Her appearance causes his leering vision to neglect all other duties. In contrast 
to the desiring King stands Armand, Dubarry’s former lover, who rejects his own desire for her 
to become the leader of the masses. As Silberman states, “his repression of desire and rejection 
of sexuality allows him to identify fully with the bourgeois revolution.”58
What Lubitsch’s film stages, then, is a competing vision of power in relation to the body. 
The ailing King in his deathbed, a tormented body stricken by smallpox, cries out for Dubarry’s 
creature comforts, but his political power wanes with the demise of his physical power. The film 
concludes with the masses who demand the sacrifice of the body. Madame Dubarry is led onto 
the scaffold and beheaded. Thus the bourgeois revolution begins to exorcise the body as the 
representation of power and institutes a new concept of the masses. This conceptualization of the 
masses, however, hinges on a paradox. As Sabine Hake has shown, the uses of French and 
English history as a subject matter in the Lubitsch films must be understood as a preoccupation 
with the “idea of nationalism,” and, by extension, the concerns of the “cultural sphere,” which 
generated “so many different configurations that the boundaries between text and context almost 
disappeared.”59 This dissolution, she demonstrates, results in the films’ propensity for inviting a 
reactionary interpretation in the relation of the individual body to the masses, an interpretation 
                                                 
57 Ibid., p. 106. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Hake, pp. 79 – 80. 
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which would be generated through the tension produced by the films’ sentiments of regression 
over and against historical fact.  
Therefore, in order to generate this mode of interpretation, the film posits an “extreme 
accessibility to ideological inscriptions that makes their blatant misrepresentation of historical 
fact not a shortcoming but a great advantage in an unscrupulous attack on the historical 
imagination.”60 It is this means of “inscription” that needs to be foregrounded in an 
understanding of how Lubitsch’s films generate their meaning. What this points to is a different 
category of meaning production that cannot be reduced to a text-immanent model or relegated to 
an audience-based reception category. As Hake shows, the films offer their horizons of 
interpretations and provide an intersecting “access to conflicting inscriptions and meanings and 
must therefore be thought of as a site of production rather than a mere product of dominant 
culture or conservative ideology.”61  
If we consider the corporeal figure of Jannings as one important instance at which these 
inscriptions of conflicting modes of thought manifest themselves, then we must take into 
consideration how his body functions as meaning here. Inasmuch as Jannings is the embodiment 
of power, he also expresses the limit of power as physical lust. Even more dramatically than 
Madame Dubarry, Dimitri Buchowetzki’s Danton (1921) stages the French Revolution as the 
fulfillment of physical pleasure and carnal desires. The first deed of Jannings’ Danton is to “seize 
an aristocratic girl” in order to vindicate the droit de seigneur for the masses. The revolutionary 
notion of class, here articulated as a desire according to which Jannings is the representative of 
the masses and therefore fulfills its desires by proxy to enjoy life’s pleasures, comes into conflict 
                                                 
60 Ibid., p. 80. 
61 Ibid., p. 91. 
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with the Robespierre as the representative of the state in its abstraction. In this conflict the 
dichotomy between the mind and the body becomes the primary locus for competing 
articulations of power. 
The difference in type between the stiff Robespierre (Werner Krauss) and frivolous 
Danton is epitomized in a sequence where Robespierre consolidates his power in the Reign of 
Terror. In his function as the ultimate bureaucrat who signs the arrest warrants and thus controls 
the force of the reign of terror, Robespierre gives his signature to the arrest of Danton because 
“the Republic demands it.” In this scene Robespierre wears a dark costume with a large white 
collar that in its rigidity resembles a Calvinist necklace. He is rendered as a pure head, no longer 
attached to any body. His signature inscribes terror, but he has already become a figure of 
abstraction because the hand is writing the words of judgment and his head is without a body. 
Separated at the neck from the rest of his body, Robespierre is the literalization of the Revolution 
in its final consequence. He is already guillotined and, because of this, his head is 
“incorporating” a power run rampant with La Terreur. Yet this literalization, the “head” of the 
Committee of Public Safety who will become the most powerful man in the Republic, is at the 
same time an abstraction, because his power rests on the state to be as a force of “writing.” 
Hence his head is the Republic in its entelechy and final fulfillment, whereas Danton remains the 
representative body of the masses. 
These competing views of power need to be resolved through a recourse to the concept of 
law. This means that in the final tribunal the conflict is played out as the body of the masses 
versus the court of the law to be written. This law sees its power fulfilled by the act of 
summoning the individual citizen. The act of the citizen speaking his name to be recorded in the 
books of the court marks his acceptance of the system of power. The court, therefore, demands 
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the name and address of the accused for the record: “your name, citizen?” says the judge to one 
of Danton’s fellow accused, Herault-Séchelles. In response he spits and demands “wash your 
hands before you write my name!” When Danton is ordered to state his name for the record he 
laughs and the masses surrounding him laugh with him. After he tells them to quiet down, 
Danton mocks the tribunal by stating “my name? Soon in the pantheon of history! My address? 
Soon nowhere!” When the court declares in reply that the “citizen Danton” is accused of being 
an “enemy of the Revolution and of the people,” Jannings heaves his chest with contumacy and 
turns to the masses behind him. “The ‘people’?” he yells and insists that they will decide on the 
final judgment, whereupon the masses flood down from the balcony and jump on the tribunal’s 
desks. 
What is being orchestrated here is a sophisticated battle between the masses as a positive 
bodily force, as incorporated by their representative Jannings, and the arbitrary and destructive 
rule of law, as exemplified by the destructive rampages of Robespierre, structured around the 
question in whose name justice will be delivered. We could consider this the moment of 
culmination for a filmic analysis of the historical film in Weimar Germany by determining that 
this battle coïncides with the reactionary fantasies that the cinema gives rise to. After all, the 
masses here are easily swayed and hence the “masses are as despicable as their leaders,” as 
Siegfried Kracauer declares this film’s implications.62
But, as Kracauer also indicates, there is an excessive tension in the manner in which the 
masses are mobilized here. Indeed, Kracauer admonishes, the spectacle of the masses was not 
confined to the screen but rather an “element” of “German everyday life – a process that reached 
                                                 
62 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film (1947; reprint, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 51. 
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its climax after the war, when no one could avoid encountering them on streets and squares.”63 
Thus, Kracauer continues, “[t]hese masses were more than a weighty social factor; they were as 
tangible as any individual.”64 For Kracauer, the cinema of the time, and especially Lubitsch’s 
films in this respect, attempted to negotiate the position of the individual in relation to the masses 
with the result that mass scenes “decomposed the crowd” to leave the individual figure “as a 
forlorn creature in a world threatened by mass domination.”65 We can therefore speak of a 
tension that these films generate between the individual and the mass. However, what Kracauer 
does not take into account here, is the question of representation if the masses are represented by 
the figure of Jannings.                
This brings us to the question of how his cinematic body relates to the concept of masses. 
In Cinema 2, Gilles Deleuze considers the emergence of the “‘classical’ intellectual cinema” of 
Sergei Eisenstein, for example, and identifies it as a cerebral cinema “which brought together 
pathos and the organic.”66 In this linkage Deleuze traces two axes, the “axis of the law of the 
concept” and “the axis of the law of the image,” both of which, in conjunction, work together to 
produce “the ideal of knowledge as harmonious totality, which sustains this classical 
representation.”67 While it would be difficult to equate the films of Ernst Lubitsch with the 
cinema of Eisenstein, it is nonetheless instructive to consider them as “intellectual” cinema in the 
way that Deleuze understands it. In particular the importance rests here in the model of 
                                                 
63 Ibid., p. 54. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., p. 55. 
66 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 210. 
67 Ibid. 
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“representation” as developed by the two axes. Deleuze defines the “law of the concept” as a 
principle of movement which is constituted “as continually integrating itself into a whole whose 
change it expresses, and as continually differentiating itself in accordance with the objects 
between which it is established.”68 In turn, this movement encounters the “law of the image” 
where “similarity and contiguity determine the way in which we pass from one image to 
another” until both axes converge “in order to achieve the identity of image and concept.”69
Deleuze explicitly remarks on the connection between this mode of signification to that 
of semiology which, via linguistics, “maintained the classic cerebral model, both from the point 
of view of metaphor – metonomy (similarity – contiguity) and from the point of view of the 
syntagm and paradigm (integration – differentiation).”70 And, indeed, Jannings’ proximity to the 
masses in Danton, in stark contrast to Robespierre’s detached paradigm of power, determines his 
metonymic quality to stand in for the desires of the individual by virtue of the congruence of his 
desires with that of the individual within the masses. The figure of Jannings thus incorporates 
two modes of signification within the same tension that Carlo Ginzburg terms the “oscillation 
between representation as a substitute and as mimetic evocation.”71  
As an embodiment of power, Jannings’ body doubles its mode of signification that is 
analogous to a mode of representation which, according to Ginzburg, originates in the 13th 
century: he is both the “effigy” of the ruler, that is, his body substitutes for a dead ruler and thus 
stands in for the “eternal body of the king inasmuch as he was associated with a public 
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 211. 
71 Carlo Ginzburg, “Representation: The Word, The Idea, The Thing” in Wooden Eyes: Nine Reflections on 
Distance, trans. Martin Ryle and Kate Soper (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 63 – 64. 
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institution,” while his “corpse was his ephemeral body inasmuch as he was an individual.”72 This 
tension would also allow for an explanation of why the Lubitsch films demand a recourse to a 
historical subject matter, since, in order to generate an effigy of the ruler, he has to be dead 
already. Moreover, the oscillation between the actual body of the “king” as the rightful ruler and 
his contiguity with the masses confirms Deleuze’s insistence that in the classical cinema, as 
opposed to the modern cinema, the masses are still there. “For in the classical cinema,” Deleuze 
writes, “the people are there, even though they are oppressed, tricked, subject, even though blind 
or unconscious.”73 However, Deleuze notes, the ideal of the cinema as a democratic art is 
compromised by “the rise of Hitler, which gave cinema as its object not the masses become 
subject but the masses subjected.”74 In this process of subjectivization, which recalls the conflict 
of Danton’s refusal to speak his name as a citizen to be recorded, the screen is left devoid of the 
people as a group or a force. 
It is crucial that Deleuze at this point turns to the cinema of the third world because it is 
there that the filmmaker must deal most conspicuously with “the elements of a people who are 
still missing.”75 In addition, Deleuze returns here to Félix Guattari and his idea of a “minor 
literature” by connecting the “minority film-maker” to the “impasse described by Kafka: the 
impossibility of not ‘writing’, the impossibility of writing in the dominant language, the 
impossibility of writing differently, … and it is through this state of crisis that he has to pass, it is 
                                                 
72 Ibid., p. 64. 
73 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, p. 216. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., p. 217. 
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this that has to be resolved.”76 As a critical evolutionary development for Deleuze this crisis can 
even be marked in classical cinema by maintaining a “boundary which marked the correlation of 
the political and the private, and which allowed, through the intermediary of an awareness, 
passage from one social force to another.”77
More importantly, however, this crisis can serve “to constitute an assemblage… as the 
prefiguration of the people who are missing.”78 In doing so, the progressive third world 
filmmaker is able to produce, “not the myth of a past people, but the storytelling of the people to 
come” by articulating “a foreign language in a dominant language, precisely in order to express 
an impossibility of living under domination.”79 Fredric Jameson has linked this impasse in 
representability to the reëmergence of allegory, which, as he claims, “fatally stages its historic 
reappearance in the postmodern era” on a global scale.80 This statement must be examined in 
light of Ohm Krüger because of the film’s allegorization of Emil Jannings and its movement of 
imagining the telos of the history of the German people as a colonized subject on a monumental 
scale.  
In other words, what happens when the problem of the myth of a people yet to come is 
allegorized through the figure of Jannings in Nazi cinema? Marcia Landy has demonstrated how 
                                                 
76 Ibid. Cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: For a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986). 
77 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 218. 
78 Ibid., p. 224. 
79 Ibid., p. 223. 
80 Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1995), pp. 4 – 5. On “allegory” cf. especially Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: 
Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981). 
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the uses of history in Nazi cinema are designed to create a “form of knowledge” that, “associated 
with the ‘mute’ language of melodrama, is commonsensical experience buttressed by folklore 
that passes as official history.”81 What Landy emphasizes, furthermore, is the way in which Nazi 
cinema creates metaleptic explanations of historical narratives, all while mobilizing and inverting 
“tradition and modernity, science and folklore, promiscuity and conjugal rectitude, same-sex 
desire and heterosexuality” into “fluid categories.”82 It is this emphasis on the fluidity, 
reversibility and mobilization of binary categories in the service of generating a normativity that 
understands itself primarily through the ultimate dichotomy of “the ‘elect’ and the ‘dammed,’” as 
Landy puts it,83 that needs to be analyzed here. 
If the “organic” development of Jannings into the figure of the leader begins with his 
incorporation of a dual understanding of the leader in Lubitsch’s films, his subsequent films will 
frequently emphasize the question of power as configured through the concept of authority. 
Nonetheless, this evocation of power in relation to authority remains grounded in a cinematic 
understanding of the body. In this respect the body of Jannings remains “excessive” within his 
films, not merely because of a larger-than-life presence, but also because he signifies beyond the 
textual framework of a particular filmic narrative. This extratextual dimension of signification 
forces us to consider the boundaries or framework within which meaning is determined in his 
films. Jannings himself was fond of this notion of an extraterritorial area, which he would have 
                                                 
81 Marcia Landy, Cinematic Uses of the Past, p. 241. 
82 Ibid., p. 242. 
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called a “romanticism” that is “not of this world.”84 Jannings celebrated this “romanticism of the 
underworld”85 because it gave rise to the counter-narratives of quotidian life.   
In the silent horror film Das Wachsfigurenkabinett (Waxworks, Paul Leni, 1924) the issue 
of boundaries is integrated into the narrative of the film, which depicts three discrete stories as 
they are conjured up by a young man who is employed in the “panopticon” display of waxworks 
at a carnival. His duty is to “write startling tales about these figures” and the first and most 
elaborate story he concocts concerns the figure of the Caliph of Baghdad, Harun al-Rashid (Emil 
Jannings). Since the wax figure has lost its arm, the “narrator” of the film, who is here rendered 
as the writer of stories, proceeds to write down the story of how the Caliph “lost his arm.” 
Beginning by writing down the name, we see how the writer enunciates this figure on the page as 
“the most romantic and mischief-loving ruler of the age” who, “above all, hated monotony.” The 
figures turn into characters as we are transported across the boundaries of fiction and time, and 
Harun al-Rashid is revealed to be a voluminous and voluptuous entity, which, by evoking once 
more the notion of dissolving boundaries, merges with the billowing pillows on which he is 
seated. 
When the Caliph becomes bored he summons his Vizier, an enunciatory act which is 
rendered as a written caption of “Wesier!” that emerges from a medium close-up of Jannings’ 
face.86 The two then begin a scheme to seduce Zarah, the beautiful wife of Assad the Baker, 
                                                 
84 Emil Jannings, “Romanticizing the Criminal in Film,” (1929) reprinted in Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, Edward 
Dimendberg, eds., The Weimar Republic Sourcebook (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1995), p. 629.  
85 Ibid. 
86 In the English-language version of the film this moment is “translated” by the insertion of a still photograph of 
Jannings from which the moving caption “Vizier!” emanates. 
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which threatens to unravel when the suspicious Assad enters the palace bedroom and sneaks 
upon the sleeping Caliph in order to hack off his arm. At the same time, however, the Caliph is 
seen charming Zarah. The solution to this temporal and spatial incongruity is revealed when 
Assad, hunted by the palace guards, returns to his house and Zarah has to conceal the enormous 
Caliph in the oven, which is the only place big enough to provide a hiding-place. Zarah stops the 
approaching guards by summoning the body of the “murdered” Caliph who emerges petulantly 
from the oven. We find out that the Caliph is able to pursue his nocturnal passions by leaving a 
wax effigy of himself in the palace bed and it is this one-armed effigy that remains in the 
panopticon. 
Such antics might certainly confirm the permeability of narrative boundaries that the film 
constructs and it is noteworthy how ingeniously the film manages to invert the limitations of 
technology to by highlighting the use of writing and the written text in the film as exemplary 
instances of mobility and fluidity. But apart from its recourse to a playful version of an early 
mode of representation of the king in Ginzburg’s sense, the film also invests a sense of dread in 
evoking wax figures that come to life. In this respect, the film brings into play the mobile 
ubiquity of the Caliph’s sexual powers but then takes pains to reduce this power, as if the 
colossal bodily mass of Jannings’ Caliph in the opening sequence87 needs to be contained within 
                                                 
87 While I do not want to put too much of an emphasis on an intertextual trajectory that is suggested by a 
contemporary reference point in popular culture, it is worth noting that, given George Lucas’ “homage” to Leni 
Reifenstahl’s Triumph of the Will at the conclusion of his 1977 film Star Wars, Jannings here appears strikingly 
similar to the “Jabba the Hutt” character (in Star Wars: Episode VI - The Return of the Jedi, Richard Marquand, 
USA 1983), a gargantuan Orientalized mass of mediaeval sexual appetite.   
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a bowdlerized version of an upbeat Arabian Nights tale.88 What this points to is an interesting 
unease surrounding the body as a locus of power. 
The relation between writing and the body, then, is marked in Das Wachsfigurenkabinett 
as a figure of replication and substitution. A narrative is inscribed onto the screen for the waxen 
replica of the body, which enables the film’s mobility to move to an archaic fantasy space of 
Baghdad. This narrative, in turn, becomes a comic account of how the wax figure substitutes for 
the real body of the Caliph, so that his physical needs can be attended to. The possibility of 
terror, which the film evokes by using wax figures, is relegated into the ostensible safety of the 
written account of a fantastical past. However, in the shift from writing to image, the film also 
engages a fear of the indeterminacy between figure and body or between image and 
impersonation. The wax figures on display in the panopticon are replicas that the film brings to 
“life” and yet their presence indicates a doubling effect by which the figures are both alive and 
dead, present and absent, at the same time. This doubling, of course, constitutes the foundation of 
the cinematic image itself, but what the film achieves here is to narrativize this dilemma by 
posing it as a problem of replication in the doubling of the body itself. 
Carlo Ginzburg has demonstrated that this understanding of figures of substitution 
predates the later emergence of the category of a more abstract representation, which had 
profound influences “in the spheres of theology and of political liturgy” of the thirteenth 
century.89 The consequences of this, therefore, Ginzburg argues, result in a “domesticating 
                                                 
88 In the conclusion of this sequence, Zarah elicits for her husband the position of Court Baker, while the Caliph 
does not get to consummate his desires for Zarah.   
89 Carlo Ginzburg, “Representation: The Word, The Idea, The Thing,” p. 78. 
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images,” a process that minimizes the “fear of idolatry” through abstraction.90 Most importantly, 
Ginzburg concludes, is the “dogma of transubstantiation” in this regard, because it indicates that 
it, “inasmuch as it denied sense data in the name of a profound and invisible reality, may be 
interpreted  … as an extraordinary victory of abstraction.”91 In the mode of doubling the 
presence of the Caliph as a figure and a body, the film resorts to the invocation of the dilemma 
between presence and absence. Indeed, the film concludes with a brief episode in which the 
writer of the stories embedded within the film becomes trapped in a nightmare of his own 
writing, where he himself is hunted by Jack the Ripper until he awakes from his own self-
produced fantasy.92
Without branching out into a larger discussion of the leadership roles that Jannings after 
these initial successes took on subsequently, it may suffice to point out that the figure of 
Jannings frequently becomes the site around which issues of power and authority are articulated. 
In fact, Kenneth Calhoon has specifically argued that to analyze Jannings’ screen dominance 
means “to acknowledge the place of the body in the history of modern domination.”93 Calhoon 
points to a paradox in representation that concerns both the position of the king in absolutism and 
the architecture of power in the Third Reich: how to “sustain the centrality of the king’s [and the 
                                                 
90 Ibid., p. 77. 
91 Ibid., p. 78. 
92 Apparently the film ends rather abruptly because Paul Leni was denied further financial backing by the studio. 
Nonetheless, this ending seems congruent with the importance the film places on the “real” consequences of abstract 
writing and thus emblematizes its own dilemma.    
93 Kenneth S. Calhoon, “Emil Jannings, Falstaff, and the Spectacle of the Body Natural,” Modern Language 
Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 1997): 83.  
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Führer’s] person in the face of ever more abstract and impersonal forms of control.”94 Calhoon 
explicitly draws the connection to the “idiom of the baroque” here,95 since Jannings, as 
“Falstaff’s heir, activates a voice that interprets a twentieth-century crisis in light of an earlier 
shift in power and its representation.”96
Calhoon argues that in Henry IV the duality between the king’s body and his role is 
facilitated by Falstaff, so that his “ultimate abandonment marks a consolidation of power that 
leaves the body behind as discarded ballast.”97 According to Calhoon, this divergence between 
power and the body finds its ultimate fulfillment in the absolutist state, which, therefore becomes 
a problem for the historical film in the Third Reich since absolutism attempts to “sustain the 
centrality of the king’s person in the face of ever more abstract and impersonal forms of 
executive control.”98 The strategies by which representations of the monarch in Nazi cinema 
therefore address this divergence is through the body of Emil Jannings as an incorporation of the 
leader, whose “irresistible physicality appears to satisfy a general nostalgia” and thus “supplies a 
palpability that the hollow spectacle of Nazi power could not even simulate.”99 In the figure of 
Jannings Nazi cinema latches on to a mode of physical embodiment of power that Jannings had 
already performed in Der blaue Engel (Joseph von Sternberg, 1929). In this film the palpable 
and physical authority of Jannings results in a “grotesque martyrdom,” which, in its semblance to 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., p. 96 (following Rainer Nägele). 
96 Ibid., p. 89. 
97 Ibid., p. 86. 
98 Ibid., p. 83. 
99 Ibid., p. 84. 
  286
a crucifixion, “stages a regression to an irreducible physicality – and sadness – at which the body 
reverberates with a creatural agony that negates transcendence.”100  
Calhoon’s argument focuses on the centrality of this abject return to a physical suffering 
that characterizes the figure of the ruler in Nazi cinema. In order to ground the abstract functions 
of power, historical films in the Nazi period necessitate “a renewed physicality that counteracts 
the disembodiment required by the political absolute.”101 Calhoon draws an explicit connection 
between this fascination with the decline of physical authority at a time of abstracted power and 
the function of allegory. While Calhoon references Walter Benjamin’s The Origin of the German 
Tragic Drama in this context, he does not emphasize the convergence between the baroque 
Trauerspiel and its depiction of the king’s suffering as the passion of Christ. Benjamin insists on 
the structural similarity between the martyrdom of the king in the Trauerspiel and of Christ: 
“Just as Christ, the King, suffered in the name of mankind, so, in the eyes of the writers of the 
baroque, does royalty in general.”102
Jannings’ body thus enacts a suffering of sheer physical power in the name of a larger 
entity. Understood in this way, Jannings comes to embody the suffering of the people by an act 
of substitution. It is this intertextual point of reference that we need to keep in mind in order to 
adequately evaluate the significance of his depiction of monarchs, rulers, and father figures. To 
contemporary audiences, of course, his corporeal filmic presence would have readily been 
associated with the hyperdramatized decline of the Weimar petit bourgeois citizen in the films 
The Last Laugh and the Blue Angel. In both cases an imposing authority figure is reduced to a 
                                                 
100 Ibid., p. 106. 
101 Ibid., p. 108. 
102 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 1996), p. 73. 
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pathetic figure of abject humiliation. The Hotel Doorman in The Last Laugh, whose 
commandeering presence is bolstered by a gigantic fantasy uniform, an eclectic assemblage of 
part Prussian military style, part Napoleonic general, and a large dose of Hotel Atlantic corporate 
identity, is demoted to the hotel’s washroom, where he awaits his end with tired, drooping eyes 
and shoulders slumped. This form of corporal punishment is repeated in The Blue Angel, where 
Professor Rath is reduced to Professor Unrat. In a clown’s costume and croaking like a rooster, 
Professor Unrat, before a man of high standing and authority, now cowers as a man who has 
been subjected to the epitome of humiliation. The abject state in which Jannings as the authority 
figure is reduced to animalistic cries at the end of The Blue Angel certainly brings a physical 
dimension to the crisis of authority. His body in grotesque postures exemplifies the decline and 
fall of the Kleinbürger. But having suffered his ultimate moment of despair and ridicule, Rath 
returns to his classroom where he dies. The question, however, then becomes in whose name 
such defeat and such sacrifice are being staged.103  
This motif of humiliation and its obverse manifestation as a matter of honor is, of course, 
a very prominent theme in the cinema of the Third Reich.104 It has been frequently remarked that 
both characters can be understood as representative of the Weimar German post-war middle 
class. Siegfried Kracauer describes Professor Unrat and the Hotel Porter as one “archetypal” 
character, who, “instead of becoming an adult, engages in a process of retrogression effected 
                                                 
103 In a profound fusion of the voice with the figure of authority, Jannings also narrated the first Ufa sound newsreel 
in an “‘upbeat talking-picture speech’” on Sept. 10, 1930. Cf. Klaus Kreimeier, The Ufa Story (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press), p. 177.  Of course, Jannings also embodied the star persona as the first 
winner of the “Oscar” awards. 
104 Cf. for example, Die Reise nach Tilsit (Veit Harlan, 1939). 
  288
with ostentatious self-pity”105 and thus concludes that “in the wake of retrogression terrible 
outbursts of sadism are inevitable.”106 If we regard these narratives of physical conversion 
therefore as indicative of a larger mental malaise, to follow Kracauer, they may serve to point to 
the question of how to negotiate between the body of the actor and the body politic. This may 
seem self-evident on a narrative level in the sense that these films enact the story of the social 
downfall of the individual. Yet this downfall seems to be linked to the problem of witnessing 
suffering as a public spectacle vis-à-vis its revelation in private. The penultimate downfall of 
both the Hotel Porter and Professor Unrat takes place in the public sphere.  
Nonetheless, their final defeat is witnessed by no one except the film’s actual or imagined 
audiences. No one, that is, except for the substitute figures who witness the same moments of 
defeat that the audiences witness and thus stand in for the larger crowds. These figures are the 
clown and school beadle in The Blue Angel, whom Kracauer describes as the two “mute” figures 
of the film. They “witness,” Kracauer states, “but do not participate. Whatever they may feel, 
they refrain from interference. Their silent resignation foreshadows the passivity of many people 
under totalitarian rule.”107 In the same manner, the benevolent night porter in The Last Laugh, 
whose flashlight illuminates the dying figure of Emil Jannings before his miraculous 
resurrection, never utters a word. Their place within the film is to substitute for our own lack of 
interfering power. The masses that partake in the witnessing of these moments of defeat find 
their corresponding figure within the film. They are reduced to a single figure of acceptance, 
male, mute, and powerless.  
                                                 
105 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film, p. 218.  
106 Ibid., p. 222. 
107 Ibid., p. 218. 
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Apart from the fact that the implied spectatorial gaze is gendered as male here by an act 
of substitution, the significance of this substitution lies in the moment where the act of 
witnessing is now no longer a public spectacle but rather takes place in private. While the 
witnesses in both The Last Laugh and The Blue Angel are representatives of the very class 
stratum into which the protagonists tragically descend, they stand in for the audience as well. The 
Blue Angel adds a disciplinary dimension to the notion of witnessing as well. When the Professor 
collapses on his desk, the camera repeats a movement that it has performed several times 
throughout the film, namely a tracking shot pulling away from the Professor’s desk toward the 
back rows of the students’ desk. In the final sequence, of course, the students’ benches are 
empty. But the seats in the movie theaters, by implication, will be filled with audience members 
witnessing this spectacle of defeat. The suggestion here is that the gaze which bears witness to 
the Professor’s death has in some way been implicated in it. The masses in the crowded 
nightclub from the sequence before are now absent, yet the desire to witness humiliation has 
come to its logical conclusion. The death of the authority figures is staged before the students in 
the audience. The destructive desire of the masses has found its victim, who is now slumped and, 
in his rigid posture as he clings to the wood, crucified on his desk. 
The difficulty of this tragedy of the fall from power and grace lies in determining exactly 
what kind of affective registers are enacted here. In Kracauer’s terms, the film enacts a 
regressive fantasy whereby the authority figure is revealed to be the “archetypal character” of 
“the philistine” he has always been.108 At the same time, the film mobilizes the inherent 
“sadism” of the masses who “are irresistibly attracted by the spectacle of torture and 
                                                 
108 Ibid. 
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humiliation,”109 as Kracauer states. But even if this were the case, the ending suggests an 
awareness of Kracauer’s insight. “Look what you have done to this formerly irreproachable man 
of integrity” the final scenes seem to say, while they offer up the corpse of a former tyrant or 
authoritarian ruler at the same time. In this wavering oscillation between these two registers of 
meaning, the film places the spectator in a position of blame. By emphasizing the rows of empty 
school benches the film insists on a disciplinary resolution. Like a student on the bench, the 
spectator is differentiated from the earlier masses as an individual and called upon to reflect on 
what his desires have wrought. 
Through this differentiation, which at the same time is attached to a testimony in silence, 
the individual bears the responsibility for the action of the masses. The figure of authority, then, 
is emblematized in its sacrifice for the desire of the masses, yet the individual is made to reflect 
on their consequences. This move inverts the structure of power by showing the frailty of the 
leader and by displacing the blame for his failure onto the individual. Yet the divestiture of 
power yields no actual conclusion. It demands to be witnessed in silence and without consequent 
action. These instances of mute witnessing, therefore, articulate a loss of the connection between 
the power of the masses and the individual.  
Without necessarily putting this observation into a teleological sequence that prefigures 
the manner in which the cinema of the Nazi period will attempt to discipline the spectator, it is 
important to note that the iconography of the body in suffering as a trope will remain crucial for 
depicting the relation between the masses and the individual beyond Weimar cinema. Thus, the 
reason the figure of Jannings returns to embody the body of power in the cinema of the Third 
Reich can be found in the connection between the sovereign as frail and fallible and as the 
                                                 
109 Ibid., p. 217. 
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embodiment of the abstract state of power. The masses, then, have no place on the screen 
because they are no longer important for the configuration of power; rather, they are addressed as 
individuals in relation to what they are witnessing. The religious dimension of witnessing the 
figure of the sovereign as a burdened individual yields a disciplinary paradox of implication for 
the spectator. As a trope, the genealogy of this mode can be explicitly linked to its baroque 
manifestation in the German Trauerspiel. As Benjamin makes clear, the “downfall of the tyrant” 
cannot yield an “easy moral satisfaction, … [f]or if the tyrant falls, not simply in his own name, 
but as a ruler and in the name of mankind and history, then his fall has the quality of a judgment, 
in which the subject too is implicated.”110
In this sense we can understand Benjamin’s dictum that the “function of the tyrant is the 
restoration of order in the state of emergency: a dictatorship whose utopian goal will always be 
to replace the unpredictability of historical accident with the iron constitution of the laws of 
nature”111 in the baroque drama also functions for the cinematic representations of power in the 
historical dramas of Nazi cinema. The abdication and suffering of power results in a secular 
martyrdom that keeps in place the utopia of a natural law in history. Benjamin connects this 
function to a concomitant female figure of chastity whose role is “to establish a corresponding 
fortification against a state of emergency in the soul, the rule of emotions.”112  
In cinematic terms this doubling of roles, the tyrant as the embodiment of the desire for 
order set against a female figure who is fortified against an “affective” state of disorder, is staged 
as a disciplinary conception that individualizes the spectator. By implicating the spectator as the 
                                                 
110 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 72. 
111 Ibid., p. 74. 
112 Ibid. 
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subject who witnesses the male tyrant in his downfall, the responsibility for what we see is 
shifted to the individual. Despite its status as a mass spectacle, the cinema here goes to great 
lengths in order to ensure that the individualization of power is replicated in the individualization 
of the spectator as silent witness. This replication becomes important again when we consider 
how Jannings comes to embody the leader of the Boers in Ohm Krüger.  
So far, the discussion of Jannings has been circuitous in the sense that these layers of 
meaning do not pertain directly to the narrative of the film Ohm Krüger itself, but open up the 
question of how the film contains meaning in both senses of the word. That is, what has been 
described above must be brought to bear on the meanings inflected within the film in order to 
determine how to understand it. On the one hand, this indicates that our discussion of how a film 
signifies must take into consideration the authorial inscriptions that the film’s star contributes in 
the production of meaning. On the other hand this also points to the question of what to include 
in the interpretation of meaning, or, respectively, what to exclude from the horizons of 
signification. In this context, the term “excess” has been useful to indicate a range of meaning 
beyond the narrative level, but in order to take seriously this form of meaning production, the 
shift away from Kristen Thompson’s concept of “cinematic excess” as a way of quantifying the 
textual and aesthetic operations of meaning is necessary.  
Rather than using an “excessive” category of meaning that permits a viewer who “is no 
longer constrained by conventions of reading” in order to turn the filmic work into a “perceptual 
field of structures which the viewer is free to study at length,”113 the problem of excess points to 
the very limit of meaning production itself. It is at this “excessive” level of meaning that the 
                                                 
113 Kristen Thompson, “The Concept of Cinematic Excess,” in Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory 
Reader, ed. Philip Rosen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 141. 
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textual work points to its own aporias and postulates a mode of interpretation that follows these 
markers of irresolution carefully. Such a mode of rigorous interpretation seems particularly 
relevant for a cinema that is a priori discussed as having ramifications beyond and outside the 
textual framework, namely propaganda films in general and Nazi cinema in particular. The 
problem lies precisely in the act of recognition that sees a film as generating levels of meaning 
that cannot be restricted to the text itself, yet refuses to take this insight seriously. What is cast 
into relief, then, is the emergence of a necessity to consider the very foundations that extend or 
support the frames of meaning within a text.              
Jacques Derrida has been instrumental in addressing this question from a perspective that 
traces a mode of signification which runs across textual and interpretive frameworks and 
exposes these frames as the precondition that enables a distinction “between the internal or 
proper sense and the circumstances of the object being talked about.”114 The result of this 
distinction “organizes all philosophical discourses on art, the meaning of art and meaning as 
such” by presupposing a “discourse on the limit between the inside and outside of the art object, 
here a discourse on the frame.”115 Derrida emphasizes the parergon here as exemplifying that 
which lies neither within “the work (ergon) nor outside the work [hors d’oeuvre], neither above 
nor below,” so that “it disconcerts any opposition but does not remain indeterminate and it gives 
rise to the work.”116   
                                                 
114 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), p. 45. 
115 Ibid. (Emphasis in original.) 
116 Ibid., p. 9. (Emphasis in original.) 
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In particular, the problematics inherent in the distinction between what constitutes a text 
and what constitutes an image as Derrida describes it in The Truth in Painting will become 
relevant later on, but for now his discussion of the Kantian use of the term colossal is 
immediately pertinent in this respect. In considering the colossal as a concept which, by virtue of 
its prodigious and “monstrous” qualities, cannot be presented adequately because “it is ‘almost 
too large,’” Derrida formulates the question of “how are we to think, in the presence of a 
presentation, the standing-there-upright (Darstellen) of an excess of size which remains merely 
almost excessive, at the barely crossed edge of a limiting line [trait]? And which is incised, so to 
speak, in excess?”117 In other words, the colossal determines that which is in and of itself too 
excessive to be contained in a presentation and therefore eludes the framing of representation. 
However, in its excessive character the colossal provides the edge of a limiting line that outlines 
the excessive dimension. 
This emphasis on the colossal brings us back to the excessive corporeal presence that 
accompanies a Jannings’ film and defines his acting style throughout his career. It needs to be 
analyzed in relation to existing studies on the functions of the body in fascism because Jannings’ 
physical presence embodies a mode that does not necessarily correspond to the groundbreaking 
work done by Klaus Theweleit. While Theweleit investigates the mechanisms by which 
corporeal materiality becomes abstracted and channeled in fascism,118 Jannings’ physical 
embodiment of leaders offers a countermovement that in its excessive materiality complements 
the dissolution of the individual body within the larger structures of fascism.  
                                                 
117 Ibid., p. 125. (Emphasis in original.) 
118 Cf. Klaus Theweleit, Männerphantasien, Bd. 2: Männerkörper. Zur Psychoanalyse des weißen Terrors (Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995).  
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One of Theweleit’s immense contributions to the analysis of the functions of the body in 
and for fascism explains how the unity that is created out of the masses of the people 
presupposes a power relation in which unity does not equate equality. Rather, “the unity of 
which the fascist speaks is a … forceful merging of oppressor and oppressed into a power 
structure [Herrschaftsgebilde]. Indeed, unity in general indicates a power relation, not an equal 
relation. Equality would be heterogeneity, masses; it is precisely the opposite of ‘unity,’ which is 
necessarily constructed out of above/below, outside/inside, etc.”119 Following Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari’s concept of the molar “paranoid-fascist” formations that describe the 
developments in the organization of masses, Theweleit investigates the transition of unruly and 
chaotic masses into “the people.” The masses become clustered into the unity of a people by the 
influence of a leader who molds the masses into a people. Theweleit demonstrates how this 
conception is already in place in the writing of Goebbels’ 1929 novel Michael or in the works of 
the author Hans Blüher, who declares that “the masses become the people when they obey,” and 
thus draws an analogy to a magnetic field which arranges the people in “formation”: “‘the 
masses’ have to be shown their place by gun shots and rifle butts; ‘the people,’ by contrast, seem 
to be the kind of ‘below’ which willingly forms itself into one of the ‘unities’ that the ruler 
man/race/nation needs in order to rule.”120
The explicit coercion that such a physical transformation necessitates finds its 
correspondence in the cultural configurations that represent these practices to the mass audiences 
in the cinema. By focusing on this relation between coercion and consensus, “[t]he object is not 
to obscure or minimize the barbarism of Fascism but to assess its forms differently,” as Marcia 
                                                 
119 Ibid., pp. 89 – 90. (Translation mine.)   
120 Ibid., p. 97. (Translation mine.) 
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Landy notes, in order “to interrogate the complex and contradictory ways in which social 
relations came to be represented and particularly its relation to conceptions of consensus.”121 It is 
at this intersection, where the formation of the masses into a people as it is reflected to the 
masses that will constitute the cinema’s audience, that Ohm Krüger indicates how complex and 
contradictory these mechanisms are indeed. 
Therefore, one of the fundamental instances which provides insight into how such 
contradictions are expressed belongs to the category of writing as figuration. Just as the figure of 
Jannings inscribes its complex layers of meaning into the film, actual instances of the process of 
inscription serve to demonstrate the film’s difficulties in mitigating the tensions generated by its 
own form. Such mitigating mechanisms can be located from the outset in the film’s credit 
sequence which is characterized by a “modern” typography superimposed over wooden grooves 
with an elaborate orchestral score. This suggests both permanence and contemporaneous 
ephemerality at the same time. The use of a typescript that evokes a relevance to contemporary, 
that is, “modern” preoccupations which the film will generate is nonetheless grounded in an 
organic and naturally progressive sense of history as depicted through the image of timber, 
engraved with the curvatures of time. In accordance with its production history described above 
and the significance of the figure of Jannings, the film is billed as “ein Emil Jannings-Film.”122
Noteworthy here is the duration in the transition between names of the cast of characters: 
following the relatively brief appearance of the name Emil Jannings as “Ohm Krüger,” because 
                                                 
121 Marcia Landy, The Folklore of Consensus: Theatricality in the Italian Cinema, 1930 – 1943 (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1998), p. 19. 
122 This is followed by “Gesamtleitung Emil Jannings” with a script by Harald Bratt and Kurt Heuser, “unter freier 
Benutzung von Motiven aus dem Roman · Mann ohne Volk · von Arnold Krieger.” Cf. Wallstein, “Ohm Krüger,” 
for a discussion of the connections between the film’s adaptation and the original novel.  
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of the ostensible nominal fusion between both names into one entity, the title of Ferdinand 
Marian’s name, playing Cecil Rhodes, lingers considerably longer on the screen than all other 
actors’ names and is accompanied by a musical transition from triumphant to ominous. This 
serves as a cue to both the characteristics of his fictional character and the fictitious nature of his 
acting. In terms of the duration of the written names on the screen, Marian’s name stands in 
tribute to his acting skills. Here name and character must not be fused, but, on the contrary, need 
to be disarticulated in order to emphasize the performative aspect of Marian playing Rhodes, 
again confirming what Linda Schulte-Sasse has observed, namely that “the first five minutes of 
any Nazi film feature generally tells us where our emotional alignment belongs.”123 As part of 
the cast billing, Jannings as the first name thus remains on-screen here for five seconds, whereas 
Marian’s name stays on for a full 12 seconds. All other on-screen single credit names are 
exchanged after a brief period of circa three seconds.  
Precisely because this is a minute detail that might not be encapsulated in any particular 
narrative trajectory, especially as it is situated within a credit sequence, which by this virtue, is 
clearly demarcated as outside of the filmic diegesis, this shift in duration signals an important 
“pedagogical” impetus and already prefigures the film’s subsequent relation to its audience. First 
and foremost, this mechanism of linking the typography of the star’s name with a shift in the 
musical soundtrack suggests a peculiar dimension of scale. The film here goes to great lengths to 
imbue a small detail with significance and the screen writing of the credit sequence thus 
functions as a moment of mise-en-abyme by which the film’s larger formal concerns are 
replicated within smaller entities of meaning. While this may indicate a tight level of control that 
                                                 
123 Linda Schulte-Sasse, Entertaining the Third Reich, p. 232. 
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is generated through an “aggressive coherence” of form,124 it also signals an metonymical 
understanding of how small details within the film stand in relation to larger parts. Already in the 
credit sequence, akin to the introduction of themes and motifs in an orchestral overture, the film 
sets out to determine how the minute will relate to the monumental and how history will resonate 
with contemporary concerns.   
Moreover, by highlighting the name of Ferdinand Marian through the use of a prolonged 
duration and the score’s shift in tonal register, this moment in the credit sequence serves to 
underscore the audience’s familiarity with Marian as the actor who portrayed Joseph Suess 
Oppenheimer in Jud Süß (Veit Harlan, 1940) and seems intent on conditioning an “appropriate” 
response to the figure of Cecil Rhodes by invoking a predetermined intertextual yoking of the 
figures of Rhodes, Oppenheimer, and Marian, and the larger association of the British Empire 
with Jews, which, while implicit, will structure the film in general. In this respect, the film’s 
credit sequence already indicates the investment that Ohm Krüger will place in the relation of 
individual figures to their historical significance and how the film will extrapolate their relation 
to each other. What is important, therefore, is how the film already assumes in its credit sequence 
the position of an audience for whom this film, under the disguise of a biopic, will elaborate the 
relation encoded by the actors’ iconography as stars. That is, the audience’s knowledge of the 
star figures of Jannings and Marian already determines and postulates how these figures will 
signify as historical characters.     
In order to emphasize this understanding of history that the film posits, the opening 
sequence makes explicit how the film assumes its own audience. The aging Ohm Krüger, having 
lost the war against Great Britain, has taken refuge in a Swiss sanatorium. Here an international 
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press corps has assembled, eager to write up dismissive gossip about a failed head of state. 
French, American, and British journalists congregate in the hotel lobby and attempt to garner an 
interview with Krüger in exile. In their eagerness to gain access to Krüger the journalists reveal 
themselves to be both sensationalist and self-absorbed. Rather than a concern with history in the 
making, they display a petty concern with scandal and “politics.” Linda Schulte-Sasse notes how 
this sequence alludes to a Weimar print culture that is identified as Jewish and as an instrument 
of capitalism.125 In contradistinction to the bustle down below, Krüger’s room is solemn and 
dark. Krüger’s eminent physician is told by a nurse that he no longer tolerates light and the 
physician, having noticed newspapers next to Krüger, informs him that they are “poison” for him 
since he should no longer concern himself with worldly matters.  
At this moment one of the pertinacious journalists gains access to the room and insists on 
taking a picture. The flashlight illuminates an aging figure sitting upright in a chair. With its rigid 
and immobile posture, its eyes seemingly hollowed out by black sunglasses, the figure resembles 
a death mask of a corpse. This is how we are introduced to “Paulus ‘Oom’ Kruger.” The camera 
imposes its flashing light onto a corporeal dying figure that bears no resemblance to the 
“historical” or abstract image of a famous Boer leader. The paradoxical importance of this 
introductory image lies in the very distinction that the film sets up from the outset here. By 
positing the physicality of the protagonist as a briefly illuminated face of death, the film on the 
one hand already insists on the impossibility to reconcile fleeting physical presence with 
historical abstraction. Yet on the other hand the film will mobilize a significant amount of textual 
force to counteract this very claim.  
                                                 
125 Linda Schulte-Sasse, Entertaining the Third Reich, p. 288. 
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To be sure, we are witness to the impending death of Krüger, yet for us his image is 
reduced to a brief ghostlike flash. The death mask of his face records the potential futility of 
connecting historical achievements to this particular body and the fact that this image of the body 
has been captured by the camera underscores the distance between the knowledge of history and 
the actual person. In this sense, the film seems to suggest that the person we see on the screen 
cannot yet be reconciled with our knowledge of Oom Kruger the historical figure. The 
illumination of Krüger as a “living corpse,” as it were, highlights the inherent contradiction of 
the photographic medium that records and captures a moment of life, but, in so doing, is linked 
inexorably to death because the photograph itself, frozen in its own temporality, becomes the 
ghost-image of life. We are introduced to a great leader in his moment of decline. His face now 
resembles a skull with hollow eyes, his skin is pale and white and lifeless, and his body remains 
rigidly immobile, tightly secured under a heavy blanket on which his hands rest. 
The image presents us with an emblem of power in its impotence, yet the opening 
sequence mobilizes a divergent notion of the figure of the leader. While Ohm Krüger is by now a 
mere effigy in the sanatorium, that is, an empty shell of the king’s body, the film will attempt to 
“resurrect” this dying body. In its initial preoccupation with death, the film therefore uses the 
figure of Krüger as an allegorical mode of signification, which, as Walter Benjamin has 
determined, confronts the observer “with the facies hippocratica of history as a petrified, 
primordial landscape.”126 Here history resides in the dying body and yet this very history has not 
yet been “written” by the film.      
This impasse creates a twofold tension. On the one hand, it assumes that the physical 
body of history is fragile, aging, and “decomposing” in the sense that the body has become 
                                                 
126 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 166. 
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merely an old shell of a great spirit. In this respect it also emphasizes the distance between 
contemporary audiences and history by already evoking the question of what it is, exactly, that 
“history” records. Here, “history” records the banalities of a dying and immobile body, suffering 
from “eye trouble,”127 and the photograph captures only a corpselike ghost. Yet at the same time, 
the dying body promises to deliver its history as “natural” because the baroque function of 
allegory is, in Benjamin's words, to show that “[e]verything about history that, from the very 
beginning, has been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed in a face – or rather in a 
death’s head.”128 The very beginning of the film, then, demonstrates the progress of history as 
pitiful and “unsuccessful,” but it turns the linear temporal progression of this process into a 
metaleptic narrative by showing the results before the causes and by emphasizing the conclusion 
of defeat before embarking on a cinematic reincarnation of the dying figure before us.   
By contrast to this allegorization, the journalists as the chroniclers of the first version of 
history are merely engaged in the politics of gossip and sensationalism. Their interest consists 
solely in the newsworthiness of how Krüger is dying in exile. Schulte-Sasse remarks how this 
moment emphasizes the film’s privileging a conception of history as speech, as an “oral history” 
which “becomes a vehicle of Truth juxtaposed with the distorted truth propagated by the press as 
a ‘machine’ of capitalism.”129 The obsession with recording the impending death of Krüger 
marks the journalists as interested only in the fleeting moments of physicality. In other words, 
the archive of history as newspaper documents and photographs provides no insights into the real 
                                                 
127 “Der Herr Präsident ist augenkrank,” the nurse tells the intruding journalist. Schulte-Sasse notes that the reporter 
is from the Berliner Tageblatt, “a well-known ‘Jewish’ newspaper.” Cf. Schulte-Sasse, Entertaining the Third 
Reich, p. 288. 
128 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 166. 
129 Linda Schulte-Sasse, Entertaining the Third Reich, p. 288. 
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concept of history as the film imagines it. Yet at the same time the film shares this baroque 
fascination with the body of history. But instead of the record of newspapers, the pictures of 
which will arrest and capture only a momentary glimpse of the dying Krüger, the film promises 
to provide a different view of history. “Are we alone, Nurse?” asks Krüger and orders his nurse 
to open the curtains, despite the fact that he can no longer distinguish between light and dark. As 
the nurse opens the window, light floods the room and illuminates the figure. What is striking 
here is the intensity with which the light beams emblaze Krüger, intensified even more by the 
off-screen noise of first the curtains and then the blinds opening until Krüger is able to sense “the 
warmth of the sun on his skin.” This is the flash of the photograph elongated into a “slow 
motion” illumination that only film can provide, so that we are now seeing clearly the person 
who until now has remained a brief glimpse and a disembodied voice.  
This differentiation between the newspaper photograph’s flash of the momentary and the 
long literal illumination that the film provides is reflected in and linked to another significant 
dichotomy as well. Krüger insists that his nurse read him the newspaper accounts. As she reads 
to him in a quaint Swiss-accented German from a resolutely celebratory article in The Times 
about the loss of Boer independence and the glory of the British Empire, she hesitates when she 
comes to a line reporting a general pardon with “the exception of one person.” Sensing the 
divergence between the malicious writing in her hands and the blind figure who constitutes “the 
exception” before her eyes, she assures him that nobody who knows him in person will believe 
such a story. Krüger, however, pronounces apodictically that “the world forgets fast” and that 
such lies will be believed if they are only repeated often enough.  
Once more, the film sets out to comment on the construction of commonsensical 
fabrications of historical understanding: the repetition of lies engenders the creation of historical 
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narratives that become the truth. The film, however, foregrounds this mechanism while at the 
same time participating in its very construction. This is all the more important to emphasize since 
studies of propaganda frequently minimize the formal complexity of the texts they examine, 
finding recourse, instead, to a clinical conceptualization that assumes a coherence and 
transparency; conversely, such transparency is precisely what the propagandistic text insists on, 
which, then, constitutes a curious blind spot in the analysis of these works. Ohm Krüger offers 
up the insight that lies will become the truth through repetition, while insisting that the film 
consists of the particular exception to this idea on textual and narrative grounds.        
Resigned to accept his fate in this state of exception, Krüger asks the nurse what she 
herself thinks of the article. She hesitates. “Don’t you wonder why he did not come to terms with 
the English?” Krüger asks rhetorically and answers himself, “one cannot come to terms with the 
English!”130 The film renders as a “truism” from the outset what it will take great pains to 
demonstrate and assert time and again in the course of its narrative. This observation need not be 
significant to note, since it might serve as an exemplary moment of how a text deconstructs its 
own foundational premises and how ideological forces attempt to erase their inherent 
contradictions. However, in the categorical insistence on the inability to communicate with “the 
English” and the lack of trust the film posits for newspaper records, the gravity of this utterance 
bestows an importance to the scene that must be underscored by the image of Krüger in its 
allegorical dimension.            
                                                 
130 In the original: “Warum hat er sich nicht mit den Engländern verständigt? Mit Engländern kann man sich nicht 
verständigen!” 
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With this authoritative proclamation, Krüger proceeds to inform the nurse about the two 
hundred years his ancestors lived in peace until “the English” came.131 As if to set the record 
straight, Krüger begins to narrate the story of his people, driven by the desire for a Lebensraum. 
His head immobile and his gaze obstructed by the black circles of his glasses as they magnify his 
hollow eyes, framed in a medium close-up, he becomes the pure voice of history as the mythical 
story of ancestors: “Our Forefathers said ‘it cannot be the will of our Creator that an entire 
people shall live in slavery.’ And so we marched deeper into the interior of Africa, searching for 
new plains and new land.” During the progress of this narration the camera gradually moves 
back as Krüger’s voice begins to detach itself from the mortal body and by the time he intones 
the name “Afrika” his face resembles a skull that has dissolved into the majestic sweeping clouds 
above a grandiose panorama of cattle marching across the South African steppes.  
At this point Krüger’s voice becomes the narrator of myth, both as the story of the 
originative creation of a people and as its constitutive exodus at the same time. With the 
solemnity and authority of the archetypal blind storyteller, Homer, the film becomes the 
enunciation of Krüger’s truth, set against the lies and banalities of quotidian newspaper writing. 
                                                 
131 Of course, the film’s revisionist rewriting of South African history takes extensive and blatant license to distort or 
invent historical facts, which, as such, would necessarily have to be addressed. Moreover, Ohm Krüger became part 
of a vast number of Soviet “booty films” that were captured from the archives by the Soviet Army during World 
War II as war bounty and “were thrown into Soviet distribution on a mass scale, without subtitles and often under 
different names.” Cf. Maya Turovskaya, “The 1930s and 1940s: Cinema in Context,” in Stalinism and Soviet 
Cinema, ed. Richard Taylor and Derek Spring (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 51. This crucial instance of circulation, 
which constitutes a remarkable instance of extrafilmic mobilization, exceeds the framework of this study, but is 
worth investigating for its importance in indicating the flexibility that Jannings’ figure carries across ideological 
boundaries.       
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It is the voice that offers a truth linked to the irrefutability of images as a presence. And this 
voice offers incantations on a magnificent “eternal” and “infinite” scale. Moreover, the voice 
narrates the story of a people in exodus and therefore reconfigures the Boer people, and by 
extension the Germans, within the frame of the Biblical story of the Jews expelled from Egypt in 
their long search for the promised land. Marcia Klotz demonstrates that such transferences of 
identity conceptions are fundamentally operative throughout a number of important Nazi films, 
but, as she notes, this particular imaginary had already been predicated historically since “many 
Boers thought of themselves as modern-day Israelites and believed the Great Trek would 
eventually take them all the way through Africa to Palestine.”132 As Krüger’s voice accompanies 
a montage of the trek as an exodus from the Cape land towards the Vaal River, it proclaims: 
 
“Years and years this trek lasted, across desolate deserts, across infinite steppes. The eternal 
creaking of wheels was the lullaby of our children. In the saddle our boys grew to be men. No 
strife, no hardship discouraged this people, which knew only one goal: to live in liberty and 
peace. Beyond the River Vaal we finally found the new home. We were diligent and the Lord’s 
blessing was with us. Thus was created our new fatherland Transvaal, fought for with our blood, 
drenched with our sweat. Here we believed we could live in peace. But then the English followed 
us there.”133  
                                                 
132 Cf. Marcia Klotz, “Epistemological Ambiguity and the Fascist Text: Jew Süss, Carl Peters, and Ohm Krüger,” 
New German Critique 74 (spring – summer 1998): 118. 
133 “Jahre um Jahre dauerte dieser Zug durch troslose Wüsten, über unendliche Steppen. Das ewige Knarren der 
Räder war das Wiegenlied unserer Kinder. Im Sattel wuchsen unsere Knaben zu Männern heran. Kein Kampf, kein 
Mühsal, entmutigten dieses Volk, das nur ein Ziel kannte: in Freiheit und Frieden zu leben. Jenseits des Flusses Vaal 
fanden wir endlich die neue Heimat. Wir waren fleißig und der Segen des Herrn war mit uns. So entstand unser 
neues Vaterland Transvaal, mit unserem Blut erkämpft, mit unserem Schweiß getränkt. Hier glaubten wir, in Frieden 
leben zu können. Aber dann kam uns der Engländer nach.” 
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 This transition initiates another transition through a dissolve to a close-up of Cecil 
Rhodes’ hand, which turns a large globe, while he muses on the innocence and beauty of the 
African continent ready for the taking in another conquest. This impressive shift in scale once 
again serves to remind us of the fluidity with which the film encapsulates the transitions whereby 
the face of Ohm Krüger becomes the story of an entire people in search for “their” land and this 
land, in turn, becomes a miniaturized representation on the globe in the grip of the British 
minister Rhodes. The category of the Boers as a nomadic people, whose search for their 
“fatherland” makes men out of boys “in the saddle,” implies another link to a popular German 
generic narrative of the period, the Western travel writings of Karl May.134 In this fusion of 
Biblical and popular narratives, the story as recounted by Ohm Krüger evokes both the profane 
and the sacrosanct at the same time. The fact that these categories, however, are not necessarily 
fixed or immutable is emblematized by the dissolve into Rhodes’ hand. Against its own 
assertions of accuracy, the film here already insists, as Marcia Landy has demonstrated, that 
various narratives of “tradition and modernity” are but “fluid categories, serving to underscore 
distinctions between the privileged and the outcast.”135             
                                                 
134 Most famous for his presumably “authentic” first-person travel accounts across the American West and the 
Middle East, Karl May (1842 – 1912) had not visited most of the countries he so vividly described at all.   
135 Marcia Landy, Cinematic Uses of the Past, p. 242. It is particularly striking that even the most privileged and 
stable binary according to Landy of “the elect” and “the dammed” is reversed here; while the dichotomy itself is still 
rigorously in place, its ascribed function can change. Accordingly, the Boers are a “dammed” people in history, but 
the myth that the film sets up relegates them ultimately to the “elect.” In addition, since the Boers figure as the 
representatives of the German people, this act of substitution has to be performed by the audience within this 
mythical frame.  
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Nonetheless, the film from the outset establishes itself over and against the written text 
that constitutes the archive of documents available to the future historian. Instead, the faithful 
historical mode of understanding lies in the recollection of a dying man; history needs to be told 
and “straightened,” that is, “rewritten,” through the enunciated speech of Ohm Krüger, as he 
offers us his own historicist rendition of “what it was really like” by looking back as an act of 
memory beyond subjectivity. History’s audience, in turn, is gendered as a benevolent nurse, a 
maternal figure who stands in for the audience and who is to receive the account of the narrative. 
In keeping with this premise, the first half of the film offers us a “pure” and “unadulterated” 
vision of Krüger’s life according to the conventions of classical narrative cinema, with its shifts 
between subjective and objective points of view.  
However, the transitions between the various dimensions of scale that the film generates 
in its first ten minutes inaugurates a symptomatic mode which betrays the film’s faith in its own 
generative power. Analogous to the transition in scale from a dying face to the magnitude of the 
African plains on a geographical level and its obverse move back to the close-up of a hand 
covering a globe, this faith in the unambiguous mobility of images which serve the narrative 
within the proper enunciative mode of history, regardless of its spatial or temporal scale, finds its 
limit point at the moment when Transvaal is invaded by British troops. Here, Krüger the 
historical narrator, whom the film has been able to efface as the enunciator of its transitions can 
no longer remain the narrative authority. As Marcia Klotz puts it, such moments of rupture in 
Nazi cinema serve as instances of intensification, which emphasize how the films “draw their 
affective power from the very inconsistencies that would seem to destabilize them.”136 
Consistent with this assessment, Krüger enters the film again as a subjective force by rallying his 
                                                 
136 Marcia Klotz, “Epistemological Ambiguity and the Fascist Text,” p. 122. 
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cabinet together and, in a fervent speech, announces that he will no longer participate in their 
petty debates. He retreats to sign his letter of resignation as president. The film then moves from 
this public demonstration of sacrifice to a private and intimate conversation between Rhodes and 
Krüger.  
Rhodes offers to “buy off” Krüger's people and, in order to prove his power, hands him a 
list of his people’s parliamentary representatives that have pledged their allegiance to Rhodes to 
which Krüger responds by taking note of Rhodes’ powers to “epidemicalize.”137 Moreover, 
Krüger reassumes a stance of anticipation that resonates with the audience’s positioning vis-à-vis 
history. In a violently hysterical outburst, he scolds Rhodes for underestimating his sense of the 
preordained outcome of their meeting, while a reproduction of da Vinci’s “Last Supper” in the 
background emphasizes the historical scale of this moment. That is, Krüger comes to articulate 
the assumed audience’s knowledge at which the knowledge of the audience merges with the 
knowledge of the character again. He renounces his own signature of resignation. This moment 
shifts the course of history as it is imagined in the film towards a unification in scale: Krüger and 
the audience have once more become one. “This is the moment of decision I have anticipated,” 
Krüger proclaims, “and now it is has arrived.” “I will remain president,” he cries, “and every 
single man of my people will be a hero!” 
At this point the film abruptly cuts to a bomb exploding as the word Mobilmachung 
(“mobilization”) is superimposed and etched in fiery Gothic letters across the screen, punctuated 
by the sound of explosions, which is followed by a lengthy montage sequence of the 
mobilization of forces, which then yields to an increasing mass of people carrying a number of 
                                                 
137 The anti-Semitic connotations of the original, presumably neologist verb durchseuchen, which connotes Rhodes’ 
abilities to cause a societal pandemic of disease, would certainly have been obvious to contemporary audiences.    
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signs, placards and posters denouncing “England” in German (!) and Afrikaans, singing 
“Burenland ist freies Land! Uns von Gott gegeben”138 down the streets of Pretoria. In this 
climactic moment, where the pure “speech” of images is abandoned in favor of a literal 
inscription of enlistment and mobilization, while renouncing the signature of a contract and 
reaffirming the audience’s assumed affective dispositions through a melodramatic shift into 
song, Krüger and the audience underwrite the mobilization of affect that is necessitated by this 
shift in scale. 
His call to arms results in the masses becoming the people: “I have summoned an army 
and a whole people answered the call!” narrates Krüger. Up to this point, the masses as a people 
have not been important because of the imposed unity between Krüger and the Boers. The 
historical drama so far has been rendered as a conflict between the individual minds of Queen 
Victoria, Cecil Rhodes, and Krüger, who bargain and attempt to outsmart each other with 
contracts and negotiations. In fact, the crowd scenes that the film has depicted thus far are scenes 
in parliaments, which, according to the film’s logic, are not representative of the people. The 
only moment in which a voice from the crowd speaks for the people, albeit for the British, comes 
at the moment when Krüger is negotiating a treaty with the Queen. A woman in the crowd states 
that “this Krüger has made an indelible impression on me, like a mythical giant from times of 
yore.” This odd moment underscores Jannings as the embodiment of Krüger. Even a British 
woman from the “historical” past within the film dimly recognizes the primordial power of 
Krüger as Jannings. Her voice can no longer be represented by the Queen and, instead, avows the 
film’s true leader outside of history. That is, the mobilization of the film extends to the female in 
general, irrespective of the narrative affiliation of national identity of the people as such.              
                                                 
138 “The land of the Boers is a free country, given to us by God.” 
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An individual male voice of reason, however, intervenes in this general mobilization and 
it belongs to Jan, Krüger’s son, who states that “all of you have gone insane” and cautions that 
“war has not yet been declared.” As he utters these words he witnesses his father’s signature to 
this effect. War has been declared, by cry, by the inscription of the mobilization into the image, 
by song, and finally re-legitimized as a declaration through Krüger’s signature. The stage has 
now been set for a redistribution of the conflict onto yet another dimension, that of the Oedipal 
conflict between father and son. Jan warns his father that their people are not yet a nation and 
will perish in the war. Moreover, he reveals that he has vowed under oath to become a pacifist 
because he “studied history” in Oxford. “History is made, not studied, you coward!” thunders 
Krüger and orders his son out of his sight. His cries of disappointment merge with the sounds of 
the masses outside. The familial conflict shifts away from his rejection of his son to the needs of 
“his” Boers who are intoning their song of freedom. 
Rejected as a father by his own son, Krüger is summoned back into his burdensome 
patriarchal position again by the chants of the masses, carrying on the tunes and cheers of 
mobilization, as a close-up of his face shows the strains of his duty. This moment marks the 
obverse movement toward the body as described by Theweleit. The body has become the people 
and the masses, whose voice has been that of Krüger, have now been reconfigured as a people. 
They have been choreographed and mobilized in the service of their father, while the individual 
son has renounced his place among the people. More importantly, the masses are now merging 
into a stream that moves toward the camera and that culminates into a procession which ends up 
in front of Krüger’s house. They demand to see him and he finally succumbs to their insistent 
chants, steps out onto the balcony and surveys his people from above. At this point the unity 
between Krüger and his people is complete. The people have heeded his call and now summon 
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him in return. With the incantation, once more, of the song of the Boers the triangulated unity 
between the people, the film’s audience, and Ohm Krüger is solidified. 
This unity, however, comes at a price. Krüger loses his eyesight, but his blindness 
epitomizes his qualities as a visionary and indicates that “he is endowed with insight and 
prophecy.”139 The prodigal son Jan returns as a Boer soldier and Krüger can only recognize him 
as one by feeling the belt of bullets slung over his chest. The symptomatology of blindness 
functions here to indicate the suffering of the mortal body that, once it has been fused with the 
people, can now regain its own physical frailty. In this act of substitution the film envisions a 
people whose leader is now burdened with prophetic blindness while the audience serves as a 
surrogate witness. Jan implores his father to “do the most difficult act,” to go to Europe and “beg 
for your people.” While Krüger travels to the European capitals, the women and children of his 
people are herded into concentration camps. Here the cruel camp commandant Winston 
Churchill tries to force Krüger’s wife to sign a declaration that “all news about their 
maltreatment in British concentration camps are vicious inventions,” but she refuses. When Jan 
is arrested by the British he is hanged on a hill top in front of all the camp’s inmates. The women 
witness his execution and storm the hill whereupon they are shot and slaughtered by the British 
soldiers indiscriminately shooting into the masses. 
Over this scene of death and destruction the film superimposes the face of the dying 
Krüger once more, now a deity, constructed from his son’s sacrifice which has become his 
                                                 
139 Marcia Landy, Cinematic Uses of the Past, p. 240. Landy also notes the allusion to Hitler’s blindness in World 
War I. 
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sacrifice again. Jan’s Calvary, the mound of his sacrifice,140 is equated with the skull of Krüger. 
The landscape of the dead merges with the allegorical face of the dying leader and we return to 
the beginning of the film. The voice of Ohm Krüger now narrates his own demise but promises 
redemption, no longer spoken to his nurse, but spoken for the audience he prophesies: 
 
“That was the end! Thus England subjugated our small people with the cruelest of means! But 
once the day of retribution will arrive. I know not when, but so much blood cannot have been 
shed in vain. So many tears are not cried for naught. We were only a small and weak people. 
Great, mighty peoples will rise against British tyranny. They will smite England to the ground. 
God will be with them. Then the road is open for a better world.”141                       
 
With these words the superimposed image slowly dissolves back to Krüger’s face alone. 
The telos of his narrative has come full circle, but the allegorical dimension that suggests the 
cyclical nature of history has now been imbued with a temporal significance of suffering and this 
vanity of sacrifice must be gainsaid once more beyond the frame of the film. As the avuncular 
presence and colossal corporeality of Emil Jannings has gradually faded again into a death mask 
of history, Ohm Krüger can now emerge as the allegory of destiny. 
                                                 
140 Not accidentally, the image alludes to the Aramaic Golgotha or its Latinized version Calvary, both denoting 
“skull” or “scalp,” the Biblical name for the place of Crucifixion.  
141 “Das war das Ende! So hat England unser kleines Volk mit den grausamsten Mitteln unterworfen! Doch einmal 
wird der Tag der Vergeltung kommen. Ich weiß nicht, wann, aber so viel Blut kann nicht umsonst geflossen sein. So 
viele Tränen werden nicht vergeblich geweint. Wir waren nur ein kleines und schwaches Volk. Große, mächtige 
Völker werden gegen die britische Tyrannei aufstehen. Sie werden England zu Boden schlagen. Gott wird mit ihnen 
sein. Dann ist der Weg frei für eine bessere Welt.” 
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CHAPTER SIX:  REÏNSCRIPTIONS OF THE DISPLACED: READING THE WRITING 
IN WOLFGANG STAUDTE’S DIE MÖRDER SIND UNTER UNS AND  ROTATION  
 
 
 
The historical imaginary of M already allegorized the figure of the ultimate outsider who is 
marked by a visible inscription in the systematic effort to differentiate and remove him forcibly 
from the social body. In its cinematic prophecy the film thus spells out the fate of a person 
branded by an imposed sign that stigmatizes its bearer as excluded and condemned. In the words 
of Anton Kaes, the anonymous murderer Beckert is marked so that he “becomes trapped in a 
bureaucratic system that disciplines by labelling.”1 But beyond the bureaucratic function of the 
label in a pervasive system of control, the allegorical use of the mark in the film only prefigures 
the actual implementation of the infamous Judenstern, the yellow Star of David with the word 
“Jew” imprinted on it that was required to be worn on the outer articles of clothing by everyone 
legally defined as Jewish. This legal requirement, which was initiated during the occupation of 
Poland and extended to the Reich in September 1941, indicates once again how easily the 
Weimar cinematic imagination merges with concrete historical facts in an uncanny mésalliance 
that in Expressionist terms would seem to emerge straight out of the fantasy cabinet of Dr. 
                                                 
1 Anton Kaes, M (London: BFI Publishing, 2000), p. 63. 
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Goebbels. Ohm Krüger follows a similar configuration between historical facts and their 
allegorization as figures whereby the historical plight of a people is reïmagined through a 
complex construction that conflates an ethnic understanding of the Boers with that of the 
Germans and then replicates this yoking in a kind of reversal of disambiguation within a 
grandiose conceptual framework that claims for itself a replication of the Jewish experience of 
diaspora. As Marcia Landy has demonstrated, the film constitutes a figurative anastomosis in 
which conceptions of the past are recirculated as destiny, so that history converges with the 
present on a monumental scale in order to portray a suffering nation.2 This redeployment of the 
Exodus is then imagined as the fate of the German people, which culminates in a cynical 
portrayal in which the German people become the apotheosis of victimhood because they are the 
ones in whose stead the Boers are suffering in concentration camps. 
It is in light of such complicated reconfigurations of victimhood in relation to the social 
body that the opening sequence of the very first German feature film to be completed after the 
capitulation and the end of the war or, to invoke a current discursive term, the “downfall” of the 
Reich must be analyzed. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, Wolfgang Staudte’s 1946 film 
Die Mörder sind unter Uns (The Murderers are Among Us), begins with a victim’s return from a 
concentration camp while it deliberately deploys the cinematic gesture of the mark that became 
the defining visual moment of the film M. Beyond this figural invocation, the film’s title itself 
establishes an oblique link to M. As Siegfried Kracauer recalls in an anecdote, Lang intended to 
call his film “Murderer Among Us,” and Kracauer uses this as his chapter title for his own 
discussion of the film and the late Weimar period as well. 
                                                 
2 Cf. Marcia Landy, Cinematic Uses of the Past (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 240 – 241. 
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In keeping with Lang’s predilection for fusing the anecdotal with the dramatic, Kracauer 
relates how Lang imparted to him the threat that his choice for the film’s title had generated. This 
event, Lang had suggested, served as his own political awakening. When announcements for the 
film’s production were issued, Kracauer states, Lang “[s]oon … received numerous threatening 
letters and, still worse, was bluntly refused permission to use the Staaken studio for his film.”3 It 
was not until Lang clarified to the studio manager, who was a member of the Nazi party, that the 
film’s title was in reference to the case of a child murderer that he was granted access to the 
studios. This was, as Kracauer suggests, due to the fact that the title caused consternation among 
party members who recognized their own kind in the title or, as he puts it in his laconic way, 
“‘Murderer among us’: the Party feared to be compromised.”4
While this cinematic link may be anecdotal, the film’s opening sequence follows a figural 
trajectory which the camera traces and which ends with a lingering on the body marked by a 
sign, along with an inscription that serves as an allegorical memento mori. In doing so, 
                                                 
3 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film (1947; reprint, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 219. 
4 Ibid. The production history of the film indicates that Staudte began to work on the script before the end of the 
war. The original title that Staudte planned to use was “The Man I Am Going to Kill,” based on an event Staudte 
experienced with a high-ranking SS-officer in Berlin towards the end of the war. In a 1974 interview, Staudte 
recalled that an Obersturmbannführer in a drunken stupor suspected that Staudte was a “communist pig” and 
threatened to kill him on the spot. When his fellow officers had managed to calm him down again, he declared that 
he was simply going to return to his business, an apothecary of which he had been the proprietor, “after all this shit 
is over.” Staudte used this incident to reflect on what would happen if he saw this man again in his pharmacy. The 
film’s production materials and documents have been made available online by the Kulturarchiv of the 
Fachhochschule Hannover, where the interview is reprinted at                                                        
http://www.hist.uni-hannover.de/~kultarch/dnach45/zeitgen_spielfilme/filme/moerder/staudte1.htm.    
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Murderers Are Among Us establishes for itself a direct relation to the film M, but, more 
importantly, continues a particular form of signification in which writing functions prominently 
as a mode of meaning. In its opening, an intertitle on black background announces with an 
ominous stroke of a gong, “Berlin 1945 – The city has capitulated ...” (“Die Stadt hat 
kapituliert”). Thus the intertitle heralds its function as a means to place the images to come 
within a very specific temporal and local context, yet one which is devoid of any human agency 
and which carries with it a sense of monumental exhaustion that has extended even into the 
world of material objects, since it is the city itself that has “capitulated” or “given up.”  
Moreover, in the common synechdochic replacement of the capital Berlin standing as a pars pro 
toto figure for the entire Reich and the German people in it, the intertitle conveys an elementary 
shift by which the film establishes the human figure as incidental and a mere marginal element in 
the larger machinations of a city and its social network from the outset. 
In so doing, the tone of the title already suggests its indebtedness to a rich filmic heritage, 
including the genre of the “city film,” and, specifically, to its most famous generic example 
Berlin, die Symphonie der Großstadt (1927, Walter Ruttmann), which also portrays the city as an 
abstract force that subsumes its inhabitants to its own temporal and spatial rhythms.5 However, if 
                                                 
5 Compare this to the use of opening titles and the credit sequence of Roberto Rossellini’s Germania anno zero 
(1948), which initiates the film by a large and sweeping, almost fluid, panoramic surveyance of the city in ruins. In 
this sequence images and credits are not separated and the production names are all superimposed. The title itself, as 
it appears over a vast tracking shot of streets and building in ruins, while structurally similar to Die Mörder sind 
unter Uns, locates and dates the film in a very different way than Staudte’s opening. Especially in its superimposed 
dedication, “This film is dedicated to the memory of my son Romano Roberto Rossellini,” who had died in 1946, 
and whose name lingers on-screen as the Berlin Reichstag in ruins moves into view, the use of writing both 
personalizes and memorializes its relation to particular people. Since the film introduces its protagonist Edmund, a 
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Berlin Symphony of a City celebrates the “abstract geometrics” of which humans are at most a 
decorative aspect in the depiction of their function as part of the urban fabric,6 then the intertitle 
of Murderers also announces a telegraphic sobriety that firmly establishes the images to come as 
belonging to another documentary mode, namely one that echoes the facticity of the newsreel. In 
the tension created within the two polarities as demarcated by these divergent filmic traditions, 
the intertitle thus indicates a problematic range of potential spectator responses, with the inherent 
promise that this very quandary is only temporary and will be resolved and determined by the 
film. More importantly, however, this introductory intertitle signals another, more pervasively 
categorical function for the entire film, namely to announce its attempt to put into relief the 
crucial interplay between text and image and thereby assert the manner by which the human 
individual is placed within this structure.   
In the very first shot that follows, the use of writing as figuration provides a visual 
commentary on this issue and indicates to what extent the question of framing will animate the 
mode in which the film places itself in relation to the specific historical situation articulated by 
                                                                                                                                                             
young child, at the end of the credit sequence, the figure circumscribed here is metonymic rather than synechdochic, 
inasmuch as it suggests the contiguous possibility of substitution or replacement of individual experience. 
6 See entry “Walter Ruttmann,” in Thomas Elsaesser and Michael Wedel, eds., The BFI Companion to German 
Cinema (London: BFI Publishing, 1999), p. 208. In this respect, the intertitle’s allegiance to the genre of city film 
serves as an oblique commentary on Ruttmann’s fascination with the force of abstraction. As Elsaesser and Wedel 
point out, Ruttmann was a fervent adherent of Nazi ideology and he continued his cinematic experiments, creating 
Wochenende (1931), a “film without images, recorded with a sound-on-film camera, and later moving on to filming 
newsreel footage on the Eastern front, where he died in 1941.” It seems a historical irony, therefore, that the 
innovator of abstract filmmaking and visual graphics would pen a heavy-handed “anti-Semitic prologue” to Leni 
Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935), which was discarded in favor of Riefenstahl’s clever use of typography in 
the titles of Triumph’s opening sequence.  
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the intertitle. After the credit sequence, which precedes the intertitle and is offered in a 
conventional superimposition over an abstract pattern that suggests the details of a concrete 
surface, the first seconds of the opening images are highly disjunctive because the sound of the 
gong has been replaced by an up-tempo music-hall honky-tonk tune, but there is no 
corresponding source at first to identify this sound. Conversely and equally disjointed, the image 
reveals a large mound, with a dying plant and a soldier’s helmet on its top, and makeshift tubes 
arranged as if in a T-pattern, until a single, crooked cross comes into view. As the camera tilts up 
along the mound which houses two makeshift graves, we see a lone male figure walking down a 
street, past the rubble, the charred remains of military vehicles, a flak gun, and the skeletal 
outlines of buildings. 
The man, we will later learn, is Mertens, played by Ernst Wilhelm Borchert,7 a surgeon 
traumatized by his war experiences who has become aimless, depressed, and has taken to drink. 
In this environment, however, children have already begun to play again amidst the ruins, while 
the bomb craters still pock-mark the urban landscape, and the general detritus of war surrounds 
everything. Given that any visible or legible inscription is absent on the crosses save the patterns 
of the wood markings, the image of the graves in the center of the lopsided compositional field  – 
                                                 
7 The credits list the names of the actors only, that is, without the names of their corresponding roles, and he is 
identified in eighth place with the name W. Borchert. He continued to use the name Wilhelm Borchert throughout 
his intermittent acting and dubbing career until his death in 1990. His name was removed from the program notes to 
the film’s premiere in the Neue Staatsoper in Berlin, on October 16, 1946, because it was revealed that his 
“questionnaire,” the main instrument for the assessment of guilt into five categories that was issued under the 
denazification directives in the Allied Occupation Zones, had been answered with grossly deceptive and mendacious 
claims of innocence. Cf. Friedrich Luft, “Die Mörder Sind Unter Uns,” Die Neue Zeitung, October 18, 1946,  
reprinted at http://www.hist.uni-hannover.de/~kultarch/dnach45/zeitgen_spielfilme/filme/moerder/k5.htm.      
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as well as a smaller one placed in the background – emphasizes its own abstract stratus, that is, 
its precise opposite from the nominal and individualized reference by virtue of its anonymity and 
ubiquity. Its function, therefore, suggests the random presence of death scattered about, while at 
the same time memorializing the individual as an abstraction, much like a memorial such as “the 
tomb of the unknown soldier” functions as the synechdochic possibility for mourning and 
memory rather than as the actual memorial itself. The cross on top of the graves punctuates the 
visual landscape as a marker within it and therefore indicates that the images as a whole must be 
regarded as a legible as much as a visible sequence. 
The absence of a concretely visible referent for whom the grave has been consecrated 
suggests that the lone male figure enters the picture as a possible representation or stand-in for 
the person who is buried under the mound on the street. The anonymous figure enters in lieu of 
the soldiers that have not been identified. With this associative yoking of figure and grave, the 
image evokes a “homecoming” on a number of different levels. While the obvious contemporary 
homecoming here would suggest that the male figure is one who is returning home from the war, 
the proximity between grave and the so-far anonymous person also emphasizes the fact that the 
buried soldiers will not have this privilege of a return home. Likewise, therefore, the appearance 
of the figure underscores an existential dimension, in which the haphazard interchangeability 
between dead soldier and living person is affirmed and the easy exchange of these states of being 
is evoked. In other words, because of the figural abstraction in the image, the condition of a state 
of being is asserted instead of being described or developed and this assertion underscores the 
condition as an abstract existential state. The figure becomes a substitution for and a substitute of 
the unknown dead and serves as an emphatic reminder of the pervasive presence of the dead 
amid the landscape of destruction. 
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In his diary of his travels throughout Europe in the immediate postwar years, Tagebuch 
1946–1949, the Swiss novelist and playwright Max Frisch offers a very insightful description of 
a similar scenario, which he encountered in Munich in May of 1946, and which, in its 
epigrammatic concision, could well have been modeled after the opening sequence of 
Murderers. Frisch offers a brief glimpse in which the seemingly mundane emptiness of existence 
encapsulates a vast absence into which a history of significance floods. In this interplay between 
presence and absence he finds a disconcerting phenomenon. He describes a walk on an ordinary 
weekday past people lounging “like seagulls” at the banks of the river Isar where:  
 
“Even time itself seems like trash; without its proprietors, like the helmet I find in a bomb crater 
with rubble and rusty tin cans. Not much to see in it, for sure! The helmet is empty and the shape 
which I hold in my hands is familiar from hundreds of images that plastered our newsstands year 
after year and which were bought there, year after year, with laughing and singing victors inside 
its shape …”8
 
Frisch uses this evocative description to work both with the idea of a history of images 
circulating in the popular imagination and the substitutional figure of the shape or the form of a 
helmet, which in its very abstracted emptiness points to the absence of its proper manifestation as 
                                                 
8 From Max Frisch, Tagebuch 1946 – 1949, published originally in the Suhrkamp Verlag 1950, and reprinted in 
Hans Magnus Enzensberger, ed., Europa in Ruinen: Augenzeugenberichte aus den Jahren 1944 – 1948, ed. Hans 
Magnus Enzensberger (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990), p. 196. In the original: “Sogar die Zeit 
erscheint wie Ramsch; ohne Eigentümer wie der Helm, den ich in einem Trichter mit Schutt und verrosteten 
Büchsen finde. Was soll man schon sehen daran! Er ist leer, und die Form, die ich in der Hand habe, kennen wir von 
hundert Bildern, die jahrelang an unseren Kiosken hingen und gekauft wurden, jahrelang mit lachenden und 
singenden Siegern drin.” (Translation mine.)  
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an embodiment of a human face. It is the shape that is asking to be inhabited by the absent 
human figure, rather than the other way around, where the human figure determines the shape of 
its own appearance. Frisch’s ironic gesture of resignation, was soll man schon sehen daran, reads 
as the implicit question of “is there anything to be seen in this?” It is the same question that the 
film’s opening shot poses. The trash and the rubble invoke a history of “familiar” associations, 
the “hundreds of images” of which Frisch is reminded, much in the same way that the lone figure 
in the alien landscape serves as a proxy for the memory of an absent crowd. 
As a visual statement, however, both Frisch’s description and the film’s opening shot of 
the man walking in the ruins at the same time seem to aggressively assert an inherent absence of 
meaning beyond their own presence, a problem of filmic images in general; that is, in their 
quiddity there is nothing to see except that which you see and things are “just” the way that they 
seem. While this might be termed the “obvious” level of the image, Roland Barthes has 
investigated a fundamental quality of signifiance in the filmic image beyond its communicative 
or significative level, which he proposes as a pervasive “third meaning – evident, erratic, 
obstinate” in his reading of stills from Sergei Eisenstein’s films.9 Determining this dimension as 
an “obtuse meaning”10 that exceeds the level of communication and information, Barthes calls it 
the “blunting of a meaning too clear, too violent,”11 to the point that “analytically, it has 
something derisory about it.”12 The importance of Barthes’ insight is that he moves the 
                                                 
9 Roland Barthes, “The Third Meaning: Research Notes on some Eisenstein Stills,” in Image – Music – Text, trans. 
Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), p. 53.  
10 Ibid., p. 54. 
11 Ibid., p. 55. 
12 Ibid. 
  322
discussion of images away from the “peace of nominations”13 into the realm of “anaphoric 
gesture without significant content”14 that maintains a perpetual state of irritability over the 
dominion of narrative and syntagma. 
This also makes it possible to consider the opening shot of Murderers Are Among Us as 
both a meditation on “nominations” in its evocation of the legibility of the cross as outlined 
above and as a cinematic gesture of repetition in openings,15 or, as Barthes states in describing 
the force of the third meaning, as “the very form of an emergence, of a fold (a crease even) 
marking the heavy layer of informations and signifcations.”16 For Barthes, this presence indicates 
the necessity of thinking of the third meaning as a kind of legible “seal” or signature” in the 
filmic image.17 While Barthes understands this presence as a categorical quality of any textual 
work – and, indeed, this is where he locates the emergence of the “filmic” itself18 – it is useful to 
think of the third meaning in general as an imprint or a colophon within the text that provides it 
with the inscription of a legibility as such. What the opening shot therefore achieves is to call 
attention to the manner in which the quality of significance is evoked beyond the fact that this 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 62. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Note that the rhetorical device of anaphora indicates the “repetition of a word or a phrase at the beginning of 
several successive verses, clauses, or paragraphs.” (Cf. The American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. 
“anaphora.” My emphasis.) 
16 Roland Barthes, “The Third Meaning,” p. 62. 
17 Ibid., p. 64. 
18 Cf. Ibid. “[T]he third meaning structures the film differently without … subverting the story and for this reason, 
perhaps, it is at the level of the third meaning, and at that level alone, that the ‘filmic’ finally emerges.” (Emphasis in 
original.) 
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would pertain to the function of any introductory shot. Lest this function, however, be dismissed 
as a merely formal element of the image, the permanent irritability, or in Barthes’ term, the 
“bodily” sensitivity maintained by the “perpetual erethism”19 of the third meaning, points to an 
important physical aspect of sensation. This sensation could be called an appellation in which the 
images signifies its own mode of signification. In this respect, it is also a disciplinary appeal in 
the sense that the image insists on a certain evaluative quality as a command to behold and a 
demand to be beheld. In this respect, the image follows the question “what is one to see in this?” 
Frisch, however, turns this gesture into a memento, in which the helmet substitutes for the 
hundreds of faces that have turned into one skull.  
The notion of the “living dead” coming home to the city that is haunted by its spirits is 
one for which the wandering man will have to stand in as a representative figure and inhabit the 
space of the city as the embodiment of its ghosts. This conceptual constellation will be confirmed 
by the film’s subsequent narrative, but the complexity of this grid of substitution and 
displacement is already encapsulated in the visual arrangement of the opening shot. Within such 
an image composition, the figure of the man thus also takes on an allegorical quality, as a 
personification of “coming home” within an abstracted field of reference. He becomes the figure 
that will stand in relation to the absent inscription of the grave and as the point of reference for 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 62: According to Barthes, the third meaning “maintains a state of perpetual erethism, desire not finding 
issue in that spasm of the signified which normally brings the subject voluptuously back into the peace of 
nominations.” In the associative play with the terms “subject” and “erethism” (by definition an “abnormal irritability 
or sensitivity of an organ or body part to stimulation”) Barthes also brings in a physical dimension; that is, the 
“subject” in question here is both the grammatical subject and the “subject” of the observer, whose organic 
sensations are disturbed.     
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the helmet. But, in turn, his figure will be inscribed through the movement of the camera.20 
Through this opening gesture, the movement of the camera establishes the framework of the film 
as one that demands to be “read” in its figurations. The demand, however, can neither be reduced 
to the category of intentional expression nor does it necessarily posit an individual “reader.” It 
merely indicates that the film’s images will be legible in the sense that they will be “intelligible” 
because they will subject the viewer to a particular mode of deciphering and thus impose a 
particular perspective. 
This insistence on legibility is reïterated by the next movement of the camera upwards 
within the same first shot. The man in the picture pauses, turns to his left in a stage-acting 
movement that shows us his profile, his face, and then defines a full circle until his point-of-view 
rests at what is to his right. He looks upward. Framed at a Dutch angle, we now see how he 
examines a large sign advertising a cabaret nightclub. This is the third level of the notion of 
“homecoming” because it spells out the fact that it is not home and hearth to which the figure is 
returning. Far from it, instead, it is the familiar space of bawdy entertainment and distraction to 
which his gaze turns. The invocation of a form of “homecoming” here is therefore also a 
rhetorical challenge implicitly directed at the audience, which finds itself in the position of 
reading the sign at the same moment he does. The sign of the nightclub becomes a rhetorical 
                                                 
20 The use of camera movement in Staudte’s opening here is so pronounced and made visible to such an extent that it 
could serve as a preliminary descriptive enactment of Alexandre Astruc’s concept of the caméra-stylo, articulated in 
the journal L’ecran Française 144 (March 1948), where Astruc formulates the importance of the camera as an 
instrument of writing. As Astruc states, since “[t]he fundamental problem of the cinema is how to express thought,” 
the caméra-stylo would enable the cinema to “ become a means of expression as supple and subtle as that of written 
language.” Quoted in David Cook, A History of Narrative Film (New York: Norton, 2004), p. 441.     
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question inscribed into the image because it emphatically points to the issue of the validity of the 
medium film itself. 
For Staudte, this was an urgent question, since he had initiated the renewal of the German 
film industry by writing a petition to the headquarters of the Soviet occupation zone after he had 
been dismissed by the other occupation forces in Berlin. To encourage the existing “idealism of 
the most able film artists,” Staudte wrote to the Soviet military commander, it was incumbent 
that, “given the undeniable political and cultural significance that befits a new German film 
creation, the impending danger of a fragmentation of the productive forces of film is to be 
resolutely resisted.”21 In relation to Staudte’s proclamation of idealism and his insistence on the 
political importance of film, the issue of the functions of popular entertainment is invoked 
through the appearance of the sign. Is this “cheap, base, or even prurient entertainment” for its 
own sake without any redeeming qualities, the writing asks, or does this constitute, in Frisch’s 
terms, something that provides a meaning to be discerned from the situation or that is legible in 
the image? 
Because of the German cinema’s long-standing association with prurience and a 
perceived absence of any redeeming cultural value, with a tedious debate surrounding these 
concerns going back as far as early Wilhelmine cinema, as well as the problematic of the abuse 
of the medium by the Nazis, the situation Staudte configures here is also a form of 
“homecoming” for the audience, so that the implications heralded by the sign here indicate the 
extent to which the film signals the faith in its own audience’s return to the movie screen as the 
                                                 
21 Wolfgang Staudte, “Letter to the Soviet Central Command,” October 9, 1945, reprinted in Das Jahr 1945: Filme 
aus Fünfzehn Ländern, ed. Hans Helmut Prinzler (Berlin: Stiftung Deutsche Kinemathek, 1990), pp. 104 – 105. 
(Translation mine.)  
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location where such problems will be posed and addressed. In fact, this faith seems to conform to 
what Ursula Fries has noted in regard to the miraculous popularity of theater performances in the 
immediate post-war year, namely that “[c]ulture was one of the few field of activity which was 
not blocked for Germans – and it was one of the few goods that was not rationed.”22 In other 
words, the return “arrival” of the cinema as a medium which is aptly suited to interrogate the 
problematics of the image is at once asserted and celebrated in the first shot and the sign of the 
cabaret club affirms the importance of properly “reading” the sign and its inherent meaning. 
There is, however, a peculiar dynamic in this image of homecoming once it is extended 
to entail the questions of exile, as an invocation of the question of where this figure comes from; 
of home, as in to what is he returning; and, finally, of continuity, as in where does he belong. 
While the image of the ruined city around him certainly suggests a new beginning at a decisive 
moment of irreversible devastation, often described in the years to come as a Nullpunkt or 
Kahlschlag (“point zero” or “clean slate”), the wandering figure belongs in and to the landscape, 
but at the same time is alien within it as a man. The playing children are certainly more at ease in 
their environment. In this sense, the appearance of the male figure also emblematizes the 
notorious debate surrounding the question of exile over and against the choice of “inner 
emigration,” which was staged in the summer of 1945 in the “Allied-controlled radio stations 
and in the newly founded newspapers,”23 and which was vividly encapsulated by the diary 
entries of the art critic and diplomat Wilhelm Hausenstein, published in 1967, in his Licht unter 
                                                 
22 Ursula Fries, “West German Theatre in the Period of Reconstruction,” in The Culture of Reconstruction:  
European Literature, Thought, and Film, 1945 – 50, ed. Nicholas Hewitt (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), p. 
210. 
23 Cf. Helmut Peitsch, “German Literature in 1945: Liberation for a New Beginning?” in Nicholas Hewitt, ed., The 
Culture of Reconstruction, p. 175. 
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dem Horizont: Tagebücher 1942 – 1946. In a number of these entries, Hausenstein articulates a 
soon-to-be familiar charge against those intellectuals who left or were forced to leave Germany, 
namely that in opposition to 
 
“running away from a situation… there was surely something worthwhile in striving for twelve 
years … to preserve the purity of goodness for its own sake, and in such a style as though Hitler 
and his scoundrels didn’t even exist, despite the danger.”24
 
Since this encapsulates very effectively a form of entitlement in which the futile 
endurance of ordinary life becomes an ennobling act, this issue of the recollection of the 
immediate past which confers a sense of moral nobility onto the survivors is also suggested by 
the male figure in the ruins who contemplates the sign. That is, the image of incongruity of the 
sign in relation to its environment of ruins emphasizes a larger concept of continuing endurance. 
Moreover, the focus on the sign amplifies the notion of legibility introduced in the camera 
movements prior to the actual written text to affirm that the perspective of reading the image 
becomes “accurate.” As an opening shot and a visual introduction to the film, this indicates a 
remarkable exercise in the disciplinary adjustment that is imposed on the spectator and implicit 
in the filmic image itself at the same time. Even though it is still broad daylight outside, the 
entrance to the establishment is bustling with activity, while upbeat but feverish piano music has 
been playing continuously on the soundtrack, having arisen out of the ominous sound of the gong 
that accompanied the opening intertitle. The club’s advertisement reads, underneath a name that 
is not discernible but includes the quirky use of the rare letter “q,” “Das moderne Kabaret: Tanz 
– Stimmung – Humor” (“the modern cabaret: dance – joyous atmosphere – humor”). 
                                                 
24 Wilhelm Hausenstein, diary entry May 15, 1945, quoted in ibid. 
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With this, a fourth level of a “return home” to the familiar is established by alluding to 
the commonsensical cliché that in a time of death there is a concomitant time of a macabre will 
to ignorance, the ubiquity of which can here be imagined as a literal dance on the graves. 
Moreover, the familiar nod of this particular recognition accompanies the image of plus ça 
change, since it posits that a form of decadent self-destruction or self-obliteration, of celebrating 
“under the volcano” as it were, is still present all around, albeit waiting to be named, 
“nominated,” that is, and accused through an open acknowledgement of the situation as posited 
by the image. The man ponders the sign, pauses, turns full circle, and begins to walk as he is 
drawn inexorably to the club’s entrance. To emphasize the importance of legibility, the camera 
focuses on the canted position of the sign which lingers onscreen as a slow dissolve finally 
merges it with the second shot, a low-angle image of an overcrowded train that is carrying a 
large mass of refugees and displaced persons, all clinging to whatever grip or spot they have 
been able to find on the engine and wagons. 
The words “dance, atmosphere, humor” as both the nominative and the accusative 
caption for the images remain inscribed diagonally across the screen in a trace as the train moves 
below them before they gradually fade out and in their lingering presence on the screen 
reverberate in their appearance of significance. The movement of the train and the mass of 
anonymous crowds in transition is continued in an oblique reverse shot, which now shows the 
movement from the perspective of the passengers atop the train engine’s roof as they absorb the 
sight of destruction below them along the way, “reading” and acknowledging the ruins as they 
are offered up for inspection and contemplation as part of the inexorable movement forward 
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along the train tracks, in exactly the same manner that the words of the cabaret sign and the 
figuration of the first shot have been offered up for legibility.25         
 Few commentators have failed to notice the Expressionist quality of the referential 
image composition, in which the jagged edges and tilted frames seem to comment on the 
situation in which the characters find themselves in the film and which seem to evoke 
deliberately a recuperated tradition of pre-Nazi cinema, as if the history of images might be as 
easily compartmentalized in such a manner of continuity. This question of a return 
notwithstanding, the opening shots are so deliberately disciplinary in their insistence on legibility 
that the efforts suggest an attempted recuperation from a form of visual aphasia by its vernacular 
use of familiar images of expression.26 Moreover, the general notion of Expressionism as a visual 
style of externalized subjectivity reïnforces this use as another deliberate instance of linkage. 
Lotte Eisner, in her introduction to German Expressionism that serves as the entry to the 
argument she elaborates in The Haunted Screen, explains that Expressionism is first and 
foremost a mysticized conceptualization of the relation between the individual and the world. In 
Expressionism, man, she writes, “commits himself to his impulses,” so that “[t]he ‘world-image’ 
is reflected in its primitive purity; reality is created by him and the ‘world-image’ exists solely in 
him.”27 As a result of these impulses, a “total extravasation of self”28 takes place, which spills 
                                                 
25 And, of course, once again indicating the conceptual proximity of the train to the medium cinema.  
26 This is not to suggest a radical return to Expressionist motifs, but rather serves to emphasize a familiar visual 
register for the viewer, since the cinema of the Third Reich employed such expressionist visual points of reference 
as well (and not infrequently at that), albeit in these instances merely as a visual tactic and without a coherent artistic 
framework.    
27 Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen: Expressionism in the German Cinema and the Influence of Max Reinhardt, 
trans. Roger Greaves (1952; reprint, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), p. 11. 
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over into a systematic realm of ideology and didacticism, because, in a peculiar German 
tendency, she observes, “every manifestation in art is immediately transformed into dogma.”29 In 
this fusion of self into world and, vice versa, world as crystallized through the self, “mind has the 
mission of giving form to matter.”30 From this intellectual artistic lineage, Eisner asserts, stems 
the pervasive atmosphere of German cinema where “exterior facts are continually being 
transformed into interior elements and psychic events are exteriorized.” 
Certainly, the study of the cinema has long centered on such extravasations and how the 
dissolution of the boundaries between self and image might be understood methodologically, but 
in this case it does not follow that to designate this as an expressionist instance would mean to 
invoke a term of obfuscation rather than clarification. Expressionism as a filmic category seems 
to have outlived its usefulness as an epochal classification and Eisner herself has recently been 
said to use the “label of expressionism” in discussing particular exemplary films of the most 
famous directors of Weimar Germany as a retrospective attempt for coherence, that is, as a 
means to “project onto their work” a pervasive mode merely “for the sake of constructing a 
coherent framework for the discussion of Weimar cinema.”31 But as precarious as the term is 
may be, Thomas Elsaesser provides a significant link to the function of the phenomenon of 
expressionism in Murderers are Among Us, since, as he insists, one of the primary goals of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Eisner’s use of the term “world-image” is in reference to the novelist and art theoretician Kasimir Edschmid (1890 – 
1966).  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. 10. 
30 Ibid., p .12. 
31 Dietrich Scheunemann, “Activating the Differences: Expressionist Film and Early Weimar Cinema,” in 
Expressionist Film: New Perspectives, ed. Dietrich Scheunemann (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2003), p. 7. 
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term expressionist cinema “was a self-conscious attempt at wooing a bourgeois public, and 
meant to persuade the middle classes to accept the cinema as a legitimate art.”32 In another 
moment of linkage, then, the film here again invokes the question of the legitimacy of its own 
use of images while at the same time inscribing this issue into a visibly dramatic expression of 
writing.   
More productive than outlining an aesthetic sense of continuity, therefore, is a focus on 
the figurations that the opening sequence inscribes. From the elaborate geometric construction of 
the letters of the sign merging with the movement of the train in the dissolve, the vector of 
movement is continued as the train moves into the shelled ruins of the Stettiner train station in 
Berlin, where the camera begins to single out and follow a female face in the crowd of the 
disembarking passengers. This, we will learn, is Susanne Wallner, played by Hildegard Knef, 
who is returning home from a concentration camp and who will find the disillusioned Mertens 
squatting in her old apartment. Even at this point, with only six consecutive separate shots at four 
minutes into the film, the camera has not yet been completely level and the perspective we see is 
slightly tilted to the left as if the heavy luggage she is carrying informs our point-of-view as well 
and fuses once more the viewer’s perspective with that of the protagonist within the image. A 
point-of-view shot now reveals her perspective as she is walking towards a corner of the train 
station where people are waiting. By this point the shot sequence has established three separate 
movements that nonetheless emphasize their similarity as a particular trajectory of movement. 
The wandering gaze of the two figures has been replicated in the motion of the camera and now 
merges completely with that of the spectator. 
                                                 
32 Thomas Elsaesser, “Weimar Cinema, Mobile Selves, and Anxious Males: Kracauer and Eisner Revisited,” in 
Expressionist Films, ed. Dietrich Scheunemann, p. 43. 
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This consolidation of movement works in accordance with what Gilles Deleuze has 
located for the cinema at this specific point in time, namely a moment at which movement 
“subordinates description of a space to the functions of thought.”33 Deleuze continues that this 
constitutes a “camera-consciousness… defined… by the mental connections it is able to enter 
into.”34 However, in contrast to the emerging practice of neo-realism in the same period, the 
vectors that are described by the movement in the opening sequence are in service of a specific 
configuration and are driven by a disciplinary compulsion. That is, in contrast, to a “lacunary 
reality”35 that Deleuze identifies for neorealist cinema, in which “there is no longer a vector or 
line of the universe which extends and links up the events,”36 the sequential arrangement of the 
shots is organized around a particular perspective. Like the cabaret sign, this perspective follows 
the gaze toward an instance of writing in an emphatic logic of movement that is punctuated by 
writing. Through its immediate proximity following the inscription of the cabaret’s 
advertisement as a title into the image of refugees on a train, this second instant of writing 
establishes a sense of repetition that emphasizes a point being driven “home” as a form of a 
disciplinary condition of viewing. In this sense, the image already emblematizes a sense of moral 
indignation since it encapsulates the gesture of furnishing evidence as a testimony. That is, it 
testifies to the demand to see and witness and, within a rhetorical register, the image thus already 
                                                 
33 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 23. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 212. 
36 Ibid. 
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anticipates the plea made during the blockade of Berlin to “look at” what has happened to this 
city.37     
In her analysis of the “images of society” in the German cinema from 1945 to 1949, 
Bettina Greffrath suggests that the opening sequence deploys two different conceptions of 
homecoming, one she terms a “successful homecoming” while she labels the other “one that has 
not been completed.”38 Greffrath does seem to notice the fact that both instances of movement 
culminate with the emergence of writing, although she misidentifies the sign that Mertens reads 
as one that states “Bar” and not one that reads “the modern cabaret.” She takes this to mean that 
in his intoxicated state Mertens stumbles toward the “bar” as a goal and that “his gaze does not 
recognizably perceive his environment.”39 Greffrath therefore identifies the issue of perception at 
work in the sequence and sees this as a matter of defining the relative value of divergent modes 
of recognition, but she does not follow through with the implications of this insight. In 
contemporary reviews of the film as well, this opening shot was memorable enough to be 
mentioned in a significant number of cases and the locale was twice identified with the term 
Bumslokal, a slang expression that technically means “dance-hall dive” but which could also 
                                                 
37 At the height of the Berlin blockade in September 1948, the mayor of the Western sectors of the city, Ernst 
Reuter, appealed to the “eyes” of the world by pleading “you peoples of the world, look at this city” (“lhr Völker der 
Welt, schaut auf diese Stadt!”) in a famous speech he gave in front of the ruins of the Reichstag.   
38 Bettina Greffrath, Gesellschaftsbilder der Nachkriegszeit: Deutsche Spielfilme 1945  - 1949 (Pfaffenweiler: 
Centaurus Verlag, 1995), pp. 198 – 199. In the original, “eine geglückte Heimkehr” as opposed to “eine nicht zu 
Ende gekommene Heimkehr.” 
39 Ibid., p. 198. Emphasis in original. 
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connote a brothel in this context.40 The reviewer of the Berlin newspaper Der Tagesspiegel even 
went as far as to attest to this scene an “astonishing optical suction capacity,”41 which, while 
unfortunate as a metaphor in either English or German, does emphasize the compelling 
disciplinary force at work here. 
This notion of force is replicated in the following sequence that Greffrath claims is 
indicative of a “successful” homecoming. For Greffrath, Susanne, in contrast to Mertens, is at 
this point endowed with a capacity for perception because she “sees with astonished, wide-open 
eyes people who have been bowed: casualties of war, refugees.”42 While this description seems 
like a rather unusual moment of astonishment for someone who is returning from a concentration 
camp, Greffrath does register Susanne’s view, which notices a poster “recalling an idyllic 
country scene.” This assessment is inaccurate and minimizes the importance of the sequence, 
especially because, as Greffrath herself seems to indicate, it occurs as a direct repetition of the 
category of perception by reading the writing on the screen again. What Susanne sees is a 
wounded soldier hobbling on crutches whose coat bears the large letters “PW” for “prisoner of 
                                                 
40 The cultural archive or Kulturarchiv of the Fachhochschule Hannover, in conjunction with the History 
Department of the University of Hannover, has made a number of documents and archival materials relating to the 
film available online, including fifteen contemporary reviews of the film. They can be found at   
http://www.hist.uni-hannover.de/~kultarch/dnach45/zeitgen_spielfilme/filme/moerder/kritik.htm.  
41 Ibid. In his review “Der erste deutsche Film nach dem Kriege,” in Der Tagesspiegel, October 16, 1945, Friedrich 
Luft calls the film’s opening shot one “mit erstaunlicher optischer Saugkraft.” Most of the other reviews available in 
the online Kulturarchiv are equally positive to enthusiastic, with specific mentions of the use of the camera and the 
set design, but the important exception is a critical review by Wolfdietrich Schnurre, who bemoans the film’s 
predilection for heavy-handed symbolism and reworks the passive construction of the film’s title by asserting that 
“murderers are among us? We are murderers.”   
42 Bettina Greffrath, Gesellschaftsbilder der Nachkriegszeit, p. 199. Emphasis in original. 
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war” that are stenciled on his back. If both sequences that comprise the opening of the film are 
structured around the category of a homecoming, which is epitomized by the act of reading 
signs, then the image of a man with a mark on his back suggests another sense of return, namely 
a deliberate return to the visual mode of signification in the film M. 
Robert Shandley notes that “[b]oth narratively and stylistically, the film vaguely echoes 
Fritz Lang’s M, a similar story of shell-shock, murder, and revenge in an anxiety-ridden 
Berlin.”43 But Shandley is more interested in examining the generic and narrative codes of the 
film, which to him suggest that the film is a “Western” since in “its presentation of the 
landscape, the hero, the heroine, and much of the plot, it echoes the filmic codes of the American 
Western,”44 an assessment he shares with Greffrath, who remarks that in the film “the 
movements of people in hiding are easily reminiscent of chase sequences in boundless 
mountainous terrain for the connoisseur of Western movies.”45 Both Shandley and Greffrath 
focus on the echoes and moments of reminiscence that the film enlists, but it seems that the 
visual linkage to M is more than just a cinematic allusion or a visual echo. In this respect, the 
film’s opening also establishes a “homecoming” or return to the issue of the mark as it 
functioned in M. What is remarkable is that the image of the mark now serves a badge of 
victimhood which is no longer defined by the relation of the outsider to a group that determines 
the status of exclusion, but rather asserted as an all-encompassing, existential condition of being.  
                                                 
43 Robert R. Shandley, Rubble Films: German Cinema in the Shadow of the Third Reich (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2001), p. 27. 
44 Ibid., p. 26. 
45 Bettina Greffrath, Gesellschaftsbilder der Nachkriegszeit, p. 218. In the original, Greffrath emphasizes the chaotic 
and incalculable terrain of the ruins as the visual equivalent of the desert and mountains in the Western film.  
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The point-of-view of Susanne is one of dislocation in the sense that she arrives at a place 
that seems no longer familiar to her. From this perspective, she is surrounded by people who are 
equally displaced from their environments. Moreover, the recognition of the mark “PW” that is 
on display on the person hobbling in front of her confers the status of the mark onto the entire 
group, since the arrival hall in which everyone is waiting is a shared communal space in which 
people are individuated as victims, that is, old men, women, children, and the wounded. In other 
words, there are only victims that have been displaced and now carry the mark to indicate their 
state of being displaced. The figure of exclusion from M has now been reärticulated as a figure of 
communal or shared displacement. The reëmergence of the mark exemplifies that everyone now 
lives under the sign and is held captive by it: Mertens is held captive by the alienating spell of 
the cabaret sign and Susanne and her fellow-travelers by the circumstances of war; that is, they 
have all been subjected to and thus marked by the condition of war. In this respect, the displaced 
figure of M has now been inverted and transferred to indicate a sense of suffering in which 
everyone is included.   
Staudte must have placed an insistent emphasis on the proper staging of this particular 
sequence, which is evident from an awkward moment of movement that precipitates the 
revelation of the writing on the poster and confirms the significance of the writing in the image. 
As the wounded prisoner-of-war turns his back towards the camera, which is still moving in a 
tracking point-of-view shot towards the remnants of the wall of the arrival hall, an old man 
standing in front of the wall begins to move but then hesitates and returns to his initial position 
for the cue he has been instructed to follow. The old man waits until the soldier has fully faced 
forward towards him so that the writing on his back has become visible and legible for the 
spectator before the old man moves again and leaves his position as Staudte had envisioned. The 
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soldier then takes over his position and stands in the old man’s place. This brief instance of 
performative hesitation, in which the awkward movement of the actor breaks up the fluidity of 
motion as a kind of gestural stutter, indicates the elaborately staged choreography of 
displacement that Staudte envisioned for the shot and enacts a violation of what James Naremore 
has termed a theatrical “protocol” of performance in which acting should be regarded as “an 
artful imitation of unmediated behavior in the real world.”46 The old man must wait until the 
soldier has turned his back fully towards the camera and sits down at the exact spot where the old 
man has been standing before, while the old man now turns his back and looks out through an 
open hole in the wall that used to be a window. Both figures are now on either side of a poster 
that the old man has partially obscured and the camera, still moving, begins to frame the poster 
in its center. It is a tourism poster advertising “das schöne Deutschland” or “beautiful Germany.” 
The image in the poster does not show a country landscape, as Greffrath asserts, nor does 
it depict the city of Nürnberg, as Shandley claims, but shows, in fact, the market square with its 
fountain and the council hall of the town of Wernigerode.47 Underneath this quintessential image 
                                                 
46 James Naremore, Acting in the Cinema (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), p. 18.  
47 Shandley in his Rubble Films, p. 31, identifies the location as Nürnberg, but this is not self-evident from the image 
in the poster, and Greffrath does not seem to recollect the image at all. My assessment is that the poster is a 
photograph of the medieval city hall or Rathaus and the market square of Wernigerode in Saxony-Anhalt. A 
speculative association of the image with Nuremberg, however, is certainly interesting since the phrase “das schöne 
Deutschland” could evoke the name of a fountain in Nuremberg, “der schöne Brunnen,” while the two steeples on 
the half-timbered building might possibly evoke the two towers of the St. Sebald Church in Nuremberg near the 
fountain. An allusion to the city Nuremberg would also be particularly poignant, given that the film had its premiere 
in Berlin on October 15, 1946, coïnciding with the conclusion of the 11-month Trial of the Major War Criminals 
before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Verdicts had been delivered on October 1, 1946, and all the 
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of an idyllic notion of an anachronistic home, that is, a “hometown” for which the geographic 
and imaginary center is the provincial town square anchored by the town hall, a half-timbered 
building with steeples, and its meeting point at the quaint fountain, the caption advertises the 
historical beauty of Germany. The camera tracks in on the poster hanging crookedly and out-of-
place on the bare wall while the old man begins to rest his head next to it in exhaustion as he 
looks out of the gaping hole in the wall. His position has been replaced by the soldier who is 
resting as well. The writing that declares Germany to be beautiful is now in full unobstructed 
view. As the camera moves towards the poster’s anachronistic depiction of small-town order and 
beauty, the image dissolves into a long shot where the steeples of the tourism poster are replaced 
by ruins of foreboding towers that reach into the clouds like apocalyptic stalagmites. 
Within the confrontation staged between the writing that asserts Germany’s timeless and 
inviting provincial beauty and the abstracted and monstrous ruins that seem to grow into the vast 
sky, the linkages established in this sequence point to an existential and thus an a-historical 
condition to which the protagonists have been made subservient. This condition is created 
through a doubling effect of alienation and refamiliarization, whereby a sense of victimhood is 
inscribed and then recognized. However, to confirm this effect, the condition is made legible in 
the characters’ relation to the signs that they perceive. This function would correspond to what 
Sabine Hake has diagnosed as a general aspect of postwar German cinema, namely that it is 
takes on a “position of depoliticised humanism that, often with an existentialist bent, 
                                                                                                                                                             
appeals had been rejected by October 13. The death sentences were carried out October 16, 1946, so that Hermann 
Göring’s suicide on the eve of his execution coïncides with the premiere of the film. Nonetheless, both critical 
assessments misidentify the image, so that the invocation of the loss that is expressed by the use of the poster is 
reënacted on a secondary level, namely that the former “beauty of Germany” can no longer be identified and thus no 
longer preserved as a record.  
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characterised most later representations of the Third Reich and its postwar legacies.”48 In this 
case, however, the a-historical condition that the film proposes is nonetheless grounded in a 
particular understanding of the figural history of images. Moreover, the sequence replicates a 
notion of authority that derives its claims to legitimacy from a seemingly timeless shift to 
allegorization. With the use of the two instances of writing, Staudte thus manages to configure 
the film as one which imposes an act of reading signs, while at the same time invoking the 
mechanism of social control that structured the film M. Since this linkage transposes the social 
conflict of M into the realm of a Berlin in ruins, it reverses the exclusionary power of the mark as 
an inclusive condition of suffering and, at the same time, suggests the importance of reading the 
signs as a disciplinary imposition which will determine the proper subject position in relation to 
the writing.       
Through this opening sequence we are introduced to the two protagonists of the film. 
Both are in the process of returning home to a place that they will have to share. Susanne 
Wallner, who has been imprisoned in a concentration camp for three years, will get to know Dr. 
Hans Mertens, who has been squatting in her apartment. He is a former surgeon and soldier now 
turned cynic and wallowing in self-pity, but she will fall in love with him and help him overcome 
his traumas. As we can deduce from the gossip of their neighbors, Mertens has long been in the 
habit of returning home drunk from his daily and nightly outings. Upon her arrival Susanne first 
visits her neighbor, Herr Mondschein, a kindly old man with an optician’s store on the ground 
floor of the building. By this time it has become evening. The focus at the conclusion of this 
introductory sequence, in conjunction with the movement of the camera, on the issue of camera 
framing emphasizes the importance of perspective. The transitions through dissolves are 
                                                 
48 Sabine Hake, German National Cinema (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 91. 
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composed in a manner that is predicated on an oblique and fragmented logic of linkages as 
geometric similarities from the images to the ruined environment that surrounds them, so that a 
fragmentary pattern in one image becomes the connecting figure to the subsequent image. The 
movement from the opening intertitle to the vision charts thus attempts to inscribe an act of 
displacement in working through from monumentalism towards the human scale.  
The transitory displacement is initiated in the first dissolve from the entrance gates to the 
nightclub that yield to the shape of a locomotive driving through them while the writing above 
the doors remains the anchor that grounds both images in the frame that has been defined by the 
writing. Finally, the vectoral movement of the opening sequence beguin with the arrival of the 
train and continued through Susanne’s walk among the ruined steeples comes to rest with the 
image of shadows cast through the railing of the steps of Susanne’s home. With this trajectory, 
the opening images replicate the fragmentation and dislocation that literalize a world out of 
balance and without footing, yet each shot becomes a movement that searches for the proper 
frame which will put the images into their required perspective. Staudte’s attention to this notion 
of framing the individual within the image here is so prominent that it rivals the later 
melodramatic work of Douglas Sirk. Moreover, the attention to framing relies on a conjunction 
between the categorical principle of Expressionism, by which tormented inner states of being are 
rendered as outward reality, and its melodramatic variant, which emphasizes the mise-en-scène 
as an articulation of the individual in relation to the constraints of the social order. 
In this case, Staudte integrates both approaches in order to arrive at a level whereby the 
relation of the individual to the image overall conveys the loss of balance on the one hand while 
at the same time emphasizing the imposition of larger impersonal forces that render the 
individual trapped in circumstances. Thus, when Susanne reaches her old home after her journey 
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from the camps on the train into the ruined city, she sees herself reflected in the fragments of a 
shattered mirror that is part of the optician’s store window. At this point the camera positions 
have finally shifted from the extreme canted and high- or low-angled perspectives that structured 
the opening sequence to a level point-of-view and now come to rest. The moment of an 
anchoring perspective has arrived when she sees her own reflection. This moment of assessment 
is repeated in the scene following immediately thereafter when Mondschein looks up from 
working on a pair of glasses because he notices Susanne, who has entered his store and has 
moved to its corner in front of two lettered posters designed to test visual acuity.49 As he looks at 
her in front of these Snellen Charts, his puzzled looks turns to a smile. 
The shift in perspective is accompanied by a sleight of hand in the production design. In 
order to frame Susanne accurately between the two charts behind her in the reverse shot, the 
arrangement of the posters has been altered so that she is flanked on either side by the letters and 
patterns of the chart as if to be examined closely. Of course this change can be considered as a 
mere marginal divergence from a particular standard of artificial filmic continuity, but, once 
again, the divergence underscores Staudte’s attention to detail that the film imposes even in such 
lesser noticeable arrangements of the mise-en-scène.50 This meticulous arrangement, then, 
                                                 
49 For a film that has often only been discussed in terms of its heavy-handedness and pathos, Staudte demonstrates a 
remarkable sense of visual wit and compositional elegance here. 
50 Staudte’s attention to detail was such that he sought to reconstruct the ruins of Berlin in the studio in order “to 
create the perfect rubble,” as Shandley states. Cf. Robert Shandley, Rubble Films, p. 37. Marc Silberman, however, 
notes that Staudte had begun shooting newsreel documentaries in the Fall of 1945 and that some of these sequences 
were incorporated into the film as well as into his later film Rotation. Cf. Marc Silberman, “Wolfgang Staudte: 
Rotation (1949),” in Widergänger: Faschismus und Antifaschismus im Film, ed. Joachim Schmitt-Sasse (Münster: 
MAkS Publikationen, 1993), p. 138. 
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continues the mode of evaluation the film has introduced with its first shot, in which the camera 
provides us with reference points that indicate how the film imagines itself as a framework and 
guideline for the issue of judgment.                           
This sense of framing is fundamental to the film in a way that the more easily 
recognizable formal correspondences to the aesthetic of Expressionism do not address.    While 
the angular constructions of the opening shot sequence suggest similarities with the aesthetic 
principles of German Expressionism, a similarity that is often evoked as a short-hand for the 
film’s aesthetic continuity as opposed to the caesura that the terms “zero hour” or “year zero” 
would imply, the juxtaposition of writing into the image suggests a more explicit reference to a 
culture of the recent past. The act of invoking the cabaret nightclub and its attendant shorthand 
for a brothel as site of depravity conveys a sentiment often associated with Weimar nightlife, 
namely the willful and forceful insistence on entertainment as a desire to block out and 
momentarily escape the harsh realities or the confinement of social conditions. Given that the 
cinema as mode of entertainment is understood to cater to this very desire, the moment fulfills a 
complicated maneuver of reflexivity. The sign in the image that announces a site of distraction 
into the joys and pleasures of a cabaret spectacle serves as a signal to indicate a disciplinary 
conflict. 
In all of these figural linkages, the logic of the image sequence follows a rigidly 
organized line of argument, in which even the seemingly elliptical dissolves are imposed by a 
coherence. This coherence has the appearance of being driven by a visual geometry, but it is, in 
fact, a logic of figuration. If Murderers Are Among Us is discussed in terms of its similarity to 
neo-realism, which Shandley suggests when he states that the film “can also be contextualized 
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with Italian neo-realism,”51 or when Anton Kaes states that the film evinces Staudte’s stylistic 
choices with “elements that recall Italian neorealism,”52 then this indicates more of a desire than 
an accurate definition. Thomas Brandlmeier cites the influential German film critic Enno Patalas, 
whose 1961 assessment on the post-war opportunities already mentions a general desire for the 
promise “that, right after the war, the German cinema suggested that it had what it took for 
achieving something similar to Italian neo-realism.”53 While there may have understandably 
been a predilection to assume in the first decade after the war that German cinema had the 
capacity to engage in new conceptions of “realism,” this runs counter to the analysis in which 
Gilles Deleuze demonstrates the radical break that neo-realism introduced in the history of the 
cinema, since it is defined by a “build-up of purely optical situations… which are fundamentally 
distinct from the sensory-motor situations of the action-image in the old realism.”54         
While the opening sequence of the film might suggest a succession of existential or 
“purely optical” situations, its mode of figuration in fact links back to very classical schemata. 
Thomas Brandlmeier comes to this conclusion as well by way of an analysis of the film’s 
symbolic and imaginary concepts when he dismisses critics who suggest an affinity between 
rubble films and neo-realism by declaring that the German cinema “uses rubbles for a German 
                                                 
51 Robert Shandley, Rubble Films, p. 28. He does note that the film’s location shots were highly stylized and the set 
designs elaborately constructed.  
52 Anton Kaes, From Hitler To Heimat: The Return of History as Film (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1989), p. 12. 
53 Enno Patalas, “In Jenen Tagen,” in Filmkritik 3 (1961), cited in Thomas Brandlmeier, “Von Hitler zu Adenauer: 
Deutsche Trümmerfilme,” in Zwischen Gestern und Morgen: Westdeutscher Nachkriegsfilm 1946 – 1962, ed. 
Hilmar Hoffmann and Walter Schobert (Frankfurt: Deutsches Filmmuseum, 1989), p. 41.   
54 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, p. 2. 
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subjectivity and a constructed cinema of ideas”55 and he stages a diametrical opposition between 
the two cinemas for which he concludes that “while the emblematic image of neoverism refers to 
contemporaneïty, the symbolic images of the rubble film refer to the deep, the hidden, the past, 
the buried.”56 Heide Fehrenbach reaches this insight from a different direction through a 
narrative analysis in which she summarizes the film as a chronicle of  a “spiritual suffering” 
experienced by a protagonist who is trapped in time; that is, since he is “imprisoned by memories 
of the past,” he is “unable to confront the present.”57 In both cases, she suggests, the emphasis 
lies on the question of the return, but it is not exactly clear how this “return” needs to be 
conceptualized.  
Fehrenbach, for example, supports her assessment of the film as a confrontation between 
“successful” and “unsuccessful returns” through an extensive citation of Eric Rentschler’s 
summary of the film, which, as he argues,  
 
“thematizes the relationship between the past and the present: the camera fixes on a grave, rising 
to gaze out a long lane where Mertens, the dazed physician… staggers toward the mound and a 
group of playing children. Framed by the specter of war’s devastation, but surrounded by youth 
and hopes for the future, Mertens will take flight into a bar from which honky-tonk music issues. 
His persistent outings into night clubs are an escape from the past and a postponement of the 
future, a step into a realm of excitement and gaiety where time is of little importance. Pursued by 
the recollection of a massacre he sought to prevent while in Poland, the physician cannot recycle 
                                                 
55 Thomas Brandlmeier, “Von Hitler zu Adenauer: Deutsche Trümmerfilme,” in Hilmar Hoffmann and Walter 
Schobert, eds., Zwischen Gestern und Morgen, p. 34. (Translation mine.) 
56 Ibid. 
57 Heide Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p. 204. 
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the past with the ease of his ex-superior Brückner, the man responsible for the killings who has 
in the meanwhile settled into a smug and comfortable existence as head of a factory where steel 
helmets are made into pots and pans.”58
  
In his customarily succinct summary, Rentschler identifies a range of important instances 
that define the film’s conflicted notion of history that will extend to the 1949 film Rotation, 
another one of Staudte’s works to reflect on recent German history. As Rentschler defines it, the 
film outlines two divergent experiences of time, namely one which seeks refuge in an eternal 
present in order to avoid a confrontation with trauma, while the other follows a linear conception 
in which progress is defined as the ability for replacement, an ability which is suggested by 
Brückner’s name as one who can effortlessly build a “bridge” from one position to another in the 
way he conforms to a new era through a grotesque version of turning swords into plowshares. 
Rentschler already invokes a third relation to history as a cyclical figure of rotation since he 
discusses the ability to “recycle” in his use of the term. In both Fehrenbach’s and Rentschler’s 
assessments, however, the focus remains on a discursive notion from the Adenauer years through 
a term deployed in public by the first West German president Theodor Heuss, namely 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, that is, the ability to leave the past behind in an act of surmounting 
it or a “coming to terms with the past,” which, as Anton Kaes states, was part of a general 
discourse that “fostered the growing view, strongly held in the 1950s, that the past should be laid 
to rest.”59
                                                 
58 Quoted in Fehrenbach, pp. 204 – 205. From Eric Rentschler, “Germany: The Past That Would Not Go Away,” in 
World Cinema since 1945, ed. William Luhr (New York: Ungar Publishing Company, 1987), p. 211. 
59 Anton Kaes, From Hitler To Heimat, p. 17. 
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Because the film culminates in a confrontation between Mertens, who is determined to 
avenge the crimes he was forced to commit during the war, and Brückner, his commanding 
officer and the “murderer among” the protagonists, played by Arno Paulsen, the narrative 
resolution for the threat of this confrontation has invited frequent charges that the film exonerates 
personal responsibility in favor of a conception of justice which implies a functioning system of 
the state. Susanne intervenes at the last moment to stop Mertens from killing Brückner with a 
memorable declaration that moves the demand for justice into the realm of the state and thus 
displaces individual action into to realm of an abstract system of justice in the same manner that 
M culminated in the intervention of the state. Likewise, in both M and Murderers Are Among Us, 
the final images depict this resolution through a process of allegorization that ultimately does not 
provide a solution but rather indicates the impossibility of finding the proper mode of 
representation and demonstrates the difficulty of halting or “arresting” the dynamic of the 
implications that have been invoked. 
In both instances, a plaintive appeal to the state as the final authoritative arbiter of 
judgment is made, so that the figure of justice in M is allegorized in the faces of the lamenting 
mothers, in whose name justice has supposedly been served, while in Murderers Are Among Us 
the final sequence shows Brückner, behind bars proclaiming his innocence, upon which first the 
image of a mother with her two children and then the stoic faces of an older man and a young 
boy are superimposed. Both are in uniform, and the old man’s wide-open eyes are staring into 
one direction, while the young boy’s eyes are pointed in the opposite direction, blindly, since he 
is wearing dark glasses. Row after row of crosses that mark innumerable graves are 
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superimposed onto their silent, accusing stares.60 A geometrical and moving pattern of these 
crosses takes over and animates the image, until the pattern comes to rest and lingers on three 
crosses arranged like the depiction of the crucifixion on Calvary with the cross of Jesus in the 
middle and next to it the two smaller crosses of Dismas and Gestas, the apocryphal names of the 
malefactors crucified on either side of him. The camera closes in on the middle cross as the 
image gradually fades out and the outstretched arms of the middle cross come closer until they 
seem to embrace the entire screen while it goes dark, with the faint cries of “but I am innocent” 
still audible.  
For a film commissioned in the Soviet zone, whose cultural officer insisted on a change 
in the ending that removed the suggestion of vigilante justice by informing Staudte that, the 
justifiable narrative desire for revenge notwithstanding, “when the people leave the theater, 
there’ll be all sorts of gun-cracking on the streets and we can’t have that, obviously,”61 this 
determined shift toward Christian iconography is certainly noteworthy.62 Moreover, the 
                                                 
60 This iconic configuration is therefore very much in line with the allegorization of the face of sacrifice at the 
conclusion of Ohm Krüger. 
61 As quoted in Thomas Brandlmeier, “Von Hitler zu Adenauer: Deutsche Trümmerfilme,” p. 39. In the original: 
“Wenn der Film ein Erfolg ist, und die Leute kommen aus dem Kino, dann gibt es Geknalle auf der Straße, und das 
kommt natürlich nicht infrage.” 
62 On the other hand, the conflation here of Christian iconography with totalitarian modes of representation under 
Soviet cultural control might be less contradictory that it seems, since a large number of Nazi films at the time were 
in the process of being shipped to the Soviet Union, where they served to augment domestic film production and 
were often shown to Soviet audiences with minimal modifications. Ohm Krüger was part of a vast number of these 
“booty films” that were captured from the archives by the Soviet Army during and after World War II and which 
“were thrown into Soviet distribution on a mass scale, without subtitles and often under different names.” Cf. Maya 
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abstracted iconic configuration of sacrifice and sin comes after a declaration of Susanne, who 
implores Mertens that “we do not have the right to judge.” To this Mertens accedes and 
responds, “You are right, Susanne. But it is our duty to raise indictments, to demand atonement 
on behalf of millions of innocent people murdered callously.”63 Given the significance of this 
resolution, it is remarkable how loosely and cavalierly the intervention of Susanne and Mertens’ 
final statement in response are represented as pontifications in both the discussions of Shandley 
and Kaes. Shandley declares that Susanne’s “final statement, that ‘we don’t have the right to be 
judge and hangman,’ followed by accession to democratic due process, is clearly 
integrationist.”64 He continues by stating that this is an example of the “film’s more enigmatic 
elements,” which can be explained by the fact that the “generic codes that best suit [Susanne’s] 
story, namely the domestic melodrama, serve to insert legal discourse into the film.”65
Anton Kaes is more assiduous in his description of the film, but nonetheless he also 
suggests it is Susanne who offers the final declaration, since Kaes states that  
 
“[a]t the end of the film Mertens’s friend, who has herself just been released from a 
concentration camp, says, ‘We do not have the right to judge, but we have the duty to accuse, to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Turovskaya, “The 1930s and 1940s: Cinema in Context,” in Stalinism and Soviet Cinema, ed. Richard Taylor and 
Derek Spring (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 51.   
63 The original dialogue states: “Wir haben nicht das Recht zu richten.” “Nein, Susanne. Aber wir haben die Pflicht, 
Anklage zu erheben, Sühne zu fordern, im Auftrage von Millionen unschuldig hingemordeter Menschen.” 
64 Robert Shandley, Rubble Films, p. 41. This representation is unfortunate, both for its rendition of the tone and of 
the content of the dialogue. 
65 Ibid., p. 45. 
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demand atonement on behalf of millions of innocent people who were murdered in cold 
blood.’”66
 
Even though Kaes sees the necessity to reproduce the final statement more faithfully than 
Shandley, his rendition still suggests that it is the concentration camp survivor who speaks on 
behalf of all of the victims in an act of abdication in which their right to adjudicate is 
relinquished in favor of a state system that has been notably absent throughout the film. These 
assessments derive their argument only by foreclosing the evident logic of figural displacement, 
in which the intervention of Susanne is continued as a vector of force that is first transferred onto 
Mertens to include him as a victim as well and then extends outward until it reaches everyone in 
an all-encompassing gesture of inclusion and forgiveness that even hears the pleading voice of 
the perpetrator while it reaches the limits of the screen to embrace the audience beyond these 
confines. 
While both Kaes and Shandley are correct in understanding the allegorization at work 
here again as a figural means to incorporate a conception of the state, they assume that the 
system of state that is imagined here either corresponds to, in Shandley’s terms, a generic 
necessity that indicates an “integrationist democratic due process” or, as Kaes puts it, 
corresponds to a dramaturgical conception that fails because it offers an “appeal to the legal 
system of the state”67 which is absent from the rest of the film. Even Wolfgang Becker and 
Norbert Schöll, who go furthest in their ideological critique of the film, see this as a fictitious 
construction of a moral civic duty, the crisis of which becomes the “touchstone of the new power 
                                                 
66 Anton Kaes, From Hitler To Heimat, p. 11. 
67 Ibid. 
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of the state.”68 As Becker and Schöll argue, it is the moral dimension that renders the shift from 
personal revenge to state power merely an issue of degree rather than a dichotomy. They cite 
Staudte’s insistence that the Soviet narrative intervention had actually convinced him as an 
indication that the ending posits the moral position of the citizen, or, in a literal translation of 
their phrase, the “acceptable state citizen’s thinking,”69 who voluntarily gives up his desire for 
revenge and displaces it into the legal order of the state. The sense of irritation that all three 
assessments register, in fact, indicates the precarious legitimacy of the state which can only 
presume its authoritative force through the allegorization that the film reaches toward in its 
conclusion. But the conception of the state that is configured here does not suggest a democratic 
state, nor does it point to a system that is based on the due process of codified law that is derived 
from a communal consensus. Rather, it even goes beyond moral or ethical categories since is 
grounded in the allegorical power of reference which, in Walter Benjamin’s terms, elevates and 
sanctifies the “profane world” since the nature of allegory, “although a convention like every 
kind of writing, is regarded as created, like holy scripture.”70
This reference points to an absolutist state because it posits the presence of a systemic 
and sacralized form of justice and this assertion derives its justification from the iconography of 
its allegorization of judgment as fiat. In this regard, the ending of the film is coherent with the 
logic that ends the film M and the film Ohm Krüger. It is precisely not a legal and democratic 
system, on the basis of which justice becomes possible, that the film offers as a solution, but 
                                                 
68 Wolfgang Becker and Norbert Schöll, In Jenen Tagen…: Wie der Deutsche Nachkriegsfilm die Vergangenheit 
bewältigte (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1995), p. 41. (Translation mine.) 
69 Ibid. In the original: “Von staatsbürgerlichem Denken her moralisch zulässig ist allerding nur der, der die Rache 
als Recht und Gesetz einfordert.” (Emphasis in original.) 
70 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 1985), p. 175. 
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rather a divine state of being that exists outside of temporal contingencies and political 
limitations as a form of destiny which will absolve the powerless individual of his responsibility 
to adjudicate and which will become the ultimate guarantor of judgment instead. In this respect, 
the film aligns itself with M, which, while offering the possibility for the intervention of the law, 
ultimate follows the logic of the legal lack of accountability, or the paragraph 51 with its 
loophole of the Unzurechnungsfähigkeit invoked at the kangaroo trial, to its end and comes to 
rest on the allegorized faces of motherhood who lament the limitations of justice accorded in the 
system of law.               
This would explain the blithe responses of audience members as described in a review 
following a screening of the film three years after its original premiere of the film and which 
might be more intriguing than they appear at first glance. In the Evangelischer Film-Beobachter, 
a recent journal of film criticism that had been established in December 1948 under the auspices 
of the German protestant church, a resistance to the topic of guilt is noted, which is evident from 
what the author declares the “vox populi” after the film’s screening. In his 1949 review of the 
film, “Unsere empfindliche Stelle - Die Mörder sind unter uns,” published in the vol. 1, no. 5, 
March 1, 1949, issue of the Evangelischer Film-Beobachter, the reviewer W.W. is puzzled by 
the lack of positive responses to the film he overheard at the screening for which he was present. 
He recounts that a significant number of audience members complained vociferously and 
derisively about the film afterward, a sentiment that he terms “our sensitive spot” in the title of 
his review.71 He provides examples for this sensitivity by making note of such utterances as “this 
                                                 
71 The review is reprinted in its original form in Hilmar Hoffmann und Walter Schobert, eds., Zwischen Gestern und 
Morgen: Westdeutscher Nachkriegsfilm 1946 – 1962, p. 255. The review is also available online in the documents 
and production materials for the film as part of the Kulturarchiv established by the Fachhochschule Hannover at 
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film should be banned,” “a consumer strike against movie theaters should be organized,” “I 
thought it was going to be a murder mystery film,” or, presumably in response to the question of 
individual guilt, “this needs to stop already.”72 In his article, the reviewer sets out to investigate 
the rationale behind such irreverent and sarcastic remarks and attempts to find an explanation for 
them. 
Remarkably, like Shandley and Kaes, this contemporary and presumably protestant 
reviewer of the film fails to identify its figural gestures toward Christian iconography in equal 
measures as well, although his choice of descriptive language suggests that the film may have 
had a more successful visual impact on him than he himself gives it credit for. It seems that the 
reviewer did recognize a sense of Christian iconography at work in the film here, but this 
sentiment only prompts him to develop a line of argument that attempts to find the reasons for 
the people’s rejection of the film. As W.W. determines, the film remains “stuck in the negative,” 
so that the “inability to prevail over a sense of guilt [nicht überwundene Schuldgefühl] leads to 
tension and thus to unproductive nihilism.”73 The conclusion that W.W. derives from this 
insurmountable inability that must lead to a fruitless or nihilist attitude is worth quoting at length. 
As he continues, this nihilism 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.hist.uni-hannover.de/~kultarch/dnach45/zeitgen_spielfilme/filme/moerder/k10.htm. I have not yet been 
able to determine who W.W. was, but there is a distinct possibility that the abbreviation stands for Will Wehling, a 
film journalist who was involved with the International Short Film Festival Oberhausen since its inception in 1954, 
when it was known as the Westdeutsche Kulturfilmtage, and who later became its executive director from 1971 until 
his death in 1975. 
72 Cf. Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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“… cannot be solved by a renewed guilt. This might also be why this film, after all, has two 
endings – and neither is a solution. After all, human guilt is only recognized in the face of God – 
and can only be forgiven at the Cross of Golgatha. The fact that this film does not dare to thrust 
forward into the religious sphere is its weakness. If it had extended itself into this chastening 
crisis, it would hardly have encountered such strongly dismissive judgment from the vox 
populi.”74
 
This analysis is significant for its laudable effort to locate the origins of the blithely 
insouciant to cynical responses of the audience members, for its insistent reversal of cause and 
effect, and for its attempts to find the motivations and original intentions at the heart of such 
sentiments in precisely the wrong place, “after all,” to use the phrase of the reviewer, since he 
begins with the question “vox populi – vox dei?”75 There is an interesting displacement at work 
                                                 
74 Ibid. In the original: “Aber er [der Film] bleibt im Negativen stecken. Das nicht überwundene Schuldgefühl führt 
zur Verkrampfung und damit zum unfruchtbaren Nihilismus. Er kann nicht durch neue Schuld gelöst werden. Daher 
kommt es wohl auch, daß dieser Film im Grunde zwei Schlüsse hat – und beide sind keine Lösung. Menschliche 
Schuld wird im Grunde nur vor dem Angesicht Gottes erkannt – und kann nur am Kreuze von Golgotha vergeben 
werden. Daß dieser Film den Vorstoß in die religiöse Sphäre nicht wagt, ist seine Schwäche. Hätte er in diese 
läuternde Krisis hineingeführt, dann hätte er wohl kaum dieses ablehnende Urteil der vox populi gefunden.”  
75 I.e. “The voice of the people, the voice of God?” With this remark W.W. encounters a common problem for film 
criticism, namely that actual audiences may react very divergently to any given film and can display a notorious 
resistance to a film’s effects and consequences, be they intended or not. Cinema attendance at the time was an 
extremely popular activity and one of the few affordable means of distraction. Thomas Brandlmeier cites figures that 
in the immediate postwar years audience numbers fast reached very high proportions since a movie ticket at 1.- RM 
was a relative bargain in comparison to a piece of butter with a black market value of 250.- RM. Cf. Thomas 
Brandlmeier, “Von Hitler zu Adenauer: Deutsche Trümmerfilme,” p. 34. As Marc Silberman notes, dubbed Soviet 
films were released within a month after capitulation and comedies and apolitical dramas from the Nazi period were 
re-released in all zones. Cf. Marc Silberman, German Cinema: Texts in Context (Detroit: Wayne State University 
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in the reviewer’s insistence on the absence of the Christian category of redemption and 
forgiveness in the film, which is also amplified by his repeated use of the phrase “after all,” or 
“im Grunde,” to search for the origins of the audience rejection and his confusion about what 
constitutes the solution that the film offers. Yet W.W. nonetheless registers an awareness of the 
visual iconography as his invocation of the crucifixion indicates. The fact that even in his brief 
description the reviewer makes reference to the Cross of Golgatha is therefore surely not 
accidental, because this is precisely the iconography that the film reaches at the end in the 
images towards which “it dares to thrust,” to remain within the review’s discursive register and 
which seems to linger in his description. 
In other words, the film does, in fact, come to the conclusion for which W.W. chastises it, 
namely that “human guilt is only recognized in the face of God.” Thus, in a noteworthy reversal 
of logic in the review, W.W. deduces that it can only be due to the absence of a profound 
humility in light of the promise of divine atonement that the audience members respond with 
nihilist taunts since, in his erroneous memory, the film does not offer a Christian solution but 
rather remains stuck or “clenched” (verkrampft) within a secular or profane definition of guilt 
and judgment. This means the conclusion that W.W. reaches can only be grounded in the 
assumption that either the film or the audience lacks an understanding of the religious dimension 
of forgiveness, which would then explain to him what causes audiences to respond dismissively 
to the film.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Press, 1995), p. 100. For W.W. this may have meant that simply the “wrong” people had gone to see the film, but on 
a more important level, his review also serves as a record of the immense pedagogical difficulty and the work 
involved in the education of the German people in terms of how to think of the medium film again.  
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Since the film’s conclusion, in fact, works in the converse by retreating into an allegorical 
dimension of guilt, the reviewer’s plaintive search for the causal origins of this nihilism seems 
woefully misguided. What the conclusion suggests is that the film’s ending already contributes to 
an incipient notion of Vergangenheitsbewältigung as a form of absolution in its way of 
“surmounting” the immediate past through the familiar allegorical appeal to a higher power of 
judgment as its inevitable destiny. Therefore, the cynical rejection of the film by the audience 
members recorded by W.W. might not necessarily be explicable by the absence of a religious 
dimension, an assertion of transference into which he must place a lot of faith since otherwise, as 
he hopes, the audience “would hardly” (“wohl kaum”) have responded in the manner that he had 
witnessed. Instead, it may be grounded in an awareness of the opposite, namely a contemptuous 
familiarity with the recognizably established presence of a sacral iconography and with an 
excessively repetitive mode of allegorical signification which recognizes the film’s attempts at 
the solicitation of the ultimate figure of authority and the means to sanctify this figure once 
more. 
In other words, the film’s gestures toward a religious dimension are very much present, 
but they no longer carry with them a chastening or purifying effect, which is what W.W. would 
like the film to achieve. Even a merely edifying effect is absent in the responses, much to the 
consternation and concern of the reviewer. The solution he imagines through his recourse to the 
figure of the cross of Golgatha does not work, precisely because this iconography has already 
long been enlisted and abused. In a changed context in which the same configuration is now 
displaced into the service of an appeal to a different disciplinary conception of power, namely a 
Christian one that promises to combine a divine authority for judgment with the virtue of mercy, 
such attempts are easily met with ridicule. 
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The mode of signification that attempts to impose a disciplinary category operates not 
only in the privileged moments of the beginning and the end but is structured as writing 
throughout the film. As part of the dramaturgical construction, various registers of writing are 
deployed against each other. So, for example, Susanne’s line of work is to design posters that in 
their direct and manipulative appeal are the functional equivalent of propaganda, but which 
espouse sentiments of social integration and communal spirit such as one that says “save the 
children.” This prompts Mertens to ridicule these attempts of discursive interventions with 
cynical self-pity and sarcasm. In contrast to Susanne’s bright-eyed faith in the power of placards 
and her spirited determination for everything that enables reconstruction and progress, stands 
another tenant of the building, Herr Bartholomäus Timm, a shadowy but slightly effete and 
bespectacled figure of manipulation, who trades in, as a sign on his door reads, the “scientific 
divination of the future.” As he tells the optician Mondschein, his occult skills are in “high 
demand” because the people’s sense of confidence and their security have been shattered. To 
alleviate these problems he is able to explain to them “how all matters great and small are 
connected in the cosmos” as he states. 
This occurs at the same time that Susanne discovers Mertens’ past when she accidentally 
finds a letter that Mertens has in his possession, addressed to the widow of his commanding 
officer Major Brückner. As it turns out Brückner is alive and “living very well,” as he tells 
Susanne. By contrast, the ailing Mondschein is still troubled because of his missing son and 
enlists Herr Timm’s help in attempting to solve the mystery of his whereabouts through a letter, 
which is the last sign of life that he received from his son while he was at the front. For the price 
of ten marks, Herr Timm is able to use the letter to visualize a bridge on which Mondschein will 
meet his son again and Mondschein, who wants to be assured and desperately needs a sign of 
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hope, is more than wiling to believe him. The film spells out very clearly how the power of 
suggestion, especially the kind that invokes the occult and the category of destiny, works easily 
on gullible people, but at the same time it postulates that its audience will be able to detect this as 
a cynical manipulation and “read” the symptoms properly and unambiguously.76 When 
Mondschein dies without having been reunited with his son, the sequence that makes this evident 
returns to a mode of writing that follows the explicit inscription of silent film and insists on an 
unequivocal act of reading as recognition without any recourse to dialogue and only a faint 
musical tune. 
What is visible is Mondschein’s coffin being carried out of the building. We know this 
because his store is desolate and empty, while the snow at his doorstep is pristine and 
undisturbed by footprints. The shadows of the funeral procession are reflected on the wall as they 
pass by Herr Timm’s sign that reads “your future is foretold by Herr Bartholomäus Timm in 
accordance with strict scientific method.” At this point the film demands from its audience the 
ability to discern and read these signs in their proper manner and thus turns to an almost 
abecedarian didacticism. However, this didactic insistence on explicit signification is less 
interesting for its heavy-handed approach than for the community of readers it imagines. The 
                                                 
76 Juxtaposed with the sequence when Herr Timm skillfully manipulates Mondschein is a scene in which two house 
tenants gossip about the cohabitation of Susanne and Mertens. Lest their intentions come across as ambiguous, the 
film shows their chattering facial profiles in distorted shadows that make their silhouettes appear like obviously 
grotesque caricatures with pointy, elongated noses and dramatically receding necklines. A charitable reading of this 
moment would note the lasting influence of F.W. Murnau’s The Last Laugh in the imagery here, but the caricature, 
in conjunction with the depiction of Herr Timm as an occult charlatan who projects an insidious aura of 
intellectualism and greed, adheres to more recent and immediately recognizable encodings of difference along racial 
and ethnic lines.      
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film’s faith in the self-evidence of the writing on the screen, along the same lines that propel 
Susanne’s posters propagating the necessary means that will eliminate social ills, is grounded in 
a sense of moral indignation that assumes its proper recognition through the transparent legibility 
of its inscription. In fact, this assumption points to the real efforts against failure in the film 
because it attempts to orchestrate a sense of collective outrage by recourse to the inscription in 
the image. Once again, that is, the writing serves to literalize and capture an event that defines 
the limits of representation and displaces it onto the authority of the written text by insisting that 
the disjunction between the coffin and the sign that promises a future determined by “scientific 
divination” will suffice to mark the affective cognition of betrayal and belief. 
As an act of designation, this shift replicates another significant moment that works even 
more profoundly in a sequence that finally determines the relation between Mertens and his 
superior Brückner and clarifies the narrative dichotomy between the two characters. When 
Brückner hears the news that Mertens is alive as well, Mertens is invited to dine with Brückner 
and his family in their opulent and immaculate villa that stands in stark contrast to the ruins 
surrounding it. Afterwards, Mertens experiences a traumatic flashback that is shown through a 
close-up of his face with his pupils beginning to shift rapidly while the sounds of war return. 
When the film returns to Brückner he is shown as someone who is enjoying his cup of coffee and 
a sandwich. Brückner, whose thin moustache and round glasses make him a dead ringer for 
Heinrich Himmler, displays an ease and self-assuredness which Susanne mistakes for an 
“enviably unexpended” disposition.77 He calmly continues his meal while the camera lingers on 
the headline of the newspaper on the table. The paper’s headline reads “2 Million People Gassed! 
                                                 
77 She characterizes Brückner’s cheerful demeanor as “beneidenswert unverbraucht,” which prompts hysterical 
laughter by Mertens.  
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Reports from the concentration camp Auschwitz.” This information, however, is of no relevance 
to Brückner, who instead chooses to concentrate on masticating and sipping his cup of coffee. 
Here the film replicates the mode of inscription that determines the transparent legibility 
of Brückner’s status and, in turn, marks him in the image as unable to “read” properly. The 
emphasis on transparency and its concomitant legibility of pathological signs is significant 
throughout the film,78 but here the writing in the headline points to the fundamental epistemic 
disjunction between his demeanor and his knowledge. Thus, it seems, Brückner’s real crime is 
his failure to “read himself” in the writing and be adequately traumatized by this process of 
inscription. This failed act of reading, which at the same time is displaced as a responsibility onto 
the spectator, defines a symptomatology that already points to another failure. This is the famous 
“inability to mourn,” which, as Eric Santner paraphrases it, reflects the failure of Germans to 
“work through the traumatic shattering of the specular relations they had maintained with Hitler 
and the Volksgemeinschaft.”79 As he continues, this work would have entailed the willingness to 
confront the narcissistic idea of identity by reconstructing “a sense of self [that] would first have 
to be reconstituted on the ruins of this narcissism.”80 Instead, through a refusal of this process, 
the Germans were able to displace onto themselves the mark that designates them as victims. 
Despite the literalization of this necessity, that is, Brückner refuses to read the writing on the 
screen and, in the absence of this work, his refusal of the imperative demand to do so marks him 
                                                 
78 The notion of transparency is also invoked when Mertens starts to overcome his trauma and begins to decorate the 
apartment for Susanne and him. Since they have no access to glass, in contrast to Brückner, Mertens “reconstructs” 
their windows by using x-ray slides from the hospital where he had been a surgeon.    
79 Eric L. Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), pp. 3 – 4. 
80 Ibid., p. 4. 
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as one to whom the ultimate designation of contempt that Mertens can muster applies, namely 
the one that defines him as a “bourgeois” or Spießbürger.81
The reconstitution of self thus occurs through the emblematic inscription that the writing 
in the film designates as present but instead displaces onto the spectator in an attempt at 
substitution. In contrast, then, to Santner’s assessment that such conceptualizations are part of a 
more recent critical development, since they are defined by the “rhetoric of mourning which has 
come to occupy the semantic field of so much critical theory in recent years,”82 the use of writing 
here already enacts the appeal that, in lieu of the work of “reading” that Brückner fails to 
achieve, displaces the burden onto the spectator of the film in an imperative mode that Santner 
attributes to the poststructuralist “arch-trope” of the “figure of the mourner-survivor.”83 
According to Santner, this figure is anticipated by Benjamin’s category of the baroque as the 
“irreducible elegiac dimension of signification,”84 which determines that the subject remains 
“marooned in a world of ruins, fragments, stranded objects that thereby take on a textual aspect: 
they demand to be read.”85 As Santner notes, this corresponds to Jacques Derrida’s insistence 
“on the testamentary – the proleptically or structurally elegiac – dimension of every linguistic 
                                                 
81 While the term Spießbürger or Spießer is adequately translated as bourgeois, with its connotative implications of 
narrow-minded conformity, selfish bigotry and undue obsequiousness, bourgeois fails to indicate the term’s military 
etymology still present in the word as an early modern expendable foot-soldier equipped only with a spear or 
“Spieß.” 
82 Eric L. Santner, Stranded Objects, p. 7. 
83 Ibid., p. 9. 
84 Ibid., p. 11. 
85 Ibid., p. 12. 
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utterance.”86 In turn, this categorical condition is defined by a fundamental “refusal or an 
inability on the part of the members of a society to assume the vocation of mourner-survivor of 
what might be called the violence of the signifier.”87 This refusal is enacted by Brückner on the 
screen and the demand for the vocation is transferred onto the spectator in his stead. Save for the 
recourse to the technical term “signifier,” then, Santner accurately summarizes the use of writing 
that the film marshals and solicits time and time again. 
As if these efforts were not enough, Staudte returns to such configurations even more 
insistently in his third film after the war, Rotation from 1949. In artistic terms, this film was a 
significant achievement in the “attempt to revitalize the tradition of Weimar proletarian 
cinema,”88 as Marc Silberman puts it. With the film, Staudte returns to the “question of personal 
responsibility but now posed almost autobiographically,”89 as Silberman notes, and demonstrates 
Staudte’s commitment to a “program of humanism and the process of ideological clarification”90 
that was fostered by returning German exiles in the Soviet zone. These efforts form part of a 
“series of films that would come to be identified later as DEFA’s antifascist classicism.”91 
Moreover, Rotation was a very popular film in the Eastern sector, but in the Western zones it 
was only screened in Bochum and Hamburg in 1950 and thereafter only exhibited through the 
                                                 
86 Ibid., p. 10. 
87 Ibid., p. 9. 
88 Marc Silberman, “Wolfgang Staudte: Rotation (Germany 1949),” in Joachim Schmitt-Sasse, ed., Widergänger: 
Faschismus und Antifaschismus im Film, p. 138. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Marc Silberman, German Cinema: Texts in Context, p. 101. 
91 Ibid. 
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“art-house and film club circuit.”92 It was shown on West German television in May 1958, where 
it generated some controversy and provoked the particular ire of a Bavarian politician and 
national-conservative lobbyist for the Sudetes Germans in the BHE, or “Union for Those 
Displaced from Home and Those Deprived of Rights,” who publicly protested the broadcast and 
accused the film of “mongering in communist class warfare” while following the “usual Eastern 
diction” of Soviet propaganda.93
These charges are indicative for the film’s exceptional willingness to investigate some of 
the causes of fascism and the individual small-scale compromises along with a silent complicity 
that made its pervasive control possible. In this respect, the film is already unusual because it 
does not avoid what Greffrath calls the “typical blind spot, the omission of 1933 – 1938,” for the 
German cinema of the period.94 As Thomas Brandlmeier remarks, the film raises “the question of 
guilt indeed anew” because it “admits the proletarian complicity and fellow-traveling under 
fascism.”95 Given these efforts, the film remains an important document for the failures and limit 
points circumscribed in the debates surrounding the explanations of the origin and rise of fascism 
at the time. Nonetheless, the conclusion that Brandlmeier reaches when he ultimately dismisses 
the film as another furtively “opportunist” attempt to “glance sidelong at the audience as the new 
                                                 
92 Cf. Marc Silberman, “Wolfgang Staudte: Rotation (Germany 1949),” p. 149. 
93 These charges were voiced by Walter Becher, representative in the Bavarian parliament for the Bund der 
Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten or BHE from 1950 – 1962, who had been the editor for the National Socialist 
newspaper of the “Reichsgau Sudetenland” until 1945. Cf. Bettina Greffrath, Gesellschaftbilder der Nachkriegszeit, 
pp. 151 – 152. 
94 Ibid., p. 145. 
95 Thomas Brandlmeier, “Von Hitler zu Adenauer: Deutsche Trümmerfilme,” p. 45. 
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people of the state with an eagerly conciliatory tendency”96 is misdirected because it obscures the 
difficult terrain of signification the film gestures toward. 
What Brandlmeier faults the film for is its apparent eagerness in the attempt to solicit the 
audience’s sympathy and its offering of a conciliatory sense of inclusion that ultimately absolves 
the audience from reflecting critically on the ideological premises of the film. Instead, 
Brandlmeier suggests, the film elicits the possibility for the absolution of individual 
responsibility so that audience members can bask in a collective sense of atonement. This 
reversal is necessary because it provides the operative premise for a civic identity within the 
disciplinary constructions of a new state system. Silberman comes to a similar conclusion when 
he argues that the film addresses a specific “historical spectator, suggesting a resolution that 
perpetuates the idea of individual victimization but yet allows for an imaginary transformation of 
guilt into the positive virtue of the individual as an agent of civic responsibility.”97 As a 
consequence, Silberman argues, the film caters to a conservative sense of  powerlessness and 
destiny that is reïnforced by a conception of history in which “events like fascism are 
catastrophes that befall mankind.”98 This, he concludes, is a result of the film’s naïve narrative 
proposal of the self as an agent for historical change, which runs counter to the film’s effort to 
                                                 
96 Ibid. Brandlmeier here offers a particularly illustrative example for a certain discursive mode in German critical 
thought that displays an acute alacrity for registering ideological contradictions and an alert fondness for categorical 
failures at the cost of reducing the complexity of either the filmic work itself or its gestures toward achievement. 
Brandlmeier states that the film shares with others a fundamental flaw, or, as he says in the original: “Sie schielen in 
ihrer Tendenz versöhnlerisch aufs Publikum als neues Staatsvolk. In Rotation verzeiht zum Schluß der, der selbst 
ein Mitläufer war, dem Faschisten. Dem neuen antifaschistischen Opportunismus wir damit Tür und Tor geöffnet.”     
97 Marc Silberman, German Cinema: Texts in Context, p. 103.  
98 Ibid., p. 113. 
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demonstrate the consequences of accommodation, “not by denouncing the petit bourgeoisie but 
by representing the system of social oppression to which it fell victim.”99
Bettina Greffrath, by contrast, praises the film as a “distinctive sociogram,”100 which 
“displays an exceptional degree of reflexivity and analytical distance that embraces its bias.”101 
She cites a number of representative contemporary reviews, which responded enthusiastically to 
the film’s formal aesthetics and narrative construction, including a review in the West German 
Süddeutsche Zeitung that praises Staudte for his “epic calm and brave yet temperate avant-
gardism.”102 As Greffrath recounts, the young journalist Wolfgang Kohlhaase, who would later 
become one of the most important screenwriters of the East German cinema, wrote in the youth 
magazine Start that the film offers “a consoling certitude for people: it is always and especially 
today up to the individual himself what will become of him.”103 Given the film’s popularity in 
light of these diametrical assessments, which replicate the controversy over Staudte’s earlier film 
Murderers are Among Us in a more starkly delineated polarity, it becomes important again to 
investigate the mechanisms by which the film attempts to generate its conception of the relation 
between individual and historical forces. 
                                                 
99 Ibid., p. 106. 
100 Bettina Greffrath, Gesellschaftbilder der Nachkriegszeit, p. 146. 
101 Ibid. In the original: “Rotation zeigt… einen außergewöhnlichen Reflexionsgrad und eine parteilich-analytische 
Distanz.” 
102 Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 11, 1953, as quoted in ibid., p. 151. In the original: “Staudtes optische 
Gestaltung brilliert mit kühnem und dennoch maßvollem Avantgardismus:… Montagen, rhythmische Rasanz und 
gleichwohl souveräne epische Ruhe.” 
103 Quoted in ibid., p. 147. 
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 From the outset, the mode of signification that Staudte employs works on a level of 
configuration which follows a stringent logic of succession, but which is even more insistent on 
an associative coherence of inscription than the opening of Murderers are Among Us. Without 
any credit sequence, Rotation opens with the images of the intricate machinery of a printing 
press over which the title of the film is superimposed and which finds is visual analogy in the 
moving cogs and gears of the press. The deafening sounds of the rotating presses merge with the 
sounds of explosions that penetrate the room, while the drums are noisily churning out the latest 
edition of a newspaper. Some women are still busy arranging batches of the paper, but around 
them soldiers are cowered on the floor as furniture is collapsing around them with each 
detonation. The rotating wheels come to a brief halt and between the platens and cylinders the 
typeset page reveals the neatly underlined headline “Battle for Berlin.” The headline is part of 
the night edition of the newspaper Der Angriff (“the attack”), a paper for the official 
administrative district or “Gau” of Berlin founded by Joseph Goebbels, whose official functions 
included his position as the district leader or “Gauleiter” of Berlin. Since its inception as a mass 
circular in 1927, Der Angriff had been aimed at a working-class audience and served as the main 
outlet for Goebbels’ inflammatory articles during the Weimar years. As yet another call to arms, 
the headline attempts to mobilize the same fervor and fanaticism once more, but even the 
workers in the printing press room are exhausted.   
The film cuts from the noise of the room and the neatly typeset headline to its aural and 
graphic antithesis. We now see various helpless graffiti inscriptions on a prison wall, with the 
rallying cry “for freedom” etched prominently and diagonally into the concrete as the soundtrack 
has gone silent. Other graffiti on the wall is comprised of other defiant cries, initials and names, 
among them the names Heinz Weiss and Karl Zech, and their execution dates. Between these 
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haphazardly placed names there are crosses that indicate various dates of death as well as lines 
that mark the duration of days in a prison cell. Juxtaposed with the crosses is one of the 
inscriptions of time that indicates six days in the annotation for a group of five, as a cluster of 
five vertical lines and one diagonal line going through four of them. Because of this cluster, the 
lines are obliquely reminiscent of the inscription “INRI” that is emblematic for a crucifixion. As 
the camera pulls back, more graffiti on the wall becomes visible, marking tributes to names of 
lovers and friends, along with phrases in various languages such as the French “adieu à tous” and 
what looks like Polish writing.104 This tableau of inscriptions is anchored in its center by the 
single word “Mutter,” or “mother,” as the figure of a man in striped prison garments moves into 
view within the frame of the image. The camera comes to a rest and lingers on the writing while 
the man stands to the right of the graffiti-covered wall as he reads the inscriptions in silence. 
There is nothing else for him to do than to remain standing there in a mute gesture of 
commemoration that pays tribute to the absent writers of these markings and the names that they 
refer to. The man’s silent tribute is a contemplation of these marks, since the inscriptions are the 
futile expressions of a writing that never imagined the promise of a corresponding audience of 
readers but rather served only as a desperate attempt to record some traces as evidence of an 
existence. The camera takes up this act of tribute by resting on this tableau, so that the audience 
                                                 
104 While it might seem like facetious sophistry in this context to fault the production design for any lack of 
verisimilitude, there is a minor orthographic discrepancy in this French inscription since it actually reads “adieu a 
tous [sic].” More than anything, this error suggests an earnest attempt at capturing the authentic typographical 
quality of a foreign language without a comprehensive knowledge of what, after all, had been the language of the 
“enemy” for decades. Likewise, the name inscribed on the wall appears to read “Français,” which as an adjective 
means “French,” but it is not a name as such since it is neither the nominal male “François” nor the female 
“Françoise.”  
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replicates the act of commemoration as we pause to read the inscriptions alongside the image of 
a man reading the writing on the wall. Another cut shows that outside even the battle seems to 
continue in silence for a while until an old lady clutching a loaf of bread is felled by a grenade 
with a howling noise. Within the intermittent noise of war that punctuates the images, humans 
have ceased to speak and are no longer in control. All that they can do is to run for cover through 
the ruins as mute and helpless figures in the distance. The explosions and the destruction of the 
machinery of war have taken on a chaotic and indiscriminate force of their own, a force that 
directs itself now more against buildings and material objects, so that people have become only a 
small and irrelevant element in the infrastructure of war.  
The notion of humans as subsumed under larger forces is emblematized as a battle waged 
between inanimate signs and slogans. We see crates burning on which the label “margarine” is 
consumed by flames as a small group of soldiers runs by. The next shot emphasizes this even 
more as it shows an emptied-out platform of a train station with abandoned luggage strewn all 
around. A ghost-like boxcar rumbles by on the tracks as a  pure automated vector of force 
without any purpose or destination since no locomotive engine is pulling it. A huge inspirational 
slogan that reads “wheels must revolve for there to be victory”105 has been painted on its side, 
but now the wheels are revolving automatically and have gained an inevitable and independent 
momentum. A tower is hit and collapses, which finally stops the boxcar in its tracks. The 
momentum of phrases circulating, however, is continued, since the film now cuts to a poster that 
declares “we will never capitulate.” A lengthy pan sequence begins as the camera pulls away 
from the slogan to reveal that nurses and doctors are working to help the wounded under this 
                                                 
105 A well-known propaganda slogan, frequently printed on train cars, that attempted to fuse the spectacle of a train 
roaring by with a sense of the inevitable power of conviction: “Räder müssen rollen für den Sieg.”  
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sign. The pan continues onto another sign that reads “field dressing station” and then closes in on 
the uniform of a junior SS-squad leader who is now wearing the badge Bahnhofswache or “train 
station police.” A disembodied voice comes from a radio to broadcast the latest reports from 
military headquarters. The officer turns and looks up and the camera tilts upward with him to 
reveal that we are underground where masses of people are sitting on steps silently. They are 
reduced to cowering as they anxiously await the impending catastrophe. 
No one speaks as they sit and endure the radio broadcast that reports “heavy fighting,” 
but proclaims the strategic progresses of “our young and dynamic divisions.” The camera is still 
in motion, panning along the masses of people, and now focuses on a poster that declares 
“silence!” From the poster the camera continues to pan right to frame an elderly man reading the 
Panzerbär, the literal translation of which means “the armored bear.”106 Its stylized logo, in 
which a bear carries a bazooka and a shovel on its shoulders, is visible above the headline that 
urges everyone to abide and declares “we will prevail!”107 The pan continues past a woman who 
seems to take this slogan to heart as she applies lipstick in order to maintain a semblance of 
                                                 
106 Der Panzerbär was a short-lived publication during the last weeks of April 1945, a tract or Kampfblatt with the 
slogan “battle paper for the defenders of Greater Berlin.” It took its name from the bear in Berlin’s coat of arms and 
was intended to be “read and passed on,” as it said on its cover. The German Historical Museum in Berlin has placed 
a facsimile of the cover page of the very last edition of the paper, published on April 29, 1945, online. Its headlines 
announced “heroic struggle: new intervention forces are dispatched into the city day and night,” “the battle for the 
city center has erupted,” and an editorial with the headline “the longer breath,” presumably to answer the question of 
which forces would be able to “hold their breath longer” and prevail. After this publication ceased. Two and a half 
days later, in the morning hours of May 2, 1945, Berlin capitulated. Cf. the document made available in the “virtual 
online museum” of the Deutsche Historische Museum, Berlin, at http://www.dhm.de/lemo/objekte/pict/d2y00503/.    
107 The slogan is “wir halten durch,” which means “we will prevail,” but it has a more colloquial register with the 
tonal equivalent of “we will abide and stick it out.”  
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quotidian life, until the shot frames the sign “welfare and food-supply station,” where soldiers 
are gathered underneath and listen to the radio which continues its status report. This sign above 
them is mounted on top of a travel poster that proclaims “first victory, then travels.”108 A woman 
passes by in deep thought until she absorbs the news coming from the radio update that reports 
the “heaviest fighting with the bolshevists around the area Tiergarten – Moabit.” Her face is 
singled out and now framed in a medium close-up. She looks up, gasps at the mention of Moabit, 
and runs up past the crowds sitting on the steps of the Potsdamer Platz subway station, as a sign 
now reveals. There are too many people in her way, so she runs back and crosses the tracks of 
the subway on which beds for the wounded have been placed to the other side of the station but 
she finds that it is equally crowded. 
This marks the end of the elaborate panning sequence and we now see a sign marking the 
street “Alt-Moabit” collapsing to the ground.109 The film returns to the shot of the man staring at 
the writing on the prison wall, where the noise of the explosions is now audible in the distance. A 
                                                 
108 “Erst siegen, dann reisen.” 
109 Staudte, who had spent the war years in Berlin, combines an exceptional sense of urban space with historical 
accuracy here. The street Alt-Moabit is the location of the Berlin main prison, so that the name “Moabit” is often 
synonymous for jail in Berlin dialect. However, Alt-Moabit also indicates the proximity to the so-called 
Zellengefängnis Lehrter Straße, a detention center in the vicinity of the Moabit prison, which was located close to 
the intersection of the streets Invalidenstrasse, Alt-Moabit, and Lehrter Strasse. The jail on Lehrter Strasse contained 
a special section for political prisoners established by the Gestapo. The prison was the site of countless executions, 
and became infamous for a particularly heinous act in the last days of the war when sixteen prisoners, among them 
the prominent resistance fighter Klaus Bonhoeffer, were summarily executed there in the night of April 22, 1945 as 
the Red Army was closing in.       
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close-up reveals his face with a prominent scar on his forehead.110 The camera cuts to the writing 
on the wall again. The light of the explosions outside illuminate the prison bars which cast their 
shadows onto the graffiti-covered wall. Silberman takes this to indicate the first instance of the 
motif of entrapment that will operate throughout the film and states that what we witness is the 
man’s face and “flashes of light from exploding bombs casting the symbolic shadow pattern of 
bars across his face.”111 While this understanding is certainly suggestive, it misidentifies the 
“symbolic” registers that function in the image here. The shadows of the bars are, in fact, not 
imposed onto the man’s face, but are inscribed onto the wall in flashes of lighting on top of the 
prisoners’ scrawling. As the camera pans slowly across the writing, subsequent flashes of 
lighting impose the horizontal and vertical shadow lines of the bars like crosses on top of the 
names onto the wall. This writing with light occurs five times in a row until the final bars 
inscribe a single cross onto the writing and a title is inscribed as a flash of light that 
superimposes itself onto the writing of the wall as well. “It began twenty years ago,” the title 
reads, and the film’s first dissolve turns the crosses on the wall into the bars of a railroad 
crossing which are unfolding to open up. 
Rather than emphasizing the motif of entrapment, the shadow crosses that are marked by 
flashes of light onto the wall suggest instances of sacrifice as more and more inscriptions are 
added onto the wall. Now, however, these sacrifices come at such a pace that they can no longer 
                                                 
110 In keeping with the iconography that generates biblical allusions, Silberman identifies this scar as the mark of 
guilt or a “Cain-like sign.” Cf. Marc Silberman, German Cinema: Texts in Context, p. 112. While it is important to 
acknowledge the biblical references here, the scar indicates the torture that Behnke suffers at the hands of the 
Gestapo. However, because the scar looks like a Y-figure, it already suggests a prolepsis to the figuration of the final 
images, which also involve two branching forks in the road as the discussion below will demonstrate.      
111 Ibid., p. 109. 
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even be recorded in permanence and instead they “scurry by” as an “image which flashes up at 
the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again,”112 to invoke Walter Benjamin’s 
by now frequently quoted dictum from his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” written 
shortly before his death in 1940. Indeed, Staudte comes close here to reconfiguring Benjamin’s 
thesis of the “true picture of the past”113 as an image itself. For Benjamin, the only way the past 
can be “captured” is as a brief illumination that “scurries by.” And this, he continues, “is an 
irretrievable image of the past that threatens to disappear with every present that did not see itself 
as addressed by it.”114 Standing in front of the wall, the prisoner sees in the markings on the wall 
                                                 
112 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Walter Benjamin. Illuminations: Essays and 
Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 255.  In this edition the 
translation reads: “The true picture of the past flits by. The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at 
the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again.” I have taken the liberty to replace “flits by” with the 
verb “scurry,” to emphasize even more the rapid lateral movement Benjamin’s use of the verb huschen evokes. In 
the original: “Das wahre Bild der Vergangenheit huscht vorbei. Nur als Bild, das auf Nimmerwiedersehen im 
Augenblick seiner Erkennbarkeit eben aufblitzt, ist die Vergangenheit festzuhalten.” Cf. Walter Benjamin, 
Illuminationen: Ausgewählte Schriften 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977), p. 253. (Emphasis in 
original.)    
113 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” p. 255.  
114 Cf. Walter Benjamin, Illuminationen: Ausgewählte Schriften 1, p. 253. (Translation mine.) Harry Zorn’s 
translation justifiably favors comprehensibility over construction, but in this particular instance he displaces the 
“every” from “jede Gegenwart” to the “image of the past” and thus cedes the agency of recognition to the present 
that see in it “its own concerns.” However, Benjamin emphasizes that “every present” is articulated by, or “meant to 
be spoken to,” by the image of the past and it is this intentional address that the present needs to recognize. Cf. 
Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” p. 255. The original reads: “Denn es ist ein 
unwiederbringliches Bild der Vergangenheit, das mit jeder Gegenwart zu verschwinden droht, die sich nicht als in 
ihm gemeint erkannte.”  
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the true judgment of his life at the moment of impending death.115 In the act of reading the 
writing, this insight is displaced onto the spectator as well, who is first “addressed by the 
writing” and then inscribed into the writing with the title that transports the film to the “true 
image” of the past, as it claims that “it began twenty years ago.” When after the dissolve into the 
past the barriers are lifted in the image as the train crossing opens up again, the woman from the 
subway station runs across the tracks and walks smilingly toward the camera. Speaking directly 
into the camera she says, “Oh my, I almost didn’t recognize you.” Only then does the film cut to 
the subject of her address, who is revealed to be the man from the prison doffing his hat. They 
are, we will learn now, almost five minutes into the film, Hans Behnke and Lotte, his future wife, 
on their first date. They take a stroll down a road in the countryside and when they come to a 
fork in the road they decide to walk down the path to the right. 
Perhaps the construction of this lengthy image sequence around the functions of writing 
is too elaborate and complicated to render in succinct terms, but even this does not explain the 
variance with which Becker and Schöll reduce this introductory sequence to the following. The 
film “begins,” they assert, with an “elaborate flashback by Hans Behnke who sits in the prison of 
Berlin as an inmate.”116 Behnke, they continue, “hears the noise of the battle outside and 
reminisces about his happiness twenty years before.”117 In their eagerness to delineate the 
                                                 
115 In biblical terms, the writing on the wall reflects God’s enigmatic judgment of King Belshazzar of Babylon in the 
Old Testament and the prophecy of his fall as deciphered by the prophet Daniel. As such, the sequence corresponds 
to Benjamin’s more Messianic articulations as well.  
116 Wolfgang Becker and Norbert Schöll, In Jenen Tagen…: Wie der Deutsche Nachkriegsfilm die Vergangenheit 
bewältigte, p. 157. (Translation mine.) The use of the verb sitzen here suggests an unfortunate pun because it is also 
a slang term with the equivalent of “doing time in the slammer.”  
117 Ibid. 
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potential ideological fault lines of the film, Becker and Schöll fail to pay attention to the film 
itself and therefore do not see that Staudte presents neither an act of “sitting” nor an act of 
“hearing” here but rather a complex visual construction that reflects on the importance of how to 
stand in relation to the signs one is forced to read. Becker and Schöll define the frequent use of 
temporal flashbacks in the films of the period as a means to establish a “moral high-
handedness”118 that serves to differentiate the present from the past. In doing so, they argue, the 
“intended attitude for the spectator is to foster a new, state-affirming, sense of ‘thank God it is no 
longer like this today.’”119 Through this they suggest the film’s categorical failure by aligning 
itself with a mode of separation between present and past. Without recourse to such categories, 
they hint that this attitude serves to achieve a secondary mode of differentiation that establishes 
an ontological difference through which it becomes possible to portray fascism as “inhuman” by 
separating it from the definitions of humanism, which, in turn, removes the notions of agency 
and complicity.120
The film deserves a more nuanced assessment, given its elaborate montage of writing 
with which it introduces itself already. Staudte himself may have invited such dismissive 
responses to the visual qualities in his work, since in interviews he coyly “admitted that he was 
ignorant of film history”121 and he modestly claimed that Rotation was “formally completely 
                                                 
118 Ibid., p. 147. In the original: “moralische Selbstgewißheit.” 
119 Ibid., p. 133. 
120 Cf. Ibid., p. 147. 
121 In an interview from 1966. Cited in Marc Silberman, German Cinema: Texts in Context, p. 105. 
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uninteresting.”122 Such protestations notwithstanding, the use of the flashback here enacts on a 
large scale a visual motif that is repeated throughout the film. This motif is most frequently 
depicted as a rotary press that marks events in time by turning out newspaper headlines, as the 
“wheels are turning,” to speak with its metaphoric register. Yet the film incorporates many 
images of rotation, circles, or revolving wheels, from the outset. In fact, the rendezvous scenes 
that inaugurate the flashback itself ends with an image of a record spinning as the gramophone 
needle jumps rhythmically in the end grooves.123 The emphasis on the image of circularity 
functions, in Silberman’s terms, to offer “a pedagogical and polemical model for motivating the 
process of self-reflection.”124 In emphasizing the significance of the figure of circularity, 
Silberman proves himself to be one of the few scholars of German cinema who remark on the 
importance of the use of figuration in general and the use of writing in film here in particular as 
well. He notes the relevance of the use of “printed matter in the film’s discursive economy”125 
and he references the work of Jens Thiele, who suggests that the “scriptural images” serve as a 
commentary that relates public events to the “protagonist’s private biography.”126
                                                 
122 In an interview from 1974. Cited in Jens Thiele, “Die Lehren aus der Vergangenheit: Rotation (1949),” in 
Fischer Filmgeschichte. Band 3: Auf der Suche nach Werten 1945 – 1960, ed. Werner Faulstich and Helmut Korte 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1990), p. 135. 
123 While establishing the iconic register of circularity, Staudte nonetheless displays an understated visual wit here, 
since the camera pans from an open box of chocolate via a cigarette burning in the ash tray to the needle jumping 
rhythmically in order to suggest that Lotte and Hans are in the process of consummating their relationship.   
124 Marc Silberman, German Cinema: Texts in Context, p. 109. 
125 Marc Silberman, “Wolfgang Staudte: Rotation (Germany 1949),” p. 146. 
126 Ibid., p. 146. 
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In fact, Thiele dismisses the prison-wall sequence, which he contrasts to the “actual, inner 
film plot,”127 but demonstrates how the use of writing in the film constitutes, in his terms, a “film 
within the film,”128 serving as a running commentary. As he notes, “in pure numerical terms, 
every second sequence in the film is characterized by inscriptions, newspaper headlines, phrases, 
or quotations.”129 However, despite his astute observations he does not consider these 
inscriptions as inscriptions. Instead, he follows the familiar displacement in which the writing 
itself is subordinate in its representative function of speech, rather than as an image of writing 
itself. Thus, he argues, the writing in the film becomes its “own inner word-film”130 that narrates 
the relation between individual and social forces. Even the prison graffiti, he concludes, only 
serves to highlight the “frenzy of war and the cynicism of the regime.”131 Nonetheless, Thiele 
acknowledges the significance of the figure of circularity in the frequent recourse to the image of 
the rotating press. He marks five instances at which the rotating press serves to function as a 
hinge that connects the sequences and “represents the seemingly inexorable course of historical 
events.”132         
The rotating press describes a figure of circularity that is determined by a sense of 
inevitable force, which underscores the movement that animates this figure. This force suggests 
an associative causality through linkages, a force that works in the same manner as the opening 
of Staudte’s earlier film. The transitions that follow show the young couple, Hans Behnke and 
                                                 
127 Jens Thiele, “Die Lehren aus der Vergangenheit: Rotation (1949),” p. 129. 
128 Ibid., p. 131. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. In the original: “Eigener innnerer Wortfilm.” 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
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Lotte, trying to make ends meet but failing to do so despite their earnest attempts. In various 
vignettes of ordinary life, the conditions and circumstances conspire to work against the couple 
and at each step they have to compromise and adjust opportunistically to the situation that they 
have to face on a small scale until their passive compliance to circumstances is absolute. Hans, a 
printer by trade, gains employment in the printing room of the Völkische Beobachter, the official 
publication of the Nazi party, and thus unwittingly becomes a crucial linchpin and relay station 
in the circulation and dissemination of propaganda. The rise of Hitler and the pervasive intrusion 
of politics into ordinary life is chronicled through the couple’s experience rendered as the fate 
that all decent people had to endure, yet at the same time the film takes note of their complicity 
by establishing a causal nexus of their act of looking away with the deportation of their 
neighbors. By the time they have allowed these events to happen their son, Helmut, is old 
enough to become party to this form of corruption as well since he becomes a fervent Hitler 
youth. 
The linkage of the interconnectedness between individual responses and their choices 
with large-scale historical events is demonstrated with associative sequences. One particular 
montage sequence is exemplary for this technique. A children’s parade by members of the Hitler 
Youth who sing “we will march on until everything falls into pieces, because today Germany is 
ours, but tomorrow the whole world will belong to us”133 cuts directly to a lengthy school 
                                                 
133 From the song “Es zittern die morschen Knochen” (“the brittle bones are shaking”), composed by Hans Baumann 
in 1932 when he was member of a Catholic youth organization. It was taken up by the Hitler Youth and became an 
exceedingly popular song due to its martial quality, celebrating a youthful victory over “fear” and “old people,” 
while exhorting “the red war.” The lines of the refrain are still cause for the occasional debate, since the version 
adapted by the Hitler Youth, and thus the one sung in the film, is “wir werden weiter marschieren, bis alles in 
Scherben fällt, denn heute gehört uns Deutschland, und morgen die ganze Welt.” Apparently, this is a variant of the 
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indoctrination session. This session, in turn, leads immediately to playful maneuvers of stone 
throwing, but then cuts abruptly to real explosions, and archival footage of marching Wehrmacht 
soldiers. Their marching picks up the same rhythm as the children singing the song before and as 
the rhythm of the footsteps increase in volume, the film dissolves back into writing. A long list 
of those who “fell for the Führer and the Reich” appears that lists their names and the locations 
of their death. The list scrolls down, adding more and more names and locations, until the 
marching sounds gradually fade out and the camera closes in on the varying names of locations 
from all over Europe, the Soviet Union and Northern Africa. By the time the list reaches the year 
1942 the locations have become “Caucasus, Stalingrad, Africa, Leningrad, Crimea, Stalingrad, 
El Alamein, Voronezh, Malta, Stalingrad, Stalingrad.” As the scrolling movement continues and 
the list goes on, the name “Stalingrad” is repeated over and over again until it has become an 
abstracted incantation that stands as the telegraphic shorthand for disaster and defeat. 
In its inscription on the screen, the names and the locations that appear replicate the same 
mode of contemplative reflection that the opening sequence initiates with the writing on the wall. 
The writing, therefore, enacts what Marcia Landy has demonstrated is the affective appeal of 
melodrama as an elegiac mode that is not a generic but rather a fundamental structure of 
theatricality in culture in which “the rituals of mourning serve better as a conduit for expressing 
the inexpressible, for communicating the affect that arises from the impossible quest for answers 
                                                                                                                                                             
original refrain “wir werden weiter marschieren, wenn alles in Scherben fällt, denn heute da hört uns Deutschland, 
und morgen die ganze Welt.” This translates as “we will march on, even if everything falls into pieces, because 
today Germany listens to us, and tomorrow the whole world will,” a slight but meaningful difference that does not, 
however, alter the overall tenor of the song.  
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to injustice.”134 Through the suggestion of scale, the use of writing here reverses the filmic 
tendency to individualize the narrative and instead gestures toward a conception in which name 
and meaning become identical. The repetition of variance that culminates in the rhythmic 
replication of the name “Stalingrad” indicates that the name itself must suffice in lieu of 
representation and therefore enforces a form of allegorization in which the name stands in for its 
reference as an incantation. As Landy demonstrates in relation to the use of writing in 
Schindler’s List, in the “conjunction of the visual image and the printed word,”135 the film here 
gestures toward an allegorical conception of history based on “the insistent reminder of the 
film’s awareness of the transitoriness of history (and of the visual image) for capturing a sense of 
the past.”136
                                                 
134 Marcia Landy, “Cinematic History, Melodrama, and the Holocaust,” in Humanity at the Limit: The Impact of the 
Holocaust Experience on Jews and Christians, ed. Michael A. Signer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2000), p. 379. 
135 Ibid., p. 385. 
136 Ibid. Landy effectively challenges the pejorative divisions of culture by demonstrating the melodramatic 
affinities between Claude Lanzmann’s documentary Shoah and a popular film such as Schindler’s List here. Miriam 
Bratu Hansen, working towards a similar approach that bridges the polarization between critical discourse and 
popular culture, argues that Schindler’s List is “not” Shoah. However, in her discussion, Hansen invokes a category 
that Landy’s attention to writing in film already suggests, namely, that a recourse to writing as a means to represent 
the “unrepresentable” can be grounded in “a quasi-theological invocation of the second commandment” that 
prohibits graven images or any likeness in representation as well. Cf. Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Schindler’s List is Not 
Shoah: The Second Commandment, Popular Modernism, and Public Memory,” in The Historical Film: History and 
Memory in Media, ed. with an introduction by Marcia Landy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 
p. 207.          
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Following this elegiac sequence in writing are two scenes that counter it through the 
power of speech and move the film’s lingering on enactments of mourning back into the realm of 
action. In one Behnke’s brother-in-law Kurt, who is hiding from the Gestapo because he works 
for the resistance, finally convinces the cautious Behnke of the moral necessity to take up the 
fight. Kurt rebukes Behnke and accuses him of doing nothing but standing at his station, the 
rotating printing press, in order to let lies and hate be disseminated. Kurt urges him to stand up 
for the millions of people who all want the same, “work, peace and bread,” and states that the 
front where he is stationed is the fact “that one must love the people.” Behnke accepts reluctantly 
this and, with his professional skills as a printer, fixes a printing press that Kurt and his fellow 
members of the underground resistance need to print their flyers urging “the end of the insanity 
of the Hitler-war.” At the same time Behnke’s son Helmut has become a member of the Hitler 
Youth, where he and his peers are instructed by their charismatic commander on the virtues of 
being German men and enticed to remain vigilant against the “dark elements and traitors” in 
their midst. 
Soon after, Helmut is shown casually mulling over a crossword puzzle as he asks his 
mother about the clue for “Tibetan bovine” with three letters. She suggests he look this up in the 
encyclopedia. When Helmut pulls out the appropriate volume, the rarely used volume “Y” for 
“yak,” he flips through the pages of the encyclopedia when suddenly one of Kurt’s flyers that is 
hidden in the book catches his eye. He is conflicted but ultimately denounces his parents to his 
commander, vowing never to speak to them again. They are interrogated and Kurt is arrested. 
The transition from Kurt’s beat-up face returns to writing when a cut shows the close-up of an 
official notification that he has died from “heart failure” in the Sachsenhausen concentration 
camp, accompanied by a shrill whistling sound. Thiele takes this moment seriously as one in 
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which an official document of writing becomes, in his terms, an active “agent that intervenes 
fatefully”137 in the plot. In doing so, Thiele comes closest to defining the nexus of the 
allegorization of fate with a sense of shock that the writing in film inscribes here. This shock 
cathected to the notification causes Lotte to stare in paralyzed disbelief while a boiling tea kettle 
is revealed to be the origin of the shrill alarm. Soon after, Behnke is arrested as well and must 
confront his own son in Hitler Youth uniform who stares at him silently. Over his face the 
graffiti on the prison wall is gradually superimposed and the film returns to its beginning as time 
folds back into the present and we see Behnke’s memory of his son’s accusing face fading away 
against the inscriptions on the wall of his cell. 
The film now returns to the battle for Berlin waging outside the cell, some of which 
consists of actual footage from Soviet archives. At the same time the military order is given to 
destroy all bridges in the center of the city even though this will result in the flooding of the 
subway stations filled with refugees. Lotte manages to escape, while thousands die in the flood. 
When Hans and his fellow prisoners are taken into the yard and lined up against the prison wall 
in order to be executed, the standard sign warning against carbon monoxide poisoning from 
running engines above them inscribes a deliberate analogy to the mass executions by gas. While 
the frightened prisoners stand and await their death, the prison is overrun by the Red Army and 
they are liberated. Helmut and his commander, having been enlisted in the final mobilization to 
hold the city at all costs, take refuge in the bedroom of a ruined house. There the commander is 
thrilled to discover a closet and eagerly sheds his uniform, telling Helmut that “civvies are now 
the last word” since “Ivan” is around the corner, after the commander had instructed his boys to 
                                                 
137 Jens Thiele, “Die Lehren aus der Vergangenheit,” p. 132. 
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fight for the “final victory” until death. Helmut breaks down in tears at this disillusioning sight 
and realizes the extent of his betrayal.  
When the battle is over, a slow tilt from the outlines of ruined buildings downward into 
the gutters reveals that Lotte has died on the streets in the crossfire. The image dissolves from 
her face into the rotating press, onto which, in turn, is superimposed a newspaper account that 
lists the victims of World War II as numbers: “14.45 million casualties of war; 5.5 million 
murdered; 2.86 million bombed; 11 million died in concentration camps.” On top of this the total 
tally is superimposed, “33.8 million people,” so that the image now consists of a triple layer, the 
admonishing numbers, the newspaper writing containing an amount of information in fine print 
that is too large to be comprehensible but is legible as a quantity, and the revolutions of the 
printing press that continue to turn in the background. 
A coda shows the prodigal son Helmut, still in uniform because he has been interned in a 
POW camp, with his new girlfriend Inge arriving at the home of Behnke. Helmut is reluctant, 
given his past behavior, to face his father, yet he desperately wants to apologize. Instead, Behnke 
embraces him and insists that it is “you,” the young generation, “who must forgive us.” Behnke 
reflects on his time in prison and tells his son that when he read the names on the wall they were 
names only at first but then they became “fates.”138 In a preëmptive act of absolution that 
diffuses the categories of victim and perpetrator by reversing the question of complicity into a 
reconciliation along filial lines, Behnke exempts his son from the knowledge he himself has 
gained by telling him that life begins for him now. For Silberman, this second nod to the “appeal 
to patient love… as an antidote to history’s repetition seems entirely inadequate for realizing 
                                                 
138 As an intriguing affirmation of the figuration of writing in film as an allegorization of destiny, the term Schicksal 
that Behnke uses here connotes both “individual fate” and “destiny.”  
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it,”139 yet he takes it to testify to Staudte’s commitment to the foundations of a democratic state. 
Behnke continues in this spirit and tells his son that what he has learned from the writing on the 
wall is that the names signify a fate that stemmed from their desire “not to become culpable” and 
for this desire they suffered an “unimaginable” fate. That is, the paternal gesture of forgiveness 
exempts the young and complicit from the burden of imagination and replaces the implications 
of “fate” with its allegorical substitute, the names that stand in for, as Behnke says, their 
“unimaginable fate.” 
With this displacement, the film equates the spectator with the position of the son and 
thereby alleviates the responsibility for imagining. As Silberman puts it, the film proposes a 
rejuvenation in which Behnke now “recognizes the truth of his past and invites the textual 
spectator to learn his lesson.”140 This provides the basis for establishing the “identificatory 
potential for a moral judgment.”141 However, the limit point of this insight is defined by the uses 
of writing, so that the disciplinary pedagogy shifts to an act of recognition, but not necessarily of 
the “unimaginable” lesson that Behnke has learned, but, in a paraphrase of Silberman’s term of 
the “textual spectator,” to the spectator of the text within the film. What this means is that the 
reference to “historical truth” as inscribed into the image through the writing of names is placed 
in relation to the force of the rotating press that defines the progress of history in general. These 
two divergent conceptions of history collide and thus demarcate what Silberman calls the “limits 
                                                 
139 Marc Silberman, German Cinema: Texts in Context, p. 113. 
140 Ibid., p. 109. 
141 Ibid., p. 105. 
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to the ideological perception of powerlessness”142 and Thiele calls the helpless “perplexity”143 of 
the film’s conclusion. 
Accompanying Behnke’s gesture of forgiveness is his decision to bequeath to his son the 
Sunday suit he wore when he met Lotte for their first date, so that Helmut can discard his POW 
uniform. He urges his son to work hard so that future generations will inherit a life “without 
danger and despair.” With this the film cuts to the railroad crossing again and shows the 
barricades opening. Inge, the son’s girlfriend, runs across the tracks toward the camera and 
repeats Lotte’s first line of dialogue, “I almost didn’t recognize you.” Without knowing it, she 
replicates Lotte’s exact behavior from twenty years before. Helmut tells her that his parents used 
to meet at this spot when they were young as well. This, Inge notes ruefully, is a sign that 
“everything is repeated in life.” Helmut protests urgently in response to Inge’s skepticism, and, 
by declaring that everything must not be repeated, insists that avoiding repetition is possible if 
everyone who desires peace will resist it. Walking down the selfsame country road that the 
parents had walked before, they come to the fork in the road but without deliberation they choose 
the other path, the one leading to the left.144
                                                 
142 Ibid., p. 113. 
143 Jens Thiele, “Die Lehren aus der Vergangenheit,” p. 140.  
144 Some critics read this shift to the left as symbolic. Silberman, however, notes that against such assessments, 
Staudte denied this partisan reading as a “coded signal for his hope for a socialist Germany” and insisted that, while 
the image was significant, the choice of direction was coincidental. Cf. Marc Silberman, “Wolfgang Staudte: 
Rotation (Germany 1949),” p. 147. 
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This solution might testify to the pressures Staudte faced from the military authorities 
who asked him to change the ending of the film before it was allowed to be released.145 It dilutes 
the forceful argument of the overall film before and provides the basis for the criticism that 
Thiele and Silberman voice against its gesture towards humanism. Nonetheless, Staudte asserted 
that part of the motivation for the film stemmed from the troublesome direction he saw emerging 
again already in 1948, which he described as the tendency that “already today too many are 
ready to go down the same path that unsettled Europe once more.”146 More importantly, 
however, the insistence on the act of will as the power that can counteract the repetition of 
history puts the film’s conclusion in a precarious position, because it comes at a point in which 
the figuration of repetition has already been amplified as the engine of history. Against this 
force, it seems, individual aspirations of change are futile and even delusional. Given the film’s 
reliance on a pedagogical mode, this conclusion indeed undermines its premises and could 
therefore demonstrate the fragile basis on which its ideological position rests. In this case, the 
film, as Silberman and Thiele conclude, becomes detrimental because it unwittingly reinforces 
the sense of powerlessness in the face of catastrophe that it has sought so hard to counteract. 
Yet, even with such a solution, which seems compromised in both senses of the term, the 
film is remarkable in its deliberate choice of figuration. The final image appears to place the 
notion of directional progress, albeit rendered as a forking path that tracks into the distance in 
separate lines, over and against the figure of the turn, which circumscribes an endless repetitive 
                                                 
145 Cf. Jens Thiele, “Die Lehren aus der Vergangenheit,” p. 140. Thiele notes that the ending Staudte had envisioned 
earlier, the acceptance of his father’s suit by Helmut with the words “this was my last uniform,” was deemed to be 
too “pacifist” by the Soviet authorities in its reference to demilitarization. 
146 From a 1955 article by Staudte cited in Marc Silberman, “Wolfgang Staudte: Rotation (Germany 1949),” p. 139. 
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loop. But this visual figure of the path is not a vector of progress that generates an irreversible 
teleological direction to be followed. It is an inscription into the image itself and thus merges 
movement with writing again. In his early visual attempts to address the legacy of fascism 
thoughtfully and constructively, Staudte remains singular in the history of the German cinema of 
this period and the decade to come. While other uses of writing in film reïnforce the discrepancy 
between image and text in order to an allegorize a force that emerges as a system of law through 
which conceptions of the state become possible, Rotation reverses this configuration. Despite its 
conciliatory humanism, the film proposes a new mode of inscription. It may only be a helpless 
and unconscious gesture, like the graffiti inscriptions on a prison wall, but its is a decisive act, in 
which the two figures of the landscape inscribe themselves into the image as a mark. They are no 
longer in a forced position of fixed contemplation. Others may be fated to remain passively in 
the face of the inscriptions on the wall, but they have claimed their right to define the traces as 
they are written on the screen. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: EPILOGUE: THE TERROR OF THE TEXT IN 23 AND DIE 
DRITTE GENERATION 
 
 
 
On Thursday May 23, 1991, an advertisement in the regional Hamburg classifieds of the 
resolutely left-wing daily newspaper die tageszeitung proclaimed the following cryptic message 
on page 22: “Hagbard Celine .. the greatest hacker of all time was stoked! His Judas is still 
callously spinning dance music records on NDR 2.”1 No other information was conveyed, nor 
was there any other indication toward the ad’s origin or its composer. While such obscure 
fragments of information or pseudo-advertisements in open message boards were a common 
element in the establishment of a contrarian identity for the alternative newspaper, affectionately 
known as die taz, the bizarre paranoia of this anonymous rant would have nonetheless struck 
even jaded readers accustomed to the paper’s irreverent style. The announcement is remarkable 
for its impropriety in tone, its direct but futile and disproportionate rage, and its catachrestic 
rhetorical linkage of an injustice of betrayal in Biblical proportions with an unnamed disc jockey 
                                                 
1 In the original “Hagbard Celine … der größte Hacker aller Zeiten wurde verheizt! Sein Judas legt immer noch 
kaltblütig Tanzmusik bei NDR 2 auf.” This advertisement was published in taz-Hamburg (i.e. die tageszeitung – 
Hamburg), Thursday, May 23, 1991, p. 22. 
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at the Northern German NDR 2, a public radio station mostly popular for its mixture of 
contemporary pop music paired with news and traffic information. Moreover, the ad conveys a 
particularly ominous linguistic register in its unequivocal use of the strictly militaristic term 
verheizt or “stoked.” Literally “spent or burnt up,” like coal shoveled into a railroad engine, the 
verb verheizen implies the meaningless military sacrifice and callous acceptance of human 
casualties in combat without any strategic gain or larger purpose to “stoke” the engine of battle. 
This term, in conjunction with a charge that a popular radio personality is still 
coldheartedly pushing “dance music” on the airwaves, seems to constitute another catachrestic 
violation of idiom usage, since Tanzmusik connotes a kind of musty and anachronistic music, 
more suitably played by a ballroom orchestra of yesteryears, rather than the popular 
contemporary chart music fare NDR 2 is known for. The gloomy pronouncement, with its openly 
presumptuous aggression and its air of conspiratorial defamation, stands equally in marked 
contrast to the lofty, clear-eyed and witty coverage that the taz newspaper usually takes on in the 
service of information and enlightenment. What gets linked here is a dark reminder of the futility 
of a machinery of war that sacrifices a nation’s best and brightest, its “chosen ones,” with a sense 
that the traitors and perpetrators of this atrocity are currently still occupying positions in the 
media in order to lull a populace into the stupefying diversions and digressions of easy listening 
music. Despite its ranting character, however, the advertisement seems curiously appropriate, 
albeit anachronistic, since its tone of desperation invokes a familiar trope that would be fitting to 
the rhetoric of rebellion by the West German youth at the time of the Oberhausen Manifesto and 
reminiscent of the historical charges against the silent complicity by their parents’ generation of 
the Adenauer years. 
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In this sense, the paranoid charges voiced in the advertisement employ a very 
conventional and easily-invoked figure of betrayal and despair, which is most vividly epitomized 
by the criticism surrounding the post-war West German careers of public figures implicated in 
the Nazi regime such as Hans Globke, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger or Hans Karl Filbinger. The fact 
that the careers of these respected public officials in the service of the construction of the Federal 
Republic of Germany continued through the post-war years, even as their bureaucratic 
complicity as civil servants, party functionaries, and judges in the service of the Nazi regime 
became public knowledge, provided the source of vehement discontent and the foundation of 
much justified anger in the political debates of the time. The confused rhetoric that animates the 
urgency of the advertisement, therefore, builds on a heightened awareness of these sensitive 
political circumstances, but continues to rely on juxtaposing terms that do not seem to belong 
together categorically and thus attempts to make evident structures of power that are still in place 
in contemporary society through such violent catachreses. 
Such charges against political personalities who remain in power, however, are already in 
place in early films such as The Murderers Are Among Us and will be revisited in later films 
such as Wolfgang Staudte’s remarkable Rosen für den Staatsanwalt or even Heimat. If its trope 
in the rhetoric of political arguments sheds light on the discursive manner by which public 
figures were allowed to remain in power despite their dubious and complicit activities in the past, 
the advertisement also provides a comfortable reassurance that the structures of power remain in 
place in familiar configurations at the same time. That is, the appearance of the ad functions as a 
form of arcane commemoration by which the fact that nothing has changed is registered, 
recognized and remembered. The act of commemorating a certain “Hagbard Celine,” in this 
sense, is achieved in the guise of a graffiti-like intervention on the newspaper page; while 
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nothing can be changed about the circumstances of his death, the ad’s composers have to console 
themselves with the futile and fleeting act of announcing a sentiment that echoes plus ça change, 
plus c’est la même chose once more as a brief but willful inscription into the quotidian pages of a 
newspaper. This might certainly not be significant enough to make note of, much like graffiti in 
general constitutes a kind of visual noise that need not be registered consciously, were it not for 
the form by which this fragment of information is conveyed. Moving from very specific 
circumstances that are only alluded to and ominously hinted at to the pronouncement of a larger 
category of truth, the ad serves as an inscription or memento, albeit one for which the 
emblematic image has yet to be supplied again, but which is already in place nonetheless within 
a public memory that is equipped to supplement the corresponding image. In its formal 
appearance as a marginal pronouncement, the advertisement commemorates the idea that a 
young martyr has been sacrificed by powers that operate through the means of a pervasive 
popular culture, and it hints at a revolutionary counterforce that has taken note of this 
phenomenon. Moreover, the fact that this revolutionary struggle has already found its first 
victims is commemorated through the martial rhetoric of the battlefield. More importantly, the 
advertisement constructs the hope of an audience. It aspires to find its readers who can 
understand the coded message and, presumably, take appropriate “action,” but there is no 
indication what this action could entail.  
This mechanism of supplementation functions as the obverse of the power relations that 
writing in film imposes. The fragmentary and ephemeral appearance of the advertisement, 
embedded within the magnitude and flow of information dissemination of a daily newspaper, 
does not guarantee a proper recipient, nor does the arcane information that is conveyed provide 
any clues as to how it must be decoded. Nonetheless, it affirms a mode of knowing that through 
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its cryptic form imposes a foreboding premonition, but through its appearance asserts the 
common dilemma of justice and retribution. The message thus stands as a fragment of paranoid 
knowledge rendered as common sense, namely that a nefarious power is located in local media 
and that ingenious rebels who challenge such power are sacrificed. Its cryptic nature appeals to a 
particular mode of philosophical thought by which common sense is affirmed, which Gilles 
Deleuze has postulated as a form of presupposition. In such an act of presupposition, an implicit 
postulate yields what Deleuze calls “a pre-philosophical and natural Image of thought, borrowed 
from the pure element of common sense,” by which thought is affirmed to have “an affinity with 
the true; it formally possesses the true and materially wants the true.”2 In its desire to offer a 
semblance of the truth, this postulate merely achieves a replication that subjects any mode of 
thinking to itself as a postulate, so that the condition of this thought becomes an assertion that 
“everybody knows and is presumed to know what it means to think.”3 The principle of this mode 
of thought is what Deleuze terms recognition. Recognition “provides a philosophical concept for 
the presupposition of a common sense” or, in other words, “it is the common sense become 
philosophical.”4
This is by no means a cause for celebration for Deleuze. Rather, such a mode of 
recognition stands as a “hindrance to philosophy,”5 or, even worse, as a sign of a “disturbing 
complacency,”6 because what it achieves is a mere repetition of an orthodoxy, where the “form 
of recognition has never sanctioned anything but the recognisable and the recognised; form will 
                                                 
2 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) p. 131. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 133. 
5 Ibid.,  p. 134. 
6 Ibid., p. 135. 
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never inspire anything but conformities.”7 In this respect, the cryptic message conveys but its 
own emphasis within this mode of recognition, while hinting at a force that is at least capable of 
recognizing the structures of power that are in place. But in its enactment it remains a futile 
gesture. It repeats the terror by which it is itself haunted by replicating a sense of alarm and 
urgency. Thus, in terms of Deleuze’s conformities, the form of the message remains welded to 
the very structures of power it purports to address. Yet, paradoxically, in this convergence lies a 
potential for a true philosophical explication or, in Deleuze’s words, it becomes an example of a 
“discordant harmony,” from which emerges “something which is communicated from one 
faculty to another, but is metamorphosed and does not form a common sense.”8 Rather than 
providing another instance in which recognition is the mode that affirms a common sense as 
conformity and which prevents the engendering of true thinking, this “something” works in 
opposition to a clarity of form and yields ideas that create a “para-sense which determines only 
the communication between disjointed faculties.”9
The value of this presence lies in the fact that it can account for a means to engender a 
kind of thinking whereby thought is not yet fixed as an image in conformity but rather a 
difficulty that allows for thinking outside of such a category as error, which would only be “the 
reverse of a rational orthodoxy, still testifying on behalf of that from which it is distanced.”10 
Instead, the work of thinking the difficulty of a thought without image offers a way out of the 
constraints of recognition and yields new directions of thinking, such as the one offered by 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 134. 
8 Ibid., p. 146. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., p. 148. 
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schizophrenia, for example, which, Deleuze takes pains to note, is “not only a human fact but 
also a possibility for thought.”11 Within these possibilities of difficulty in thinking, there is a 
“fortunate” side to this difficulty because difficulty “is not a de facto state of affairs but a de jure 
structure of thought.”12 This difficulty needs to be pursued in the service of a “new principle 
which does not allow itself to be represented,”13 that is, a thought without image. 
This also serves as the problem that the advertisement commemorating Hagbard Celine 
inevitably points to. In this respect, the advertisement provides an instance where Deleuze’s 
critique of recognition is applicable. The understanding of power that the advertisement 
professes does not seem to generate any new mode of thinking. Rather, it affirms an apparently 
commonsensical observation as paranoia. And yet, although the structure of the announcement 
appeals to a conformity in recognition, albeit a conformity that heralds its own subversive status 
in relation to power, its effect remains profoundly disturbing as it reverses one of the postulates 
which recognition normally yields, namely as the function of “modality” or of “solutions,” i.e. 
“problems being materially traced  from propositions, or, indeed, formally defined by the 
possibility of their being solved.”14 In fact, the opposite is the case, because, while the paranoid 
structure of thought offered here conforms to conventional registers of allegorical sacrifice, to 
biblical references, and to a conception of popular culture as an insidious force – which in and of 
themselves are very common images of thought – there is nonetheless no solution that this 
fragment of knowledge explicitly or implicitly provides. It remains suspended between any 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 147. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. 167. 
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potential modalities of resolution except for the premise of its very recognition as such. The act 
of recognition invoked in this particular piece of writing may fail to fulfill its pronounced goal of 
intervention in structures of power, but it can remain and stand as a merely differentiating force 
from the coherence on the pages of the newspaper. In doing so, it remains a futile gesture, but a 
gesture nonetheless.                              
The background for this embittered cry for emblematizing the sacrifice of “the greatest 
hacker of all times” involves a complicated tale of conspiracy theories, espionage, and 
unauthorized computer security breaches surrounding the figure of Karl Koch, a rebellious 
youngster who had died two years earlier to the day of the advertisement’s publication, on the 
twenty-third of May, 1989.15 His nom de guerre served as a reference to the character Hagbard 
Celine, taken from the 1975 occult science fiction opus The Illuminatus! Trilogy by Robert Shea 
and Robert Anton Wilson, an underground classic of which Timothy Lear reportedly has 
proclaimed that it was “more important than Ulysses or Finnegans Wake.”16 In this trilogy, 
Hagbard Celine is the name of a genius and rebel submarine commander who battles a global 
conspiracy by a cabal of illuminati to unleash nuclear World War III. Koch was fascinated by the 
book and had memorized large passages of it by heart and was able to recite them as if they were 
chapter and verse. As a minor cause célèbre, Koch made his name in the emerging underground 
computer hacking scene of West Germany in the 1980s, but for a while he caused panic and 
consternation among the authorities and in the West German media when his hacking skills were 
                                                 
15 As the film suggests, Karl Koch attributed great significance to the number 23 in a delusional state of apophenia, 
so the fact that the advertisement appeared on p. 22 acquires fictional or factual significances only if the proximity 
to the page number 23 indicates the possibility that its authors had requested that it be put on the subsequent page.  
16 Robert Shea and Robert Anton Wilson, The Illuminatus! Trilogy: The Eye in the Pyramid, The Golden Apple, and 
Leviathan (New York: MFJ Books, 1975), frontispiece. 
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tied to the KGB to whom he had solicited classified information obtained from the US 
Department of Defense and other highly sensitive computer systems. A confused and disturbed 
teenager, Karl Koch did not conform to the image of the sophisticated high-tech anarchist who 
moves through global network systems with stealth and determination. Instead, the German 
newsweekly Der Spiegel called him an “eternal loser” and stated that rather than being a skillful 
cyber-guerrilla, Koch was merely an “orphan from a broken home, a high-school dropout and 
drug-addled computer freak, who for the sake of his hobby … burned through his inheritance of 
100,000 Deutschmark within a year-and-a-half.”17
Nonetheless, Karl Koch managed to rise to considerable fame in hacker circles and was 
soon anointed to the “ranks of the hacker elites,” as Koch himself described it.18 He was 
especially revered by members of the so-called Chaos Computer Club or CCC, a network 
association of hackers and computer experts founded in Berlin in 1981, but active throughout 
Germany and in the region of Hamburg and Northern Germany in particular, whose stated 
mission was to offer “reconnaissance missions at the edge of invisibility” in the service of the 
“new human right to the free exchange of information.”19 Koch was born in 1965 and grew up in 
Hannover, a city in the north of West Germany close to the East-West German border. The city 
was almost completely destroyed during the war and so became a show case for the specific 
                                                 
17 “Alle großen Anarchisten starben am 23.,” Der Spiegel, 24 (June 12, 1989): 87 - 94. Such characterizations 
elicited a vehement defense by Koch’s computer allies and friends. For some interesting documentation in this 
regard, albeit some of it tinged with sophomoric pathos or melodramatic fervor or both, see for example the material 
offered on the following websites http://www.hagbard-celine.de/ and http://www.schaechl.de/kk/.  
18 Quoted in Hans-Christian Schmid and Michael Gutmann, 23: Die Geschichte des Hackers Karl Koch (Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999), p. 31. 
19 Ibid., p. 29. 
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brand of the West German architecture of reconstruction and city planning that favored wide 
thoroughfares and bland functional high-rises. His mother died of cancer when he was 11 and 
from early adolescence on, Karl Koch had continuous and vehement clashes with his father, an 
editor at a Hannover newspaper. Despite academic difficulties in school, he became very active 
in high school politics and student government and frequently traveled to other cities to 
participate in leftwing demonstrations and antigovernment political protests. During this time, he 
began to experiment with drugs and found his calling in computer hacking, an activity that 
appealed to his conspiratorial sensibility and active imagination fostered by the Illuminatus 
novels. 
While his hacking skills were celebrated in the circles of the Chaos Computer Club, Karl 
Koch became increasingly delusional and paranoid, to the point that he imagined to have caused 
the nuclear disaster in the Chernobyl power plant in 1986. He also spoke repeatedly of his 
awareness that he was ill, a state of mind which led him to state his intent to “get an atom bomb 
and blow himself up on the top of the World Trade Center.”20 Nonetheless, his circle of friends 
grew because he had inherited a large sum of money from his father who had died when Karl 
was nineteen. He was hospitalized in various mental institutions, but in spite of his incapacitating 
mental illness and increasingly dangerous drug use, he managed to attract the attentive interest of 
the Soviet embassy in East Berlin and provided them repeatedly with information obtained by his 
hacking activities before the German federal police intervened. When the sensational news of 
Koch’s criminal computer enterprises was made public, he was contacted by a number of 
journalists. Of these, one particular journalist, who worked for a youth program at the NDR 
public radio station, was later alleged to have bribed and hectored Koch to perform illegal hacks, 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 36. 
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so that he could then cover these for his radio programs. His notoriety and momentary fame did 
not prevent Koch from descending even deeper into his paranoid delusions. On May 23, 1989, a 
few months after he joined the Church of Latter Day Saints and having informed some of his 
acquaintances about his recent revelatory contacts with alien life forms, he drove to a secluded 
forest area where he set himself on fire. His body was only found a week later, burned beyond 
recognition. 
Hacking, writes McKenzie Wark, should not be misconstrued by reducing the activities 
of hackers to a “mere criminality” as the embodiment of the “new form of the juvenile 
delinquent, or nihilist vandal, or servant of organized crime,” or even merely to a “harmless 
subculture.”21 Instead, Wark understands “hacking” as the definitive mode of expression for the 
“information proletariat”22 that offers a revolutionary potential, because “to the hacker there is 
always a surplus of possibility expressed in what is actual, the surplus of the virtual,” so that 
hacking becomes the ability “to release the virtual into the actual, to express the difference of the 
real.”23 It is in this mode of production that “hacking” should be understood, because what it 
produces is not mere information as such. Rather, the “hacker class produces the possibility of 
production.”24 In this respect, Wark charts out a means to identify a revolutionary potential in the 
conditions of actuality without subjugating it to an instrumentalization through a power that 
Wark calls the “vectoralist class,” a class so defined “because they control the vectors along 
                                                 
21 McKenzie Wark, A Hacker Manifesto (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 32. 
22 Ibid., p. 23. 
23 Ibid., p. 32. 
24 Ibid., p. 33. 
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which information is abstracted.”25 These vectors define the fault lines of the struggle for 
information between creative expression and its appropriation as intellectual property.     
The advertisement that commemorates Hagbard Celine and the activities that he enjoyed 
pursuing might therefore be more productively classified as an attempt to intervene in this 
struggle through a mode of recognition and thereby create the conditions for a new production of 
meaning. In fact, the original obituary by Karl Koch’s friends, which also appeared in the taz, is 
even more pronounced in this regard. With the name Karl Koch followed by “hagbard” [sic] in 
parentheses,26 his sister Christine and “his friends” as the undersigned announce his death and 
state their “anger” about it by writing that they are “sure that Karl would still be alive had he not 
been driven to death by the protective forces of the state and the media.”27 While less dramatic in 
its announcement than the advertisement that followed two years later, the tone is equally 
indignant in its elegiac attempt to find a meaning in Koch’s death. The confluence of the 
“protective forces” of the state and the media as ultimately pursuing the same interests in a 
conflict that sacrifices young idealists as martyrs might originate from a more melodramatic 
imagination, but it is important to note that in melodrama the relation between the individual and 
the social order is encapsulated. Here, as well, this relation is articulated, but, while it fails to 
produce a new dimension of meaning, the obituaries can nonetheless indicate how their attempt 
to produce meaning must be interpreted. In other words, the enigmatic pronouncements that 
speak of the threat by the forces of the state and the forces of the media can be decoded, that is, a 
                                                 
25 Ibid., p. 11. 
26 The insistence on violating the German orthographic convention of capitalizing proper names and nouns was a 
typographical mark of the RAF, “the Red Army Faction” terrorist group, in their written statements and missives. 
27 Obituary in taz, reprinted in Hans-Christian Schmid and Michael Gutmann, 23, p. 137. 
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name can be attributed to the disc jockey who has betrayed “Hagbard” as the journalist who 
exploited his talents28 and the advertisement can serve to indicate a counterforce that remains in 
the shadows, but the information that is reproduced falls into a paranoid variety within the 
categories of recognition. 
The young TV and documentary director Hans-Christian Schmid had already worked on 
the subject matter of Karl Koch’s tragic circumstances when he graduated from the Munich Film 
Academy and returned to his drafts and treatments for the development of his second feature film 
after the highly successful intergenerational stoner comedy Nach Fünf im Urwald (1995). 
Together with his collaborator Michael Gutmann he scripted a screenplay that followed the 
circumstances of Koch’s life and death fairly meticulously and both were very concerned that the 
production design be historically accurate. Their insistence on this aspect of the film resulted in 
the use of documentary material in order to have the film reflect “images that were embedded in 
the collective consciousness” of the period.29 However, these images were then dramaturgically 
integrated into the subjective and mental “explanatory model of the world” that the character 
                                                 
28 Hans-Christian Schmid and Michael Gutmann, for example, refrain from naming the journalist and give him a 
pseudonym for their interviews with him. The journalist has stated in these interviews that for a while he annually 
received an envelope with some dirt and the words “this is ground from Karl’s grave. We hope that your guilty 
conscience will eat you up eventually.” Cf. Schmid and Gutmann, 23, p. 133. He suspects that the sender of the 
envelope and the advertisements are the work of Karl’s friends, but he has no proof. For such reasons, which also 
imply a misguided sense of continuing anger, the film fictionalizes most characters, with the exception of Karl 
Koch, into composites for “dramaturgical reasons.” With little effort online or in archival work, however, the name 
of the NDR journalist and the likely names of Karl’s friends responsible for the advertisement can be ascertained 
through the documentation of the original sources available or simply by informed conjecture. 
29 Ibid., p. 167. 
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Karl Koch employs.30 Moreover, the team of Schmid and Gutmann were fascinated by the 
possibility to create new markers of identification for the state of West Germany, since the 
narrative posed the difficulty of having to avoid the “clichés and the stories that take place in the 
elegant Munich or the high bourgeoisie of Hamburg.”31 Instead, because the politicized time of 
the early 1980s had not been frequently represented in the cinema, both Schmid and Gutmann 
found that in the locations of Hannover, which they saw as epitomizing the average sphere of life 
in the post-war era, the particular quality of  the “funk of ordinary West Germany” or, in 
German, the Mief, was actually discernible and even “palpable”32 on the screen. The film was 
well received both critically and popularly in Germany and was shown in North America at the 
Toronto International Film Festival in 1998 but has not been distributed in the U.S. to date.  
Sabine Hake has called 23 a film that is particularly noteworthy because of its ability to 
envision the nomadic constructions of cultural identity outside of and beyond entrenched 
categories by “[e]xtending … reflections on homelessness into the world of new information 
technologies.”33 In this assessment, she echoes McKenzie Wark’s understanding of the hacker 
culture as an extension of the information proletariat which challenges manifestations of the 
state. Wark builds on Giorgio Agamben’s notion that “the state can recognize any claim for 
identity … [b]ut what the state cannot tolerate in any way is that singularities form a community 
without claiming an identity, that human beings co-belong without a representable condition of 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p. 202. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Sabine Hake, German National Cinema (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 192.  
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belonging.”34 By making explicit the link to representation as the limitations of the state, Wark 
asserts that the hacker class enables its potential through abstractions and thus continuously 
eludes identification, because “it is not hackers who poison the waters, or enrich the plutonium, 
or genetically modify the crops, or inculcate the dangerous creeds, but it is hackers who hack 
these bright new possibilities into being.”35
The implications of this mode of creating new possibilities find a visual correspondence 
in the film 23, which thematizes both the dangers and the potential inherent in this form of labor 
while celebrating the difficulty of defining the “singularity” of the hacker Karl Koch in his 
struggle to battle his actual and imaginary foes. In fact, Agamben’s assessment of the topicality 
and “disquieting” prophetic power of Guy Debord’s works, the analyses of which “history seems 
to have committed itself to relentlessly confirm,”36 can be extended to the film as well, since it 
offers an example of Debord’s ninth maxim in The Society of the Spectacle that declares “[i]n a 
world that really has been turned on its head, truth is a moment of falsehood.”37 Agamben 
locates another possibility in the condition of the spectacle, namely the fact that “the spectacle 
still contains something like a positive possibility.”38 The basis of the ultimate condition through 
                                                 
34 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 87. 
35 McKenzie Wark, A Hacker Manifesto, p. 117. 
36 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End, p. 80. 
37 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1995), p. 14. 
(Emphasis in original.) A transcription of the book on the website www.marxists.org gives the entry, translated 
under the pseudonym “Black & Red,” as follows: “In a world which really is topsy-turvy, the true is a moment of 
the false.” Cf. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/debord/society.htm.   
38 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End, p. 83. 
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which the spectacle is experienced is, according to Agamben, now coming to its final conclusion 
in a “phase, in which language not only constitutes itself as an autonomous sphere, but also no 
longer reveals anything at all – or better yet, it reveals the nothingness of all things.”39 At this 
point, “language thus acquires, for the last time, the unspoken power to claim a historical age and 
a state for itself: the age of the spectacle, or the state of fully realized nihilism.”40 Hans-Christian 
Schmid’s film 23 begins with a credit sequence that provides a tangible visualization of this 
discursive alienation created by the experience of language in the age of the spectacle. While it 
demonstrates the randomness by which any truth can be crystallized and established around 
pieces and fragments of information, it also makes visible the mode by which such clusters of 
meaninglessness can be reärticulated in order to derive a sense of force. As the opening of the 
film makes clear, this force is at work and needs to be harnessed in order to expose both its 
destructive and creative potential. The labor process involved in doing so is analogous to what 
Wark establishes as the task and potential achievements of the hacker class.          
While credit sequences are generally not discussed in relation to the cinematic image, 
unless they are analyzed as a contribution to auteurist cinema such as the work of Saul Bass for 
Alfred Hitchcock’s films, the opening credit sequence of 23 demonstrates how vital the credit 
sequence can be in order to emblematize the ideas that will be introduced in the filmic images to 
come. Moreover, the credit sequence brings into relief some of the thematics in terms of a visual 
language that transcends the boundaries usually ascribed to the difference between image and 
text. 23 opens with a black background, onto which gradually, and at first randomly, small-print 
newspaper headlines are superimposed in white, taking their place at various positions within the 
                                                 
39 Ibid., p. 84. 
40 Ibid., pp. 84 – 85. 
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screen. After the production company’s logo of Clausen & Wöbke has disappeared, the headline 
“TWA flight 800: Bomb explodes in row 23” initiates the subsequent sequence of newspaper 
headline fragments. Then the following lines are interspersed and fade in onto the screen: “B 23 
is Germany’s deadliest road,” “genetic material on 23 chromosomes,” “code ‘23’ in Morse code 
means communications breakdown,” and “Karpov, Kasparov: check mate in the 23rd round.” 
Once the pattern of the reöccurrence of the number 23 is established, the next pieces of 
information appear almost simultaneously, blurring and superimposing themselves over the 
previous sentences. “Julius Caesar was felled by 23 knife stabs,” “Olof Palme murdered: the 
deadly shots occurred at 23:23 hours,” “230 injured at the Discotheque La Belle,” are announced 
and linger on in quick succession, until the director’s name appears in larger print when the final 
two headlines are added. “Giacomo [sic] Savonarola was executed on May 23, 1498”41 and “23. 
5. 1989: Richard von Weizsäcker reconfirmed in his post.” 
As the director’s name fades from the lines again, the headlines are repeated in such fast 
succession, once more interspersed with the number 23 flashing rapidly onto the screen, and are 
multiplied until an information overload sets in and the lines blur into the visual equivalent of 
white noise. From this grainy televisual white noise, however, a larger pattern becomes gradually 
discernible, as the pixelated white lettering increases in volume and clusters into the shape of the 
large number 23 that begins to fill the screen. An aural fragment gradually increases in volume, 
as we hear a female voice, which can be identified by audience members versed in German 
political minutiae as that of Rita Süssmuth, who in her function as president of the West-German 
parliament, addresses someone and asks whether the nomination will be accepted. With this the 
                                                 
41 Correct is Girolamo Savonarola (1452 – 1498), the influential heretic who urged repentance and rejected the rule 
of the Medici, who was tortured, hanged and burned, in this successive order, by the citizens of Florence. 
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screen dissolves into a television screen on which Richard von Weizsäcker accepts his 
reconfirmation for a second term as President of Germany. 
This amazingly complex credit sequence bombards the viewer with a multitude of 
information that can barely be processed in time until the television news coverage of 
Weizsäcker’s reëlection continues the credit sequence with actual images rather than the 
abstracted representation of numbers and letters. In its intensity, the sequence offers a 
compendium of important and marginal knowledge that weaves together political fragments that 
may at some time have had an urgency as quotidian media events, such as the crash of flight 
TWA 800 from New York to Paris off the coast of Long Island. This catastrophe occurred at a 
time when airline crashes were still considered highly anomalous and were not readily available 
for the public imagination as potential disasters. Almost immediately after it happened the crash 
ignited competing models of explanation, with some credible sources stating, contrary to the 
official explanation of a fuel tank malfunction, that the commercial aircraft had been shot down 
accidentally by a US Navy missile. While this piece of information is included for its numerical 
value of the number of victims, other fragments relate to the circumstances of the times during 
which the film takes place, such as the bombing of the Berlin nightclub Discotheque La Belle, a 
place popular with American soldiers stationed in the American sector of Berlin. At the time, the 
La Belle bomb attack was rumored to have been carried out by Libyan agents smuggled in 
through East Berlin, a speculation that was later confirmed as accurate. 
The two most portentous fragments of information, however, relate to the date of May 
23, or 23. 5. in the German notation, in such a way that they are imbued to carry a semblance of 
significance. Five centuries are spanned between the execution of Girolamo Savonarola and the 
beginning of Richard von Weizsäcker’s second term as German President, both of which 
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occurred on May 23, and which are therefore asserted to carry significance. Von Weizsäcker was 
certainly a well-respected conservative politician, who, in his figure-head function that the 
German Presidency connotes, will chiefly be remembered for introducing a nuanced discourse 
and level-headed approach to the subject of how Germany should understand the end of World 
War II as a day of liberation and not a day of defeat. Here, however, he is equated in historical 
terms with the theocratic prophecies of Savonarola. Savonarola is an important figure in the 
history of the Renaissance because he attempted to introduce a return to fundamental Biblical 
values in an increasingly secularized Florence by imposing the “bonfire of the vanities,” in 
which “idle” and secular art objects were destroyed, before he himself was excommunicated and 
executed.42 His inclusion among Libyan secret agents and Berlin nightclubs, a post-war German 
presidency, and chess masters, suggests a secret history, a history which can only be discerned 
by a paranoid imagination, that is, within an apophenic pattern recognition of the white noise of 
information overload. 
The patterns that are created here establish a false history in which disparate elements are 
fused together to form a “secret” configuration. At the beginning of the film it is the film viewer 
who is posited to recognize this pattern in a reverse movement, whereby the individual strands of 
information and knowledge stand on their own until they form the larger cluster of the number 
and can no longer be discerned as discrete, only as an accumulation of visual noise. Inasmuch as 
credit sequences are taken to introduce the thematics or tone of a film, here, too, the sequence 
                                                 
42  We can assume that in a film which has obviously taken great pains in its production design to recreate the time 
and place of its settings as accurately as possible, the assignation of the first name of Savonarola as “Giacomo” 
instead of “Girolamo” is an unfortunate and erroneous misidentification, but this occurrence nonetheless befits the 
film’s larger emphasis on fragments of information and elements of truth rather than veracity itself.  
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serves a pedagogical function in order to alert the viewer to the mode of imagination necessary 
for the understanding of the film to come. The credit sequence thus initiates a sense of counter-
history, one which could productively be called a myth-creation. Here Carlo Ginzburg in his 
discussion on the history of the term “myth” as a discursive category offers some useful insights. 
In tracing the changing definitions of myths, Ginzburg demonstrates that the Aristotelian 
interpretations of Boethius engender an understanding of myth that opens up a “hitherto 
uncharted terrain … for exploration,”43 namely the creation of a fictitious space in which a new 
realm of fiction is established. In this realm, a category is constructed as a “construction that, 
within a well-defined sphere, made operative a nonexistent reality,”44 much in the same sense 
that poetry “constitutes a reality that is true to all intents and purposes, but not true in the literal 
sense.”45       
As Ginzburg traces the functions of myth, he determines that it operates on the 
oppositional premise “that the majority of mankind, in thrall to passion and ignorance, can be 
held in bounds only thanks to religion or to the myths introduced by the wise minority.”46 This 
dialectic between the majority or the masses and a leading minority that controls them through 
the exertion of myth as a power function Ginzburg locates specifically in the example given by 
Machiavelli, in which he observes that the Florentine citizenship, despite its urbane 
sophistication, falls prey to the persuasive powers of Savonarola.47 Savonarola’s 
                                                 
43 Carlo Ginzburg, “Myth: Distance and Deceit,” in Wooden Eyes: Nine Reflections on Distance, trans. Martin Ryle 
and Kate Soper (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 34. 
44 Ibid., p. 35. 
45 Ibid., p. 36. 
46 Ibid., p. 44. 
47 Cf. Ibid., p. 45. 
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fundamentalism, in other words, is the necessary mode by which the masses can be controlled 
through the generation of myths. It is therefore all the more significant that the figure of 
Savonarola be invoked in the credit sequence of 23 in conjunction with the figure of the West 
German president. A curious dynamic is introduced here, whereby the invocation of 
Savonarola’s execution date and von Weizsäcker’s second inauguration, both hints at and 
obscures a mythical history. The problem, however, is not that myths provide a sense of false 
consciousness or that they stand in opposition to an official history. Rather, Ginzburg proves that 
issues of power distribution are related to the question of how myths are established and that 
these are not necessarily hidden. For this Ginzburg includes an extended passage from 
Benjamin’s Passagen-Werk,48 in which Benjamin records a June 1936 article by Jean de 
Lignières that states that “a shrewd observer remarked, one day, that fascist Italy was run like a 
large newspaper … with an adroit and insistent orientation of the reader toward certain 
inordinately enlarged aspects of social life.”49 Moreover, the result of this state of affairs is that 
fascism is not defined by secrecy but in fact by the way in which information is regulated or, in 
other words, “that fascist regimes are publicity regimes.”50
                                                 
48 Cf. Ibid., p. 58. 
49 Ginzburg offers his own translation from Benjamin’s Gesammelte Schriften, edited by Rolf Tiedemann. The 
passage above is taken from Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press), 2002, p. 768.   
50 Ibid. Indeed, the real powers of fascism move inscriptions into the realm of the real, as the mark of the Judenstern 
and the “bonfire of the books” demonstrated. These inscriptions are by now dispersed but still legible on our 
television screens as “crawl.” And there may not be as much of a distance as we would like to imagine between the 
signs that proclaim “Arbeit macht frei” at the gates of the concentration camp Theresienstadt and “Honor bound to 
defend freedom,” the motto of the JTF-GITMO in Guantánamo Bay.   
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This understanding of information and its distribution as a contested political dimension 
is what both McKenzie Wark and Hans-Christian Schmid emphasize. The exertion of power by 
the state is not carried out in secret, although significant aspects of its power might be made 
invisible, but it is rather spelled out in the open. The disturbing dimension of 23 lies not in the 
fact that Karl Koch became delusional to the point that he fantasized his own persecution, but 
rather that there were no other imaginary means of solution available to him except for the 
recognition of his suffering as a victim of the forces of the state, in lieu of any other resolutions. 
The hacker in this film thus becomes another allegory for suffering. He imagines the modes of 
resistance in relation to the state until his sacrifice becomes “Christlike” in a state of victimhood. 
In Koch’s case, at least, this desire found its completion by his few disciples, who make their 
presence known in the marginal advertisement on a newspaper page in a vain gesture of 
resistance.51
Gilles Deleuze takes seriously the strands of “false movements” in the New German 
Cinema by explicitly invoking the title of Wim Wenders’ Falsche Bewegung (1975) in this 
respect. He notes that there is a “constantly variable link”52 in the post-war German cinema 
which oscillates in an “oppressive, useless, and unsummonable time”53 through the movements 
that depict, “from one pole to the other, the powers of the false which weave a narration.”54 The 
                                                 
51 Now relegated to the internet, of course, where there are a number of sites dedicated to Koch. In addition, there 
are many sites that pursue Koch’s apophenia, or recognition of meaningful patterns in random data, in the 
numerology of the number 23, which gives the film its title.  
52 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 136. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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text that is “woven” here by the movement of the shuttle is a machinic text that inscribes its own 
repetition. The final images, then, of 23 depict Karl Koch’s face behind the windshield of a car, 
in which the movement of sunlight is mirrored and refracted, driving down a country road 
towards his demise, as the camera pulls out into the skies above in an extreme long shot and 
leaves the car to its movement below. Deleuze would certainly have noted the image repetition 
here as a false movement through which the film replicates and bounces back to the other pole, 
the first images of Volker Schlöndorff’s film Circle of Deceit (1981, Die Fälschung), which 
depict a man, “caught in a chain of forgers, blankly watching the movement of a windscreen 
wiper.”55
Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s 1979 grotesque film on the triangulated conjunction of 
terrorism, capitalism, and the media, The Third Generation, derives its impulse from a more 
immediate urgency of disentangling the network in which the relations of power are inscribed 
and replicated. The title, he states, indicates a generation of terrorists that differentiates itself 
from its earlier manifestations by the fact that they are no longer motivated by ideals or ideology 
or the fact that they are willing to defend and rationalize these motives so thoroughly that they 
become criminalized, but rather by a self-serving and pointless perpetuation of violence. 
However, Fassbinder also insists that equally one could name as the “third generation” those 
who upheld the consistency of the “German bourgeoisie” from 1848 to 1933, as well as the way 
in which “our grandfathers… experienced the Third Reich” and “our fathers” who squandered 
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away an “opportunity after the war to set up a state that could have been more humane and free 
than any had ever been before.”56          
Fassbinder called the impetus for his film a “simple” one, because, as he says, it has “one 
starting point in the imagination: that is, that in the last analysis terrorism is an idea generated by 
capitalism to justify better defense measures to safeguard capitalism.”57 The film constructs a 
continuous barrage of writing, sound, noise, and competing channels of media to replicate a form 
of terrorist assault that is created by the media, since, as Fassbinder explained, that “it’s the 
media, which constantly hammer away at people, who in the meantime have become so hooked 
and helpless that by now they can’t even manage to push a button to get some peace and quiet.”58 
Fassbinder discusses the theme of the film under the category of the relation between reality and 
the media, whom he accuses of “sloppy thinking habits.”59 His film attempts to counter these 
thinking habits by a specific intervention into the triangulated configurations of power in an 
appeal to the civic and civil duty of the viewer as a way for the individual citizen to formulate 
concrete political perspectives on the basis of the exposure to his film.  
                                                 
56 Rainer Werner Fassbinder, “The Third Generation” in The Anarchy of the Imagination. Interviews. Essays. Notes, 
ed. Michael Töteberg and Leo A. Lensing, trans. Krishna R. Winston (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1992), p. 131. 
57 “‘[T]his is the only way we can do films here: by making them without worrying about losing money’: A 
Conversation with Wolfram Schütte about The Third Generation, Cinematic Politics, and a Strategy against 
Resignation,” in Rainer Werner Fassbinder. The Anarchy of the Imagination. p. 37. 
58 Ibid., p. 127. 
59 Rainer Werner Fassbinder. “The Third Generation” in The Anarchy of the Imagination., p. 129. 
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Moreover, the challenge to the legitimacy of state through a senseless terrorism, or as 
Fassbinder calls it, “adventures experienced in a sort of intoxication for their own sake,”60 
becomes such a futile gesture of self-assertion, which then allows the state to disperse any of its 
negating force into a mediated diversion for the benefit of its own consolidation. This inevitable 
mechanism, in fact, Fassbinder asserts angrily, “poses so little risk, even in the negative sense of 
being comprehensible,”61 that one cannot but wonder whether the state did not itself engineer the 
threat of terrorism. “Why not?” asks Fassbinder grimly and enumerates other notorious instances 
of pretext such as the burning of the Reichstag, the Gleiwitz radio transmitter incident that 
precipitated the invasion of Poland, and the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.62 For 
Fassbinder this means that the contradictions become apparent in the West German model of 
democracy because of its reliance on authoritarian modes that serve as a continuation of 
disciplinary coercion from the Wilhelminian Obrigkeitsstaat onward. That is, the very mode in 
which the state exerts its power through the acceptance and consolidation of the legitimacy of its 
power continues to function in turn as a replication of a blind obedience which tolerates no 
dissent or challenges to structures of authority already in place. This mode is still in place where 
democracy is a system of government imposed onto the citizens of West Germany. 
The film follows a band of bored terrorists, whose existence as a force is engineered and 
supported by the industrialist P.J. Lurz, played by Eddie Constantine. Lurz is interested in a 
continuous state of emergency, since this state of emergency predicates his business of computer 
surveillance and security equipment. For Timothy Corrigan, the film exemplifies the “spectacle 
                                                 
60 Ibid. p. 132. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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of narcissistic violations of… public space”63 in order to demonstrate that the basis for these 
violations is the “democratic law of the state where the public spectacle of individual choice and 
freedom is built on and maintained by private violence, power, and greed.”64 Ultimately, Lurz 
becomes himself the kidnapping victim of the terrorists and gamely assists them in their efforts 
to record the image of his face on a video camera. As he keeps reciting the lines they have given 
him, the terrorists attempt to inscribe the words “in the name of the people” in chalk as graffiti 
onto the wall behind his face. 
Throughout the film, abject political and sexual graffiti inscriptions, taken from various 
actual locations of public lavatories in Berlin, are replicated as titles on the screen and provide 
the film with a semblance of structure. The opening titles, typed in machine-like succession over 
the images, declare that the film is “a comedy in six parts about the parlor games of cruelty and 
madness, similar to fairy tales told to children to help them bear their lives unto death.” 
Following this preface is the written announcement that the film is “dedicated to a true lover 
[wahren Liebenden], hence probably to no one.” Apparently, this was a “result of a misreading in 
the cutting room of ‘lover’ for ‘liberal.’”65 In this misrecognition between the public and the 
                                                 
63 Timothy Corrigan, A Cinema Without Walls: Movies and Culture After Vietnam (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1991), p. 213. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Cf. Jan Dawson, “The Sacred Terror: Shadows of Terrorism in the New German Cinema,” Sight and Sound 48, 
no. 4 (autumn 1979): p. 245. The dedication reads on the screen: “gewidmet einem wahren Liebenden als [sic] 
keinem wahrscheinlich?” Another error, this one typographical with “als” for “also,” makes this dedication even 
more complicated. The error exemplifies a subjunctive dimension, “dedicated to a true lover as probably no one,” 
but its original intention is to articulate as a question an address of political subjectivity: “Dedicated to a true liberal, 
thus probably no one?” This is followed by a public statement of the Social Democratic chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
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private, addressed to everyone who views the screen, but spoken to someone who “probably” 
does not exist, a writing opens up that at this point can only be read by someone in the febrile 
grip of “archive fever,” as Jacques Derrida calls it.66 As Derrida reminds us, this fictional figure 
suffering from “archive fever”67 has “exhausted the science of archaeology” for a reconstruction 
of the past.68 He has exhausted his skills of mastery in “the art of deciphering the most 
indecipherable, the most enigmatic graffiti”69 in his searches for the traces on the walls in the 
ruins of Pompeii and he is no longer driven by a lifeless scientific “desire to decipher.”70 Derrida 
emphasizes “the literal sense” of the imprint conveyed in this desire, namely the dream of 
“reliving” the steps and traces of others. This position is an “irreplaceable place,”71 and so 
Derrida leaves us with the impossible in the moment of the trace. The figure finds himself, in the 
dream-like, singular condition “of the printer-printed, of the impression and the imprint, of the 
pressure and its trace in the unique instant where they are not yet distinguished the one from the 
other.”72
                                                                                                                                                             
who expresses his gratitude in retrospect to the German legal scholars for their willingness to refrain from 
challenging his actions against terrorism on a juridical or constitutional basis.     
66 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996). 
67 Ibid., p. 98. The figure is Norbert Hanold from Wilhelm Jensen’s 1903 novella Gradiva: A Pompeiian Fancy.   
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., p. 99. 
72 Ibid. (Emphasis in the original.) 
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